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The concept of local self-government is not new to India; it dates back to Chola period. 
The British rule eclipsed this system, however, the Imperial Government later on realized 
the necessity of local self-government in India and initiated many measures to create 
local bodies under various enactments. Though several committees and commissions 
were appointed earlier to examine the financial requirements of Urban Local Bodies and 
Panchayati Raj Institutions, yet they were ad hoc in character and they did not enjoy any 
Constitutional status. Nevertheless, several committees and commissions strongly 
suggested that the chronic problem of local finance could be solved only through having 
any scientific method of devolution of power and resources. 
In this direction, the landmark political empowerment to the grassroots was through the 
passage of the 73"^  and 74'" Constitutional Amendments in the Constitution of India by 
the Parliament of India in 1992, made effective on April 24,1993. Subsequently, 
conformity legislation was passed in the States too. It not only provided a Constitutional 
status to the local bodies but also laid down, without ambiguity, that legislature could by 
law endow them with such powers and authority that might be necessary to enable them 
to function as institutions of self-government. Therefore, it was a landmark year in the 
State-Local relations in India. Even though issue of self governance has been stated 
clearly by the Directive Principles of State Policy, it is only after these Amendment Acts, 
the panchayats and the municipal bodies were provided with wide ranging provisions to 
transform these local bodies into strong and viable units of "self-government". 
One of the salient features of these Amendments was the appointment of a State 
Finance Commission (SFC) in all the States within one year from the commencement of 
these Acts, thereafter, for every fifth year. The basic function of the State Finance 
Commissions is to devise a system of distribution of the government revenues to the 
local bodies; define their power of taxation and responsibilities for improving the local 
finances and delivery of civic services. 
The institution of local bodies in India failed to acquire the status and dignity of viable 
units of local self-government and a responsive people's body. Over the years there has 
been a growing realization that local bodies have failed to provide adequate services 
primarily on account of the woefully insufficient resources at their command. Fiscal 
transfers from the State, which constitute an extremely important part of the municipal 
revenues, depended more on an ad hoc system of grants-in-aid rather than being a 
predetermined share in taxes based on well-defined criteria. No set principles were laid 
down in matters relating to quantum of grants to the States and the share thereof, which 
was required to be passed on by them to the local bodies. This gapping omission in the 
Constitution has been corrected with the adoption of these twin Amendments to the 
Constitution, which have inserted two parts-IX & IX-A dealing respectively with the 
panchayats and the municipalities. The enactment also provides that "the legislature of 
the State may by law provide for the composition of the Commission, the qualifications 
which shall be requisite for appointment as member thereof, and the manner in which 
they shall be selected" and further, "the Commission shall have such powers in the 
performance of their functions and the Legislature of the State may, by law confer on 
them." 
The second chapter deals with the theories of fiscal federalism given by eminent 
economists like Stigler and Gates and an attempt has been made for theoretical 
foundations, on which basis State-Local fiscal relation should be developed. 
Fiscal federalism revolves around the two questions, (i) Which level of government 
provides which functions, so as to avoid potential incompatibilities and destructive 
competitions among the government and achieve a social welfare maximum? (ii) How 
much people sort themselves among the various jurisdiction again with the goal of 
avoiding incompatibilities and intergovernmental competitions and achieving a social 
welfare maximum? 
Stigler gave two principles of local governance and concluded that decision-making 
should occur at the lowest level of government consistent with the goals of allocational 
efficiency and distributional equity. To achieve an optimal federalist system, various 
legitimate functions of government are best distributed among the governments within 
the fiscal hierarchy. The national government Is the proper government for resolving the 
distributional question in order to avoid inconsistencies and competition among 
governments. Gates solidified Stigler's principle by suggesting that the optimal form of 
federal government In which each level of government, possessing complete knowledge 
of the tastes of its constituents and seeking to maximize their welfare, would provide the 
Pereto-efflcient level of output and would finance this through benefit pricing. 
Those functions that supply public services to meet the varying tastes and preferences 
of citizens should necessarily go to the lower-tevel governments. Those functions which 
are not involved in such variations in requirements and preferences and which enjoy 
economies of scale should go to the higher level (national/state) of government. 
Whereas in practice such clear-cut demarcation Is not possible and It results In spatial 
spillover of benefits and costs. The national government In such case should try to 
internalize them by providing financial assistance to local self-governments. This is the 
economic justification for grants from higher-level governments to lower level 
governments. The resources of revenue, those whose base is spatially mobile, should 
necessarily go to the national government and those, which are immobile, should go to 
the local governments. Benefit levies are more efficient when they are administered at 
local level, as it is easier to assess the benefits and costs. The sources, which involve 
redistrlbutive role, should go to the national government on efficiency ground. 
The third chapter highlights the three-tier structure of local government in the sample 
States, i.e., Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and NCT of Delhi and their legislative framework. 
An attempt has also been made to draw up a comparative picture concerning what 
Constitutional status is given to local governments in 73'" and 74"" Amendment of the 
Constitution. Local governments are democratically elected bodies whose jurisdiction is 
of local level, backed by powers to levy local taxes and to exercise their functions. 
However, they vary substantially both geographically and demographically. Bailey (1999) 
suggests some economic principles for local government's size and structure: 
(i) Local government should be as small as possible without forgoing the 
potential efficiency gains of economies of scale. 
(ii) The jurisdictional areas of local governments should, as far as practically 
possible, be conterminous with the areas benefiting from their provision of 
services, 
(iii) These benefit areas should also match financing area so as to prevent tax 
exporting, 
(iv) Matching of financing and benefit areas may require regional (rather than 
local) government for the provision of some services, 
(v) Benefit areas will have to be periodically reconfigured as services 
technologies and transport infrastructures change over time. 
There are various types of local bodies and still more diversified and their groups. In the 
present study, a bird's eye view of the nature and legal structural features of these 
different types of governments in different States is provided. But the focus is mainly on 
the sample States, i.e. Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and NCT of Delhi. 
Tamil Nadu State government is bifurcated into Urban Local Bodies and Panchayati Raj 
Institutions. Urban local bodies are again trifurcated into Municipal Corporation, 
Municipalities and Town Panchayats. These bodies are horizontal local bodies and not 
controlled by any other local bodies and are independent and directly controlled by the 
State government only. The PRIs are also trifurcated into three-tiers of governments 
which are vertical in nature, village panchayat (at the grass root level), panchayat union 
council (at the intermediate/block level) and District panchayat (at Commissionery / 
District level). 
The structure of Uttar Pradesh seems almost similar to Tamil Nadu except the difference is 
of nomenclature. State government of Uttar Pradesh is bifurcated into urban local bodies and 
Panchayati Raj Institutions. ULBs are trifurcated into three horizontal bodies i.e., Nagar 
Nigam, Nagar Palika Parishad and Nagar Panchayat. These bodies are independent and 
directly controlled by the State Government. The Panchayati Raj Institutions have vertical 
three-tiers of rural governments i.e.. Gram Panchayat at the grass root level, Kshetra 
Panchayat at block level and Zila Parishad at the District level. Out of the total population in 
Uttar Pradesh, PRIs covers 80 per cent and ULBs 20 per cenL 
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Delhi, being a quasi-state government, having different structure of local bodies, its urban 
local bodies are divided into three horizontal local bodies viz. Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
(MCD), New Delhi Municipal Council (NDMC) and Delhi Cantonment Board (DCB). Among 
all the local bodies in the NCT of Delhi, only MCD conforms to the norms of the local self-
government. It is a unique municipal body in the sense that the rural local bodies come under 
its jurisdiction. Panchayati Raj in Delhi consist of two statutory institutions and a non-
statutory body, namely the gaon sabha and the gaon panchayat, which are the 
democratic institutions at the grassroots level, the circle panchayats, which perform 
primarily judicial functions and the panchayat samiti as an advisory body at the block 
level. 
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When the structure of rural and urban local bodies in Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and 
NCT of Delhi is compared, the structure of Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh seems almost 
similar except the difference in nomenclature. Delhi, on the contrary, being a quasi-state 
government, (formerly an union territory) does have different structure for local bodies. In 
Tamil Nadu and Uttar Pradesh, there are three horizontal urban local bodies and three 
vertical rural local bodies. 
At the rural grass root level, Tamil Nadu has Village Panchayat and Uttar Pradesh has 
Gaon Panchayat, constituted for 5 years. Village Panchayat can be constituted in Tamil 
Nadu with minimum population of 500 or more. Whereas the minimum limit is 1,000 in 
case of Goan Panchayat of Uttar Pradesh. Village Panchayat (Tamil Nadu) is headed 
by the President and Pradhan in Uttar Pradesh and NCT of Delhi. Village Panchayats in 
Tamil Nadu have 5-15 members whereas 9-15 in Uttar Pradesh depending upon the 
population and these members are chosen by direct election. 
Intermediate level of panchayat have different nomenclature, in Tamil Nadu it is known 
as Panchayat Union Council, whereas in Uttar Pradesh it is called Kshetra Panchayat 
and in case of Delhi it is known as Panchayat Samiti. Panchayat Samiti of Delhi is a non-
statutory local body that acts as an advisory body. Panchayat Union Councils are 
headed by Chairman and Kshetra Panchayat by Pradhan. Town Panchayat in Tamil 
Nadu and Nagar Panchayat in Uttar Pradesh are in a transition stage of being converted 
into Urban Local Bodies from Village Panchayat, having a population limit of minimum 
5,000 and 75 per cent of the male population are engaged in non-agriculture activities, 
and 30,000 to 1 lakhs in Uttar Pradesh. Town Panchayat (Tamil Nadu) consists of 2 
persons (25 years of age or more) nominated by State Government along with IVIP's, 
MLA's and MLCs of State. Whereas Nagar Panchayat (Uttar Pradesh) consists of 10-24 
members and ex-officio members, MP's and MLA's representing constituencies and 2-3 
MLCs. 
In Tamil Nadu, a jurisdiction having minimum population 20,000 and 75 per cent of male 
members engaged in non-agricultural activities qualify to be a municipality. In case of 
Uttar Pradesh, minimum population varies between 1-5 lakhs. Municipalities of Tamil 
Nadu consist of a Chairman and 20-25 Councilors out of which one Councilor is the Vice 
Chairman and two members nominated by ttie State government. The municipality of 
Uttar Pradesh consists of the Chairperson and 25-55 elected, ex-officio members 
comprising all the MPs and MLAs representing constituencies, 3-5 MLCs nominated by 
the State. NDMC consists of a Chairperson nominated by the Central Government, 3 
MLAs of Delhi, 5 members nominated by Central Government, 2 members nominated by 
Central Government in consultation with the Chief Minister of Delhi and 2 MPs. 
Municipal Corporation of Chennai consists of 155 elected Councilor, 10 members 
nominated by the State Government. Municipal Corporations of Uttar Pradesh consists 
of Nagar Pramukh and Sabhasads whose number varies between 60-110, MP's and 
MLA's of that area and the State Government nominates 5-10 members. The Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi consists of 10 persons nominated by the Administrator, all the MP's 
and the MLA's of MCD and 1/5* MLA's of the NCT of Delhi nominated by the speaker of 
that Legislative Assembly. 
The fourth chapter throws light on principles of assignment of functions of local bodies 
and a comparative approach between the XI and XII Schedules with the Panchayati Raj 
Institutions and Urban Local Bodies of the sample States. Under the decentralized 
governance system, each level of government namely Central, State and Local are 
supposed to shoulder respective responsibilities of providing public goods to the society. 
Under the Constitution of India while List I enlists the functions to perform by the Central 
Government and State Government, Lists II provides a mixed category of services, 
which may be discharged by the Central and State combined and for the third tier level 
government the Constitution has provided Schedule XI and XII for rural and urban local 
bodies. These are indicative lists of functions only. The respective State Governments 
may assign one or all and also in addition to list, other functions also to any level of 
government through legislature decisions. 
In terms of the theory of fiscal federalism, functions whose benefits are largely confined 
to geographical area and which are subject to heterogeneous preferences are suitable 
for the municipalities. These are the "essential municipal" functions. Services with large 
spill over effects, distributional and stabilization attributes and providing uniform benefits 
need to be entrusted to the higher levels of the government. Similarly, functions that 
involves substantial economies of scale or are of national interest may not be assigned 
to small local bodies. For valid reasons certain function of higher authorities are 
appropriate for entrustment to the municipalities, as if under principal-agents contracts. 
These are 'agency' functions that need to be financed by intergovernmental revenues. 
In conformity with the TS^ '' and 74* Amendment, ail the States have amended their 
respective Panchayati Raj Acts and Municipal Acts called Conformity Acts. They enlisted 
the functions assigned to the different levels of their respective Panchayati Raj 
Institutions and Urban Local Bodies. In the present study the functions assigned to 
different levels of Panchayati Raj Institutions and Urban Local Bodies across the country 
has been discussed and it can be concluded that there are certain differences in the 
adoption of the functions assigned by the XI and XII Schedule of the Constitution. 
It may be argued that in Tamil Nadu among ULBs of various nature the non-uniformity in 
adopting XII Schedule in on the functions of maintenance of roads and bridges, water 
supply, public health, vital statistics, regulation of slaughter houses, public and private 
drainage, plantation of trees and provision of public bathing. In case of Uttar Pradesh, it 
is on the function of Planning of Social & Economic development, fire services, poverty 
alleviation programme, vital statistics, plantation of trees, public bathing and provision of 
rest houses. In case of NCT of Delhi, both the Urban Local Bodies have adopted all the 
functions to perform. The function which are performed by all the local government in 
these three States are public amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops, 
public conveniences and public and private latrines. It means upkeeping of the city has 
been recognized as the sole function to be performed by them. 
In case of Panchayati Raj Institutions the assignment of functions among VPs, 
Panchayat Samiti and District Board are of different nature in all the States. The basic 
unit of Panchayati Raj Institutions remain village level of local body. Therefore it would 
be interesting to see that the common functions are minor irrigation, water management, 
maintenance of roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and means of 
communication, libraries & cultural activities, health and sanitation. Relief work and 
promotion of tourism has not been taken up by any Panchayati Raj Institutions. Among 
all the three States the indicative list under XI Schedule on paper has been adopted to 
the maximum extent by the Uttar Pradesh. 
The fifth chapter has been devoted to various theories of local taxation given by 
Musgrave, Gates, Foster and Pelmen, etc on principles of taxation in federal system and 
own resources generated by different local bodies. An attempt has been made to study 
the suggestions made by the State Finance Commissions for enhancing these 
resources. 
For smooth functioning of local bodies they are assigned certain powers to raise 
resources at their own and it being in addition to what subvention they receive from 
higher-level governments. In this respect, appropriate expenditure, tax assignment and 
other revenue sharing powers for each tier of government is a crucial component. 
The Constitution provides in the 7* Schedule, three lists, namely, a Union List, a State 
List and a Concurrent List. Out of the State List, the legislature of a State is expected by 
law, to endow the panchayats and municipalities, with such powers and authority, as it 
may consider necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government 
and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers upon panchayats and 
municipalities. 
The principles to devolve taxation powers to local body should envisage the taxes over 
which the local governments should have full control in terms of determination of the tax 
rate, assessment, collection and appropriation of the proceeds. It should depend on the 
sustainability to meet the civic obligations, since the local governments provide many 
essential services. Their tax resources should be such that ensure the smooth discharge 
of local functions. 
After going through all the taxes imposed by different local bodies in the sample States, 
it may be observed that there are certain differences in imposing of various taxes and 
non-taxes. The taxes imposed by Urban Local Bodies of Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and 
NCT of Delhi are not uniform, the only tax which is common is professional, trade & 
calling and employment tax. Whereas Property tax is the main source of revenue for all 
the Urban Local Bodies except Town Panchayat of Tamil Nadu in lieu of Property Tax it 
imposed House Tax. 
10 
In the sixth chapter, the intergovernmental fiscal transfers, theory of intergovernmental 
grants, and revenue sharing given by Oates and Bradford have been discussed. 
Structure and types of grants given to local bodies, principles recommended by the 
Taxation Enquiry Commission and State-wise pattern of revenue sharing and receiving 
of grants have also been discussed. 
The statistical information covered in the chapter shows that these resources are not 
sufficient to meet expenditure needs of these local bodies. Therefore they have 
depended on inter-governmental fiscal transfers from their parent States. These 
transfers to bridge this gap, comes in the form of revenue sharing, statutory grants and 
also non-statutory grants. Apart from certain grants in certain cases, the ratio of total 
transfers in total revenue receipts provides a measure of dependency of these local 
bodies on their parent government. 
In the seventh chapter a comparative analysis of recommendations made by the State 
Finance Commission's of the sample States, has been made. The SFCs were 
constituted in different States under different set of circumstances. The prevalent 
conditions of State-Local fiscal relations were different but the constitutional mandate 
required that in future these relations should become as per the provisions of the 73'^ ^ 
and 74* Amendment to the Constitution. In retrospection it may be observed that the 
three different reports of the Commissions are based on three different settings in terms 
of geographical location, political scenario, different stages of development of State local 
relation and empowerment of local bodies. Therefore the recommendations also have 
different hues and colours on various aspects of local government and fiscal position. 
The uniformity among all these reports are in terms of such subjects as setting up of 
finance cell at State level, need for the reform in property tax, etc. 
The report recommends on Global Sharing of revenues, Grants-in-aid, Reform in 
resource raising. Constitution of nucleus cell. Improvement of services, Maintenance of 
accounts, etc. 
The eighth chapter contains the main findings regarding the study and suggestions 
emanating from the study. 
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On going through the terms of references, it may be observed that the principle 
references are the same for all the three States but on minutely examining it may be 
observed that the government of Uttar Pradesh has entrusted more tasks, to its State 
finance commission, whereas the scope of NCT of Delhi is limited. The State of NCT of 
Delhi is different than other two States, as it does not have Panchayati Raj Institutions 
and the rural bodies are merged with MCD. There was a long pending demand of local 
bodies for a scientific devolution of taxes between State and local bodies. A large 
number of persons living in rural areas and for their welfare local bodies need financial 
support. Many important taxes which were collected by the local bodies, had been taken 
up by the State, therefore there was a fall in tax revenue to the local bodies for example 
Octrai duties in Uttar Pradesh collected by municipalities were abolished and in lieu of 
this levy of surcharge was entrusted to the trade tax department. 
Though the terms of references are almost same for different State Finance 
Commissions but their approach for devolution of taxes and for determination of tax rate 
are different, may be due to the different local needs. Tamil Nadu and Delhi examined 
the property tax in much detail and they have also suggested a detailed scheme for 
levying of this tax, to achieve progress of the taxation and better compliance. 
The SFC of Tamil Nadu has laid special emphasis on the measures for increasing 
resources for Urban Local Bodies. They have enumerated certain taxes for this purpose: 
to name a few these are library tax, lighting tax, surcharge from sales tax, income from 
minor minerals, land revenues, tax on luxuries in hotels and lodging houses, betting tax. 
State excise revenue, sugarcane cess, urban land tax, terminal taxes etc. It has been 
observed that these taxes are imposed only by Urban Local Bodies of Tamil Nadu. 
Taking their benefits in view, it is advised that the other States of India should also follow 
suit. Uniquely, only the Chennai Municipal Corporation imposes timber tax. Though it 
has contributed a little in the financial position of the Corporation, yet it is worth following 
by other Urban Local Bodies of the other States. 
It has been examined from the financial positions of the Uttar Pradesh and NCT of Delhi 
that betterment tax, tax on transfer of immovable property, theater tax, tax on boats have 
been levied to raise the revenues but these have not been adopted by the Tamil Nadu. It 
is suggested that Tamil Nadu should not hesitate in introducing these taxes for the 
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betterment of the financial position. It is also recommended that these taxes should also 
be imposed by other States of India, wherever they do not exist. 
The Uttar Pradesh Government took the initiative in introducing the trade and calling tax 
and toll for cleaning of private latrine and thus helped the Urban Local Bodies in raising 
their resources for the improvement of living conditions of their residents. It w^ould be 
healthy step for other States of India to do the same if they have not as yet introduced it. 
Similarly NCT of Delhi levied the tax on consumption and sale of electricity and tax on 
buildings. It is recommended that the other States may follow this step taking into the 
local phenomena in view. 
It has been observed that Property Tax has been imposed by Zila Parishads in Uttar 
Pradesh whereas Village Panchayats of Tamil Nadu have levied House Tax in its place. 
If feasible, this sort of tax may be introduced by other States of India also. Not only this, 
Panchayati Raj Institutions of Uttar Pradesh have taken bold steps by levying 
circumstances on property tax, land revenue, entertainment tax, sales tax, electricity tax, 
market fees, toll tax, sanitary fees, exhibition and fair fees, construction and 
management fees, fees for registration of animal, library fees, school fees, irrigation 
water charges, water charges and slaughter fees. It is suggested that other States 
should not lag behind in these respects if they have not already imposed these taxes. 
The Panchayati Raj Institutions of Tamil Nadu came forward in levying local cess 
surcharge on land revenue, professional tax, and pilgrim tax and thus improved their lot 
to a great extent. It is opined that other States should take this step for their economic 
betterment as well. 
It is for the general information that SFC of Uttar Pradesh emphasized the quality 
improvement of services like, street lighting, sanitation, maintenance of roads and public 
lamps. These recommendations would prove as beacon lights for the amelioration of 
lives of the peoples of the Urban Local Bodies and it is proposed that the Urban Local 
Bodies of other States should also incorporate these recommendations in their civic 
services. 
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PREFACE 
The system of local self-government is not alien to India. The traces of similar system 
are also found during Chola Period in 10'^  and 11*" Centunes A.D. Later on the British 
rule eclipsed the system, which was in vogue in India. However, the Imperial 
Government later realised the necessity of local self-government and initiated many 
measures to create local bodies under various enactments. Modern history of Urban 
Local Bodies (ULBs) in India can be traced as far back as the year 1687, with the 
formation of the Municipal Corporation of the port city of Madras. This corporation was 
setup to levy certain direct taxes and to provide amenities like education, water supply, 
cleaning of roads, etc. 
Over the years the local bodies have failed to provide adequate services mainly because 
of lack of resources at their command and inadequate infrastructure. This is because 
there had not been regular division of revenue and proceeds among State Government 
and local bodies. So for a very long time, the sharing of revenue was on adhoc basis. 
This problem was further aggravated in case of the Urban Local Bodies, by the fact that 
while urban population has grown rapidly, the lack of adequate financial resources 
available to municipalities for discharging their obligations has remained a perpetual and 
largely unaddressed problem and underscored the need for a Constitutional remedy to 
provide for a regular assessment of their fiscal resources gap on account of increasing 
responsibilities and escalating costs. 
With the passage of time, challenges emerging out of increasing population and the 
characteristics thereof, a need to strengthen and revitalise the whole system of local 
self-government was felt. After long deliberations spreading over three successive 
governments, the Constitution was amended by 73^ "^  and 74'" Acts in 1992, which came 
into effect in 1994. In pursuance of these Constitutional Amendment Acts, all the State 
Governments enacted legislations regarding governance of local self-government in the 
country. These Acts provide for structural uniformity and stability to the grass-root 
institutions under the overall supervision and control of the State Government. 
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The IZ"^ and 74'^  Amendments Acts, interalia, mandate the setting up of a State Finance 
Commission (SFC), in each State on the pattern of the Union Finance Commission. The 
SFCs are required to study and recommend among other things, the distribution of the 
net proceeds of taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable by the State Government, between 
Panchayati Raj Institutions (PRIs) and ULBs which may be divided among them under 
Part IX and IX (A) of the Constitution, and allocation between PRIs and ULBs of their 
respective shares of such proceeds. The democratic decentralization is facilitated by 
granting of limited autonomy to the local self-government units. Thus, the Act is a 
landmark in the history of local self-government in the country. 
The present study gives a comparative picture of three different State Finance 
Commissions i.e. Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and NCT of Delhi. It contains eight 
chapters. 
The first chapter is of introductory nature. The structures of fiscal federalism, the 
historical background and emergence of local government have been discussed. Need 
and appointment of State Finance Commissions, objectives of the present study, 
research methodology and review of the literature have been mentioned in this chapter. 
The second chapter deals with the theories of fiscal federalism given by eminent 
economists like Stigler and Gates and an attempt has been made for theoretical 
foundations on whose basis the State-Local fiscal relations should be developed. 
The third chapter highlights the three-tier structure of local government in the sample 
States and their legislative framework. An attempt has also been made to draw up a 
comparative picture concerning what constitutional status has been given to local 
government through the IZ"^ and 74"" Amendment Acts. 
The fourth chapter throws light on the principles of assignment of functions to local 
bodies and a comparative approach between the 11'^ and 12* Schedules with the 
Panchayati Raj Institutions and Urban Local Bodies of the sample States. 
The fifth chapter has been devoted to various theories of local taxation given by 
Musgrave, Gates, Foster and Pelmen, etc on the principles of taxation in federal system 
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and own resources generated by different local bodies. An attempt has also been made 
to study the suggestions made by the State Finance Commissions for enhancing these 
resources. 
In the sixth chapter the intergovernmental fiscal transfers, theory of intergovernmental 
grants and revenue sharing given by Oates and Bradford have been discussed. 
Structure and types of grants given to local bodies, principles recommended by the 
Taxation Enquiry Commission and State wise pattern of revenue sharing and receiving 
of grants have also been discussed. 
In the seventh chapter a comparative analysis of recommendations made by State 
Finance Commissions of the sample States, has been made. 
The eighth chapter contains the main findings regarding the study and suggestions 
emanating from the study. 
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CHAPTER -1 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
1.0 BACKGROUND 
Local self-government was central to the ideological framework of India's national 
movement. But soon after achieving Independence, the country followed the path of 
centralization, thereby curtailing the powers and authority of local self-governments. 
Huge investments made through capital-intensive projects did not percolate down to the 
masses. It was not difficult to diagnose the malady, not at least for Nehru who said, "To 
uplift lakhs of villagers is not an ordinary task. This can be done only if people 
themselves take up the responsibility. They are not merely to be consulted, but the 
effective power has to be entrusted to the people". 
Converting the vision into reality was a daunting task particularly because India is a vast 
country with a surging population of multi-ethnic characteristics. Political and economic 
management of such a big nation from one particular location might be difficult, 
inefficient and unprofessional. It was under this realisation that, the 73'''' and 74* 
Constitutional Amendments were passed by the Parliament in 1992, which came into 
effect on April 24,1993. This was a landmark transition of political power to the 
grassroots. Subsequently conformity legislation was passed in the States also. It not 
only provided a Constitutional status to the local bodies but also laid down, without 
ambiguity, that legislature could by law endow them with such powers and authority that 
might be necessary to enable them to function as institutions of self-government. 
Therefore, it was a landmark year in the State-Local relations in India. Even though 
issue of self governance has been stated clearly by the Directive Principles of State 
Policy, it was only after these Amendment Acts, the panchayats and the municipalities 
were provided with wide ranging provisions to transform these local bodies into strong 
and viable units of 'self-government'. 
An important aspect of these Amendments relate to the finances of panchayats and 
municipalities. Strengthening the finance is a precursor for the panchayats and 
municipalities to become viable units of government. 
It is enshrined in tine Directive Principles of State Policy^ that the democratically elected 
local governments compared to other forms of government are in a better position to 
assess the needs and developmental priorities of the area they represent and provide an 
outcome that is closest to the preferences of its people. This position has also been the 
anchor of the earlier attempts^ that have been made to operationalise the Directive 
Principles of State Policy and introduce a system of Panchayati Raj in the country. Other 
important issues concerning to local governments viz. determination of appropriate 
spending responsibilities for local governments, distribution of fiscal powers between 
local and higher levels of government, extension of autonomy to local governments in 
choosing tax rates, laying down their borrowing powers, defining the relations between 
the executive and the elected councils, or even the more general issue of strengthening 
local governments, have received a little systematic attention in the past. 
1.1 HISTORICAL BACKGROUND: EMERGENCE OF THE LOCAL GOVERNANCE 
The system of local self-government, both urban and rural is not alien to India. The 
inscriptions in uthiranerur (Tamil Nadu) exhibit the existence of a similar system during 
Chola period in 10"^  and 11"" centuries A.D, which was controlling the entire community 
life. The system of election was also in existence even in those days. The British rule 
eclipsed the system, which was in vogue in India. However the Imperial Government 
later realised the necessity of local self-government and initiated many measures to 
create local bodies under various enactments. 
Modern history of urban local bodies (hereafter ULB's) in India can be traced as far back 
as the year 1687 with the formation of the Municipal Corporation of the port city of 
Madras. This corporation was set-up to levy certain direct taxes and to provide certain 
amenities like education, cleaning of roads, etc. However this corporation was 
substituted by Mayor's Court in 1726 to collect taxes for provision of local amenities. 
Similar types of Corporations were also setup in Bombay and Calcutta, which lasted only 
till 1842. In 1850 a new Act, viz. 'Improvement of Towns Act' was passed by the 
Government of India extending the local self-governments to the whole country and 
authorising a system of administration by councillors in the matters of construction, 
repairs, cleanliness, lighting, maintenance, etc. However in 1863, based on the report of 
the Royal Army Sanitary Commission, which pinpointed the insanitary state of affairs in 
Indian towns, a series of Acts were passed, which led to the establishment of city 
municipalities through Lord Mayors Resolution of 1870. 
During the late 19'^  Century, Lord Ripon undertook an evaluation study on the progress 
of the local self-government since 1870 that resulted into the Lord Ripon's Resolution of 
1882. The government made attempts to divide the functions between the provincial 
government and the local bodies in order to raise more income through local sources for 
themselves. On the recommendations of the Royal Commission on Decentralisation 
(1907) and the Montague Chelmsford Report (1918) the Government of India Act, 1919 
was passed and the system of 'Dyarchy' was introduced. The type of organisation, 
powers and responsibilities of ULBs differed from State to State but they were similar in 
organizational structure. For the smaller cities and towns. Municipalities were formed, 
while Municipal Corporations governed big cities. A Corporation was headed by the 
Mayor and the Municipality by the Chairman. 
The ULB's administration has also been reviewed from time to time by various 
commissions / enquiry committees, appointed by the Central and State Governments for 
improving the resource generation and providing local services. 
The Panchayati Raj Institutions (hereafter PRIs) on the other hand, were in vogue in 
India from time immemorial. History reveals that there was a well-developed system of 
village panchayats in ancient India that had almost become defunct during the 17"^  and 
18'" Century under the British rule. Gandhiji had remarked long ago, "How long history 
does not record, the Indian genius worked out the village and local panchayat through 
which the villager's life has maintained its tenor even away from the din of battle and the 
rush of rising and falling empires". Inspite of its ancient origin the panchayat system was 
also broken under the British rule, by their ruthless method of revenue collection. 
Though during the period of Lord Mayo in 1871, the rural bodies were revived, but at the 
District level and not at the Village level. Under the 1884 Act, a three-tier system of rural 
local bodies was brought into force, only to collect revenues. After this many Acts were 
passed for the same reason. 
Local self-government was central to the ideological framework of India's National 
Movement. It was in this context Gandhiji had said, "True democracy cannot function by 
twenty men sitting at the Centre. It has to be worked from below, by the people of every 
village." 
After India's independence, Gandhiji revived the 'little republic' by his moving words viz. 
"India's independence must begin at the bottom. Thus every village will be a republic or 
a panchayat having full powers, the greater the powers to the panchayats, the better for 
the people". As a result, Article 40 (Annexure. A.8) of part C of the Constitution of free 
India laid down the principle^, "The State Government shall take steps to organize village 
panchayats and endow them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to 
enable them to function as units of self-government". 
1.2 NEEDS AND EMERGENCE OF STATE FINANCE COMMISSIONS 
The institution of local bodies in India failed to acquire the status and dignity of viable 
units of local self-government and a responsive people's body. Hence keeping in view 
the past experiences, the Government of India under the visionary leadership of the late 
Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, initiated efforts to provide constitutional status to local 
self-government to impart 'certainty, continuity and strength'. 
Over the years there has been a growing realisation that local bodies have failed to 
provide adequate services primarily on account of the woefully insufficient resources at 
their command. Fiscal transfers from the State, which constitute an extremely important 
part of the municipal revenues, depended more on an ad-hoc system of grants-in-aid 
rather than being a predetermined share in taxes based on well-defined criteria. No set 
principles were laid down in matters relating to quantum of grants to the States and the 
share thereof, which was required to be passed on by them to the local bodies. This 
gapping omission in the Constitution has been corrected with the adoption of the 73"^  
and 74"^  Amendments to the Constitution, which have inserted two parts-IX (Annexure 
A.1) & IX-A (Annexure A.2) dealing respectively with the panchayats and the 
municipalities. These historic amendments have accorded constitutional status to the 
third tiers of government at the local level. They have also provided a constitutional 
mechanism to take care of the financial inadequacies plaguing the local bodies, which 
were not able to perform effectively as vibrant democratic units of self-governments, 
apart from giving them protection against arbitrary treatment by the State Governments. 
One of the salient features of the 73"^  and 74'^  Constitutional Amendment Acts, 1992 
was the appointment of a State Finance Commission (SFC) in all the States within one 
year from the commencement of these Acts, thereafter, for every fifth year. The SFCs 
would review the finances of local bodies and recommend principles which should 
govern the distribution / assignment of the net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls and 
fees levied by the States and grants-in-aid from the Consolidated Fund of the State 
between the State, municipalities and the panchayats at all levels. The basic function of 
the SFC is to devise a system of distribution of the government revenues to the local 
bodies; define their power of taxation and responsibilities for improving the local finances 
and services. The enactment also provides that 'the legislature of the State may by law 
provide for the composition of the Commission, the qualifications which shall be requisite 
for appointment as member thereof and the manner in which they shall be selected' and 
further, 'the Commission shall have such powers in the performance of their functions as 
the Legislature of the State may, by law confer on them.' 
The 1992 amendments are related to two parts-IX and IX-A of the Constitution, wherein 
Article 243 which had been replaced in 1956*, has now been suitably amended and 
inserted to make provisions in respect of the Panchayats (Article-243 and its sub-parts 
243-A to 243-0) (Annexure. A.I) and the Municipalities (Article 243 P to 245 ZG) 
(Annexure A.2). There are three provisions in the amended Constitution that are directly 
relating to local bodies, namely, 
• to the Constitution and composition of the panchayats and municipalities; 
• to the functional and fiscal powers of the panchayats and municipalities; and, 
• to the institutional arrangements for planning for economic and social 
development. 
For establishing of the panchayats and municipalities, the Constitution provides that 
'These shall be constituted in every State, panchayats at the village, intermediate and 
District levels in accordance with the provisions of this part. Panchayats at the 
intermediate level may not be constituted in a State having a population not exceeding 
20 lakhs' (Article 234 B). 
These shall be constituted in every State: 
• A Nagar Panchayat for a transitional area, that is to say, an area in transition 
from rural area to an urban area; 
• A Municipal Council for a smaller urban area; and 
• A Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area" (Article 243 Qf. 
An important provision in the amended Constitution is that every panchayat and every 
municipality shall have tenure of five years; if dissolved sooner, the Constitution requires 
that elections be held within six months. The Constitution makes a specific provision for 
the reservation of women and other disadvantaged groups in order to impart greater 
participation of those sections of local communities, which have been outside the 
mainstream of development^. Thus, the two amendments not only provide for the 
creation of a third-tier of government, but also confer uniformity in their structure and 
safety from arbitrary dissolution or suspension. That State Government's discretion in 
constituting panchayats or municipalities, determining their structure, or keeping them 
under dissolution or suspension for long periods, as was the case in the pre-amended 
era, has been done away with in the new Constitutional framework. 
1.3 OBJECTIVES OF THE STATE FINANCE COMMISSIONS 
The main objective of the SRC is to review the existing financial conditions of the local 
bodies, suggest improvements in the augmentation of resources to match their 
responsibilities and to improve the delivery system of the public services. The terms-of-
references (hereafter TOR) issued by the Government as well as the objectives of the 
SFC envisaged in the Constitutional Amendments, indicate that the SFC is distinct from 
the Union Finance Commission. The Union Finance Commission (hereafter FC) has 
only to suggest distribution of the funds between the Centre and the States, while the 
SFC has to recommend the taxes of the State which could be assigned to the local 
bodies and also to indicate the principles of distribution of funds by the State 
Government to the local bodies and in the distribution of funds among the different tiers 
of local bodies besides inter-se distribution. The TORs also indicate that the SFC has to 
ensure a sound financial management besides suggesting for avoiding unproductive 
expenditure. It also envisages [he measures needed for upkeep of the assets created 
and maintained by the local bodies to ensure public utility. 
Specially, the SFCs have the following objectives to be achieved: 
(i) to provide a predictable, unambiguous, simple and detailed mechanism of 
devolution of funds among the State Government and local bodies; 
(ii) to address the terms of references in totality; 
(iii) to review the financial position of local bodies; 
(iv) to determine the principles of distribution of State resources to the local bodies; 
(v) to determine the assignment or appropriation of taxes, duties, fees, etc., to local 
bodies; 
(vi) to provide a mechanism of sharing resources to all tiers of local bodies; 
(vii) to determine the principles for grants-in-aid to local bodies from the State; 
(viii) to suggest measures needed to improve the financial position of the local bodies; 
(ix) to minimise State control over: 
a) fiscal powers of local bodies, 
b) approval of taxes, 
c) approval of taxation rates, 
d) approval of expenditure, 
e) approval of borrowing. 
1.4 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN PANCHAYATI RAJ INSTITUTIONS AND THE URBAN 
LOCAL BODIES 
A significant difference between the Panchayati Raj Institutions and the Urban Local 
bodies is that, the Panchayati Raj Institutions has a linkage of organisations with a three-
tier system; whereas the urban local bodies are independent and have no linkage either 
with the higher bodies or with the administrative machinery at the District levels. In the 
past they were mostly controlled directly by the State Government and all the aid was 
rendered direct from the State. However, an inspector, who was also the inspector of 
other local bodies at the State level, was controlling the municipal bodies. Now a 
separate Director / Commissioner looks after the Municipal Administration. The 
Corporations, however, were under the direct control of the Government until recently 
while they are placed under the administrative control of the Director General of 
Municipal Corporation. Further details are given in Chapter 3. 
1.5 DIFFERENCE BETWEEN UNION FINANCE COMMISSION (FC) AND STATE 
FINANCE COMMISSIONS (SFC) 
It is necessary to note here that there are two fundamental differences between the 
Union Finance Commission provided under Article 280 and the State Finance 
Commissions provided under Article 243-1 and 243-Y (Annexure A.1 & A. 2) of the Indian 
Constitution. 
1. The FC was conceived against the background of the realisation by the framers of 
the Constitution that the Central Government will have more revenues at its 
disposal, part of which should be transferred to the State Governments so as to 
reduce vertical as well as horizontal federal fiscal imbalances. But the SFCs are 
provided mainly to reduce horizontal fiscal imbalances, as there is no possibility of 
State Governments experiencing surplus revenues. They are expected to transfer 
some of their functions along with the revenues to the local bodies. 
2. The scope of the recommendations of the SFC is much broader than that of the 
FC. The FC is expected to recommend principles and magnitudes of the revenue 
from certain taxes levied by the Central Government as also grants-in-aid from the 
Consolidated Fund of India. The SFCs are expected to recommend sharing of the 
revenue from tax and non-tax revenue sources, assignment of tax / non-tax 
sources, grants-in-aid and measures to enable the local bodies to raise revenues. 
In other words, the FC is not asked to suggest measures for raising more revenue 
by the State Governments, whereas the SFCs are specifically asked to do so. 
1.6 TERMS OF REFERENCES OF SELECTED STATE FINANCE COMMISSIONS 
Subsequent to coming into force of 73^ *^  and 74"^  Constitutional Amendment Acts, the 
SFCs were constituted in all the States of the country. In the present study reports 
submitted by first SFCs of Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and NCT of Deilii were studied. 
The States selected represented different size, character and region of the country. 
1.6.1 TAMIL NADU 
In the two notifications issued in G.O.Ms No. 350, Finance, dated 23.4.94 and G.O.Ms 
No. 971, Finance dated 6.12.94 necessary terms of references were issued to the Tamil 
Nadu State Finance Commission. Accordingly the Commission was asked to review the 
financial position of the different tiers of PRIs and the ULBs in the State and make 
recommendations as to: 
(a) The principles which should govern: 
i) the distribution between the State and panchayats / urban local bodies of the 
net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable by the Government 
which may be divided between them, and allocation between the District 
panchayats, panchayat union councils and village panchayat / urban local 
bodies of their respective shares of such proceeds; 
ii) the determination of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned 
to or appropriated by the panchayats/urban local bodies; 
iii) the grants-in-aid to the panchayats/urban local bodies from the Consolidated 
Fund of the State. 
(b) the measures needed to improve the financial position of the panchayats/ urban 
local bodies. 
In reviewing the financial position of the urban local bodies, the Commission should also 
(i) assess the financial position of the panchayat unions/ urban local bodies as on 
31^' March 1994 with reference to revenue receipts and expenditure and the debt 
position; 
(ii) assess as far as may be practicable the financial position of the village 
panchayats as on 31^' March 1994 with reference to revenue receipts and 
expenditure. 
Further in making its recommendations, ihe Commission should have due regard to the 
resources of the State Government, the demand thereon of the resources and the need 
to generate adequate surplus on revenue account for State's commitments on capital 
account. The Commission should also regard to: 
(i) the existing level of devolution of resources to the panchayats/ urban local bodies 
and the adequacy of such devolution. 
(ii) the maintenance and upkeep of capital assets owned by or entrusted to 
panchayats/ urban local bodies. 
(iii) the tax efforts of panchayats/urban local bodies and its incentives to increase 
such tax efforts. 
The Commission can suggest changes, if any, in the existing classification of 
panchayats / municipalities and town panchayats on the basis of their financial position 
and suggest measures to improve financial management of panchayats/ urban local 
bodies and to reduce unproductive expenditure in panchayats and urban local bodies. 
The report of the Commission should however cover the period of five years 
commencing from 1.4.1997. 
1.6.2 UTTAR PRADESH 
The terms of reference of the Uttar Pradesh State Finance Commission as contained in 
the UP Government Finance Department Notification dated 22-10-1994 (as amended) 
are as follows: 
Accordingly, the Commission shall make recommendations relating to the following 
matters: 
a) the distribution between State Gram/ Kshetra/ Zila Panchayats and urban local 
bodies of the net proceeds of taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable by the State 
which may be divided amongst them under Part IX and IX-A of the Constitution 
and allocation between panchayats at all levels and urban local bodies of their 
respective shares of such proceeds; 
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b) the determination of taxes, duties, tolls and fees, which may be assigned to or 
appropriated by the Gram/ Ksherta/ Zila panchayats as the case may be and by 
the urban local bodies; 
c) the principles which should govern the grant-in-aid to the Gram/ Kshetra/ Zila 
panchayats as the case may be, and to urban local bodies from the Consolidated 
Fund of the State; 
d) the measures for strengthening the financial position of Gram/ Kshetra/ Zila 
panchayats and urban local bodies; 
e) any other matter which the Government may refer to the commission in the 
interest of sound finance of Gram/ Kshetra/ Zila panchayats and urban local 
bodies. 
The said Government Notification also stipulated that in making its own 
recommendation; the Commission shall have regard, among other considerations to: 
1) the revenue resources of the State Government and the demands thereon, in 
particular, on account of expenditure on civil administration, debt serving and 
other committed expenditure or liabilities; 
2) the liabilities of panchayats and urban local bodies in respect of implementation 
of schemes entrusted to them under Article 243-G and 243-W and works 
entrusted to them at appropriate levels; 
3) the revenue resources of panchayats and urban local bodies at ail levels based 
on the potential for raising resources for the next 5 years and targets fixed for 
additional resource mobilisation along with tax efforts made in this direction; 
4) the scope for better fiscal management consistent with economy in expenditure 
and efficiency in administration; 
5) the maintenance and upkeep of capital assets and maintenance expenditure on 
those Plan Schemes as are entrusted to these bodies which are completed by 
March 31, 1997; 
6) the Commission may make an assessment of the debt position of the panchayats 
and urban local bodies at all levels as on March 31, 1994 and suggest such 
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corrective measures as are deemed necessary keeping in view the financial 
requirements of the State; 
7) if the funds available at the local level do not meet full requirements of 
expenditure on Plan side after the new arrangements, then the Commission will 
make specific recommendation regarding the arrangement of funds for 
expenditure on both Plan and Non-Plan side. 
The Commission was enjoined upon to make its report available on each of the 
aforesaid matters covering a period of 5 years commencing from April 1, 1996. Another 
term of reference was added through the Government Notification dated January 16, 
1996 asking the Commission to give its recommendation regarding the maintenance and 
auditing of accounts of urban local bodies. 
1.6.3 NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF DELHI 
The First Delhi Finance Commission was constituted under Government of NCT of Delhi 
order dated April 3, 1995 with following terms of references: 
The Commission shall: 
(a) Determine the manner, principles and procedure which should govern-
(i) the distribution between the National Capital Territory of Delhi and the 
Municipalities, of the net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable 
by the National Capital Territory of Delhi which may be divided between them; 
(ii) the determination of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned to 
or appropriated by the Municipalities; 
(iii)the grants-in-aid to the Municipalities from the Consolidated Fund of the 
National Capital Territory of Delhi; and 
(b) The needed measure to improve the financial position of the Municipalities. 
While making its recommendations the Commission shall have regard among other 
considerations, to-
i) the overall resource position of the Government of the National Capital Territory 
of Delhi; 
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ii) the scope for economy in the Municipal Administration; 
iii) the scope for improvements in resource mobilisation by the Municipalities; and 
iv) the tax efforts made by the Municipalities. 
The Commission shall make its report available by 31^' March 1996 on each of the 
matters aforesaid and covering a period of five financial years commencing from the 1^' 
April 1996. It shall also indicate in the report the basis on which it has arrived at its 
findings and state, as far as possible, the estimates / forecasts for all the Municipalities 
together, as well as separately for each of such bodies. 
1.6.4 COMPARISJON OF TORs OF THREE STATES 
The three sample States of Delhi, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu have many similarities 
in their terms of references of their First State Finance Commissions. It stems from the 
fact that SFCs have derived their existence and functions from 73 '^' and 74'^ Constitution 
Amendment Acts of 1992. 
The TORs of the SFCs of these three States ask for recommendations to determine the 
measures, principles and procedure for distribution of net proceeds of the taxes, duties, 
tolls and fees leviable by the government among panchayats and urban local bodies. 
Since the local bodies had limited resources prior to the said Constitution Amendments, 
the TORs also call for determination of taxes, duties, tolls and fees that may be 
appropriated or assigned to them. Third major similarity in the TORs is the 
recommendations on the principles, which will govern the grants-in-aid to local bodies 
from the Consolidated Fund of the State. Another major requirement for each of the 
State Finance Commission is to give recommendations on measures for strengthening 
the financial position of local bodies while keeping in mind the resources position of the 
State Government and liabilities of the local bodies. All the TORs also call for scope for 
economy in expenditure by local bodies and efficiency in administration. 
Apart from common points there are some differences in TORs as well. Delhi TOR is 
concerned only with the financial position of municipality and municipal corporation as no 
panchayats being left any longer in NOT of Delhi, whereas Uttar Pradesh and Tamil 
Nadu concern both PRIs and ULBs. 
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Delhi and Uttar Pradesh TORs enjoin their respective Commission to make its report 
available on each of the matters covering a period of five years commencing from April 
1, 1996 whereas Tamil Nadu specifies a period of five years commencing from April 1, 
1997. 
A significant TOR, which was later added to the Uttar Pradesh State Finance 
Commission, was regarding recommendations on maintenance and auditing of accounts 
of urban local bodies. This finds mention only in TORs of State Finance Commission of 
Uttar Pradesh. 
1.7 REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
From time to time. Committees / Commissions study teams have been constituted to 
study the status of local governments in India with a view to improve them. Main focus of 
some of these committees is as follows: 
A study team under the chairmanship of Balwant Ral Mehta (1952) was of the view that 
all developmental programmes undertaken in a local area should be channelised 
through elected bodies. The study team also recommended for the creation of an inter-
connected system of democratic institutions at village, block and District level, which 
could undertake developmental activities with the people's participation. The block level 
institution could be converted as a panchayat union / samiti which should be the unit 
incharge of all development work since the unit at District level would be unviable and 
the panchayats at village level should undertake the provision of basic amenities in 
villages and also involve in the developmental activities formulated by the block level 
institution. The District level organisation, namely Zila Parishad was more too co-
coordinated the activities of various smithies at District level. 
Further in 1957 Balwant Rai Mehta Committee felt that development cannot progress 
unless responsibility and pov;er is given to the community. They recommended an early 
establishment of statutory elective local bodies and devolution to them of the necessary 
resources, power and authority. Therefore in order to encourage people's participation 
and to overcome defects of the Community Development Programme, Panchayati Raj 
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Institutions apparatus was stipulated to achieve socio-economic transformation of rural 
India. 
K. Santhanam Committee report on Panchayati Raj Finance (1963) was the first 
committee to deal with the issue involved in strengthening the finances of the 
panchayats. This committee examined the various aspects of finances of the panchayats 
and made several recommendations for raising revenues from their own resources and 
the principles to govern devolution of various grants to the panchayats from the State 
Governments. One of the most important suggestions of the committee was that 
attempts should be made to help the panchayats to take remunerative undertakings and 
thereby increasing the scope for non-tax revenues. The committee was of the view that 
"loan to the panchayats for these purposes cannot be adequately given by the State 
Departments and even when it is possible, it is desirable to give loans through special 
institution which will function purely as a financial concern, free from any kind of political 
interferences". 
Mahavir Tyagi Committee presented a report on Central Direct Taxes Administration 
Reforms (1969) and made a number of suggestions regarding the taxes, which could be 
raised by the panchayats and also indicated different assigned revenues and grants, 
which could be transferred to them by the State Government. 
The High Level Committee of Gujarat (1973) was in favor to strengthing the financial 
position of the local government's and suggested that State Financial Boards should be 
constituted to go into the matters relating to distribution of State resources between the 
State and Panchayati Raj bodies. 
Linn (1975) explained about the problems faced by the urban governments in the 
developing countries like urban management, slums and squatter settlements, rapid 
population growth, poverty and laid focus on the urban finance aspects of the difficulties 
encountered by urban governments in developing countries in trying to cope with rapid 
urbanization at low levels of income. 
The Central Government appointed a High Level Committee in the year 1977 under the 
chairmanship of eminent legislator Dr. Ashok Mehta, to review the Panchayati Raj 
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system and also to enquire into the causes of decline of the Panchayati Raj Institutions 
and to recommend appropriate measures to reform and strengthen them. This 
Committee submitted a number of recommendations for reform and revitalization of 
Panchayati Raj based upon the 'central premise of linking institutions of democratic 
decentralization with socially motivated economic development' and emphasized the 
need for District planning and mobilization of funds on their ovjn, for the Plan 
implementation. The committee drev^ up three phases of Panchayati Raj in India after 
Independence. From 1959-64, it was the phase of ascendancy, 1965-69 was the phase 
of stagnation and from 1969-77 was that of decline and recommended the 
reorganization of the Panchayati Raj bodies into two main tiers. It felt that the three-tiers 
in vogue at present may continue for some more time, but in the long run only two-tiers 
should take the responsibilities of local and regional development. Development 
necessitates that the first point of decentralisation below the State should be the District 
Planning. Supervising and coordinating development programmes at District level is 
necessiated, as administrative and technical competence of the requisite caliber is 
available only at the District level. The Block should only have an executive committee of 
the Zila Parishad (e.g Maharashtra) to implement the development programmes 
formulated and approved by the Zila Parishad. The existing Village Panchayats are 
financially as well as leadership-wise weak. Threfore, the committee recommended the 
Constitution of Mandal Panchayats. Another reason for such recommendation is that 
people now want better quality of local services, which Village Panchayats with their 
meager resources cannot provide. The Mandal Panchayats serving a population of 15 to 
20 thousands would have adequate resources, menpower, talent and threshold to 
launch various development projects. The committee has also suggested a tie up 
between the PRIs and the much needed focal points for spatial development. It further 
assessed that the inability of the PRIs to come up to the expectation lay in their weak 
financial resources. 
Abhijit Datta (1984) suggests some measures to improve municipal finances, which 
should lie within the municipal system. Under the Indian conditions significant 
improvement within the municipal system has to be ushered externally by the States and 
the Central Government. He indicated specific action areas to improve the boundaries of 
municipal decision making in the field of municipal functions, taxation, resources transfer 
and integration of municipal planning with the national planning system. The net result of 
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all these improvements should enable the municipal authorities to ultimately handle at 
least 10 per cent of the total governmental revenue over the next decade. Further in 
1995 he concluded the discussion of fiscal reforms of the Panchayats in four points: 
(i) The panchayats are to be strengthened as institutions of self-government 
and not merely as agents of State Plan implementation, 
(ii) The fiscal strengthening of the panchayats involved simultaneous 
measures for fiscal and organizational contraction of the State 
Government, 
(iii) The State field staff transfer strategy to the panchayats prevents fiscal 
decentralization to take root, 
(iv) The fiscal accountability of the panchayats is to be outside State 
bureaucratic control and related mainly to their constituents. 
G.V.K. Rao Committee (1985) suggested ways of revamping rural local governments 
and recommended a bold scheme of democratic decentralization in which the District 
level body was to be of pivotal importance. 
L.M. Singhvi Committee (1986) suggested, "a pattern of compulsory and optional 
levied taxes and a list of subjects of which powers to levy taxes and fees may be 
entrusted to PRis with a provision that for a given period, the State Government shall 
levy and collect on behalf of Panchayati Raj Institutions and shall disburse to them on 
the basis of recommendations of the Finance Commission in each State". This 
committee tracing the growth and development of democratic decentralization 
resurrected the nearly forgotten Gram Sabha, comprising all the inhabitants of a village 
and called it as the embodiment of direct democracy. Besides it wanted to vest 
Panchayati Raj with Constitutional status, saying that a separate chapter should be 
added in the Constitution of India, so as to make the identity and integrity of the PRIs 
'reasonably and substantially inviolate". It wanted the establishment of Nyaya 
Panchayats for a cluster of villages. As regards the participation of political parties in 
Panchayati Raj elections, it itself did not volunteer any definite role which is pragmatic, 
workable and consensual and in consultation with different parties of the land. 
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Sarkaria Commission on Centre-State Relations (1988) recommended Constitutional 
provision to secure elections to local bodies. It did not favour the idea of the L.M.Singhvi 
Committee to confer Constitutional status to the PRIs. The commission advocated that 
the power of enacting any law on the Panchayats vests under entry 5, list II exclusively 
with the States. Uniformity in these aspects of the law throughout the territory of India is 
essential. The uniformity can be secured by adopting in the following order of preference 
any of the alternatives given below: 
1. By law with respect to this matter made by all the State legislatures in 
accordance with a Model Bill prepared on the basis of consensus at the forum 
of the Inter-State Council, recommended to be established under Article 263. 
2. By a law on this subject made by Parliament under Article 252 (1) with the 
consent of the legislatures of all the States. 
3. By a parliamentary law uniformly applicable throughout India containing 
provisions analogous to Article 172 and 174 of the Constitution. 
Adoption of above alternative (1) or (2) will not require any amendment of the 
Constitution. However as a condition precedent for adopting alternative (3), those 
aspects of the matter which are analogous to Article 172 and 174, will have to be carried 
out of the ambit to entry 5, list II and transposed as a separate item of list II. Recourse to 
alternative (3) may be had only as a last resort. 
On the issue of fiscal crisis of local bodies, Bagchi (1993) is of the view that no single 
policy instrument like grants can achieve all the objectives. Attempts to serve several 
objectives simultaneously, like equalisation of fiscal capacity across jurisdiction and 
stimulating local government tax efforts while minimizing administration costs and 
promoting local autonomy may end up by achieving a little in any direction as the effect 
of one may be neutrali2:ed by that of the other. Further in 1995, he focuses on the tasks 
before the SFCs in relation to Panchayat functions and finances and considers the 
issues relating to the fiscal restructuring of the panchayats in terms of their Plan finance 
and revenue base. 
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B.S. Khanna (1994) threw light on the development of rural local self-government during 
1947-48 to 1957-58. He made intensive description of Panchayati Raj works in ten 
States of India and suggests that these States should be classified into three categories: 
a) Category I, where Panchayati Raj has been developing satisfactorily as local self-
government and development agency. 
b) Category II, where Panchayati Raj was radically reorganized and the system made a 
good headway initially and later solwed down and subsequently was dissolved 
temporary because of change in the attitude of succeeding party government in the 
State. 
c) Category III, where Panchayati Raj was superseded and dissolved for long periods 
and elections were delayed considerably or else their structure was truncated thereby 
resulting in their languid performance. 
M.A. Oomen (1995) reviewed the existing structure of the Panchayati Raj finance and 
conformity legislations passed by the various State legislatures with reference to the 
functions and finance of PRIs and outlined some of the conceptual and operational 
issues of intergovernmental transfers with special reference to SFCs and the task facing 
them. He also suggests some measures to improve panchayat finance, to improve poor 
tax base and difference in imposing taxes. They are: 
- raising non-tax income by assigning more land to panchayats; 
- creation of permanent assets like shops, flats, fishing, ponds etc; and 
tax on agriculture. 
He further suggests that intergovernmental transfer may be governed by such broad 
principles as adequacy, autonomy, fiscal prudence, predictability transparency and 
operationality, tax sharing and tax assignment. Distribution of grants-in-aid interse must 
be based on criteria which each SFC must evolve, preferably with the help of some 
composite index of backwardness and measures of resources effort. The goal of building 
institutions of self-government can be achieved only if the transitional tasks are pursued 
with clarity of purpose and dedication to the cause of democratic decentralization and 
finance is made to play the inevitable midwifery role in this task. 
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P.K. Mohanty (1995) analyses the key issues of municipal finance witfi reference to the 
principles and practices of revenue assignment in formulating programmes for municipal 
finance reforms in the spirit of the 74th Constitution Amendment Act, 1992. 
Bohra (1996) studied the problems of Centre-Sate fiscal relations. His study is based on 
Rajasthan and the analysis is carried out at the level of State and local bodies. He 
concludes that: 
(i) The element of subjectivity in public expenditure is declining over the 
years, 
(ii) The political theory of local finance overrides the Fabricant Hypothesis, 
(iii) The expenditure equalisation leases on the models of fiscal choice yield 
relatively better results. 
1.8 OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY 
The ensuing study aims: 
1. To examine whether local bodies have been endowed with the powers as 
enshrined in the Constitution of India according to the 73"^  and 74'^  Amendments. 
2. A comparative study of the services provided by the local bodies of Tamil Nadu, 
Uttar Pradesh and NCT of Delhi. 
3. To study performance of local bodies within the State as well as among States. 
4. To examine whether intergovernmental fiscal relations are according to the needs 
of the local bodies. 
5. To analyze the scheme/ formula or methodology adopted by different State 
Finance Commissions of Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and NCT of Delhi for 
devolution of taxes and transfer of other financial resources to the local bodies. 
6. To examine the evolution of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in these States. 
1.9 HYPOTHESIS 
The hypothesis that there are no major differences in the method of devolution of taxes 
between the different States and also between PRls and ULBs within the States is 
proposed to be examined. 
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1.10 RESEARCH METHODOLOGY 
India is a three-tier polity having Central, State and Local Governments. The focal points 
of the study are vertical relations as well as horizontal relations of State and local as well 
as among local governments, which has special features and characteristics. An attempt 
has been made to compare the attention paid by parent Governments to deal with fiscal 
issues of its dependent level of Governments. 
The study is a review of the recommendations made by the First State Finance 
Commissions. The sample is limited to three States, namely, Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu 
and National Capital Territory of Delhi (NCT of Delhi), because it is not possible to study 
all the States. Though desirable, but it is very difficult for an individual researcher due to 
time, space and other constraints. The study is purely based on secondary data 
collected from various reports of State Finance Commissions and other Government 
publications. The problem under study on the basis of comparative economic methods 
has also been examined. 
Uttar Pradesh (UP) has been selected because it is the parent State of the researcher 
and it also represents northern part of the country. Lately, the erstwhile State has been 
bifurcated into Uttaranchal and the present Uttar Pradesh, but this study has taken into 
analysis the combined State for which first SFC submitted its report. This State also 
represents the poorer and backward States of the country. 
Tamil Nadu (TN) represents a Southern State and is also considered to be one of the 
developed States where local governments, both urban and rural, do play an important 
role in their economy. 
Delhi, though basically is a Union Territory and the capital city of India, represents a 
unique system of governance. It was accorded the quasi-statehood, because all the 
State powers have not been granted to it whether in terms of resource raising or 
functional domain. Many of the State functions are under various Ministries of the Union 
Government. Its local body like Municipal Corporation of Delhi is under control of 
Ministry of Home Affairs and Delhi Cantonment Board is regulated by the Ministry of 
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Defence. The State Government has a little regulatory and administrative control over 
them. 
1.11 DATA AVAILABILITY 
The proposed study is basically of the nature of the survey of measure TOR, 
methodology adopted, scope and recommendations of the SFC reports of selected 
States. It has been noted that although the TOR has been derived from the Constitution 
of India under Article 243-1 and 243-Y, yet there is no uniformity in the approach and 
scope adopted by these States. 
Statistical and analytical data have also been given in these reports with varied coverage 
for example the coverage by Tamil Nadu and NCT of Delhi is adequate but in Uttar 
Pradesh it desired to be covers by more information. 
1.12 LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY 
1. For this study only three States have been taken because of the limitation of time 
and other constrains; and it is purely based on secondary data, particulariy the 
information gathered from the reports of State Finance Commissions. 
2. These three States have been selected because Tamil Nadu represents from 
Southern part of India, Uttar Pradesh is from north and Delhi is not purely a State 
but a mixture of both State and Union Territory. 
3. The simple and advanced econometric method for empirical study could not be 
applied, as the research scholar is not familiar with these tools. 
4. The Delhi Cantonment Board (DCB), which is under the control of Ministry of 
Defence, did not fall within the purview of the State Finance Commission of NCT 
of Delhi, hence has not been included in the present study. 
1.13 SUMMARY 
The concept of local self-government is not new to India, the similar system may be 
traced back during Chola period. The British rule eclipsed the system, however, the 
Imperial Government latter on realised the necessity of local self-government and 
22 
initiated many measures to create local bodies under various enactments. Though 
several committees and commissions were appointed earlier to examine the financial 
requirements of ULB's and PRI's, yet they were adhoc'' in character and they did not 
enjoy any Constitutional status. It has been strongly suggested by many, that the chronic 
problem of local finance can be solved only through having any scientific method of 
devolution of power and resources. These SFCs should make recommendations so as 
to ensure a stride and adequate flow of resources to the local bodies through grants and 
loans in addition to the assigned heads of revenue and shared taxes. The 1992 Acts 
suggest for an appointment of Finance Commission in all the States within one year from 
the commencement of the Constitution Amendment Act initially and thereafter for every 
five years, to review the finances of the local bodies and to recommend the principles on 
the basis of which the taxes are to be appropriated by or assigned to the local bodies, as 
also grants-in-aid to the local bodies from the Consolidated Funds of the States. The 
basic function of the SFC is to look into the finances of the local bodies, both rural and 
urban and to devise a system of distribution of the government revenues to the local 
bodies, its powers of taxation and the responsibilities for improving its local finances and 
services. 
In the chapter to follov\/, several theories related to fiscal federalism propounded by 
eminent economists would be discussed which have direct bearing on State-Loca! fiscal 
relations. 
Footnotes: 
1. The Constitution of India, Part IV, Directive Principles of State Policy, Article 40 on organisation of 
village panchayats. 
2. The Balw/antarai Mehta Committee (1952), recommended setting up of a three-tier structure of PRI's 
for effective decentralization and Ashok Mehta Committee on Panchayati Raj Institution (1977) 
emphasized that the psychic dividends of the association of rural people with the planning and 
development process are crux of the matter. A committee set up by the Planning Commission to 
reviews the progress in the sphere of decentralization identified absence of financial autonomy and the 
primacy of government officials as against people's representatives as major weakness. 
3. The Constitution of India, Part IV, Directive Principles of State Policy, Article 40 on organisations of 
Village Panchayats. 
4. Until its repealment in 1956, Article 243 related to the territories in Part D of the first schedule and any 
other comprised within the territory of India but not specified in that schedule. 
5. The gradation of an area into transitional, small or large, is to be determined by the Governor of a 
State, on the basis of such factors as population, area, density, revenue generated for local 
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administration, employment in non-agricultural activities and other factors that point to the economic 
importance of the area (243 Q). 
6. Articles 234 D and 243 T provide for the reservation for women and other disadvantaged groups. 
7. Because they are not guided by fiscal principles, normative fiscal principles were missing largely. 
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CHAPTER -2 
THE FISCAL FEDERALISM 
THEORETICAL ISSUES 
CHAPTER 2 
THE FISCAL FEDERALISM: THEORETICAL ISSUES 
The fiscal operations are typically carried out by many units of Government or 
jurisdictions. The United Kingdom, Switzerland and Holland operate with two tiers of 
Governments i.e., central and local, whereas in Canada, Australia, Germany and India 
there are three-tier arrangement i.e.. Central, State (province) and Local. In India, this 
multiple unit system includes the Central Government, 28 State Governments, 7 Union 
Territory Governments and a very large number of local self-governments (Annexure A.6 
& A.7). The multi unit fiscal structure, as it prevails in any particular country, reflects the 
historical forces of nation making, wars and geography. Typically, modern nations have 
emerged by combination of pre-existing sovereign jurisdictions, which then join into 
national units, in doing so, member jurisdictions may retain certain fiscal prerogatives 
while surrendering others, thereby joining in a compact arrangement, which determines 
the fiscal aspects of the federation apart from assigning or delegation of political powers. 
Political history thus tells much in explaining the structure of fiscal arrangements in any 
country. There are also good economic reasons why certain fiscal functions should be 
operated on a more centralized level while others should be decentralized. The spatial 
fiscal structuring would be desirable on grounds of economic considerations only to 
satisfy three major functions i.e., allocation, distribution and stabilisation. 
In order to satisfy these basic factors in fiscal federalism two fundamental questions 
arises, i.e., 
1. Which level of Government should provide various legitimate allocation and 
distributional functions so as to avoid potential incompatibilities and 
destructive competitions among the Governments and achieve a social 
welfare maximum? 
2. The second question relates to the sorting of people among jurisdictions; how 
much people sort themselves among various jurisdictions, again with the goal 
of avoiding incompatibilities and intergovernmental competitions and 
achieving a social welfare maximum? 
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An attempt to answer these two questions is referred to as the theory of fiscal 
federalism, (Tresch, R.W. 2002) 
(a) Stigler's prescription for an optimal federalism, 
(b) Oates's Perfect Correspondence and 
(c) Oates's Decentralisation Theorem. 
2.1 ALLOCATIVE EFFICIENCY: THE FUNDAMENTAL ALLOCATION ISSUE IN FISCAL 
FEDERALISM 
Under these assumptions, the fundamental economic issues in fiscal federalism are: 
Why have a federalist structure in the first place? Alternatively, what possible economic 
advantages occur by having any lower level Governments at all? Let us consider, 
max W[U^Xhi)] 
(Xhi) 
H 
s.t F y =0 I, 
Where h= 1,2 H included everything in the locality. If the National Government can 
affect a set of policies consistent with the first order conditions of this model, giving the 
existence of such problem as externalities, decreasing cost production and an 
inappropriate distribution of income. What can additional lower level Governments 
possibly do to enhance the economic well being of society? Why should the National 
Government not do every thing? 
Many public sector economists have provided their answers to these questions but none 
of them is entirely satisfactory. These are explained below: 
(a) Stigler's Prescription for an Optimal Federalism 
George Stigler (1957) in his short masterpiece, "Tenable Range of Functions of Local 
Governments" tried to find out optimal federalism. His justification for 'local governments' 
rests on two principles: 
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First, that representative Government works best. The closer the governnnent is to its 
constituency better it is for the constituents, it is presumable because local governments 
perceive the utilities or demands of their constituents better than a National Government 
could. Second, those subsets of people within a country have the right to vote for 
themselves different kinds and amounts of public services. 
According to Stigler, these two principles imply that decision-making should occur at the 
lowest level of Government consistent with the goals of allocational efficiency and 
distributional equity. He concluded that, an optimal federalist system could be achieved if 
the various legitimate functions of Government are best distributed among the 
Governments within the fiscal hierarchy. Higher-level Governments may be necessary to 
achieve either allocational efficiency or distributional equality. Stigler argues, "that the 
National Government is the proper Government for resolving the distributional question 
in order to avoid inconsistencies and competition among Governments (other theorists 
also followed on this point). In contrast, the responsibility for allocation of functions 
throughout the fiscal hierarchy turns naturally on the geographic scope of both 
externalities and decreasing costs, the traditional allocation Issues in public sector 
theory. A Government body must be sufficiently large to capture all decreasing costs 
from a particular decreasing cost services, or to include all citizens affected by a 
particular externality generating activity, but it need not be any larger. Thus, the optimal 
sized jurisdictional unit varies with each specific instance of a decreasing cost service or 
an externality". 
(b) Perfect Correspondence 
Dates in 'Fiscal Federalism', solidified Stigler's principle by suggesting the notion of a 
perfect correspondence: "--the optimal form of federal government, to provide the set of 
'n' public goods would be one in which there exists a level of government for each 
subset of the population over which the consumption of a public good is defined. This 
would be sufficient to internalize the benefits from the provision of each good. Such a 
structure of government, in which the jurisdiction that determines the level of provision of 
each public good, includes precisely the set of individuals who consume the good. In the 
ideal model, each level of government, possessing complete knowledge of the tastes of 
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its constituents and seeking to maximize their welfare, would provide the Pareto-efficient 
level of output and would finance this through benefit pricing". 
Given the existence of a federalist system, the notion of a perfect correspondence sets 
natural limit on the size of each local government. Oates is certainly correct when he 
suggests that a perfect correspondence will produce a first-best social welfare optimum, 
assuming that local governments follow the first best allocational decision rules. 
(c) Oates Decentralisation Theorem 
Oates added a new constraint to the basic first-best general equilibrium model. It is 
assumed that there are two natural sub groupings, A and B, within the total population 
and all individuals within each subgroup have identical preference and it varies across A 
and B. Suppose, that society produces two purely private goods, X and Y, that are both 
consumed by all members of the society. Y is a purely private good, it is provided by the 
government either national or local. Assume finally, that the distribution of income is 
optimal, so that each subgroup can be viewed as containing a single individual. 
Under these assumptions social welfare maximization can be presented as follows: 
max U^ (X^, Y^) 
( X^, Y^, X^ Y") 
s.t. U^ (X^ Y^) =11 
F(X'^+X^ Y'^+Y^) = 0 
We know that the first order conditions from this problem are: 
M R S V Y A = ! V 1 R S V Y B = MRTX.Y -—(1) 
More over, with different tastes, X'*' ^  X^ and Y'*':^ Y^ in general, at the optimum. Given 
the model as it stands, it obviously makes no difference whether a single National 
Government provides Y'^  and Y^ according to (1), or whether each sub-group forms its 
own government and individually satisfies: 
M R S V Y A = MRT x,Y - - (2 ) 
MRS%B,YB = MRTx,Y - - ( 3 ) 
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Suppose, however, the National Government were constrained to offer equal amounts of 
Y to each subgroup, so that Y'^  =Y^ with national provision of Y. Since, in general Y"^  i" 
Y^ at the social welfare optimum, this would represent an additional binding constraint on 
the formal general equilibrium model, implying a lower level of social welfare at the 
optimum. It is easy to show that the new first-order conditions become: 
MRSV,YA = MRS%B,YB = MRTx,Y + ^ 3/ ?^2 Fx (4) 
Where: 
X,2 = The Lagrangian multiplier associated with society's production 
possibilities, F() =0. 
A,3 = The Lagrangian multiplier associated with the new constraint, Y'^  = Y^. 
Local autonomy is obviously the preferred structure under these conditions because it 
avoids subjecting society to an unnecessary constraint upon government decision-
making. Oates labels this result-the decentralization theorem: 
"For a public good, the consumption of which is defined over geographical subsets of 
the total population and for which the costs of providing each level of output of the good 
in each jurisdiction is the same for the central or the respected local government, it will 
always be more efficient (or at least as efficient) for local governments to provide the 
Pareto-efficient levels of output for their respective jurisdictions than for the central 
government to provide any specified and uniform level of output across all jurisdictions." 
The decentralization theorem does not actually solve the problem of justifying local level 
governments in a first-best policy environment. It is really an exercise in the theory of the 
second best, precisely because the National Government is forced to offer equal service 
levels to all subsets of the population. Nonetheless, this is a compelling restriction. The 
U.S citizens have long and successfully, argued for local autonomy over public 
elementary and secondary education on the grounds that a federal takeover, despite 
some financial advantages, would imply standardized education for all children. 
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The point is that for the particular second-best model, Oates chose as an autonomy is 
highly relevant for the United States and not just some arbitrary formal model that 
happened to be biased against national decision making. 
In the light of these theorems, it seems that the theoretical underpinnings related to 
functional allocation and assignment of revenue resources and intergovernmental fiscal 
arrangements are to bridge the gap. 
2.2 THEORETICAL UNDERPINNING 
The theory of fiscal federalism tries to use micro economic theory for allocation of 
functions and sources of revenue among multi level governmental system. According to 
the concept of decentralization, each of the political unit would have control over the 
geographical area that would internalize benefits and costs of public goods. It means 
fiscal federalism applies cost-benefit analysis to allocate governmental functions to 
different levels of governments. Thus, that level of government, which supplies public 
services at least cost, should be entrusted with those functions. 
According to Oates (1972), assigning fiscal tasks to the different levels of government, 
there are number of factors that must be weighed against one another in the 
determination of the proper level of government to provide a particular public service. It 
is believed that the optimal degree of fiscal decentralization will vary substantially among 
different societies. The Central Govenmient should assume primary responsibility for 
resolving the stabilization and distribution problems and for providing efficient outputs of 
those public goods that significantly affect the welfare of individuals in all jurisdictions. If 
these functions are placed at highly decentralized levels of government, it may result in 
undesirable levels of these types of programmes. In the case of national public good, the 
problem with decentralized jurisdiction is that it will tend to provide sub-efficient levels of 
the good because of the failure to take into account the benefits conferred on residents 
of other jurisdiction. This is because of inability of decentralized decision-making units to 
appropriate the social benefits of their programmes. 
Invariably, those public services whose supply does not involve economies of scale 
should be decentralized. Such division of functions ensures economic efficiency in the 
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provision of public goods, accountability of the money spent and fiscal autonomy of 
lower level of government. 
Therefore, those functions that supply public services to meet the varying tastes and 
preferences of citizens should necessarily go to the lower level governments. Those 
functions which are not involved in such variations in requirements and preferences and 
which enjoy economies of scale should go to the higher-level (national / state level) 
government. Wherever such clear-cut demarcation is not possible, it results in spatial 
spillover of benefits and costs. The National Government in such case should try to 
internalize them by providing financial assistance to local self-governments. This is the 
economic justification for grants from higher-level governments to lower level 
governments. 
As for the resources of revenue, those whose basis are spatially mobile should 
necessarily go to the National Government and those, which are immobile, should go to 
the local governments. Besides, benefit levies are more efficient when they are 
administered at local level, as it is easier to assess the benefits and costs. The source, 
which involves redistributive role, should go to the National Government on efficiency 
ground. 
According to Musgrave and Musgrave (1959), the basic consideration in determining the 
economic efficiency of the allocation function, we assume that a group of people, having 
landed on a new planet, considers what special arrangements should be made and also 
suppose that individual will permit their location choices to be determined by fiscal 
considerations. Now the question arises, whether social goods and services should be 
provided on a centralized or a decentralized basis and what spatial arrangement of fiscal 
organization is most efficient in rendering such public services? 
The crucial feature of social goods is that of spatial limitation of benefit incidence. Some 
social goods are such that the incidence of their benefits is nation-wide, e.g., national 
defense, space exploration, cancer research and the Supreme Court, while other is 
geographically limited, e.g., a local fire engine or street lighting. Therefore, the members 
of the 'group' who share in the benefits are limited to the residents of a particular 
geographic region/ locality. 
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Allocation theory as applied to the public sector had led us to the conclusion that public 
services should be provided and their costs shared in line with the preferences of the 
residents of the relevant benefit region. Moreover, given the fact that a political process 
is needed to secure preference revelation, it follows that particular services should be 
voted on and paid for by the residents of this region. In other words, services which are 
nationwide in their incidence such as national defense, should be provided for National 
Government, services with loca! benefits e.g. streetlights, should be provided for by local 
units, still others such as highways should be provided for on a regional basis. In the 
multiple jurisdictions, each jurisdiction provides services whose benefits accrue within its 
boundaries and it should use only such sources of finance as will internalise the costs. 
The theory of multiunit finance must provide an answer to the question of what 
constitutes, the optimum number of fiscal communities and the number of people within 
each community. To deal with this complex problem, let us begin with a simple model, 
which allows for one public service only, the benefit Incidence of which is limited to all 
within a given geographical area and vanished beyond it. It is also assumed that 
consumers have identical tastes and income, so that, they agree on the desirability of 
social good provision. The crux of the problem is that the cost to each consumer will be 
less provided larger number of consumers takes part in the benefit. Since we postulate a 
pure social good so that the quality of service received per person is that the number of 
participants does not affect the quality of service received per person. The presence of 
savings from cost sharing due to large numbers leads to a single benefit area and, in 
fact to a unitary structure of fiscal provision. There are, however other considerations, 
which may pull in opposite direction towards a multiunit solution. Thus the design of 
optimal community size must strike a balance between the advantage of sharing in the 
cost to a given level of public services and the disadvantages of crowding. To bring out 
the nature of problem, we begin with the two simplifying assumption that people are 
similar in their preferences and income and that those public services are pure social 
goods. 
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2.2.1 OPTIMAL COMMUNITY SIZE 
The choice of optimal size for a given service level is shov^ /n in figure 2.1. We assume 
that a given level of social goods is provided, the total cost of which equals Z rupees. Let 
us suppose further that each member pays a price equal to the marginal benefit received 
and the cost split equally among them. The AA curve then shows the per capita service 
cost (measured on Y axis) for various community size (measured on X axis). This cost 
decrease as numbers (N) increase. Since the cost remains equal to Z throughout, the 
curve AA is a rectangular hyperbola with per capita cost equal to Z/N. It reflects a form of 
'decreasing per capita cost' with increasing number of consumers in the group. The Am 
Am curve, which is derived from the AA curve, shows the marginal savings of per capita 
service cost that results as the group number is increased. The optimal group size would 
be such as to include the entire community. The community would be expanded so long 
as Am Am were positive (i.e. AA were downward sloping), no matter how large the group 
became. 
Figure 2.1: Choice of Optimum Size for Given Service Level 
AA curve: Per capita service cost or Zl N 
AjK„ curve: Marginal savings in per capita service cost 
Oa curve: Per capita crowding cost 
Oe^ curve: Marginal per capita crowding cost 
Number ol persons. 
Source: Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) 
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The situation changes if the cost of crowding is allowed, let OB trace the per capita cost 
or disutility of crowding for various sizes of the group while Obm shows the marginal per 
capita crowding cost. The optimal size of the community will then be given by ON2, 
where Obm is equated with Am Am, calling for N2 members in this case. The community 
will be expanded in numbers so long as the extra per capita savings from cost sharing 
within a larger group exceeds the incremental per capita costs of crowding. Beyond this 
point, further expansion of the group would reduce total welfare and is therefore not 
undertaken. Various governmental units of size ON2 will thus be established with per 
capita costs for each unit set at OC, with a total population P and giving total services 
cost Z in each community. There will be P/N2 jurisdictions with per capita cost of Z/N2. 
If the service level increases and the AA and Am Am curves shift up, the optimum size of 
the group increases. Thus, for a higher service level involving cost 'Z', the per capita 
service cost curve rises to A'A' and the marginal curve to Am' Am' with the optimal group 
size increasing to On4 at a per capita service cost of OD and with the group enlarged to 
N4 members. 
2.2.2 OPTIMAL SERVICE LEVEL 
Now we have to determine the optimal service level for any given group size. This is 
shown in figure 2.2. 
Figure 2.2: Choice of Optimum Service Level for Given Community Size 
Unit cos; 
per capita 
($) 
i ^ ' . 1 - — — • 
1 -^ ^ i — 
i 
(?= Q. 
_ 1 _ 
i-, 
.Service levels, Q o 
Source: Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) 
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Service levels are measured along the horizontal axis and per capita unit service cost on 
the vertical axis. DD is an individual's demand scheduled for the service and since tastes 
and income levels are identical for all, it is representative for all members of the 
community. SS is the cost schedule for the service showing cost of the community as a 
whole. The unit of the facility is here shown to rise with the service level, the scope of Si 
Si depending on the nature of the facility and its production function, 82 S2 is the supply 
schedule, which presents itself to the individual if the community contains N2 members. 
S4S4 reflects the supply schedule in an N4 member community and so forth. The vertical 
level of S2S2 is one half of S1S1. that of S4S4 is one quarter of S1S1 as and so on. 
Assuming a tax structure, which divides total cost equally, all face the same SS 
schedule. Since the same quality is available to each member of the community, the 
services level purchased by various sizes of community will be determined at the 
intersection of the DD curve with the supply curve pertaining to the particular community 
size. Thus the level of services purchased with Ni members will be that corresponding to 
the intersection of S1S1 with DD namely OQ1, the level purchased by N2 members will be 
OQ2 and the level desired by an N2 member community will be OQ4, as shown in the 
diagram. 
2.2.3 OPTIMAL STRUCTURE 
Figure. 2.3: Combination of Optimum Size and Service Level 
Service level, Q 
upt.mal service level at various community sizes 35 
.Size of coriinuinity. A' 
Source: Musgrave and Musgrave (1984) 
In the final step, these two considerations are combined in figure 2.3, with community 
size N measured on the horizontal axis and service levels Q on the vertical axis. In figure 
2.1 we find that a service level involving a total cost Z calls for a community size N2, at a 
higher level. Involving cost Z' calls for size N4 and so forth. This relationship is traced in 
line NN of figure 2.3, which shows the optimal community size at least (Z,Z" etc) of figure 
2.1. Turning to figure 2.2, we find that community size Ni calls for services level Qi, size 
N2 calls for Q2 and so forth. This relationship is traced in line QQ of figure 2.1, showing 
the optimum service levels for various community sizes. The overall optimal solution is at 
E, where the two lines intersect, the optimal service level being O/and the optimal group 
size N7. 
2.2.3.1 EXTENSION OF MODEL 
The model of efficient design thus calls for multiple fiscal units differing in size and 
regional scope. Some will be nationwide, while others sub-national. Now a number of 
complications must be introduced; 
a) Difference In Tastes: It is not possible that tastes of all individual are similar, local 
fiscal units will be similar but tastes differ from individual to individual. Since people differ 
in their preferences for public services, for the efficient solution people with similar tastes 
to should grouped together. Thus, the system will contain multiple units, some similar 
and some different with regard to both size and composition of the public sector. At the 
same time, if the groups split into smaller units they have to pay cost for it. It means as 
the number of people in any one jurisdiction is reduced, some of the advantage from 
larger number groups is lost. Nevertheless, provision for local goods through a multiple 
system of differentiated fiscal units will remain more efficient than a uniform pattern of 
central provision. 
b) Difference In Income: The resulting structure of fiscal units will differ also because 
people have different incomes. Different income groups prefer different social goods. 
Demand will be more income-elastic for some services than for other services. As a 
result, residents whose income varies a little from the average of the community, they 
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satisfy themselves with less facility. Because of this, people with equal income will desire 
to join in the same community. 
But it may be noted that, if the price (or taxes) which people are willing to pay, for a 
given supply of social goods, will be higher if their incomes are larger. As a result, the 
cost of social goods for one who has low income will be less if their neighbours have 
higher incomes and hence are willing to carry a larger share of the cost. This situation 
creates a further tendency for the wealthy to congregate. But it also induces the poor to 
follow the wealthy and the wealthy to exclude the poor via zoning. 
2.3 A CASE FOR LOCAL LEVEL GOVERNMENTS 
Therefore, one of the primary tasks in the study of local finance is to place the local 
governmental functions and finance in the perspective of national and State finances 
and to clearly define their role in national economic development. A pluralistic society is 
unattainable without some degree of economic pluralism. 
As the local bodies are assigned certain functions confined to their area of operation, the 
question arises as to what are the resources transferred to match them. Any transfer of 
central resources to local units is a matter of the extent of devolution. The resource 
allocation as between levels of government assumes significance when a local body is 
created by a statutory enactment with defined functions allocation whether by the 
Central or State Government. 
Any attempt at a function-resource correspondence is rendered difficult for any time 
frame, even though it is considered democratically relevant and economically 
convincing. Local government is not merely a democratic device, but also through it the 
essentially collective local needs as distinct from the national or provincial, could be 
satisfied. The building up of social overheads so necessary, cannot take place fast 
enough unless the local bodies are entrusted with the responsibility of mopping up 
resources for the purpose. 
The separation of functions and resource allocation is a centrally guided operation and 
therefore, resource raising and expenditure programmes are a part of general budgetary 
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system and do not entail special principles of local finance as such except some 
administrative guidelines. In this model there is a greater integration of the economic 
process, because the economic policies of the different levels of government may vary 
considerably from each other. The absence of integration does not necessarily result in 
a less than optimum national welfare, even as integration also may not achieve it. On the 
contrary, a major consideration in justification of local bodies for local interests is that 
total welfare is increased in the process. Before we consider the local fiscal system, it is 
appropriate at this point to dwell with the economies of local government. 
In terms of micro-economic theory, it is said that efficiency in the allocation of a society's 
resources can be pushed to pareto optimum level If the decision making process is 
decentralized at individual unit level. Based on this law, an economic case for local 
government has been developed by Oates. In the resources allocation at the disposal of 
the public sector, i.e., the government, the most efficient distribution among the units is 
that conforms to the pareto-optimum. As between the central, provincial authorities, 
which constitute the public sector, the resource allocation has to follow the interest 
proximity path. 
The market mechanism normally provides for the production and distribution of goods in 
accordance with the individual's revealed preferences, but the citizens do not adequately 
reveal them in respect of public and merit goods. As the preferences are inadequately 
revealed, the market is unable to maximize / minimize their supply. Say for instance, 
provision for the maintenance of defence, police and law, nuclear station, environmental 
preservation etc. cannot be provided at all by market means. Essentially then, when the 
market mechanism fails to operate in a delivery of certain kinds of goods and services in 
appropriate quantities, the government alone as a public agent, can provide them or is 
expected to provide them. 
Thimmiah (1983) observed, "the government is expected to step in when the market fails 
to efficiently allocate the society's resources. Therefore, the government as a collective 
institution is justified for the supply of public and merit goods which are essential for the 
very existence of a society". 
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However, not all the public goods can be provided by any one level of government. A 
specific authority depending upon the prevailing technology of production can make an 
efficient provision for any type or class of goods. Whether the demand for any public 
goods is from the whole group of citizens of the State or part thereof, determines as to 
which unit can undertake the supply of such goods most economically. 
For instance, defence, railways and air transport, malaria eradication, space exploration 
etc., are managed efficiently by the National Government, even as lighting and 
scavenging of town roads are better provided by a local body. It is the size of the public 
and the area which we may term as the market that determine any particular unit's 
efficiency in supplying in supplying them to Its consumers. We may safely say that some 
class of public goods involves economies of scales in their provision. Others are to be 
spatially restricted to achieve economy and efficiency in their supply. The need to delimit 
the provision of various types of public and merit goods spatially arises and as such, 
provision at the optimum level and at least cost can be made only when the demand for 
such public services varying, according to the tastes and preferences of citizens are met. 
Precisely, it is this consideration for spatial delimitation in the supply of goods and 
services that gives a strong theoretical support for a multi-level governmental system. 
Logically, it may be deduced that larger the variety of public and merit goods, more can 
be the units of government, as between the central and the smallest unit. But, 
theoretically it cannot be so, as economies of scale operate against multiplication of 
levels of authority beyond a point. Hence, given a range of economy of scale and cost of 
service delivery, the number of levels of government cannot indefinitely be increased. 
The unit of authority may be conceived on two basis: (1) population and area wise as 
corporations, municipalities, villages, District, etc. and (2) service-wise as water and 
sewerage, street lighting, primary education, etc. While the former provide a number of 
public services restricted to a specific area, the later is restricted to a specific services 
delivery generally over a wider region. 
In brief, we may say that there are some public and merit goods, which have a Statewide 
coverage and others a limited spatial coverage. The latter class of goods caters to the 
varying tastes and preferences of the citizens and thus only can be supplied efficiently 
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and at least cost. The supply of spatially limited public sector goods naturally devolves 
on State, provincial and local governments. 
The principle of the sphere of interest can be effecting provided the resources 
corresponding to them are assigned to the resources corresponding to the respective 
local authorities. The means of financing the production of these goods implies the fund-
raising powers of the local bodies. There cannot be a supply price as in the case of free 
market goods for each public and merit goods. It is truly said that any kind of trading in 
public goods for a voluntary payment (i.e. an exchange price) prevents many citizens for 
enjoying them. This leads to many undesirable results. Therefore, only through a 
compulsory levy of taxes can the cost of supply of public goods be recovered. This 
principle applies, generally to all levels of governments. But In the case of particular type 
of public and merit goods and at the level of local unit, the cost of service principle 
cannot be applied always. Aggregative, however, the tax system as such must be able 
to account for the sum total of the cost of public and merit goods at all levels. 
The function-resource correspondence and the service cost of public goods assume 
theoretical and practical importance when once we accept local units as part of a multi-
governmental system. The issue of local finance can be posed as under: 
(i) In a multi-lavel fiscal system, what should be the basic principles of transfer of 
functions, resources and finances to local bodies? 
(ii) When revenue and expenditure heads are transferred to them, what are the 
guiding considerations in local taxation and expenditure programmes? 
In the matter of functional assignment to local authorities, the spatial delimitation concept 
is considered earlier. Such functions as are confined to the limits of a local body and 
scarcely have any spillover effect are best suited to be assigned to local authorities. 
Traditionally, these functions are: sanitation and health, street lighting, water supply, 
primary education, roads and culverts, town planning, epidemic control, vaccination, etc. 
The significance of some of these functions has changed due to economic and political 
causes over time. Some functions identified as local have become the concern of the 
National Government. Similarly, a few areas considered as State-level are passed on to 
the local bodies. Both technology and economic development add new functions to the 
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The principle of efficiency is an administrative criterion. The principle of suitability is that 
the tax must be most suitable to the local body to administer. That is, the tax must have 
an exclusively local base and the local body must be able to manage the tax easily with 
its limited taxmanship. The adequacy rule is self-explanatory. The tax given over to local 
bodies must be productive enough to yield adequate revenue to meet their expenditures. 
This particular requirement is of special significance in countries like India with a large 
number of local bodies, each differing in size, resource base, etc. The resource-revenue 
response is dissimilar and quite likely that some taxes may not find a base in certain 
local bodies. So, even with the same resource heads revenue potential may differ 
widely. Therefore, along with a common pattern of distribution of revenue sources, there 
should also be some heads of revenue, which can work as balancing factors to correct 
inter-local inequalities and also ensure a national minimum throughout the country in 
local service functions. 
The guiding principles of resource division enunciated earlier can be meaningful only 
when the State and local revenue heads are constitutionally separated. But rarely the 
local bodies are anywhere provided with such safeguards. Therefore, however desirable 
such separation be, the local authorities have to depend for their autonomy on the good 
sense of the State Government and the democratic opinion and vigilance of the 
population. 
According to Thimmaiah, the functions and sources of revenue are divided between 
National and lower level governments on the basis of the above principles. It is but 
natural that more elastic sources of revenue with nation-wide base go to National 
Government and less elastic sources of revenue having immobile and localised tax base 
go to lower level governments. This result in vertical federal fiscal imbalance, i.e, 
imbalance between the expenditure needs and own revenues of local governments 
would be much more than that of the National Government. Financial transfers are also 
justified from offsetting the special externalities and spillover effects of the expenditure 
functions undertaken by the lower level governments. 
42 
However, other adverse effect of multi-level government, namely, tax and expenditure 
overlapping cannot be eliminated through fiscal transfers. They require expenditure and 
tax policy co-ordination and harmonization. 
Multi-level governments also have some advantages, that it encourages competition 
between governments in the supply of public services and hence improve efficiency in 
their design and delivery. It is also assumed that the operation of multi-level 
governments in a country encourages government's authority to reap the benefits of 
comparative advantage in production and supply of a variety of public and social goods 
to the citizens. Yet another advantage assumed is that the multi-level governmental 
system reduces the size of the Government through competition. 
It is true that the operation of a National Government and several State and local 
governments in a contiguous geographical area will provide an opportunity for 
competition between governments of same level in providing public services to the 
citizens. But this competition cannot take place between National, State and lower level 
of governments, because their functions are complementary to each other. Because of 
this difference in the functions, allocated to National, State and local self-governments, 
the scope for competition in supply of social and public goods is limited. 
In the area of revenue sharing, the degree of such complementarity is still lower as the 
sources of revenue are allocated between National, State and local self-governments on 
the basis of spatial spread and mobility of tax base over the geographical area of the 
federation. Through sources of revenues whose base has nation-wide and mobility 
across the boundaries of the State and localities, are normally assigned to National 
Government. The sources of revenue, which have localised base, are assigned to State 
Government or even to local governments. Since National, State and local self-
governments operate on the same geographical area, some sources of revenue, which 
are not related to spatial allocation, face the problem of substitutability. In consequence, 
overlapping of revenue sources occur as between State Governments and local self-
governments. But the scope for competition between State Governments and between 
local self-governments is very high because they perform not only the same functions 
but also raise revenues from same sources, though in separate spatial boundaries. 
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The economic justification of local self-governments was confined only to the allocative 
function of the government. Other functions, redistributive function and stabilization 
function, were exclusively assigned to National Government. But in some of the 
developing countries like, India, economists have rejected the earlier view and expanded 
the functions of local self-government so as to include not only redistributive function but 
also stabilization function. In India under the planning regime the redistributive measures 
were confined to only social welfare programmes. It was only during 1970's that anti 
poverty programmes started emerging. At the same time many State Governments had 
already formulated some limited social security programmes like old age pension, widow 
pension, educated unemployment benefit and such other specified group welfare 
programmes. Some of these programmes no doubt degenerated into populist schemes. 
Even then the State Governments did not bother about the financial implications of such 
programmes in tfie context of movement of people across the boundaries of the States 
to claim such social security benefits. Such leakage was only short lived as many 
adjoining States also started similar programmes to wow the voters. Similarly, while 
National Government is responsible for determining and regulating the money supply, 
issue of currency, coinage and price control, in actual practice whenever prices rise the 
Central Government asked State Governments to take appropriate action to control 
prices by taking effective measures to prevent hoarding of essential commodities. Thus 
we have a situation where both the Central and the State Governments are performing 
redistributive as well as stabilization functions. We have to modify the old concept and 
reconcile it with the reality through the medium of complementarity of the functions of 
National, State and local self-governments. 
The existing functions of the urban local governments have evolved over the past one 
century or so. Functions of ULBs and PRIs have been identified as local in nature not on 
the basis of any economic logic but on the recommendations of the successive 
committees. To give an example, the Rural-Urban Relationship Committee (1966) 
observed that: "the goals of the local government in the context of the changed 
conditions may be listed as follows: 
• to function as local units of self-government, 
• to provide local public services and conveniences, 
• to ensure planned and regulated development of urban areas. 
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• to mobilize local resources and utilize them to the maximum good of the 
community, 
• to promote social, economic and cultural development in an integrated manner". 
The Committee further elaborated the detailed obligatory and discretionary functions of 
ULBs, likewise Askok Mehta Committee in its model Constitution Amendment Bill 
suggested broad functions relating to Panchayati Raj Institutions as: 
"The council shall perform such executive administrative functions within their respective 
territorial jurisdiction as the State Government may, by law, confer on them including 
functions relating to; 
• the promotion of economic and social development, 
• implementation of plans relating to economic and social development made by 
the Central Government or State Government, 
• the State Government shall, with a view to decentralize the power, endeavour to 
devolve progressively greater powers and responsibilities on the councils to 
enable them to function effectively as institutions of self-government.' 
The 73'" and 74* Amendments to the Constitution have broadly indicated functions of 
PRIs and ULBs in the 11* (Annexure A.3) and 12* (Annexure A.4) Schedules 
respectively. A convention to assign certain specific functions to ULBs has developed 
over the years. Now certain new functions have come to be added to them, i.e., 
environmental protection and town planning, urban poverty alleviation, welfare of weaker 
sections, etc. 
Some of the functions like primary education, which was earlier, considered as of local 
nature having come to be transferred to the State level agencies because of the national 
concern for achieving uniform standard of service like universal literacy. Some functions 
like water supply handed over to independent agencies like Jal Sansthans (in case of 
Uttar Pradesh) because of the high capital costs involved in supplying water and high 
degree of technical manpower required. Electricity is also privatized by some of the 
ULBs. 
45 
However, the problem of allocation of functions in regard to PRIs is yet to be settled. 
This is so because these institutions did not function for a long time. In other words, they 
did not exist for a long period to evolve their own locally needed functions. Therefore, the 
State Governments had a free hand in specifying their functions. In this context, while 
formulating the 73''^  and 74* Amendment to the Constitution, suggestion was made to 
prepare and add the 4"^  list to the Constitution as the local self-government list specifying 
the subject of local matters i.e., after the 'Union list', 'State list' and the 'Concurrent list' a 
suggestion was made to add local self-government list. However, this was not supported 
by the National Commission on Urbanization on the ground that it would create rigidity 
and would come in conflict with the interests of the State Government. 
Thus the 73"^  and 74"^  Amendments have only added 11* and 12* schedules by listing 
certain specified broad functions without making them binding either on the State 
Government or on the local bodies. 
The team of framers of the Indian Constitution recommends for the creation of a Finance 
Commission in the Constitution. Accordingly, the Indian Constitution created the Finance 
Commission under Article 280 to make recommendations on the devolution of financial 
resources from the Central Government to the State Governments. The finance 
Commission attracted the attention of the Committees and Commissions, which was 
previously appointed to examine the finances of the ULBs in India. The Rural-Urban 
Relationship Committee (1966) recommended that well before the appointment of the 
Finance Commission by the President, the Governor of each State should appoint a 
body to be known as the Municipal Finance Commission to examine the financial 
requirements of the local bodies for meeting their financial obligations for various 
obligatory services and development schemes. This Municipal Finance Commission 
should not only act as a financial insurance for local bodies of the State Governments, 
but would also act as insurance for the local bodies to make the best use of the taxes 
allocated to them. The State Governments, the Committee observed may include the 
financial implications, from the recommendations of the Municipal Finance Commission 
in their proposals for the National Finance Commission appointed under Article 280. 
Subsequently, the Committee on Budgetary Reforms in Municipal Administration 
appointed by the Government of India, which submitted its report in July 1974, endorsed 
these recommendations. Later, the National Commission on Urbanization, which 
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submitted its report in August 1988, also suggested the appointment of State Finance 
Commissions to recomimend the quantum and distribution of devolution of financial 
resources from the State Governments to the ULBs. 
The Ashok Mehta Committee, which prepared a model of Constitutional Amendment Bill 
for the creation of PRIs, also recommended for the creation of a Finance Commission to 
review the financial position of PRIs and make recommendations on this devolution of 
financial resources from the State Government to PRIs. Thus the idea of having a 
Finance Commission separately for Municipal bodies, which was mooted as early as 
1963, took the shape of a common commission for both ULBs and PRIs, under the 73"^  
and 74"" amendments to the Constitution. 
Both the 73^ ^^  and 74'*^  Amendments to the Constitution have made provision for 
appointment of State Finance Commission to make recommendations on the financial 
transfer to the ULBs as well as PRIs. While the 73"^  Amendment under Article 243-1 has 
provided for a Finance Commission, the 74* Amendment under article 243-Y makes 
reference to the Finance Commission provided under Article 243-1, which should look 
into the financial needs of the ULBs also. 
2.4 SUMMARY 
Fiscal federalism revolves around the two questions, (i) Which level of government 
provides which functions, so as to avoid potential incompatibilities and destructive 
competitions among the government and achieve a social welfare maximum? (ii) How 
much people sort thennselves among the various jurisdiction again with the goal of 
avoiding incompatibilities and intergovernmental competitions and achieving a social 
welfare maximum? Different theories of fiscal federalism have tried to answer these 
questions. In the present study we only examine the theories given by Stigler and Gates. 
Stigler gave two principles of local governance and concluded that decision-making 
should occur at the lowest level of government consistent with the goals of allocational 
efficiency and distributional equity. To achieve an optimal federalist system, various 
legitimate functions of government are best distributed among the governments within 
the fiscal hierarchy. The National Government is the proper government for resolving the 
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distributional question in order to avoid inconsistencies and competition among 
governments. Gates solidified Stigler's principle by suggesting that the optimal form of 
federal government in which each level of government, possessing complete knowledge 
of the tastes of its constituents and seeking to maximize their welfare, would provide the 
Pereto-efficient level of output and would finance this through benefit pricing. 
Those functions that supply public services to meet the varying tastes and preferences 
of citizens should necessarily go to the lower-level governments. Those functions which 
are not involved in such variations in requirements and preferences and which enjoy 
economies of scale should go to the higher level (National/State) of government. 
Whereas in practice such clear-cut demarcation is not possible and it results in spatial 
spillover of benefits and costs. The National Government in such a case should try to 
internalise them by providing financial assistance to local self-governments. This is the 
economic justification for grants from higher-level governments to lower-level 
governments. The resources of revenue, those whose base is spatially mobile, should 
necessarily go to the National Government and those, which are immobile, should go to 
the local governments. Benefit levies are more efficient when they are administered at 
local level, as it is easier to assess the benefits and costs. The sources, which involve 
redistributive role, should go to the National Government on efficiency ground. After 
studying the theoretical explanation of fiscal federalism, the legal framework of local 
bodies in India will follow. 
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CHAPTER -3 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK 
OF LOCAL BODIES IN INDIA 
CHAPTER 3 
LEGISLATIVE FRAMEWORK OF LOCAL BODIES IN INDIA 
Local governments are democratically elected bodies whose jurisdiction is of local level, 
backed by powers to levy local taxes and to exercise their functions. However, they vary 
substantially both geographically and demographically. 
Bailey (1999) suggests some economic principles for local government's size and 
structure, which are as following: 
(i) Local government should be as small as possible without forgoing the 
potential efficiency gains of economies of scale, 
(ii) The jurisdictional areas of local governments should, as far as practically 
possible, be conterminous with the areas benefiting from their provision of 
services, 
(iii) These benefit areas should also match financing area so as to prevent tax 
exporting, 
(iv) Matching of financing and benefit areas may require regional (rather than 
local) government for the provision of some services, 
(v) Benefit areas will have to be periodically reconfigured as service technologies 
and transport infrastructure change over time. 
The type and nature of third layer government in India pose a problem of comparison. 
There are various types of local bodieswhich are furthermore diversified. In the present 
chapter an attempt has been made to have a bird's eye view of the nature and legal 
structural features of these different types of governments in different States. But our 
focus would be mainly on our sample States, i.e. Uttar Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and NCT of 
Delhi. 
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3.1 CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISION AS PER 73"" AND 74™ AMENDMENT FOR 
CONSTITUTION OF RESPECTIVE PRIS AND ULBS 
According to Article 243-1 of Indian Constitution (Annexure A.1), panchayats are 
appointed at all the three levels of governments but at intermediate level it is not 
constituted if population is less then 20 lakhs. All the seats in a panchayat are filled by 
persons chosen by direct election from territorial constituencies in the panchayat area. 
Each panchayat area is divided into territorial constituency and the numbers of seats 
allotted to them are same throughout the panchayat area. 
Panchayats are constituted generally for a period of five years from the date appointed 
for its first meeting. It can also be dissolved as soon as it is being in force. The election 
to constitute a new panchayat should be completed before the expiration of a period of 
six months from the date of its dissolution. Persons can be disqualified from the 
membership of panchayat, if law disqualifies him for the time being in force for the 
purpose of elections to the legislature of the State. No person is disqualified on the 
ground that he/she is less than 25 years of age, if he / she has attained 21 years of age. 
Seats are reserved for scheduled castes (hereafter SO) and scheduled tribes (hereafter 
ST) in the same proportion, to the total number of seats and the proportion of SC/ST in 
that panchayat area, out of which 1/3^ ^ are reserved for SC/ST women. From the total 
seats 1/3"^  of the seats are reserved for women (including reserved for SC/ST women). 
Such seats are allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a panchayat. The offices 
of the Chairperson in the panchayats are also reserved for SC/ST and women in the 
same manner (Article-243-D) (Annexure A.1). 
Panchayats have all the powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to 
function as institutions of self-governments and such law may contain provisions for the 
devolution of powers and responsibilities upon panchayats at the appropriate level. They 
have also some powers to prepare plans for economic development and social justice 
related to matters listed in the XI Schedule. Panchayats have powers to assign, levy and 
collect taxes, duties, tolls and fees in accordance with such procedure and subject to 
such limits. Panchayats also get grants-in-aid from the Consolidated Fund of the State. 
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After the commencement of the Constitution (73'^''Amendment) Act 1992, the Governor 
of State is asked for the creation of State Finance Commission to review the financial 
position of the panchayats and make recommendations to the Governor regarding, the 
distribution between the States and the panchayats of the net proceeds of the taxes, 
duties, tolls and fees leviable by the State and also for the determination of these taxes, 
duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned to, or appropriated by, the panchayats, the 
grants-in-aid to the panchayats from the Consolidated Fund of the State. The SFC has 
to take measures to improve the financial position of the panchayats. 
The legislature of the State may, by law make provisions with respect to the 
maintenance of accounts by the panchayats and the auditing of such accounts. 
The State Election Commission conducts elections of the panchayats. The Governor 
determines the service tenure and office of the State Election Commissioner. The State 
Election Commissioner is not removed from his office except in like manner on like 
grounds by a judge of High Court and the conditions of his services are not varied to his 
disadvantages after his appointment. 
The 73"^  Amendment is also applicable to the Union Territories (hereafter UT) and has 
effect as if the references to the Governor of a State were references to the 
Administrator (Lt. Governor) of the Union Territory appointed under Article-239 and 
references to the Legislature or Legislative Assembly of a State were references in 
relation to UT having a Legislative Assembly. The President may, by public notification 
direct that the provision is to apply to any UT or part thereof subject to such exception 
and modifications as he may specify in the notification. 
The 73''' Amendment is not applicable to the scheduled areas and the tribal areas 
referred in clause (2) of Article 244. It is also not applicable to State of Nagaland, 
Meghalaya and Mizoram, the hilly areas in Manipur, hilly areas of Darjeeling District in 
West Bengal for which Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council exists. 
In the Constitution, the validity of any law relating to the delimitation of constituencies or 
the allotment of seats of such constituencies, made under article 243-K are not question 
in any court. No election to any panchayat are called in question except by an election 
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petition presented to such authority and in such manner as provided for by or under any 
law made by the legislature of a State. 
Similarly for ULBs, according to Article-243 of Indian Constitution, Municipalities are 
constituted in ^very State, Nagar Panchayat at transitional area and Municipal Council at 
small urban area and Municipal Corporation for a larger urban area. The Governor 
differentiate between the transitional, small and large urban area based on their area, 
density of the population, revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of 
employment in non-agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors 
as it may deem fit. 
Ail the seats in a municipaiity are fiiied by persons chosen by direct elections from the 
territorial constituencies in the municipal area and for this purpose each municipal area 
are divided into wards. The person can represent municipality who have special 
knowledge or experiences in municipal administration, the Members of Parliament 
(hereafter MPs) and the Members of Legislature Assembly (hereafters MLAs) of the 
State representing constituencies, which comprise wholly or partly the municipal area, 
the members of the council of the State and members of the Legislative council of the 
State registered as electors within the Municipal area. 
The ward committees consisting one or more wards, constituted in municipality having a 
population of three lakhs or more. The composition of the wards committee and the 
manner in which the seats are filled in ward committee are provided in the Legislature of 
a State. The member of a municipality representing a ward within the territorial area of 
the wards committee is a member of that committee. If the ward committee consists of 
only one ward, then the member representing that ward is the member. For two or more 
wards, one of the members representing such wards in the municipality elected by the 
members of the wards committee is the Chairperson of that committee. 
Seats are reserved for SC/ST in the same proportion to the total number of seats and 
the proportion of SC/ST in the municipality out of which 1/3'^  are reserved for SC/ST 
women. For the total reserved seats 1/3"^  of the seats are reserved for women (including 
reserved for SC/ST women). Such seats are allotted by rotation to different 
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constituencies in a municipality. The office of the Chairperson in the municipality is also 
reserved for SC/ST and women in the same proportion. 
Every municipality, unless dissolved for the time being under any law in force, continue 
for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting. The election to constitute a 
municipality is completed before the expiry of its duration and before the expiration of a 
period of six months from the date of its dissolution. 
A person can be disqualified from the membership of a municipality, if law disqualifies 
him for the time being in force for the purpose of elections to the legislature of the State. 
No person is disqualified on the ground that he is less than 25 years of age, if he / she 
attained 21 years of age. 
Municipalities have all the powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to 
function as institutions of self-government and same law may contain provisions for the 
devolution of powers and responsibilities upon panchayats at the appropriate level. They 
also have some powers to prepare plan for economic development and social justice 
related to matters listed in XII Schedule of the Indian Constitution. 
Municipalities have powers to assign, levy and collect taxes, duties, tolls and fees in 
accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits. Municipality also gets 
grants-in-aid from the Consolidated Fund of the State. 
The Finance Commissions constituted under Article 243-1 also review the financial 
position of the municipalities and make recommendations regarding: 
(i) the distribution between the State and the municipality of the net proceeds of 
the taxes, duties, tolls and fees leviable by the State, which may be divided 
between them and allocated between the municipalities at all levels of their 
respective share. 
(ii) the determination of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees, which may be assigned to 
municipality. 
(iii) The grants-in-aid to the municipalities from the consolidated fund of the State, 
and the measures needed to improve the financial position of the municipality 
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and any other matter referred to the Finance Commission by the Governor in 
the interest of sound finance of the municipalities. 
The legislature of a State may, by law make provision with respect to the maintenance of 
accounts by the municipalities and the auditing of such accounts. 
Elections of the municipalities are conducted by the State Election Commissions as 
referred in the case of panchayats. 
The 74'^  Amendment is also applicable to the Union Territories. The references to the 
Governor of a State are references to the Administrator (Lt. Governor) of the Union 
Territory appointed under Article 239 and references to the Legislature or the legislative 
assembly of a State were references in relation to a Union Territory having a Legislative 
Assembly, to that Legislative Assembly. The 74* Amendment however, is not applicable 
to the Scheduled Areas and the Tribal Areas and do not affect the functions and powers 
of the Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council constituted under the law for the time being in force 
for the hill areas of the Darjeeling District of West Bengal. 
In every State, a District Planning Committee (hereafter DPC) is constituted at District 
level to consolidate the plans prepared by the panchayats and the municipalities in the 
District and to prepare the draft of Development Plan for the District as a whole. 
The Legislature of the State, by law, provides the composition for filling of seats for DPC. 
Not less than 4/5'^ of the members of such committee can be elected from amongst the 
elected members of the panchayat and municipality at the District level in the proportion 
to the ratio between the population of the rural areas and of the urban areas in the 
District. Functions relating to District Planning and the manner in which the Chairpersons 
of such Committees is chosen, may be assigned to such Committees. 
The DPC prepare draft development plans related to the matters of common interest 
between the panchayats and the municipalities including spatial planning, sharing of 
water and other physical and natural resources, the integrated development of 
infrastructure and environment conservation. The Chairperson of every DPC has to 
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forward the Developments Plan, as recommended by any such committee, to the 
Government of the State. 
In every Metropolitan area. Metropolitan Planning Committee (hereafter MPC) is 
constituted to prepare a draft development plan for the Metropolitan area as a whole. 
The legislature of a State provides the composition and filling of seats for such 
committee. Not less than 2/3'" of the members of such committee are elected from 
amongst the elected members of the municipalities and the Chairpersons of the 
panchayats in the metropolitan area in proportion to the ratio between the population of 
the municipalities and of the panchayats in that area. 
The representation in such Committees of the Government of India (hereafter Go!) and 
the Government of the State (hereafter GoS) and of such organisations and institutions 
are made as may be deemed necessary for carrying out the functions assigned to such 
committee. The Chairperson of such Committee is chosen as provided by the 
Legislature of the State. Every MPC prepares the Draft Development Plan, regarding to: 
1. the plans prepared by the municipalities and the panchayats in the 
Metropolitan area. 
2. the matters relating to the common interest of municipalities and panchayats, 
including co-ordinated spatial planning of the area, sharing of water and other 
physical and natural resources, the integrated development of infrastructure 
and environment conservation. 
3. the overall objectives and priorities set by the Gol and GoS. 
4. the investment made in the Metropolitan area by agencies of the Gol and GoS 
and other available resources. 
The Chairperson of MPC forwards the development plan, as recommended by such 
committee to the Gol. 
In the Constitution the validity of any law relating to the determination of constituencies 
or the allotment of seats to such constituencies, made or purporting to be made under 
Article 243-ZA are not called in question in any court. No election to any municipality is 
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called in question except by an election petition presented to such authority and in such 
manner as in provided for, by or under any law made by the legislature of a State. 
Now we turn to examine the State-wise profile regarding application of these provisions. 
3.2 STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN TAMIL NADU 
Local Governments in Tamil Nadu State is bifurcated into Urban Local Bodies and 
Panchayati Raj Institutions. The urban local bodies are again trifurcated into municipal 
corporation, municipalities and town panchayats. These bodies are horizontal local 
bodies and not controlled by any other local bodies. They are independent and directly 
controlled by the State GJovernment only. The PRIs are also trifurcated into three-tiers of 
governments which are vertical in nature, village panchayat (at the grass root level), 
panchayat union council (at the intermediate level) and District panchayat (at District / 
Commissionery level). Out of the total population in Tamil Nadu, PRIs covers 58 per cent 
and ULBs 42 per cent. 
The Government in the case of panchayat union council and District panchayats and the 
inspector in the case of village panchayat shall have power to fix or alter the number, 
designation and grades, the salaries, fees and allowance payable to the officer and 
servant of any village panchayat or panchayat union council or the District panchayat, as 
the case may be. The Government shall have the pov^er to make rules regarding the 
authorities who may appoint the officers and servants of panchayats, other than 
Commissioner and the Chief Executive Officer and the classification, method of 
recruitment, pay and allowance, discipline and conduct of services of such officers and 
servants. Any officer or servant of a village panchayat may be transfered to the service 
of any panchayat union council or any other village panchayat by the inspector, after 
consulting the Commissioner or the executive authority concerned. The structure of local 
governments in Tamil Nadu is given in flow chart 3.1 on the next page. 
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Flow Chart 3.1: Structure of Local Governments in Tamil Nadu 
Structure of Local Governments in 
Tamil Nadu 
Village Panchayat 
(at grass root level) 
3.2.1 RURAL LOCAL BODIES 
Following the introduction of 73rd Constitutional Amendment Act, 1992, which came into 
force in April 1993, the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act, 1994 was enacted. In consonance 
with the amendment, the Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act provides for the three-tier system of 
rural local self-government with 12,617 village panchayats (hereafter VPs) at the 
grassroot level, 385 panchayat unions councils (hereafter PUCs) at intermediate level 
and 28 District panchayats (hereafter DPs) at the District level. Recently, in February 
1999, a new panchayat union in Salem District was notified (Yercaud Panchayat Union) 
with 9 village panchayats. 
57 
3.2.1.1 GRAMSABHA 
The gram sabha (hereafter GS) is the nucleus of the panchayati raj system under the 
1994 Act. It consists of persons registered in the electoral roll relating to the village 
panchayat, (1/3'^ '' members form quorum for transacting the business of the gram sabha, 
but now it is reduces to l/IO""). Comprised within the area of the said VP, it has to meet 
thrice a year and at least once in six months. The gaon sabha has to approve the budget 
proposals and annual plan of the VP and give approval to its annual audit statement of 
expenditure. Meetings of gaon sabha are presided by the President and in his absence, 
by the Vice-President and in absence of both, by a member chosen by the members 
present at the meeting. 
3.2.1.2 VILLAGE PANCHAYAT 
Village Panchayats are the grass root level democratic institution of local administration. 
An officer (known as inspector) not below the rank of Collector appointed by the 
Government, classify and declare every local area comprising a revenue village or 
villages or any portion of revenue village or contiguous portion of two or more revenue 
villages as a village panchayat. At present there are 12,617 VPs in Tamil Nadu. The total 
number of members in a VP varies from 5 to15 depending upon the size of the VP area. 
Each panchayat area is divided into territorial constituencies in such manner that the 
ratio between the population of each constituency and the number of seats allocated to it 
are practicable and same throughout the panchayat area. There is no financial limit. The 
ward members and the president are elected indirectly by and from amongst the elected 
ward members. Seats are reserved for SC/ST and women as per Article 243-D, of the 
Constitution of India. 
3.2.1.3 PANCHAYAT UNION COUNCIL 
Panchayat Union Councils are the intermediate level of rural local government. At 
present there are 385 PUCs in the State encompassing 12,617 village panchayats. The 
1994 Act empowers the Government to declare a Panchayat Development Block of 
Panchayat Union, for purpose of the National Extension Services scheme of community 
development. A PUC is to be formed for each development block. 
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A PUC consists of the direct by elected members from wards in the panchayat union, 
MPs and MLAs representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly of the PUs, 
Member of Legislative Council (hereafter MLC) of the State who are registered as 
electors within the panchayat union and such members (1/5'^  of the total number of the 
members elected directly for the council of presidents of VPs) elected by the presidents 
of the VPs. The PUC consists of persons elected from the wards in the PUC at the rate 
of one member for each 5000 population of PUC area. Seats are reserved for SC/ST 
and women as per Article 243-D of the Constitution of India. The Committees of PUC 
(Annexure A.5) include: 
1. Appointment committee, for appointment of all posts and approval of pay of 
these posts under PUC; 
2. Agriculture production committee; 
3. Education committee; and 
4. General-purpose committee. 
3.2.1.4 DISTRICT PANCHAYAT 
District Panchayats are constituted at the District level. It is having jurisdiction over the 
entire District excluding that portions which are included in a municipality or town 
panchayat or industrial town ship or under the authority of a municipal corporation or a 
cantonment. 
District Panchayat are constituted with directly elected members (one member for every 
50,000 population). The MPs and MLAs from the District, ex-officio members of the 
District panchayat council, MLC of States who are registered as electors within the 
District, are members of the District Panchayats. Seats are reserved for SC/ST and 
women as per Article 243-D of the Constitution of India. The District Panchayat consists 
of following committees: (Annexure A.5). 
(i) Committee for food and agriculture; 
(ii) Industry and labour committee; 
(iii) Public works committee; 
(iv) Education committee; and 
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(v) Committee for health and welfare including prohibition. 
3.2.2 URBAN LOCAL BODIES 
3.2.2.1 TOWN PANCHAYATS 
A unique feature of a Tamil Nadu's urban local self-government is the existence of town 
panchayats (hereafter TPs), which are not purely urban but in a transition stage of being 
converted into an urban local body from a village panchayat. Every local area comprising 
of a revenue village or villages or any portion of a revenue village and having a 
population estimated at not less than five thousand and 75 per cent of male working 
population are engaged in non-agricultural activities, with annual income of not less than 
1 lakh of rupees has been classified and declared as town panchayat. There are 635 
town panchayats in TN. Analysis of existing position reveals that the majority of them are 
still predominantly rural in character. 
Town Panchayat consists of two persons of 25 years or more having special knowledge 
or experience in municipal administration, to be nominated by the State Government, but 
do not have right to vote in the meetings of the municipal council, and the MP's, MLA's 
and the MLC's of the State who are registered as electors within the area of town 
panchayat. Seats are reserved for SC/ST and women as per Article 243-D of the Indian 
Constitution. 
3.2.2.2 MUNICIPALITIES 
The Governor of the State can declare any small urban area to be a municipality 
provided the minimum population is 20,000 and 75 per cent of the male working 
population are engaged in non-agricultural activities and the annual income exceeds Rs 
3 lakhs. At present there are 104 municipalities in Tamil Nadu. Municipality is comprised 
of the President who is the Chairman, elected by those whose names appear in the 
electoral rolls relating to the municipality and 20-25 councillors (not less than 25 years of 
age) The term of the Chairman is for five years. The councillors elect one member 
amongst themselves to be its Vice-Chairman. Two persons (not less than 25 years of 
age) having special knowledge or experience in municipal administration are nominated 
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by the State Government, but they do not have right to vote in the meetings of 
municipality. Seats are reserved for SC/ST and w/omen as per Article 243 -T of the 
Constitution of India. 
3.2.2.3 MUNiCiPAL CORPORATION 
There are at present six Municipal Corporations in Tamil Nadu, having population 
ranging from 5 to 10 lakhs and having average annual income of over 50 crores. The 
Chennai Municipal Corporation consists of 155 elected councilors; apart from this 10 
persons (25 years of age) are nominated by the State Government. Seats are reserved 
for SC/ST and women as per Article 243-T of the Constitution of India. 
As provided in the Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919, the State Government 
may, by notification'and subject to such conditions and restrictions, entrust to the 
corporation, the standing committees, v^ /ard committees or any other committee 
constituted under the Act with such powers and responsibilities with respect to the 
preparation of plans for economic development and social justice to enable them to carry 
out the responsibilities conferred upon them including those in relation to the matters 
listed in the Act. 
3.3 STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN UTTAR PRADESH 
The structure of Uttar Pradesh seems almost similar to Tamil Nadu except the diference 
is of nomenclature. Local Government in UP is bifurcated into urban local bodies and 
panchayati Raj Institutions. ULBs are trifurcated into three horizontal urban local bodies 
i.e., Nagar Nigam, Nagar Palika Parishad and Nagar Panchayat; these bodies are 
independent and directly controlled by the State Government. The Panchayati Raj 
Institutions have a vertical three-tiers of rural governments i.e. Gram Panchayat at the 
grass root level, Kshetra Panchayat at block level and Zila Parishad at the District level. 
Out of the total population in Uttar Pradesh, PRIs covers 80 per cent and ULBs 20 per 
cent. 
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Flow Chart- 3.2: Structure of Local Government in Uttar Pradesh 
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3.3.1 RURAL LOCAL BODIES 
The Provincial Government in Uttar Pradesh (earlier known as United Provinces) 
enacted the first Village Panchayat Act, 1920, in order to set-up village level bodies with 
a view to assisting the administration of civil and criminal justice and also to improve 
sanitation and other common concerns of the village. The Collector of the District 
appointed the panches of panchayats, set up under the United Provinces District Board 
Act, 1922. The panchayats of that period were clearly meant to be agencies of the 
Government. In 1947 when the Congress Government assumed office, it passed the 
United Provinces Panchayat Act, 1947 and in 1949, gram panchayats were constituted 
across the State. Subsequently, after about a decade in 1961, the State adopted a 
three-tier system of PRIs, which were renamed as gram panchayat at village level, 
- kshetra panchayat at the block level and zila panchayat at the District level. The United 
Provinces Panchayat Act, 1947 and the Kshetra Samiti and Zila Parishad Adhiniyam, 
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1961 have been amended in 1994, after the promulgation of the 73"^  Amendment to the 
Constitution. 
3.3.1.1 GRAM SABHA 
The State Government shall by notification in the Official Gazette, establish a gram 
sabha for a village or a group of villages by the name of the village having the largest 
population. Every person whose name is included in the electoral roll for a gram sabha is 
a member of the gram sabha. A member of a gram sabha ceases to be such member if 
the entry relating to that member is deleted from the electoral roll for the gram sabha. 
The gram sabha have two general meetings every year, one soon after harvesting of the 
kharif crop and the other soon after harvesting of the rabi crop. The pradhan of the 
panchayat calls the meeting and also presides over them. 1/5"^  of the members form the 
quorum. 
3.3.1.2 GRAM PANCHAYAT 
A gram panchayat (hereafter GP) is established in every panchayat area. The term of 
gram panchayat is for five years. There is a general election, in the manner prescribed, 
to constitute or reconstitute gram panchayat. It consists of a Pradhan and 5 to 9 
members, depending upon the population. If population is 1000 then 9 members, for 
population 1000-2000 then 11 members, for population 2000-3000 then 13 members 
and for population more than 3000 there will be 15 members. For election of gram 
panchayat every panchayat area are divided into territorial constituencies in such 
manner that the ratio between the population and the member of seats allotted to it, are 
same through out the panchayat area. The members of the gram sabha from among 
themselves elect the Pradhan of a GP. At present there are 58,605 gram panchayats in 
Uttar Pradesh. Seats are reserved for SC/ST and women as per Article 243-D of the 
Constitution of India. 
Committees of Gram Panchayat 
Every Gram Panchayat shall constitute the following (Annexure A.5) committees: 
(i) 'Samata Samiti' performs the functions relating to promotion of economic, 
social and cultural interests and prevention of social injustice and 
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exploitation of SC/ST and other backward classes, welfare of women and 
children and their protection from social injustice and exploitation, 
(ii) Vikas Samiti performs functions relating to agricultural protection, animal 
husbandry, rural industry and poverty alleviation programmes, 
(iii) Gram Shiksha Samiti performs functions relating to promotion and 
development of primary education, 
(iv) Lok Hit Samiti for function relating to public health, public works and other 
functions of the gram panchayat. 
3.3.1.3 KSHETRA PANCHAYAT 
The rural areas of each District are divided into 'Khands' specifying each khand by a 
name and the limits. Kshetra Panchayat (hereafter KP) consists of all Pradhans of 
constituent gram sabha, the Chairman of the Committee for a Town area and the 
President of the Committee for a Notified Area, between two to five members from co-
operative societies, all MPs and MLAs whose constituencies include khand and all MPs 
and MLAs who have their residence in the khand. The KP is constituted for five years 
and seats are reserved for SC/ST and women as per Article 243-D of the Constitution oi 
India. 
Committees of Kshetra Panchayats 
Every Kshetra Panchayat has the following (Annexure A.5) Committees: 
(i) Karya Samiti (Working Committee); 
(ii) Vitta Evam Vikas Samiti (Finance and Development Committee); 
(iii) Shiksha Samiti (Education Committee); 
(iv) Samatas Samiti (Social Justice Committee) 
3.3.1.4 NAY AY PANCHAYAT 
Nayay Panchayat (hereafter NP) is established for each circle in the District comprising 
of a number of gram panchayats. The number of members in a NP varies from 10 to 25 
and they are known as panchs, who are appointed from the gram panchayat. Out of 
these, two members are elected for Sarpanch and Sahayak (assistant) Sarpanch. The 
Sarpanch has the power to form benches consisting of five panches each for the 
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disposal of cases and enquiries coming up before the nayay panchayat. The State 
Government may prescribe the Constitution of special benches for the trial of any class 
or classes of cases. A NP can impose Rs 5 as a penalty but not exceeding Rs 250. it 
has no power to imprison a person for default of payment. For the last 25 years, the NPs 
have not been functioning in the State. 
3.3.1.5 ZILAPARISHAD 
The Zila Parishads (hereafter ZP) are the highest tier of the PRI. It is an autonomous 
body exercising jurisdiction over the rural areas in the revenue District of UP and are 
responsible for the local self-government in the area. At present, there are 63 Zila 
Pahshads functioning in the State of UP. The ZP consists of the following members-
Pramukh of all KPs established in the District, specified number of representatives 
elected by the kshetra panchayats from their members the presidents of all the municipal 
boards in the District, the head of the Disthct co-operative bank, a representaive of 
cooperation societies to be chosen as specified by the State Government, the Chairman 
of the District-co-operative Federation, all MPs (lok sabha) and MLAs from the District or 
part, all MPs (Rajya sabha) and MLAs residing in the District. The term of ZP and 
members is for five years. Seats are reserved for SC/ST and women as per Article 243-
D of the Constitution of India. Adhayaksha (Chairman) and Upadhayaksha (Vice 
chairman) are elected through secret ballot by the memibers of ZP. An Adhayaksha who 
is not otherwise a member of a parishad is an ex-officio member. 
Committees of Zila Panchayat 
The ZP acts through several committees, which are as follows and details of these 
committees are provided in Annexure A.5: 
(i) The Karya Samiti (Executive Committee), 
(ii) Vitta Samiti (Finance Committee), 
(iii) Siiiksiia Evam Jan Swasttiya Samiti (Education & Health Committee), 
(iv) Krishi Udyog Evam Nirman Samiti (Agriculture & Public Works 
Committee), 
(v) Samta Samiti (Social Welfare Committee), 
(vi) Niyojan Sam/Y/(Planning Committee). 
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3.3.2 URBAN LOCAL BODIES 
3.3.2.1 NAGAR PANCHAYAT AND MUNICIPALITY 
The Governor may, having regard to the population and density of population of any 
local area, revenue generation, percentage of employment in non-agricultural activities, 
the economic importance and such other factors as may deem fit, declare any local area 
having population between one to five lakhs as municipality and nagar panchayat having 
population between 30,000 to 1 lakh. Nagar Panchayat are for the transitional i.e. 
transformed from rural to urban areas. 
A municipality consists of the President, who is its Chairperson and 25 to 55 elected. In 
case of Nagar Panchayat elected mem.bers varies from 10 to 24. The ex-officio 
members, comprising all the MPs and the MLAs representing constituencies, which 
comprise wholly or partly of the municipal area, do not have right to vote in the meeting 
of the municipality. The ex-officio members, comprising MLCs, nominated by the State 
Government, in the Official Gazettee, from amongst persons having special knowledge 
or experience in municipal administration and whose numbers varies from two to three in 
nagar panchayat and three to five in municipality. Seats are reserved for SC/ST and 
women as per Article 243-T of the Constitution of India. 
3.3.2.2 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
Municipal Corporations are constituted in every big city, depending on certain factors 
such as size and the municipal sources. It consists of a Nagar Pramukh and Sabhasads 
whose number varies from 60 to 110. Nam Nirdishta Sadasyas who are nominated by 
the State Government from amongst persons having special knowledge or experience in 
municipal administration and who's number varies between 5 to 10, but they do not have 
right to vote in the meetings of the corporation; Paden Sadasyas comprising the MPs 
and the MLAs representing constituencies comprising the whole or part of the city, who 
are registered as electors in the city. The Chairperson of the Committees are not the 
members of the corporation. The Sabhasads are chosen by direct elections from the 
wards. Seats are reserved for SC/ST and women as per Article 243-T of the Constitution 
of India. 
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3.4 STRUCTURE OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN THE NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY 
OF DELHI 
Delhi has a unique character because it is quasi-state union territory. The structure of 
local bodies in NOT of Delhi is described below: 
Flow Chart- 3.3: Structure of Local Government In National Capital Territory of 
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3.4.1 RURAL LOCAL BODIES 
Unlike the States in India, the NOT of Delhi iiad a single-tier system of Panchayati Raj till 
Februrary 1961 when an attempt was made to provide for a second tier through an 
executive notification by the Lt. Governor. This second tier was only a non-statutory and 
advisory body at the block level in the five blocks. There was also an elected Circle 
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Panchayat, which performed primarily judicial functions. Thus the Panchayati Raj in 
Delhi consisted of two statutory institutions and a non-statutory body, namely: 
• The gaon sabha and the gaon panchayat which were the democratic 
institutions at the grassroots level, 
• The circle panchayats which performed primarily judicial functions and 
• The panchayat samiti as an advisory body at the block level. 
These rural local bodies now come under the jurisdiction of the Municipal Corporation of 
Delhi. 
3.4.1.1 GAON SABHA 
The gaon sabha comprised of all the eligible voters in the panchayat areas. The sabha 
elected the panches and also the pradhan who headed the panchayat and presided over 
the deliberations of both the panchayat and the sabha. While the goan sabha elected the 
pradhan, the up-pradhan was elected by the goan panchayat from among its members. 
The term of office of the pradhan, the up-pradhan and the panches was of three years 
and the period could be extended by two years by the Chief Commissioner (now Lt. 
Governor). The goan sabha could, at a meeting specially convened for the purpose, 
remove the pradhan or the up-pradhan by a two-thirds majority of the members present 
and voting. The government could also remove them for misconduct. 
3.4.1.2 PANCHAYAT SAMITI 
The Panchayat Samiti is a non-statutory creation, which acted as an advisory body in 
Delhi. It consisted of the following: 
1. Pradhans of the panchayats within the block; 
2. MP's of the constituency of which the block was a part; 
3. The Municipal Councillor whose constituency fell within the block; 
4. One representative of the Cooperative Marketing Society existing in the block (to 
be elected by the society); 
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5. One woman and one harijan to be co-opted by the Chairperson of the Block 
Panchayat Samiti, if it did not have such members already in the samiti; 
6. One representative of the Jamia Rural Institute (Jamil Millia Islamia in the case of 
Shahdara block); and 
7. One representative each of the Agricultural Product Market Committees of 
Narela and Najafgarh (only in these two panchayat samitis); 
8. Some members are invitees, such as a representative of the Municipal Zonal 
Officer of which the block formed a part, the Medical Officer of the primary health 
centre and the sanitary inspector; 
9. Some of the representatives from the functional departments of the Delhi 
Administration in an advisory capacity are also included like, the Extension 
Officers of the Departments of Agriculture and Industry of the Delhi 
Administration, the Co-operative Inspectors and the Panchayat Officer posted in 
the block; 
10. The Block Development Officer acted as Member-Secretary of the Panchayat 
Samiti. 
The pradhans of the panchayats of the block elected from among themselves a 
chairperson. The samiti generally met once in a month and had a term of three years. 
3.4.1.3 CIRCLE PANCHAYATS 
The circle panchayats performs primarily tv/o types of judicial functions: (i) to provide 
panels of panchayat adalat (courts) for the trial of certain types of suits, criminal cases 
and proceedings specified in the act; and (ii) to perform certain development and related 
functions. The circle panchayats are elected by the gaon sabhas constituting the unit, in 
the same manner as the members of the gaon panchayats are elected. The gaon 
sabhas area with a population of 1,000 or less returne two persons and those with more 
than 1,000 returne three persons. Each of the circle panchayats electe from among its 
members a sarpanch and a nabi sarpanch. The government can remove them for 
misconduct or other reasons. There are 23 Circle Panchayats in NOT of Delhi as a 
whole. 
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The civil jurisdiction of the circle panchayat extends over petty amount suits dealing with 
respect to description if the value did not exceed Rs 200, a suit for money due on 
contract immovable property, recovery of moveable property; compensation for 
wrongfully taking or damaging a moveable property; and damages caused by cattle 
tresspass. 
3.4.2 URBAN LOCAL BODIES 
After the adoption of the Constitution of India, the Parliament enacted the Government of 
Part C State Act, which provided for an elected Legislature Assembly for Delhi with a 
Council of Ministers, but this arrangement lasted for four years from 1952 to 1956. With 
the enactment of the Constitution (seventh) Amendment Act, 1956, Delhi ceased to be a 
Part C State and became a Union Territory under the direct administration of the 
President of India. In 1966 a new elected body called the Metropolitan Council of Delhi 
was created by the enactment of Delhi Administration Act, 1966. The Act provided for an 
Executive Council, which was headed by the Lt. Governor of Delhi and comprised of the 
Chief Executive Councillor and three Executive Councillors. 
The current set up of Delhi was brought about by Article 239-AA of the Constitution 
inserted by the Constitution (Sixty-ninth Amendment) Act, 1991. By this amendment the 
name of the Union Territory of Delhi was changed to National Capital Territory of Delhi 
(hereafter NCT of Delhi). Though it continues as a union territory, it has been endowed 
with a Legislative Assembly with a Chief Minister and a Council of Ministers with limited 
powers as distinct from the powers available to them in other States. Matters covered by 
entries 1, 2 and 18 of the State List of the Seventh Schedule viz., public order, police 
and land have been kept outside the purview of the Legislative Assembly of NCT of 
Delhi. Further, even in matters falling in the State List, the powers of Parliament under 
the Constitution to make laws with respect to any matter for a Union Territory or any part 
thereof, too has not been diluted in any way. In the event of such powers being 
exercised, by both, the law made by the Legislative Assembly shall, to the extent it is 
repugnant to that made by Parliament, be void. The powers of the Council of Ministers to 
aid and advise the Lt. Governor is confined only to matters with respect to which the 
Legislative Assembly has powers to make laws and in the case of any difference of 
opinion between the Lt. Governor and the Council of Ministers on any matter, the Lt. 
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Governor is authorised to make a reference to the President for decision and to act 
according to the decision given thereon by the President. Even though the matters 
governing the local bodies are covered by Entry No.5 of the State List in the Seventh 
Schedule, the enactment governing the municipalities in Delhi namely the MCD 
(Amendment) Act, 1993 and NDMC Act, 1994 were nevertheless made by the 
Parliament, notwithstanding that a Legislative Assembly was already in existence in 
Delhi. Such a provision may have far reaching consequence on the legal framework 
within which the municipalities of NCT function, vis-a-vis the Central Government and 
Government of NCT of Delhi. 
3.4.2.1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI 
Delhi Municipal Commission came into existence in the year 1862. At that time, it was 
confined to an area of two square miles with population of 1.2 lakhs. Later, Delhi 
Municipal Committee replaced Delhi Municipal Commission. It had 21 nominated 
members: 6 government officials and the remaining 15 were nominated officials (3 
European, 6 Hindus and 6 Muslims). After independence, Delhi Municipal Committee 
was reconstituted in November 1951, with the total number of members increased from 
21 to 63 of which, 50 were elected on the basis of adult franchise. The Delhi Municipal 
Conimittee converted to Corporation in 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 
1957, was enacted by the Parliament on December 28, 1957. The first corporation came 
into existence on April 7, 1958 following the elections held in March 1958. Nine of the 
eleven local bodies and the Delhi District Board (for civic needs of rural area) were 
merged into it. The Delhi Cantonment Board (hereafter DCB) and New Delhi Municipal 
Committee (hereafter NDMC) continued to exist as separate entities. 
Implementation of the 73"^  and 74"^  Constitution Amendment Acts, 1992 not only 
necessitated but also dictated major amendments in the Delhi Municipal Corporation 
Act, 1957. The Delhi Municipal Corporation (amendment) Act 1993, was passed by 
Parliament on September 17,1993 and its provisions were enforced from October 1, 
1993, incorporating fundamental changes in the composition, functions, governance and 
administration of the Corporation. 
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Among all the local bodies in the NCT of Delhi, only Municipal Corporation of Delhi 
(hereafter MCD) conforms to the norms of the local self-government. It is a unique 
municipal body in the sense that it discharges the functions of the District Board for rural 
areas as also other functions, which are normally discharged by the corporations in other 
States. It is also entrusted with the work of developmental nature, particularly 
construction of arterial roads and over-bridges, laying of trunk mains for water supply 
and sewerage, etc throughout the NCT of Delhi. The MCD claims in the memorandum 
submitted to the first State Finance Commission, that it is the largest municipal authority 
in the world on the basis of population. The whole area of the NCT of Delhi, except 
covered by NDMC and DCB, is under the jurisdiction of MCD and its growth and 
development are the Constitutional responsibility of the Government of India. The 
Corporation which employees over one lakh people, more than any other local body in 
the country and nearly 50 per cent more than Government of NCT of Delhi Is, thus, 
distinguished by the scope and magnitude of the duties and obligations discharged by it, 
in comparison to other municipal corporations. Its special relationship with Government 
of India has a direct bearing on its financial resources and administrative functioning. 
According to the 2001 census, the total population residing in MCD area was 1.25 crores 
of which 12.50 lakhs was rural. Its general budget is nearly one-third the size of the 
budget of NCT of Delhi. The city has been growing fast year after year without a 
commensurate growth in the resources required for meeting the civic needs of the 
residents as well as a large floating population. 
MCD's larger population lives in semi-urban and rural areas, which are devoid of basic 
civic amenities. Providing these facilities casts a heavy burden on its resources, as the 
level demanded is the same as for urban areas. To provide basic amenities like water, 
electricity and transport, three statutory bodies, were established under the control of 
Government of India through viz. Delhi Joint Water and Sewage Board Act, 1926 (now 
named as Delhi Jal Board), Delhi State Electricity Board Act, 1951 (now named as Delhi 
Vidyut Board which was recently privatized) and Delhi Transport Authority Act, 1952. 
(now named as Delhi Transport Corporation). 
The Administration and day-to-day activities of MCD are looked after by the Municipal 
Commissioner. The delivery of services as also revenue administration of MCD is 
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decentralized through a network of 12 Zones directed from the headquarters in the Town 
Hall. A Deputy Municipal Commissioner heads a Zonal office. Zones are further sub-
divided into wards, which are in all 134 in number. 
The Corporation is composed of the directly elected councillors, on the basis of adult 
franchise (suffrages) from various wards. Ten Persons, who are not less than 25 years 
of age and having special knowledge or experience in municipal administration, are 
nominated by the Administrator and have the right to vote in the meetings of the 
Corporation. MPs representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the area 
of the Corporation and the MLAs, 1/5"" of the MLAs of the NCT of Delhi representing 
constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the area of the corporation to be 
nominated by the Speaker of that Legislative Assembly by rotation every year; provided 
that while nominating such members by rotation the Speaker shall ensure that as far as 
possible all the members are given an opportunity of being represented in the 
corporation at least once during the duration of the corporation, are members of the 
corporation. 
3.4.2.2 NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
The first municipality for the imperial city of Delhi was set up in February 1916 by the 
name of Raisina Municipal Committee. After nine years, in April 1925, it was upgraded to 
a second-class municipality under the Punjab Municipal Act. The Committee consisted 
of ten members and a Chairperson. In September 1925, it was allowed to impose taxes 
on building. In February 1927, the committee was renamed as New Delhi Municipal 
Council (NDMC) and in 1932 it was upgraded as first class municipality. 
In February 1980, NDMC was superseded and an administrator was entrusted with all 
powers vested in the Committee. Balakrishnan Committee recommended for 
reorganization of NDMC. The Punjab Municipal Act, 1911, as applied to NDMC was 
replaced by the NDMC Act, 1994 and Council was notified on November 10, 1995. 
The NDMC has a unique set-up, unique in the sense; it has excluded the modality of 
electing Municipal Councillors. The Chairperson is appointed by the Central Government 
in consultation with the Chief Minister of NCT of Delhi, who is an officer of / or above the 
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rank of Joint Secretary to the Government of India. Out of the other ten members, seven 
of them are nominated and other three are MLAs of Delhi. Vice-chairperson is also 
nominated by the Central Government in consultation v i^th the Chief Minister of NCT of 
Delhi from among the ten members. Among these three nominated members ten are 
women and one belonging to SCs representing constituencies, which comprise wholly or 
partly the NDMC. The MPs representing the constituency, which comprise wholly or 
partly NDMC area are special invitee to the meeting of council without having the right to 
vote. 
3.5 SUMMARY 
When the structure of rural and urban local bodies in TN, UP and NCT of Delhi is 
compared, the structure of TN and UP seems almost similar except the difference in 
nomenclature. Delhi on the contrary being a former union territory and now a quasi-state 
government, does have different structure for local bodies. In TN and UP, there are three 
horizontal urban local bodies and three vertical rural local bodies, whereas, NCT of Delhi 
is quite different. It has two tier rural local bodies; one at the grass root level and the 
second tier is only a non-statutory and advisory body at the block level and three 
horizontal urban bodies i.e., MCD, NDMC and DCB. Among all the local bodies in the 
NCT of Delhi only MCD conforms to the norms of the local self-government. MCD has 
also is unique character that it also has rural areas within its jurisdiction. The NDMC has 
a unique setup, in the sense; it has e.xcluded the modality of electing Municipal 
Councilors. 
Rural local bodies of all these three States consist of gram sabha. The common features 
of the gram sabha are that, it consists of persons registered in the electoral roll relating 
to village panchayat and these sabha elect members, Chairman and Vice-Chairman. 
The quorum for a meeting of gram sabha are V3"^ in the case of TN and 1/5'" in UP and 
213'^ for NCT of Delhi. Gram Sabha meets atleast thrice in a year but not more than six 
months are intervening between any two meetings in TN. In UP it meets at least twice in 
the year. Village Panchayat of TN and Gram Panchayat of UP are constituted for five 
years. Village Panchayat can be constituted in TN with minimum population of 500 or 
more. Whereas this minimum limit is 1000 in case of gram panchayat of UP. The 
chairman is known as President in TN and Pradhan in UP and NCT of Delhi. The VPs in 
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TN has five to fifteen members whereas nine to fifteen in case UP depending upon the 
population and these miembers are chosen by direct election. In all these three States 
reservation of SC/ST and women is in proportion to the population but does not exceed 
27 per cent. 
In UP, Pradhan of gram panchayat can be removed by a majority of 2/3^^  members of 
the panchayats present and voting. No motion in the first year is allowed but in case 
motion fails, it cannot be moved again within one year. In NCT of Delhi also, for removal 
of Pradhan of Gaon Sabha, 2/3"^  majority of the members present and voting is required. 
Intermediate levels of panchayat have different nomenclature. In TN, it is known as 
PUC, whereas in UP it is called Kshetra Panchayat and in case of NCT of Delhi it is 
known as Panchayat Samiti. Panchayat Samiti of Delhi is a non-statutory local body that 
acts as an advisory body. The PUCs are headed by Chairman and KP by Pradhan. The 
PUC consists of elected members (at the rate of one for 5,000 population), MP's, MLA's 
and Presidents of village panchayat. The KP consists of elected members (at the rate of 
1 for 2,000 population), all Pradhans (ex-officio) MP's and MLA's. In PUC notice by 2/3''' 
members and the government after considering the view of the members of the council 
can remove the Chairman and in KP it may be done by the majority of the elected 
members. No notice within one year and no fresh notice within one year of rejections 
can be considered. In both KP and PUC, seats are reserved for SC/ST and women in 
proportion to their population but not exceeding 27 per cent. 
Town Panchayat in Tamil Nadu and Nagar Panchayat in Uttar Pradesh are in a 
transition stage of being converted into an Urban Local bodies from Village Panchayat, 
having a population limiit of minimum 5,000 and 75 per cent of the male population are 
engaged in non-agriculture activities in TN and 30,000 to 1 lakhs in case of UP. Town 
Panchayat (TN) consists of two persons nominated by State Government, MPs, MLAs 
and MLCs of State. Whereas Nagar Panchayat (UP) consists of ten to twenty four 
members and ex-officio members, MPs and MLAs representing constituencies and two 
to three MLCs. 
In Tamil Nadu, jurisdiction having minimum population of 20,000 and 75 per cent of male 
members engaged in non-agricultural activities qualify to be a municipality. In case of 
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UP, minimum population varies between 1-5 lakhs. Municipalities of Tamil Nadu consist 
of a Chairman and twenty to twenty-five councillors out of whom one councillor is the 
Vice Chairman and two members nominated by the State Government. The municipality 
of UP consists of the Chairperson and twenty-five to fifty-five elected, ex-officio members 
compnsing all the MPs, MLAs representing constituencies and three to five MLCs 
nominated by the State. NDMC consists of a Chairperson nominated by the Central 
Government, three MLAs of Delhi, five members nominated by Central Government, two 
members nominated by Central Government in consultation with the Chief Minister of 
Delhi, and two MPs. Reservation for SC/ST and women are similar in these 
municipalities and it is according to Article 243-T of the Constitution of Indian. 
Municipal Corporations of TN consists of elected councillors, MPs, MLAs and members 
nominated by the State Government. Municipal Corporations of UP consists of Nagar 
Pramukh and Sabhasads whose number varies between 60-110, MP's and MLA's of 
that area and the State Government nominate five to ten members. The Sabhasads are 
chosen by direct elections. Municipal Corporation of Delhi is composed of the directly 
elected councilors, on the basis of adult franchise from various wards, ten persons are 
nominated by the Administrator, all the MP's of MCD area, the MLA's and 1/5* MLA's of 
the NCT of Delhi nominated by the speaker of that Legislative Assembly. In all the three 
States, seats are reserved for SC/ST and women candidates in proportion to the 
population and as per Article 243-T of Indian Constitution. 
After legislative framework of the local bodies an examination of the functions assigned 
to them to follow. 
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CHAPTER -^ 
ASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS 
TO LOCAL BODIES 
CHAPTER 4 
ASSIGNMEENT OF FUNCTIONS TO LOCAL BODIES 
Under the decentralized governance system each level of government namely Central, 
State and Local are supposed to shoulder respective responsibilities of providing public 
goods to the society. Under the Constitution of India while list-l enlists the functions to be 
performed by the Central Government and State Government, lists-li provides a mixed 
category of services, which may be discharged by the Central and State Governments 
combined. For the third tier level government, the Constitution has provided Schedule XI 
and XII (detailed lists are given in Annexure A.1 & A.2) for rural and urban local bodies. 
These are indicative lists of functions only. The respective State Government may 
assign one or all and also in addition to the list, other functions also, to any level of 
government through legislature decisions. 
As a prelude to an in-depth examination of the functions of the local bodies, it is 
necessary to enquire into the functions and resources assigned to them and the 
rationale thereof. This is a pre-requisite to any kind of appraisal of performance of these 
bodies. 
History and convention had the influential role in determining the functions of local 
bodies in each country' rather than passing through the scrutiny of any principle of 
administrative or theoretical tenets. Conformity legislations enacted by State 
Governments indicated wide differences in the perception of the States regarding the 
obligatory and discretionary functions of the municipalities. Mohanty (1995) suggests a 
common framework for clarifying the assignment of municipal functions, keeping in view 
the theory of the fiscal federalism and the rationale behind popular international and 
national practices. This theory asserts that the public sector functions should to the 
extent possible, be carried out by the lowest level of government. As Gates (1972) 
describes the fundamental rule for the distribution of expenditure, responsibilities in a 
federation, "each public services should be provided by the jurisdiction having control 
over the minimum geographic area that would internalise the benefits and costs of such 
provision". This rule is justified on the ground of efficient allocation of budgetary 
resources with access to local knowledge, administrative feasibility, financial autonomy 
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and accountability. The theory of fiscal federalism has recently been formally adopted by 
the European Union under the name of 'subsidianty' (European Commission, 1993). 
In terms of the theory of fiscal federalism, functions whose benefits are largely confined 
to geographical area and which are subject to heterogeneous preferences are suitable 
for the municipalities. These are the 'essential' municipal functions. Services with large 
spillover effects, distributional and stabilization attributes and providing uniform benefits 
need to be entrusted to the higher levels of the government. Similarly, functions that 
involves substantial economies of scale or are of national interest may not be assigned 
to small local bodies. For valid reasons certain functions of higher authorities are 
appropriate for entrustment to the municipalities, as if under principal-agents contracts. 
These are 'agency' functions that need to be financed by intergovernmental revenues. 
4.1 FUNCTIONS OF RURAL LOCAL BODIES 
Article 40 (Annexure A.8) of the Constitution of India in its Directive Principle of State 
Policy entrusted to the States the responsibilities of organizing Village Panchayats and 
endowed them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to 
function as units of self-government. Before the IZ"^ Amendment, the panchayats were 
assigned some traditional functions mainly relating to maintenance rather than 
development. It made functioning of PRis maintenance-oriented. Now when we look at 
Article 243-G, it enlists the power, authority and responsibilities of panchayats (Annexure 
A.1). 
Though the Amendment has provided a list of functions under the provision of the 
Eleventh Schedule, it has not mentioned clearly the level of PRIs, which would perform a 
particular type of function. The term 'appropriate level' has created an ambiguity about 
the responsibility of institutions at three levels. 
The functional responsibilities of the PRIs can be divided into three broad categories, 
viz. civic, developmental and welfare functions, though these categories may not in 
practice be mutually exclusive in some cases. The village panchayats are ideally suited 
to perform these functions due to their direct and close proximity to the people, 
especially where people's initiative, support and participation would play a crucial role. 
The middle layer of PRIs can perform functions relating to planning and implementation 
of block level development programmes and also take up civic functions, which are 
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common to villages under its jurisdiction. The District panchayat seems to be an ideal 
unit for performing functions relating to planning, co-ordination, supervision, review and 
monitoring of all programmes and taking up common programmes involving more than 
one panchayat union. 
in the Eleventh Schedule, there are 29 items ranging from agriculture, minor irrigation, 
mining of minor minerals to small-scale industries, as the functional domain of PRIs. The 
Schedule also mentions education, health, literacy and sports. The welfare activities for 
the weaker section and the disabled are also expected to be placed under the 
jurisdiction of PRIs. The responsibilities of rural housing, drinking water, electhfication 
(including distribution of electricity), non-conventional energy, etc, are passed on to the 
PRIs along with social welfare, women and child development and family welfare. 
Developmental functions, ranging from land improvement, social forestry and minor 
irrigation to villages, khadi and small-scale industry, education, literacy and family 
planning are assigned to PRIs. Even water supply for which an arrangement does not 
presently exist, assumes a developmental dimension rather than a routine maintenance 
function. 
The list of 29 items proposed for devolution is only illustrative and not exhaustive. Major 
items can be devolved, depending on the capacity of the respective level of PRIs to 
discharge them satisfactorily and serve the people better. For any devolution of functions 
to be meaningful, it must be accompanied by the devolution of functionaries (staff) and 
funds. Therefore, tlie schemes or package of devolution must contain these three F's 
i.e.. Functions, Funds and Functionaries together. Though there are various aspects of 
devolution, viz. planning, review, administrative control, funds control, execution 
devolution, however, in cases where public participation is already available in different 
forms, like in co-operatives, the devolution to local bodies may be limited to items like 
identification of needs, planning and review, and need not to be overlapped. 
In conformity with the 73'^  Amendment, all the States have amended their respective 
Panchayati Raj Acts called Conformity Acts (hereafter CAs). They enlist the functions 
assigned to the different levels of their respective PRIs. By looking at the CAs of all the 
States it becomes possible to discuss the functions assigned to different levels of PRIs 
across the country. The functions of local government are divided into two: First, comprising 
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functions, which it is duly bound in law to undertake (obligatory functions); and Second, 
which it may take up in its own discretion (discretionary functions). 
4.1.1 TAMIL NADU 
4.1.1.1 FUNCTIONS OF DISTRICT PANCHAYAT 
The District Panchayat advises government on all matters concerning the activities of 
village panchayats, panchayat union council as well as on all matters relating to the 
development of the economic resources of the District and the service maintenance for 
promotion of culture and welfare of the inhabitants of the District. More details are given 
in Annexure A.9. In particular it performs the following functions: 
1. Advising the government on all matters relating to all village panchayat and 
panchayat union councils in the District and monitoring the progress in respect 
of the services and development schemes; 
2. Advising the Government on the matters concerning the implementation of any 
provision of law such as: classification of matters as village panchayat markets, 
fairs, festivals, roads and panchayat union markets, fairs, festivals, roads and 
fixing rates of contribution payable by one authority to the other. 
4.1.1.2 FUNCTIONS OF PANCHAYAT UNION COUNCIL 
It shall be the duty of Panchayat Union Council, within the limits of its funds, to make 
reasonable provision for carrying out the requirements of the panchayat union in respect 
of the following matters: (the details are presented in Annexure A. 10) 
1. The construction and maintenance of all public roads, dispensaries and child 
welfare centers, houses for poor, orphanages, shops, stalls, plinths, 
elementary school, public markets, poultries, etc; 
2. Prevention of any epidemics or malaria, veterinary relief; 
3. Control of fairs and festivals; 
4. Maintenance of statistics relating to births and deaths; and 
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5. Improvement of agriculture and encouragement of cottage industries. 
4.1.1.3 FUNCTIONS OF VILLAGE PANCHAYATS 
It is the duty of the village panchayat, within the limits of its funds, to make reasonable 
provision of carrying out the requirements of village panchayat in respect of follov>/ing 
matters (more details are provided in Annexure A. 11): 
Obligatory Functions 
a) The construction, maintenance and repair of all village roads, drainage, 
sewage, latrines, burial grounds, wells, etc.; 
b) The lighting of public roads and public places in built-up areas; 
c) The cleaning of street, removal of rubbish and jungle growth and improving ihe 
sanitary condition of village; and 
d) The sinking and repairing of wells, ponds or tanks and the construction and 
maintenance of water for washing and bathing purposes. 
Discretionary Functions 
As regards the discretionary functions the list is very wide and covers almost all aspects 
of village development. Some of important activities include: 
a) The plantation of trees and lighting on both sides of public roads; 
b) The control of fairs and festivals; 
c) The opening and maintenance of public places, slaughter houses, reading 
rooms, cart stands and public cattle's sheds, establishment and maintenance 
of wireless receiving sets; 
d) Maintenance of play grounds, parks, sports club and centers of physical traing, 
and other provisions for the safety, health, comfort, convenience, culture or 
recreation of the inhabitants of the village; and 
e) Administer all unreserved forests in the village for the benefit of such a village. 
4.1.2 UTTAR PRADESH 
4.1.2.1 FUNCTIONS OF ZILAPARISHAD 
There are many functions of Ziia Parishad (more details are provided in Annexure A. 12), 
some of the important functions are as follows: 
1. To classify fairs and festivals of GPs, KPs and ZPs for purpose of 
management and control by the concerned panchayat; 
2. To classify as village roads, inter-village roads and District roads for the 
purpose of management by the concerned panchayat; 
3. To supervise generally the activity of the GPs and KPs of the District; 
4. To act as the main channel of correspondence between the State 
Government at the one hand and the KP and the GP on the other hand; 
5. Promotion of agriculture, land improvement, soil conservation, animal 
husbandry, poultry and dairying, fisheries, social forestry, poverty alleviation 
programme and tourism; 
6. Rural housing, primary and secondary schools, sports and cultural affairs, 
markets and fairs; 
7. Establishment and maintenance of godowns, small cottage and village 
industries, fuel and fodder programmes, drinking water for public and private 
use; 
8. Development and maintenance of roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, 
waterways and other means of communication, rural electrification, non-
conventional energy sources, medical and sanitation, providing poor 
houses, asylums, orphanage, rest houses, planning and statistics; 
9. Implementation of maternity and child health programmes, social welfare 
including welfare of handicapped and mentally retarded, weaker sections, 
old age and widow pension schemes and other relief work. 
4.1.2.2 FUNCTONS OF KSHETRA PANCHAYAT 
Annexure A. 13 details the functions of Kshetra Panchayat. In short the powers and 
function are as follows: 
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1. Promotion and development of agriculture and horticulture, animal 
husbandry, dairy, poultry, piggery, fisheries, farm forestry, sericulture; 
2. Land reform, land consolidation, soil conservation, minor irrigation; 
3. Cottage, Small Scale and Village industries, rural housing; 
4. Fuel and fodder land, rural electrification, non-conventional energy; 
5. Education including primary and secondary schools, sports and cultural 
affairs; 
6. Control of markets and fairs; 
7. Providing maternity and child development, women welfare, family welfare, 
welfare of handicapped and mentally retarded, old age and widow pension 
schemes, social justice; 
8. Providing medical facilities, sanitation and drinking water; 
9. Control of epidemics, poverty alleviation programme; 
10. Planning and statistics, economic development, periodical review of 
achievements and targets, collection of data and maintenance of statistics; 
11. Supervision over gram panchayats, distribution of grants of the gram 
panchayat. 
4.1.2.3 FUNCTIONS OF GRAM PANCHAYAT 
A gram panchayat should perform the following functions, namely: 
1. Promotion and development of agriculture, horticulture, wastelands, grazing land, 
land consolidation, soil conservation, irrigation, animal husbandry, dairying, 
poultry, fisheries, forestry, small industries, local trade, rural housing, fuel and 
fodder land; 
2. Construction and maintenance of village roads, bridges, ferhes, culverts, rural 
electrification, markets and fairs; 
3. Promotion and implementation of poverty alleviation programmes, non-
conventional energy sources; 
4. Education activities including primary ana secondary schools, sports and cultural 
affairs, rural clubs for sports, family welfare, registration of birth, death and 
marriages; 
5. Social welfare activities including welfare of handicapped and mentally retarded, 
welfare of weaker section, public distribution system; and 
6. Providing medical facilities, drinking water and sanitation. 
More details of these functions are furnished in Annexure A.M. 
4.1.3 NCT OF DELHI 
4.1.3.1 FUNCTIONS OF GAON PANCHAYAT 
The goan panchayat had been assigned a long list of duties, both obligatory and 
discretionary under the two legislations, the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954 and the Delhi 
Panchayati Raj Act, 1954. (Details of these functions are given in Annexure A. 15). The 
functions are briefly given below. 
Obligatory Functions 
1. To assist in the development of agriculture, commerce and industry; 
2. Collection of data, population census and other statistics; 
3. Regulation of melas (fairs), markets and haats (local unorganized markets) and 
construction of new buildings; 
4. To construct and regulate sources of water supply for drinking and other 
purpose; and 
5. To provide primary education, construct and maintain public streets and attend 
to their lighting, village sanitation and medical relief. 
Discretionary Functions 
The Gaon Panchayat was empowered to take up, at its discretion, the following 
functions; 
1. To prescribe minimum standards of cultivation, regulate the use of manure and 
fertilizers, encourage production, improve breed of cattle and prevention of 
disease among them; 
2. To promote goodwill and social harmony among different communities; 
3. To act as a channel through which government assistance reaches villages and 
to especially help in obtaining and distributing government loans among 
agriculturists; collect taxes and dues from the agriculturists on behalf of State 
Government. 
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4. To provide relief against famine or ottner natural calamities, maintain libraries, 
reading rooms and other cultural programmes for the public. 
4.1.3.2 FUNCTIONS OF PANCHAYAT SAMITI 
The main function of Panchayat Samiti is to advise the administration and also to the 
MCD, if the latter so, desired, 
1. Regarding various development schemes, disbursing loans and grants as were 
placed at its disposal by the Administration; 
2. Preparation and execution of the Development Plans for the block and 
coordination of the plans, covering more than one gaon panchayat. 
3. Any other function assigned by the Delhi Administration or the Municipal 
Corporation of Delhi. 
More details of these functions are given in Annexure A.16. 
4.1.3.3 FUNCTIONS OF CIRCLE PANCHAYATS 
The Circle Panchayats perform primarily judicial functions and had been assigned 
primarily two types of functions to perform, which are briefly discussed below. (Annexure 
A. 17 covers the details of these functions): 
(i) To provide panels of panchayat adalat (courts) for the trial of certain types of 
suits, criminal cases and proceedings specified in the act; and 
(ii) To perform certain development and other related functions, if the Lt. Governor 
decides to utilize the services of the circle panchayats in this work. 
4.2 FUNCTIONS OF URBAN LOCAL BODIES 
A conscious plan to define the extent and nature of municipal functions is currently on 
the agenda of each country\ It may be different from one State to another, varying from 
degree of decentralization to centralization. The observation of Shah (1925) in this 
connection is noticeable: "If the functions of the municipalities are considered simply as 
so many isolated heads or groups of duties without any interconnection amongst 
themselves, or without any definite purpose behind them all, the task of civic government 
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would be most arid. Municipal organisation would then be merely a fifth wheel of the 
coach". 
Now the question arises: what is the proper sphere of functions of urban government? 
Urban public sector functions are ail arranged with a view to render the utmost possible 
service to the civic community as a whole in any such matters in which the local body 
can render a prompt and effective service compared with either the Central Government 
or the individual himself. Promotion of civic, welfare and development functions is the 
prime objective of municipal bodies. 
Article 243-W (Annexure A.2) of the Constitution has spelt out the powers, authority and 
responsibilities of municipalities. Adequate resources must accompany municipal 
powers and duties, howsoever determined, either via centralization or decentralization 
principle. The general maxim is that in the matter of raising and utilising resources, the 
ULBs should be self-reliant and autonomous. Further, the resources must have a near 
correspondence to the municipal functions. Hence, functions and financial resources of 
municipal bodies must be viewed not separately or disjoint but as an entity. Therefore, 
any principle of municipal function as mentioned above must not ignore their resources 
complement^. 
The States in India have specified in their municipal enactments the functions and 
resources raising powers of their respective urban local bodies. There is no uniformity in 
the functions handed over to municipalities. But as the range of functions itself is of a 
limited nature, the differences are not wide^. The municipal functions are classified into 
two groups in all the States, namely, (1) Obligatory and (2) Discretionary. These two-fold 
divisions have a ring of being compulsory and non-compulsory, even though the laws 
have given protection to municipalities from being sued on this account. 
Devolution of functions to ULBs has been given in XII Schedule of the 74"" Constitutional 
(Amendment) Act, 1992 and have been incorporated under concomitant amended Acts 
of the respective urban local bodies. 
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4.2.1 TAMIL NADU 
4.2.1.1 FUNCTIONS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
Annexure A. 18, provides the details of functions discharged by these bodies. A summary 
of general functions of Municipal Corporation is as follows: 
(i) Providing public health, safe drinking water supply, lighting and drainage; 
(ii) Precaution against diseases and fire; 
(iii) Regulation of milk trade; 
(iv) Provision of public & private markets and butcher shops, etc.; 
(v) Public latrines and urinals and removal of rubbish; 
(vi) Provision of municipal slaughter houses, burning grounds and crematoria; 
(vii) General provision regarding licenses, registrations and permissions; 
(viii) Maintenance, repair and naming of public streets; and 
(ix) Vital statistics of births and deaths. 
4.2.1.2 FUNCTIONS OF MUNICIPALITIES 
As provided in the Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act, 1994, the State Government 
may, by notification and subject to the conditions and restriction specified therein, entrust 
to the Municipalities, Town Panchayat, the Wards Committee or any other committee 
constituted under this Act, with such powers and responsibilities with respect to the 
preparation of Plans for economic development and social justice and also with such 
powers and authority, as may be necessary to enable them to carry out the 
responsibilities conferred upon them including those in relation to the matter listed in 
Schedule X of Tamil Nadu Municipal Act given in Annexure A. 19. 
They are briefly given as below: 
(i) Municipalities have to look after all the public services like, water supply, 
lighting, public and private drainage, public and private latrines, scavenging, 
public and private streets; 
87 
(ii) Precautions should be taken in case of dangerous building structure, trees and 
tanks, wells, holes and fire; 
(iii) Regulation of milk trade; 
(iv) Provision of slaughter houses, burial and burning grounds and crematoria, 
compulsory registration of vital statistics; 
(v) Prevention of cruelty towards animals and prevention of dangerous diseases 
and compulsory vaccination, etc. 
4.2.1.3 FUNCTIONS OF TOWN PANCHAYAT 
The functions of the town panchayats and the municipalities are one and the same and 
are given in various sections of the Tamil Nadu Municipalities (Amendments) Act, 1994. 
Details are provided in Annexure A.20 and the same are briefed below: 
(i) Provision and maintenance of streetlight, public drainage, public latrines; 
(ii) Provision for cleaning the public streets and removal of sweepings; 
(iii) Provision for safe drinking water and water for other uses. 
4.2.2 UTTAR PRADESH 
4.2.2.1 FUNCTIONS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION 
Obiigatoty Functions 
It shall be incumbent on the corporation to make reasonable and adequate provisions, 
by any means or measures, which it is lawfully competent to use or to take, for each of 
the following matters, namely: 
(i) Defining the limits or making any alteration in the limits of the city, naming and 
numbering of streets, town planning and improvement including slum 
clearance; 
(ii) The collection and removal of sewage, offensive matters, rubbish and their 
treatment; 
(iii) The watering, scavenging and cleaning of all public streets, drains and other 
public places, lighting of public places, sufficient supply of water for drinking 
and other purposes; 
(iv) Construction and maintenance of public hospitals, dispensaries, maternity 
centers, veterinary hospitals; 
(v) Parking plots, bus stops and public conveniences and fire extinguishers; 
(vi) Public markets and slaughter houses and also providing places for disposal of 
dead; 
(vii) Preventing and checking the spread of contiguous, infectious and dangerous 
disease, establishment and maintaining a system of public vaccination; 
(viii) The registration of vital statistics including births and deaths; 
(ix) The regulation of offensive and dangerous trades, including prostitution; 
(x) Establishing, maintaining and aiding schools for primary education including 
nursery education, promotion of cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects; 
(xi) The construction, maintenance, alteration and Improvement of public streets, 
bridges, subways, culverts, causeways and the like, cattle ponds, residential 
quarters; 
(xii) Safeguarding the Interest of weaker sections of the society including the 
handicapped, mentally retarded, slum Improvement and upgradation; 
(xiii) The maintenance of the corporation offices, all public monuments, open spaces 
and other properties vested In the corporation; 
(xlv) Urban poverty alleviation, providing urban amenities and facilities; and 
(xv) Promotion of urban forestry. 
Discretionary Functions 
The corporation may. In Its discretion, provide from time to time, either wholly or partially, 
for all or any of the followings matters, namely: 
(i) The Organisation, maintenance or management of Institutions including lunatic 
asylums, orphanages and rescue homes for women, sick or incurable, taking 
care and training of blind, deaf, mute or otherwise disabled persons or of 
handicapped children; 
(ii) Distribution and processing of milk and milk products for the benefits of the 
residents of the city and also providing milk for Infants and school children; 
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(iii) The construction and maintenance of public streets or places of drinking 
fountains for human beings and water tanks for animals; 
(iv) The construction and maintenance of theaters, motor transport facilities; 
(v) Libraries, museums and art galleries, botanical or zoological collection; 
(vi) Organisation of exhibition, athletics or games; 
(vii) Presentation of civic addresses and holding the civic receptions; 
(viii) Providing grants and loans or other facilities to people and v^elfare of the 
people; 
(ix) Survey of buildings and lands; 
(x) The adoption of any measures likely to promote the public safety, health or 
convenience; 
(xi) Sanctioning such schemes for promotion of employment, control and relief from 
begging, removal of social disabilities of SC/ST and OBCs and for poor relief; 
(xii) Promoting tourism, trade, industries and corporation bank. 
More details of these functions are given in Annexure A.21. 
4.2.2.2 FUNCTIONS OF MUNICIPALITY 
It shall be the duty of every municipality to make reasonable provision within the 
municipality for: 
Obligatory functions 
(i) Lighting, watering, cleaning public streets and places; 
(ii) Construction, altering and maintaining public streets, culverts, markets, 
slaughter houses, latrines, privies, urinals, drains, drainage works and 
sewerage work; 
(iii) Providing water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes; 
(iv) Establishment of and maintaining public hospitals, dispensaries, system of 
public vaccination, maternity centers, primary schools, fire extinguishers, 
parking plots, bus stops and public conveniences; 
(v) Regulating offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, calling or practices, 
dangerous building and places; 
(vi) Removal of dead animals, preventing cruelty towards animals; 
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(vii) Safeguarding the interests of weaker sections of the society including the 
handicapped and mentally retarded, slum improvement and upgradation, urban 
poverty alleviation 
(viii) Providing urban amenities and facilities to the residents; 
(ix) Registering births and deaths, maintaining the finance of the municipalities, 
fulfilling any obligation imposed by the law upon it; and 
(x) Promoting urban forestry and ecological aspects, cultural, educational and 
aesthetic aspects. 
Discretionary Functions 
A municipality may make provisions, within the limits of the municipality (and with the 
sanction of the prescribed authority outside such limits) for: 
(i) Preparation and execution of the Master Plan and town planning schemes 
and registration of vital statistics; 
(ii) Informing the people regarding tax imposition and managing and controlling 
of the municipality; 
(iii) Construction, establishment and maintenance of new streets, tramways, 
railroads and other means of locomotion, electricity (or gas) and power 
works; 
(iv) Establishing and maintaining libraries, museums, orphanages, rescue homes 
for women, offices, rest houses, camping grounds, poorhouses, dairies, 
wells, dams and other works of public utility; 
(v) Providing good system for disposal of sewage and preparation of manure 
from rubbish; 
(vi) Maintenance of primary schools, promoting trade and industries; 
(vii) Giving relief from local calamities, promoting the public safety, health and 
convenience, measures for control of beggary, removing social disabilities of 
SC/ST; 
(viii) Holding fairs and exhibitions; and 
(ix) Supply of milk. 
The details of these functions are given in Annexure A.22. 
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4.2.3 NCT OF DELHI 
4.2.3.1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI 
MCD has to perform a large number of functions. Details are provided in Annexure A.23. 
Some important functions are highlighted as follows: 
Obligatory Functions 
It shall be incumbent on the Corporation to make adequate provision by any means or 
measures, which it may lawfully take, for each of the following matters, namely: 
(i) The construction, maintenance and supply of water, drains and public 
latrines; 
(ii) The registration of births and deaths; 
(iii) Measures for preventing and checking the spread of dangerous diseases and 
providing public vaccination; 
(iv) The lighting, watering and cleaning of public streets and other public places; 
(v) The establishment and maintenance of schools for primary education, 
municipal offices, public parks, gardens or recreation grounds, public streets, 
bridges, culverts, causeways and the like, hospitals, dispensaries and 
maternity and child welfare centers; and 
(vi) The preparation of plans for economic development and social justice. 
Discretionary Functions 
The corporation may in its discretion provide either wholly or in part, for the following 
matters, namely: 
(i) The establishment and maintenance of education including cultural and 
physical education, giving aid to libraries, museums, art galleries, botanical 
and zoological collections, stadium, gymnasium, akharas and places for 
sports and games, theaters and cinemas; 
(ii) The organisation and maintenance of fairs and exhibitions; 
(iii) The acquisition of moveable and immoveable property for any of the aforesaid 
purposes; 
(iv) The establishment and maintenance of veterinary hospitals; 
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(v) Organisation, construction, maintenance and management of rest houses, 
infirmaries, orphanages, swimming pools, public washhouses, bathing places 
and other institutions designed for the improvement of public health; 
(vi) Organisation and management of farms and dairies within or outside Delhi for 
the supply, distribution and processing of milk and milk products; and 
(vii) Any measure not herein specifically mentioned before, likely to promote public 
safety, health and convenience or general welfare. 
4.2.3.2 NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
Obligatory Functions 
It shall be incumbent on the council to make adequate provisions by any means and 
measures, for the following obligatory matters, namely: 
(i) The construction, maintenance and cleaning of drainage works; 
(ii) The construction or purchase, maintenance, extension, management for 
a) supply and distribution of electricity to the public; 
b) providing a sufficient supply of pure and wholesome water; 
(iii) The establishment and maintenance of public medical relief, municipal markets, 
regulation of the markets, public streets, bridges, culverts, causeways and the 
like; 
(iv) The establishment and maintenance of schools; and 
(v) The maintenance of municipal offices, public parks, gardens or recreation 
grounds. 
Discretionary Functions 
The council may provide either wholly or in part for all or any of the following matters, 
namely: 
(i) The furtherance of education and health facilities; 
(ii) The establishment, maintenance and aid to libraries, museums, art galleries, 
botanical and zoological collections, stadium, gymnasia, akharas and places for 
games and sports; 
(iii) The survey of building and lands, the registration of marriages and taking of 
census of population; 
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(iv) The provision of liousing accommodation for the inhabitants of any area or for 
any class of inhabitants; 
(v) The provision of music and other entertainment in public places or places of 
public resort; 
(vi) Establishment of theaters and cinemas; 
(vii) The construction and maintenance of hospitals, rest houses, swimming pools, 
public washhouses, bathing places, poor houses, infirmaries, children's home, 
houses for disabled and handicapped; 
(viii) Distribution and processing of milk and milk products for the benefit of the 
residents of Nev\/ Delhi; 
(ix) The Organisation and management of cottage industries, handicraft centers, 
sales emporia and fairs and exhibitions; 
Annexure A. 24 provides the details of these functions. 
From the above discussion it is observed that there are certain differences in the 
adoption of the functions assigned by the XI and XII Schedule of the Constitution. For a 
ready reference summary in a tabular form is given in 4.1 and 4.2 
Table 4.1: 
Comparison of Functions of Urban Local Bodies in IN , UP and NCTD 
s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
Functions 
Urban planning / Town 
planning 
Regulation of land use 
and construction of 
buildings 
Planning of social and 
economic development 
Roads and bridges 
Water supply for 
domestic, industrial and 
commercial purposes 
Public health, saniiation, 
conservancy and solid 
waste management 
Fire services 
Urban forestr/, protection 
of environment and 
promotion of ecological 
aspects 
Tamil Nadu 
MC 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
M 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
I P 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
NN 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
NPP 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Delhi 
MCD 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
NDMC 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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s. 
No. 
9. 
10. 
11. 
12. 
13. 
14. 
15. 
16. 
17. 
18. 
19. 
a) 
b) 
c) 
d) 
e) 
f) 
g) 
h) 
i) 
J) 
Functions 
Safeguarding the 
interests of weaker 
sections of the society, 
including the handicapped 
and mentally retarded 
Slum improvement and up 
gradation 
Urban poverty alleviation 
Provision of urban 
amenities and facilities 
such as parks, gardens, 
play grounds, etc 
Promotion of cultural, 
educational and aesthetic 
aspects 
Burials and burials 
ground, cremation and 
cremation ground and 
electric crematoriums 
Cattle ponds, prevention 
of cruelty to animals 
Vital statistics including 
registration of births and 
deaths 
Public amenities including 
street lighting, parking 
lots, bus stops and public 
conveniences 
Regulation of slaughter 
houses and tanneries 
Other functions 
Public and Private 
Drainage 
Public and private latrines 
Scavenging 
Control over nuisance 
Milk trade 
Plantation of trees 
Public bathing, washing 
houses, etc 
Control of dangerous 
trade practices, etc 
Public vaccination 
Rest house, theaters, etc 
Tamil Nadu 
IVIC 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
IVI 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
TP 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
NN 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
NPP 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Delhi 
iVICD 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
NDMC 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
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Table 4.2: 
Comparisons of Functions of PRI's of TN, UP, & NCTD 
s. 
No. 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5. 
6. 
7. 
8. 
9. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
Functions 
Agriculture, including 
agriculture extension 
Land improvement, 
implementation of land 
reforms land consolidation 
and soil conservation 
Minor irrigation, water 
management and 
watershed development 
Animal husbandry, dairying 
and poultry 
Fisheries 
Social forestry and farm 
forestry 
Minor forest produce 
Small-scale industries 
including food-processing 
industries 
Khadi, village and cottage 
industries 
Rural housing 
Drinking water 
Fuel and fodder 
Roads, culverts, bridges, 
ferries, waterways and 
means of communication 
Rural electrification, 
including distribution of 
electricity 
Non-conventional energy 
resources 
Poverty alleviation 
programme 
Education including 
primary and secondary 
schools 
Technical training and 
vocational training 
Adult and non-formal 
education 
Libraries & cultural 
activities 
Markets and fairs 
Tamil Nadu 
VP 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
PUC 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
DP 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Ut 
GP 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
tar Prad 
KP 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
esh 
ZP 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Delhi 
GP 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
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s. 
No. 
22 
23 
24 
25 
26 
27 
28 
29 
30 
31 
32 
Functions 
Health and sanitation 
including hospitals and 
primary health center and 
dispensaries 
Family welfare 
Women and child 
development 
Welfare of weaker sections 
and in particular, of the 
schedule castes and the 
schedule tribes 
Public distribution system 
Maintenance of community 
assets 
Disposal of wastes 
Burial ground 
Vital statistics including 
registration of births and 
deaths 
Relief work 
Promotion of tourism 
Tamil Nadu 
VP 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
PUC 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
DP 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Uttar Pradesh 
GP 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
KP 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
ZP 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No Yes 
Delhi 
GP 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
4.3 SUMMARY 
It may be argued that in TN among ULBs of various nature the non-uniformity in 
adopting XII schedule is on the functions of maintenance of roads and bridges, water 
supply, public health, vital statistics, regulation of slaughter houses, public and private 
drainage, plantation of trees and provision of public bathing. In case of Uttar Pradesh, it 
is on the function of planning of social & economic development, fire services, poverty 
alleviation programme, vital statistics, plantation of trees, public bathing and provision of 
rest houses. In case of NCT of Delhi both the ULBs have adopted all the functions to be 
performed. The functions that are performed by all the local governments in these three 
States are public amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops, public 
conveniences and public and private latrines. It means upkeeping of the city has been 
recognized as the sole function to be performed by them. 
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In case of PRIs, the assignment of functions among VPs, Panchayat Samiti and District 
Boards are of different nature in all the States. The basic unit of PRIs remain village level 
local body. Therefore, it vv/ould be interesting to observe that the common functions are 
minor irrigation, water management, maintenance of roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, 
watenways & other means of communication, libraries & cultural activities, health and 
sanitation. Relief v^ork and promotion of tourism have not been taken up by any PRIs. 
Among all the three States, the indicative list under XI Schedule has been adopted to the 
maximum extent by the Uttar Pradesh. 
FOOT NOTE 
1. The United Nations also has taken considerable interest in the rriunicipa! movement and has proposed 
measures to strengthen it. 
2. The ideologically based decentralization theories are not very vocal on this aspect. 
3. Out of the 61 entries listed in List II of 7"^  Schedule of the Constitution, the total number of powers and 
functions delegated to urban local bodies w/ith various degrees of limitations do not exceed twelve. 
These are entry numbers 6,7,12,13,17,28,30,31,33 and of these, the municipal bodies have greater 
freedom in respect of 8 to 9 items, in the remaining, the State interference seems to be more. 
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CHAPTER -5 
OWN RESOURCES OF LOCAL 
BODIES IN INDIA 
CHAPTER 5 
OWN SOURCES OF REVENUES OF LOCAL BODIES IN INDIA 
In the previous chapter, allocation of functions to local bodies was discussed. To finance 
the smooth functioning of local bodies, they are assigned certain powers to raise 
resources at their own and it being in addition to what subventions they receive from 
higher level governments. In this respect, appropriate expenditure, tax assignment and 
other revenue sharing powers for each tier of government is a crucial component. Both 
theory and practice suggest that it is important to specify expenditure responsibilities as 
clearly as possible in order to enhance accountability, reduce unproductive overlap, 
duplication of authority and legal challenge. In theory, decision-making should occur at 
the lowest level of government, consistent with the principle of subsidiarity. 
The Constitution of India does not lay down any expenditure / functional responsibility or 
fiscal power for panchayats and municipalities. The Constitution provides in the 7'^  
Schedule, three lists, namely, a Union List, a State List and a Concurrent List. Out of the 
State List, the legislature of a State is expected by law, to endow the panchayats and 
municipalities, with such powers and authority, as it may consider necessary to enable 
them to function as institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions 
for the devolution of powers upon panchayats and municipalities. The Constitution 
Amendments contain two Schedules, viz Schedule XI (Article 243-G) and Schedule XII 
(Article 243-W), (furnished in Annexure A.3 and A.4) which comprise a list of functions 
considered appropriate for devolution to panchayats and municipalities. The list of 
functions is illustrated for devolution to panchayats and municipalities and it is illustrative 
in nature. The Constitution thus maintains the prerogative of the State in respect of 
determining the functional / spending responsibilities of the panchayats and 
municipalities. 
Likewise, the Constitution maintains the prerogative of the State Legislature to decide 
which taxes, duties, tolls and fees should be assigned to local bodies and which of them 
should be shared between the State and local bodies. With respect to tax assignment 
and powers too, the authority of the State legislature has not been altered. However, 
recognising that the State-Local fiscal relations in the country have historically been 
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marked by ad-hocism and tentativeness and that there is a need to bring order and 
stability in their relation, the Constitution has provided, as observed earlier, for the 
setting up of a Finance Commission in every State, for the purpose of coordinating and 
reviewing the financial position of the panchayats and municipalities. 
Notwithstanding the provisions contained in Articles 243-G and 243-W (Annexure A.3 & 
A.4) and the XI and XII Schedules dealing with the functional /spending responsibilities 
and Article 243-1 and 243-Y dealing with the constitution of a Finance Commission in 
every State, the absolute rights of the State legislature over what functions should be 
assigned to, or devolved on, the panchayats and municipalities or withdrawn from them 
and which taxes should be assigned and shared, have not been changed by the recent 
amendments. This arrangement implies concurrency of functions and tax powers 
between the State and panchayats and the State and municipalities. It implies that the 
panchayats and municipalities do not possess what are referred to as general 
competence powers permitting them to take actions not explicitly prohibited or assigned 
elsewhere. They possess the legally delegated powers and functions under the doctrine 
of ultra vires (Dillon's Rule) that limit local choices and diversity. "They are to take 
nothing from the general sovereignty except what is expressly granted." 
5.1 THEORIES OF LOCAL TAXATION 
Given the sources of local finance, the theoretical considerations of each of them are of 
much significance to the national economy as much as to the local economy. What 
norms govern local taxation? How different are they from the central taxation principles? 
Ever since the days of Adam Smith, economists have been engaged in laying down the 
precepts of taxation. The tax maxims not merely define the status of the individual in the 
social compact (Musgrave, 1956) and serve as guidepost to tax administration, but refer 
to the economic implications of any basis of taxation as such. Some of the well- known 
tax theories are briefly discussed here in order to determine their appropriateness to 
local taxation. 
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5.1.1 THE BENEFIT THEORY 
Benefit linked taxes are treated on a quid pro quo basis and as such they are just 
payments made by individual members for services rendered by the State. According to 
Foster and Pelmen (1980), an efficient local tax should fall on those who get benefit from 
local services. Every tax payment is for a corresponding benefit received from the 
Government. In a general way, it may be said that tax payments and State service 
package resemble a quid pro quo relationship. But on this ground, it cannot be 
ascertained that each tax is a payment for a measurable service. The benefit principle 
merits consideration in as much as it relates the choice of public services to the 
preferences of the community members. Musgrave views this as an important 
requirement for a normative theory of budget determination in a democracy. A 
comparison of the total benefits rendered and total taxes paid gives some clue to the 
understanding of the national balance sheet. There is some relationship established 
between the preferences of members revealed in the voting process and the services 
performed by government. Though a tax by its nature is a general levy, it can be inferred 
that the cost of public services, wherever possible, be allocated in accordance with 
benefit and where it cannot be identified, be met by the general contributions which are 
meant for the maintenance of State. 
In its application, the benefit theory is more relevant in a service function oriented local 
context than at central level. Many of the local body's services are specific and 
measurable. The beneficiary also is clearly identifiable whether an individual or a group 
of persons. Hence, the benefit principle is more applicable and convenient in municipal 
taxation. 
5.1.2 COST OF SERVICE APPROACH 
As the cost of production influences the price determination in a free market, so also the 
cost of service rendered by the State to its citizens determines the tax payable by them. 
The cost of services is ascribable in certain areas as public roads, education, bridges, 
etc. and the taxes like road tax, education cess and tolls on bridges may be levied in 
accordance with the cost of service provided. However, in a large number of public 
goods, the service costs cannot be precisely determined either because the service is 
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much collectivized. Further, equity considerations weigh against it as in the case of 
public parks, street lighting, pollution control, etc. 
5.1.3 ABILITY TO PAY APPROACH 
Among the several tax theories, the ability to pay version is perhaps the most celebrated 
one. The approach based on one's income delinks the tax contributions with any 
particular benefit derived or service rendered. Irrespective of any benefit, a tax is a 
compulsory contribution assessed on an individual's ability to pay. The discovery of the 
law of diminishing utility has given a theoretical justification to the ability principle. In 
achieving equity and income redistribution, the ability based tax system has a far greater 
influence than any other. Though the ability principle is well established in the theory of 
tax structure, Its "effectiveness at the local governmental level may be doubted. The 
ability determined tax base would be too narrow for any local body to meet its needs. 
Perhaps, the only tax which can be partly designed on ability is the local profession tax 
and, to a very limited extent, the property tax. 
5.2 ANALYSIS OF THEORIES 
No one particular approach outlined above can satisfactorily fit into the revenue needs of 
any level of government. More so, in the case of local bodies, whose area Is limited and 
the local economy has to bear the cumulative burden of State taxes and other 
impositions. Generally, we tnay field that the ability and cost of service principles are 
better suited to State level application and the benefit theory to local bodies. But here 
again, if the local government is created and based on administrative devolution, cost 
service principle ought to hold better. On the other hand, if it is the result of a process of 
democratic decentralization, it has relatively more discretionary powers and hence its tax 
considerations can be to some extent, of a mixed pattern. However, in netting the 
desired revenue a mix of these principles rather than an exclusive reliance on any one of 
them is desirable and a variety of considerations are to be balanced in arriving at a 
working principle of State/ Local finance. 
According to Nanjundappa and Nadakarni (1967), local and national finances need not 
be considered on the same footing and a local body need not operate on the same 
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principles of taxation as the National Government. But Hicks (1955) said that like any 
other level of government, the local unit's tax should be convenient and certain, fair 
between persons in like circumstances and be economical in collection. In making a 
distinction between national and local finance, Hicks further observes that a local body 
has to practice more or less sound finance that is proper to phvate enterphse, whereas 
the National Government can indulge in deficit finance. This difference limits them to 
levy ability-to-pay based and progressive taxes. If it should do so, it can only tax very 
few and exclude many. This allows the local enterprises and resources to migrate. 
Hence, it may be concluded that the local tax base is not amenable to progression. 
The public finance literature provides some desirable principles to guide the assignment 
of revenue sources among the three different levels of government in a federation. The 
congruence principle suggests that, the less mobile a tax base and stronger the spatial 
concentration of the tax base and ownership, the lower the level of government to which 
those taxes should be assigned. Using the criteria of equity and efficiency, Musgrave 
(1984) suggested the following broad principles of revenue assignment: 
1. Taxes suitable for economic stabilization should be central; 
2. Progressive distributive taxes should be assigned to Central Government; 
3. Tax bases distributed highly unequally between jurisdictions should be 
centralized; 
4. Taxes on mobile factors of production are best handled centrally; 
5. Residence based taxes such as sales of consumption goods to consumers or 
excises are suited to States; 
6. Taxes on completely immobile factors of production are best suited for local 
levels; 
7. Taxes of lower levels of government should be cyclically stable; 
8. Benefit taxes and user charges are to be used appropriately at all levels; 
9. Resource taxes and value-added tax (VAT) are appropriate for sharing between 
governments. 
The principles to devolve taxation powers to local body should envisage the taxes over 
which the local governments should have full control in terms of determination of tax 
rate, assessment, collection and appropriation of the proceeds. It should depend on the 
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sustainability to meet the civic obligations, since the local governments provide many 
essential services. Their tax resources should be such that ensure the smooth discharge 
of local functions. 
The following guidelines are indicated by theory of public finance for the choice of local 
taxes: 
1. The tax base should be immobile to allow the local authorities some freedom to 
vary the tax rates without the tax base vanishing; 
2. The tax yield should be adequate enough to meet local needs and be 
sufficiently buoyant (i.e. expanding, at least, as fast as expenditure over a 
period of time); 
3. The tax yield should be stable and predictable and it should not be susceptible 
to cyclical fluctuations; 
4. The tax should be perceived to be reasonably and progressively fair by 
taxpayers; 
5. The tax should be easy to administer efficiently (at the minimum resource costs) 
and effectively; 
6. It should not be possible to export much if any, of the tax burden to non-
residents; 
7. The tax should be visible to ensure accountability on the part of local 
government. 
The local bodies under different tiers have been vested with powers for local taxation 
(which have been) evolved over the years under various circumstances and spheres. 
The local bodies enjoyed such powers even before the advent of British rule. This could 
be seen from the report of the various committees constituted during the British rule like 
Royal Commission on Devolution (1906) and Indian Taxation Enquiry Committee (1924). 
The pre-independent situation more or less continues even after independence. The 
powers of local taxation have been examined by various committees / commissions and 
also different enquiry/ commissions from time to time. They made several 
recommendations to the Government of India. The significant among these are Local 
Finance Enquiry Committee (1950), Taxation Enquiry Commission (1953-54) and 
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Santhanam Comnnittee (1963) in respect of PRIs and Zakaria Committee (1963) and 
Rural-Urban Relationship Committee (1966) in respect of ULBs. 
The Local Finance Enquiry Committee (1950) recommended as many as 12 items of 
revenues out of the State and Central lists for making the net proceeds of the revenues 
exclusively available to the local bodies. 
The Taxation Enquiry Commission (1953-54) considered it desirable and necessary that 
out of the various recommendations made by the Local Finance Enquiry Committee, 
certain items of resources should be reserved for being utilised solely by the local 
bodies. It also indicates that these taxes should be allowed to be developed only by the 
local bodies, or for them; but where the State Governments are utilising any of the taxes 
for the purpose of the State revenue, the State Government should gradually withdraw 
from the field and allot the proceeds from these taxes to the local bodies. 
The Santhanam Committee on Panchayat Raj Finance (1963) felt that the financial 
resources have to be adequate for the functions allotted to each PRI and substantial 
assistance should come from the government. At the same time, it should not detract the 
dignity and autonomy of a self-governing institution due to dependence on assistance 
from higher level. It is essential that for stability and ensured growth of ihese institutions, 
they should have substantial and growing resources entirely within their power to exploit 
and to develop. 
According to the recommendations of various commissions and committees, adequate 
assistance has been suggested to the local bodies for discharging the obligatory and 
discretionary functions. However in practice it is difficult to assess the level of needs and 
services and also the levels in the stages of development in each of the various local 
bodies and quantify and classify them into various categories for the purpose of financial 
assistance. This has resulted in adoption of ad-hoc measures for financial assistance. 
The present constitutional requirement (73'*^  and 74"^  Amendments), for a three tier 
system of PRIs and uniform three tiers of ULBs and the suggested devolution of 
additional functions to these local bodies involve corresponding additional financial 
responsibilities for the local bodies which have to be taken care of by the Centre and 
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State. The need for a State Finance Commission to review the finances of the iocal 
bodies has therefore, arisen as exhibited under 243-1 of the ys'*^  Constitutional 
Amendment Act, 1992. It is also found necessary that the SFC's recommendations will 
have to precede those of the Union Finance Commission, so that the requirements of 
local bodies could be considered by the Union Finance Commission. 
The District Planning Committees (hereafter called DPCs) (Article 243 ZD) and 
Metropolitan Committees (Article 243 ZE) envisaged under the Constitutional 
Amendments devolved the Constitutional responsibility to consolidate the plans 
prepared by the DPCs for all the local bodies, which ought to be taken care of by the 
State Finance Commission to adequately provide financial resources for the various 
functions now allocated to each tier of the local bodies. The transfer of power of funds 
may not achieve the objectives of the Constitutional Amendment and functionaries, while 
making recommendations for augmentation of resources as well as for assistance from 
the various levels of government. The resources of local bodies can be generally 
grouped under four broad heads, viz., 
1. Own resources, 
2. Assigned/shared revenues, 
3. Grants and 
4. Loans. 
Own resources consist principally of own taxes, fees and other non-tax revenues. The 
own taxes comprise generally property / house tax, professional tax, vehicle tax, tax on 
agricultural land, pilgrim tax, tax on animals in all the local bodies. Assigned revenues as 
on date contain two parts, (a) taxes levied, collected and passed on to local bodies by 
the State Government, (b) taxes levied, collected and shared by the State Government 
with the local bodies. So far as the grants are concerned, there is no specific system of 
grant-in-aid and there is no general-purpose grant such as per capita grant for 
establishment, as envisaged by the Taxation Enquiry Commission. The grants are given 
either as incentive for tax efforts or for matching the efforts in maintenance of services. 
Mostly, the grants-in-aid are discretionary and unpredictable and no specific provision 
has been made in the statute to make them compulsory, except in a few cases. Loans 
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are available for creating infrastructural facilities with the permission of the government, 
subject to the capability to discharge the debt service. 
There are some general characteristics of municipal taxation, which distinguish it from 
Central and State taxation: 
1. The municipal tax objective is revenue and revenue only. The States taxation 
has other purposes besides revenue. 
2. The municipal tax effect is very little on the neighbourhood and even on the 
local economy its impact is inconsiderable. 
3. Because of citizen nearness to local authority, a local tax is easily resisted or 
avoided. 
4. Much of municipal taxation is direct and, hence cannot wholly be shifted. This 
indeed is regarded as a primary requirement of a good local tax. According to 
Shah & Bahadurjl (1925), "The tax burden should not generally be capable of 
being shifted from the people of the city to any other people outside the city 
limits". 
5. Municipal taxation is confined to local wealth only. This limits the revenue 
potential of municipal bodies. 
6. Also, for this reason, municipal taxation is characteristically regressive. But 
the regressiveness is, though visible, not so pronounced as to cause any 
serious economic effects. 
These general features of municipal taxation in comparison with the Central and State, 
do not suggest that it is qualitatively an effective system. It is only suggestive of the 
special features of municipal taxation and that it should not be judged by the central tax 
norms, or macro-level considerations. 
BIFURCATION OF SOURCES OF REVENUE BETWEEN THE STATE GOVERNMENT 
AND LOCAL BODIES 
The local government is a State subject under entry 5 of the 7"^  Schedule of the 
Constitution^ and the responsibility for providing adequate finance for local bodies is that 
of the State Governments. While distribution of sources of revenue between the Centre 
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and the States is provided for in tiie Constitution, there is no Constitutional reservation of 
sources of revenue for local bodies. 
The Taxation Enquiry Commission examined the question of resources for local bodies 
in detail and the Commission observed that it was both desirable and necessary that 
certain taxes should be reserved for being utilised exclusively by or for local bodies. 
They were however, not in favour of a Constitutional Amendment with a view to provide 
Constitutional reservation of sources of revenue for local bodies. The Taxation Enquiry 
Commission recommended that the following taxes should be reserved for exclusive 
utilisation by or for the local bodies: 
(i) Tax on lands and buildings popularly known as property tax; 
(ii) Taxes on the entry of goods into the area of local authority for consumption, 
use or sale therein, popularly known as octroi^; 
(iii) Taxes on professions, trades and calling; 
(iv) Taxes on vehicles other than mechanically propelled; 
(v) Taxes on animals and goats; and 
(vi) Taxes on advertisement other than newspaper advertisements. 
In addition, the Taxation Enquiry Commission recommended that the following taxes 
should also be permitted to be levied by local bodies: 
1. Theatre tax or show tax; 
2. Duty on transfer of property; 
3. Taxes on goods and passengers carried by roads or waterways; 
4. Tolls. 
The above recommendations mostly fall in line with the general principles of local body 
finance indicated above. 
According to Oates, "to carry out the functions, the various levels of government require 
specific fiscal instruments. On the revenue side, governments will typically have access 
to tax and debt instruments. But in a federal system there is a further method for 
allocating funds and intergovernmental grants among the different levels of the public 
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sector. One level of government may generate tax revenues in excess of its 
expenditures and then transfer the surplus to another level of government to finance part 
of the latter's budget". 
A brief examination of fiscal instruments in federal fiscal system to follow. 
5.4 TAXATION IN FEDERAL SYSTEM 
The determination of the vertical structure of taxes is known in the literature as the 'tax-
assignment problem' (Charts McLure, 1983). The basic issue here is the normative 
question: which taxes are best suited for use at the different levels of government? The 
question is typically posed in a setting in which there exists a Nation State with a Central 
Government, where there is little or no mobility across national borders; at decentralized 
levels, in contrast, economic agents, goods and resources have significant mobility 
across jurisdictional boundaries with the extent of this mobility increasing at successively 
lower levels of government. Local government for analytical purposes may sometimes 
be characterized as operating in a setting in which economic units can move 
economically among jurisdictions. 
The difference in the mobility of taxed units at the central and decentralized levels has 
important implications for the design of the vertical structure of taxation. Taxes as we 
know, can be the source of distortions in resource allocation as buyers shift their 
purchases away from taxed goods. In a spatial setting, such distortions take the form of 
locational inefficiencies, as taxed units (or owners of taxed items) seek out jurisdictions 
where they can obtain relatively favorable tax treatment. High excise taxes in one 
jurisdiction for example may lead purchasers to bear unproductive travel costs in order 
to purchase the taxed items in jurisdictions with lower tax rates. 
Such examples can suggest the conclusion that decentralized levels of government 
should avoid the taxation of highly mobile economic units (be they households, capital, 
or final goods). But this in itself is not correct. The real implication is that decentralized 
levels of government should avoid nonbenefit taxes on mobile units. Or, more 
accurately, the analysis shows that on efficiency grounds decentralized governments 
should tax mobile economic units with benefit levies (Oates & Robert Schwab, 1991 and 
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Oates 1996). Such economic units, in short, should pay for the benefits that they receive 
from the public services that local governments provide to them. 
The most well known case of this is the Tieabout Model' in which local jurisdictions use 
benefit taxes that effectively communicate to household the cost of consuming different 
levels of local public goods; this results in an efficient pattern of consumption of these 
goods. But this is true not only for households. If local governments provide local inputs 
that increase the productivity of capital employed in their jurisdiction, then they should 
levy benefit taxes on capital in order to provide the set of signals needed for the efficient 
deployment of capital across localities (Oates and Schwab, 1991). In sum, efficiency 
requires not only that decentralized jurisdictions refrain from nonbenefit taxation of 
mobile economic units, but that they actively engage in benefit taxation where the public 
sector provides services to these units. 
The public sector must for various reasons rely to a substantial extent on non-benefit 
taxes. Redistributive programmes that provide assistance to the poor, for example, 
simply transfer of income. Such programmes are not well suited to use at decentralized 
levels of government, where the mobility of economic units across local boundaries can 
undermine the working of such programs. It is for this reason that the literature suggests 
that non-benefit taxes to the extent they are needed are best employed by higher levels 
of government. 
But Provincial, State and Local Governments do, in fact, make use of some such levies^. 
In a seminal treatment of this issue making use of an optimal taxation framework, 
Gordon (1983) has explored the ramifications of the decentralized use of a wide range of 
non-benefit taxes. Gordon finds several forms of potential distortion that result from an 
individual jurisdiction's ignoring the effects of its fiscal decisions elsewhere in the 
system; these include inefficiencies involving, for example, the 'exporting' of tax burdens, 
external congestion effects and impacts on levels of revenues in other jurisdictions, as 
well as certain equity issues associated with a generally regressive pattern of tax 
incidence''. 
The analysis suggests, moreover, some guidelines for the use of such taxes. A reliance 
on resident-based taxes rather than source-based taxes, for example, can lessen tax-
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induced distortions by reducing the scope for tax exporting (Inman and Rubinfeld, 1996; 
McKinnon and Nechyba, 1997f. The analysis, moreover, establishes a presumption for 
the taxation of relatively immobile economic units. A particularly attractive tax base is 
improved land, since a tax on a factor or good in perfect inelastic supply will not be the 
source of any locational inefficiency. Such taxes (and by associated benefits from 
spending programs) will simply be capitalized into local land values. Thus fiscally hard-
pressed city governments have at their disposal a tax base that cannot escape them 
through mobility. There is some evidence in this regard that the city of Pittsburgh, which 
has used a graded property tax under which land is taxed at five times the rate on 
structures, has experienced an expansion in building activity that might not have been 
forthcoming in the presence of a higher tax on mobile capital (Gates and Schwab, 1997). 
5.5 OWN SOURCES OF LOCAL BODIES 
Now let us turn specifically to local bodies. Own revenues are such income of local 
bodies, as are raised by themselves and from sources, which are considered as 
belonging to them in law. These own sources are considered under two heads, which 
pass the test of foregoing theoretical considerations: 
1. Own Tax Revenues: Own taxes consist of direct and indirect taxes and receipts 
grouped under fee, cess and levies. The own taxes comprise generally: 
a) Taxes on Property / House tax: rates on buildings and lands including 
open land, general rate and service taxes, duty on service or properties; 
b) Taxes on goods: Octroi and terminal taxes; 
c) Personal taxes: taxes on professions, trades, calling and employments; 
d) Terminal tax on passengers including the pilgrim tax; 
e) Taxes on animals and vehicles; 
f) Entertainment tax, theater and show tax; 
g) Taxes on agricultural land; 
h) Advertisement tax. 
I l l 
2. Own Non-Tax Revenues 
a) User charges; 
b) Fines and fees, etc. 
Now let us turn to State specific range of such taxes and non-taxes levied by local 
bodies of Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and NCT of Delhi. 
5.6 TAMIL NADU 
5.6.1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF TAMIL NADU 
6.1.1 OWN TAX REVENUES 
(a) Property Tax and Property Related Taxes 
Property tax Is the major source of revenue. It yields the major income for local bodies. 
The property tax is accompanied by a number of service taxes viz. water supply, 
drainage, lighting, education, scavenging, etc. 
Table 5.1: 
Components of Property Tax (in percentage) of different Municipal Corporations 
ofTN (1991-92) 
Components 
of property 
tax 
General 
purpose tax 
Drainage tax 
Education 
Tax 
Library Tax 
lighting Tax 
Scavenging 
Tax 
Water Tax 
Total 
Colmbatore 
15.78 
24.99 
6.58 
2.24 
0 
0 
50.43 
100.00 
Chennai 
59.27 
0 
22.18 
3.71 
14.83 
0 
0 
100.00 
Madura! 
37.47 
19.77 
18.43 
3.65 
0 
7.49 
13.18 
100.00 
Salem 
12.79 
10.77 
14.85 
4.74 
8.93 
7.38 
40.53 
100.00 
Trichy 
17.29 
20.17 
14.41 
7.78 
11.53 
8.65 
20.17 
100.00 
T.Veli 
31.08 
0 
18.23 
6.63 
9.20 
9.20 
25.66 
100.00 
All 
Corporations 
41.77 
9.18 
17.42 
3.73 
9.38 
1.90 
16.64 
100.00 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
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(b) Professional Tax 
Under the respective Acts of the corporations, powers have been given to levy 
professional tax on all professions, trade and calling in the area of the local body 
concerned. The maximum and minimum tax leviable based on the income of the 
individuals / establishments was indicated in the Act itself and the local bodies were 
given the freedom to levy the tax at the rates of their own choice in between the 
maximum and minimum and enforce it in their areas through the personnel of the local 
bodies concerned. Since the professional tax was levied mainly on the basis of income 
of the persons, tax in respect of self-employed professions like doctors, lawyers, traders 
and others could not be assessed correctly, as their income is normally not 
ascertainable by the local body staff. With a view to improving the resources of the local 
bodies, a new consolidated Act namely the Tamil Nadu Tax on Professions, Trades, 
Calling and Employment Act, 1992 was enacted to levy the tax based on the 
professions, calling, etc. with the maximum limit of Rs 1250 per half year (Rs 2500 per 
year) as allowed in Article 276 of the Constitution of India. Prior to the revision of rates, 
the rates, which were in force, were Rs 125 per half year and Rs 250 per year. 
In respect of employees, various slabs have been prescribed based on their half-yearly 
income and the rates to be adopted for the slabs have also been indicated in the Act. 
Regarding the professionals, various parameters have been adopted like the period of 
service in the connected profession and the assumed gross income in the profession. 
The tax for half year or full year has been prescribed at a flat rate depending on their 
period of service, etc. 
(c) Vehicles Tax 
The local bodies may levy a tax on non-motorised vehicles, like carts, bicycles and 
rickshaws. Due to its non-productivity, they have been allowed to levy this tax on 
motorized vehicles and also on tractors. 
(d) Tax on Animal and Carriages 
This tax is also not a viable one as the amount realised under this head is very.meager. 
Therefore, instead of levying taxes on animals, a uniform pattern and system of licensing 
of animals like dogs, pigs and other domestic animals can be introduced. 
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(e) Tax on Timber 
Timber Tax has been in existence in Cinennai Corporation for a very long time right from 
the inception of the Act, but the income under this tax has been very low. 
(f) Company Tax 
In Chennai Municipal Corporation taxation on the companies based on the paid-up 
capital of the company is levied, if its head office or principal office is situated in the city 
of Chennai. The tax based on the gross income received in the city in the years 
immediately preceeding is to be taken for taxation. The levy varies from Rs 100 per year 
to Rs 200 per year. 
(g) Vacant Land Tax 
Vacant Land Tax can a be major source of revenue for the ULBs, but this source is 
under-exploited in our country, though provisions are available to levy tax on vacant 
lands in the urban areas like corporations and municipalities. 
(h) Pilgrim Tax 
This tax is collected from the places of importance due to religious functions or festivals 
or some such reasons. There are not many such centers in Tamil Nadu, which are 
levying this tax. Among the corporations, Madurai falls under this category. 
It may be levied in respect of: 
a) Places of holiday resorts and seasonal specialties. 
b) Temple towns. 
c) Places of geological or archeological importance. 
5.6.1.2 NON-TAX REVENUES 
The non-tax revenues are broadly classified into four categories and they are: 
(a) User charges 
The charges levied for access to and the use of given services. It is possible to recover 
user charges only in cases where the principle of exclusion, namely, excluding those 
who do not pay, can be applied. The user charges are normally confined only to water 
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supply, sewerage, drainage, garbage and solid waste collection and communication 
facilities like roads, etc. 
(b) Licence, fees and other charges 
Dangerous and offensive trade licence fee, parking fees and a fee in the market bus 
stands, etc. 
(c) Income from properties 
The municipal corporation's earns as a rent from its own properties like markets, bus 
stands, shopping complexes, guesthouses, etc. 
(d) Income from special services 
Special services like private connections for water supply have been dealt with under 
user charges, licence fees, etc. 
The details of aggregate revenue receipts of municipal corporations of Tamil Nadu are 
furnished as follows: 
Table: 5.2 
Municipal Corporations of TN: Aggregate Revenue Receipts 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
Revenue 
Property Tax 
Other Taxes 
Total Tax Revenue 
Non-Tax Revenue 
Total Own Source Revenue 
Shared Revenue 
Grants 
Total Transfers 
Total Receipts 
1991-92 
2864.67 
(14.76) 
4432.19 
(22.84) 
7296.86 
(37.61) 
2337.86 
(12.05) 
9634.72 
(49.66) 
8737.31 
(45.04) 
1027.87 
(5.30) 
9765.18 
(50.33) 
19399.90 
(100) 
1992-93 
3343.41 
(11.26) 
4999.87 
(16.86) 
8343.28 
(28.12) 
3138.49 
(10.58) 
11481.77 
(38.70) 
17430.31 
(58.74) 
761.66 
(2.57) 
18191.97 
(61.30) 
29673.74 
(100) 1 
1993-94 
4140.81 
(16.98) 
6882.54 
(28.21) 
11023.35 
(45.20) 
4133.46 
(16.95) 
15156.81 
(62.15) 
8443.53 
(34.62) 
785.34 
(3.22) 
9228.87 
(37.85) 
24385.68 
(100) 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage stiare in Total Receipts 
Source: Report of First State Finance Com mission of Tamil N adu 
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It is observed from the Table 5.2 that tax revenues are the major source of revenue. It 
generates about 28-45 per cent of the total receipts, out of which around 40 per cent 
comes alone from property tax and rest 60 per cent by other taxes. Out of total receipts, 
property tax contributes around 12-16 per cent and 17-28 per cent are contributed by 
other taxes. On the other hand, non-tax revenues contribute only 10-17 per cent of the 
total receipts. The total own source of revenue contributes about 38-62 per cent of the 
total receipt; it is around 50 per cent in the year 1991-92, 38.7 per cent in 1992-93 and in 
the year 1993-94 it is 62.15 per cent. Rest 37-50 per cent comes by the way of fiscal 
transfers. 
5.6.2 MUNICIPALITIES 
5.6.2.1 OWN TAX REVENUE 
1. Property Tax and Property-Related Taxes: The property tax yields major 
income to the municipalities also, which accounts for one-third of the total 
revenues and more than 85 per cent of the total tax revenues. The property tax is 
accompanied by a number of service taxes viz, water supply, drainage, lighting, 
education, scavenging, etc. The details of property tax are given below in Table 
5.3. 
Table 5.3: 
Municipalities of TN: Component of Own Source of Revenue Receipts 
(Rs in Crores 
Own Tax Sources 
Property Tax 
Tax on General Purposes 
Service Tax 
Scavenging Tax 
Lighting Tax 
Water Tax 
Drainage Tax 
Education Tax 
Library Cess 
Total Property Tax 
1991-92 
10.15 
4.54 
4.78 
10.62 
2.82 
6.41 
0.54 
39.87 
1992-93 
11.12 
4.95 
5.29 
12.23 
3.06 
6.99 
1.14 
44.78 
1993-94 
12.94 
5.80 
6.37 
15.28 
3.58 
8.50 
1.42 
53.90 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
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2. Other Taxes: The taxes levied by Municipalities are similar to Municipal 
Corporations. These are as follows: 
(!) Professional tax; 
(ii) Vacant land tax; 
(iii) Vehicle tax; 
(iv) Taxes on animals. 
5.6.2.2 NON-TAX REVENUE 
The sources of non-tax revenues of the municipalities are the same as available to the 
municipal corporations. They are as follows: 
(i) Income from properties like shops, bus stands; 
(ii) License fees on Dangerous & Offensive trades; 
(iii) License fees on building regulations; 
(iv) Users charges; 
(v) Misc. revenues. 
The details of the non-tax revenues are given below in Table 5.4. 
Table 5.4: 
Municipalities of TN: Non-Tax Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Crores) 
Details 
Licence Fees 
Income from Properties 
Income from Special Services 
Other Miscellaneous Receipts 
Total Non-Tax Revenue 
1991-92 
3.66 
16.41 
9.09 
5.19 
34.35 
1992-93 
4.32 
18.09 
11.91 
5.72 
40.04 
1993-94 
4.85 
19,53 
15.77 
7.33 
47.48 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
The details of aggregate revenue receipts of the Municipalities of TN are furnished in 
table 5.5. 
Table: 5.5: 
Municipalities of TN: Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
Revenue 
Property Tax 
Other Taxes 
Total Tax Revenue 
1991-92 
3987 
(32.06) 
446.78 
(3.59) 
4453.79 
1992-93 
4478 
(33.05) 
312.70 
(2.30) 
4790.70 
1993-94 
5390 
(34.27) 
1033.43 
(6.58) 
6423.43 
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Revenue 
Non Tax Revenue 
Total Own Source Revenue 
Shared Revenue 
Grants 
Total Transfers 
Total Receipts 
1991-92 
(35.82) 
3435.54 
(27.36) 
7889.33 
(64.45) 
3457.40 
(27.81) 
1086.14 
(8.74) 
4543.54 
(36.54) 
12432.87 
(100) 
1992-93 
(35.36) 
4000.41 
(29.55) 
979.11 
(64.91) 
4084.79 
(30.15) 
6690.00 
(4.94) 
4753.79 
(35.08) 
13548.77 
(100) 
1993-94 
(40.86) 
4747.59 
(30.19) 
11171.2 
(71.05) 
3920.65 
(29.93) 
6340.00 
(4.02) 
4554.65 
(28.96) 
15727.50 
(100) 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage share in Total Receipts 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
The property tax yields major income to the municipalities, which accounts for one-third 
of the total revenue and around 90 per cent of the total tax revenue, whereas the 
remaining 10 per cent is contributed by other taxes. The own tax revenues are 
contributing around 35-41 per cent of the total receipts whereas non-tax revenues are 
also generating very good amount, which is around 27-30 per cent. Out of the total 
receipts, 63-72 per cent are contributed by the total own sources of revenues; it is 63.45 
per cent in 1991-92, 65 per cent in 1992-93 and more than 71 per cent in the year 1993-
94. Rest of the 28-37 per cent is coming through fiscal transfer. 
5.6.3 TOWN PANCHAYATS 
5.6.3.1 OWN TAX REVENUE 
The own revenue source now available to the Town Panchayats are based on Tamil 
Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994 as detailed below: 
1. House tax: The Town Panchayat levy house tax in place of property tax. The 
distinction is related to the ingredients of the property tax and house tax. 
Whereas the house tax is levied only on buildings, the property tax is levied 
on the buildings and also on the land appurtenant to those buildings. The 
property tax has components for services, while house tax does not have 
such components. The income from house tax ranged from Rs. 1702.50 lakhs 
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to Rs. 1839.82 lakhs in the year 1991-92 to 1993-94, which contributed about 
21-27 per cent of the total income. 
Professional tax: Professional tax is levied in town panchayats on the same 
basis as in other local bodies. In terms of percentage, this source contributed 
6.4 per cent in 1991-92, 3 per cent in 1992-93 and 17.1 per cent in 1993-94, 
of the total income. The jump in revenue in the year 1993-94 was due to the 
implementation of the new enactment of 1992. 
Vehicle Tax: The town panchayats levy vehicle tax under the Tamil Nadu 
Panchayats Act, 1994. It derived around Rs. 6000, which is 0.17 per cent of 
the total own revenues. 
Tax on agriculture land for specific purpose: The Town Panchayats are 
eligible to levy tax on agricultural land for specified purpose. This tax 
contributed Rs 1800 in year 1993-94 which was 0.29 per cent of the total own 
revenues. 
The income from the own source revenues in the year 1991-92 to 1993-94 is given 
below: 
Table 5.6: 
Town Panchayats of TN: Composition of Own Source of Revenues Receipts 
(Rs in Crores) 
Own Source of Revenues 
House tax 
Water tax 
Profession tax 
Tax on carriage and animals 
Tax on carts / vehicles 
Tax on agricultural land 
Pilgrim tax 
Total 
1991-92 
17.02 
1.48 
4.04 
0.01 
0.06 
0.07 
0.17 
22.85 
1992-93 
17.32 
1.56 
2.12 
0.01 
0.06 
0.07 
0.21 
21.35 
1993-94 
18.39 
1.74 
14.89 
0.15 
0.06 
0.10 
0.18 
35.51 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
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5.6.3.2 NON-TAX REVENUES 
1. Non-tax revenue e.g income from properties like shops, bus stands, etc. 
2. License fees on dangerous & offensive trades, 
3. License fees on building regulations, 
4. User charges. 
The details of non-tax revenue sources and income derived by town panchayat are furnished 
in table 5.7. 
Table 5.7: 
Town Panchayats of TN: Non-Tax Revenues Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Crores) 
Non Tax Revenue 
D&O Trade Licence Fees 
Encroachment Fees 
Building Licence fees 
Tourist Bus Fees 
Fees from other Services 
Fairs and Festivals 
Total 
Income from properties lands & building parks 
Avenue tree produces 
Markets 
Shops/shopping complex 
Slaughter houses 
Bus/carts & vehicles stands 
Pay & use latrines 
Income from other properties 
Total 
Income from special services lighting 
Water supply & drainage 
Medical institutions 
Sewage farms 
Sale: rubbish, garbage, manure 
Town Planning 
Income from other services 
Total 
Miscellaneous receipt income from investments 
Interest from P.F deposits 
Lapsed deposits 
Recovery of charges for services 
Any other Miscellaneous 
Total 
Total Non-Tax Revenues 
1991-92 
0.70 
0.05 
1.19 
0.15 
1.02 
0.22 
3.33 
0.51 
0.48 
2.33 
1.12 
0.16 
1.36 
0.11 
1.28 
7.35 
0.12 
4.23 
0.05 
0.07 
0.07 
0.05 
0.08 
4.67 
1.06 
0.13 
0.21 
0.05 
1.69 
3.14 
18.49 
1992-93 
0.77 
0.06 
1.27 
0.16 
1.22 
0.24 
3.72 
0.52 
0.62 
2.79 
1.32 
0.18 
1.62 
0.17 
1.65 
8.87 
0.07 
4.87 
0.09 
0.08 
0.07 
0.05 
0.09 
5.32 
1.10 
0.12 
0.23 
0.08 
1.82 
3.35 
21.26 
1993-94 
0.79 
0.05 
1.32 
0.22 
1.12 
0.28 
4.08 
0.63 
0.49 
2.87 
1.69 
0.21 
1.66 
0.15 
1.58 
9.28 
0.07 
6.04 
0.10 
0.12 
0.06 
0.04 
0.09 
6.52 
1.08 
0.13 
0.27 
0.08 
1.85 
3.41 
23.29 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
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The details of aggregate revenue receipts of Town Panchayats of TN are given in table 
5.8: 
Table: 5.8 
Town Panchayats of TN: Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
Revenue 
House Tax 
Other Taxes 
Total Tax Revenue 
Non Tax Revenue 
Total Own Source Revenue 
Shared Revenue 
Grants 
Total Transfers 
Total Receipts 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage 
1991-92 
1702.50 
(27.16) 
447.72 
(7.07) 
2150.22 
(33.97) 
1847.07 
(29.18) 
3397.29 
(63.15) 
2116.30 
(33.43) 
216.76 
(3.42) 
2333.06 
(36.85) 
6330.35 
(100) 
share In Total Re 
1992-93 
1732.27 
(24.15) 
262.66 
(3.66) 
1994.93 
(27.81) 
2125.36 
(29.63) 
3320.29 
(57.44) 
2761.52 
(38.47) 
292.80 
(4.08) 
3054.32 
(42.57) 
7174.61 
(100) 
:elpts 
1993-94 
1839.82 
(21.15) 
1553.01 
(17.84) 
3392.83 
(38.99) 
2327.54 
(26.75) 
5720.37 
(65.74) 
2681.32 
(30.82) 
299.12 
(3.74) 
2980.44 
(34.25) 
8700.80 
(100) 
1 Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
It is clear from the table 5.8 that, the house tax is yielding around one-fourth of the total 
receipts, its contribution ranges between 21-27 per cent of the total receipts, which is 80 
per cent of the tax revenue. Other taxes contributed 3-17 per cent of the total receipts. 
The percentage of income has fallen down from 27.16 per cent in the year 1991-92 to 
24.15 per cent in 1992-93 and 21.15 per cent in 1993-94. Whereas on the other hand, 
non-tax revenue also contributed good amount at around 27-30 per cent of the total 
receipts. The total own sources revenue is contributing very handsome amount to the 
total receipts that ranges between 63-71 per cent; it is 63.45 per cent in the year 1991-
92, 63.91 per cent in 1992-93 and 71.05 per cent in the year 1993-94, of the total 
receipts. Fiscal transfers contribute remaining 34-42 per cent. 
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5.6.4 DISTRICT PANCHAYATS: Taxes of District panchayat has not yet been specified. 
5.6.5 PANCHAYAT UNION COUNCIL 
5.6.5.1 OWN TAX REVENUES 
Local cess surcharge on land revenue: The only source of own tax relevant to PUCs 
is local cess surcharge (hereafter LOS). LCS charges may vary between Rs 5 to 10. 
This income contributes roughly 5 to 6 per cent of the total income of PUCs. The PUCs 
accounts do not reflect the actual collection but only the adjustments made out of the 
collection. Though the levy is made by PUCs, the revenue department does the 
collection. 
5.6.5.2 NON-TAX REVENUES 
This source contributes 5 to 7 per cent of the total income and it works out to Rs. 5 to 
Rs. 7 per capita. The details of item-wise receipts for three years are furnished here 
under: 
Table 5.9: 
Panchayat Unions of TN: Non-Tax Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
{Rs 
Revenue 
Fees and fairs 
Receipts from properties 
Receipt from special services 
Other Miscellaneous revenues 
Total 
in Crores) 
1991-92 
4.38 
3.92 
1.85 
8.17 
18.32 
1992-93 
4.88 
5.66 
1.69 
7.94 
20.17 
1993-94 
5.65 
5.16 
1.51 
9.94 
22.26 
Source: Report of First Slate Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
The details of aggregate receipts are given in table 5.10, 
Table: 5.10: 
Panchayat Unions of TN: Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
Revenue 
Local Cess Surcharge 
Non Tax Revenue 
Total Own Source Revenue 
1991-92 
955.23 
(3.65) 
1831.51 
(7.00) 
2766.74 
(7.00) 
1992-93 
1545.61 
(5.21) 
2016.65 
(6.80) 
3562.26 
(12.06) 
1993-94 
2123.53 
(5.48) 
2225.73 
(5.75) 
4349.26 
(11.42) 
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Revenue 
Shared Revenue 
Grants 
Total Transfers 
Total Receipts 
1991-92 
700.39 
(2.68) 
25590.84 
(86.33) 
26291.23 
(89.01) 
29077.97 
(100) 
1992-93 
840.52 
(2.84) 
25134.08 
(84.78) 
26815.12 
(87.62) 
30377.38 
(100) 
1993-94 
970.11 
(2.50 
32760.21 
(84.58) 
33730.32 
(87.08) 
38079.58 
(100) 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage stiare in Total Receipts 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
It is analysed from the table 5.10 that the local cess surcharge is the only source of own 
tax revenue but it contributes meager amount of around 3-6 per cent. The non-tax 
revenue contributes 5-7 per cent of total revenues. On an average, total own source 
revenue is contributing only 10-12 per cent of the total receipts which is, 10.68 per cent 
in 1991-92, 12.06 per cent in 1992-93 and 11.42 per cent in the year 1993-94 of the total 
receipts. Whereas the major portion of the total receipts are contributed by the fiscal 
transfers, which is around 84-87 per cent of the total receipts. 
5.6.6 VILLAGE PANCHAYAT: OWN TAX REVENUES 
Own tax revenues of Village Panchayats consist of the following taxes: 
1. House tax 
2. Professional tax 
3. Vehicle Tax 
4. Tax on agricultural land for specific purposes 
5. Pilgrim Tax 
6. Water Tax. 
The composition of Own Tax Revenue for a period of 3 years from 1991-94 is furnished 
hereunder. 
Table 5.11: 
Village Panchayats of TN: 
Composition of Own Source of Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Crores) 
Own Source of Revenues: 
House Tax 
Library Cess 
Water Tax 
1991-92 
7.15 
0.33 
0.63 
1992-93 
7.82 
0.58 
0.60 
1993-94 
8.62 
0.68 
0.74 
Average 
7.42 
0.50 
0.59 
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Own Source of Revenues: 
Profession Tax 
Vehicle Tax 
Tax on Agriculture land 
Pilgrim Tax 
Total 
1991-92 
0.83 
0.34 
0.02 
0.04 
9.34 
1992-93 
1.03 
0.39 
0.03 
0.04 
10.49 
1993-94 
6.54 
0.28 
0.03 
0.04 
16.94 
Average 
2.02 
0.35 
0.04 
0.03 
10.95 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
The details of aggregate revenue receipts are furnished hereunder 
Table: 5.12: 
Village Panchayat of I N : Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
Revenue 
House Tax 
Other Taxes 
Total Tax Revenue 
Non Tax Revenue 
Total Own Source FRevenue 
Shared Revenue 
Statutory Grants 
Non- statutory Grants 
Total Transfers 
Total Receipts 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage 
1991-92 
714.52 
(7.22) 
219.13 
(2.22) 
933.65 
(9.45) 
1002.10 
(10.14) 
1935.75 
(19.85) 
3811.44 
(38.57) 
829.63 
(8.40) 
3306.13 
(33.45) 
7947.20 
(80.41) 
9883.03 
(100) 
share in Total Receipts 
1992-93 
782.18 
(6.65) 
266.47 
(2.26) 
1048.65 
(8.91) 
1176.02 
(9.99) 
2224.67 
(18.90) 
4941.22 
(41.98) 
883.88 
(7.51) 
3719.26 
(31.60) 
9544.36 
(81.09) 
11769.04 
(100) 
1993-94 
861.85 
(6.60) 
831.71 
(5.85) 
1693.56 
(11.92) 
1192.92 
(8.40) 
2886.46 
(20.31) 
5190.95 
(36.54) 
1063.56 
(7.49) 
5065.15 
(35.65) 
11319.66 
(79.68) 
14206.12 
(100) 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
It is observed from the table 5.12 that, the total tax revenues contributes only 8-12 per 
cent in the total receipts, out of which 6-7 per cent are contributed by house tax and only 
2-5 per cent by other taxes. On the other hand, non-tax revenues are also contributing 
meager amount of around 8-10 per cent of the total receipts. Total own sources 
revenues are contributing only 18-20 per cent of the total receipts; it is 19.58 per cent in 
1991-92, 18.90 per cent in 1992-93 and 20.31 per cent in the year 1993-94 of the total 
receipts. The major income is coming by way of fiscal transfers that are around 80 per 
cent of the total receipts. 
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5.7 UTTAR PRADESH 
Urban Taxation 
The total resources of urban local bodies in the State comprise 1/3"^  revenue receipts 
from their own tax and non-tax revenues and the remaining 2/3'^ is in the shape of 
grants-in-aid from the State Government, in the l/S'*^  component of own tax and non-tax 
revenues collected by ULBs, the share of non-tax revenues is practically 50 per cent 
thereof. 
The UP State Finance Commission had made a study of tax and non-tax receipts of 
selected Urban Local Bodies and concluded that, tax receipts of 1992-93 over 1991-92 
show a growth rate of 9.7 per cent whereas tax receipts of 1993-94 over 1992-93 exhibit 
a growth rate of 19.7 per cent thus the average annual growth of tax revenue comes to 
15.7 per cent. The non-tax revenue receipts during 1992-93 show a growth rate of 28.2 
per cent over the receipts of 1991-92. However, in 1993-94, the growth rate of non-tax 
revenue as compared to 1992-93 came down to 5.5 per cent. Generally, some 
nonrecurring non-tax revenue receipts occur in some years when the level of non-tax 
revenue receipts goes up sharply. In case of most of user charges, specific rates have 
been prescribed for non-tax revenue items. The local bodies are able to collect only 40-
50 per cent of their current demand. It is apparent that substantial arrears of tax and 
non-tax revenues are accumulating over the years. 
5.7.1 NAGAR NIGAMS: OWN TAX REVENUES 
1. Property Taxes: Property taxes comprise of the following taxes which are subject 
to the exceptions, limitations and conditions hereinafter provided, levied on 
buildings and lands in the city: 
a) A general tax which may be levied, if the corporation so determines, on a 
graduate scale; 
b) A water tax; 
c) Drainage tax leviable in areas provided with sewer system by the 
corporation; 
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d) A conservancy tax in areas in whicli the corporation undertakes the 
collection, removal and disposal of excrementitious and polluted matter from 
privies, urinals and cesspools. 
Provided that the aggregate of property taxes in no case be neither less than 15 per 
cent nor more than 25 per cent of the annual value of the building or land or both 
assessed to such taxes. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
Vehicle Tax: a tax on vehicles other than mechanically propelled vehicles and 
other conveyances plying for hire and kept within the city or on boats moored 
therein. 
Animal Tax: a tax on animal used for riding, driving, draught or burden, when 
kept within the city. 
Professional Tax: a tax on traders, callings and professions and holding of 
public or private appointments. 
Dog Tax: a tax on dogs kept within the city. 
Betterment Tax. 
Tax on Immovable Property: a tax on deeds of transfer of immovable property 
situated within the city. 
Advertisement Tax: a tax on advertisements, except published in newspapers. 
Theater Tax. 
The details of the aggregate revenues are furnished in the given table 5.13 
Table: 5.13: 
Nagar Nigams of UP: Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1993-94 to 1994-95) 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
Revenue 
Property Tax 
Other Taxes 
Total Own Source Revenue 
Non-Tax Revenue 
Total Own Source Revenue 
Grants 
Total Receipts 
1993-94 
1969.20 
(27.78) 
919.25 
(12.96) 
2888.51 
(40.74) 
1832.58 
(25.85) 
4721.03 
(66.60) 
2367.22 
(33.39) 
5992.38 
(100) 
1994-95 
2158.24 
(23.71) 
1565.95 
(17.20) 
3724.19 
(40.92) 
2814.01 
(30.92) 
6538.20 
(71.84) 
2562.63 
(28.15) 
9342.82 
(100) 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage share in Total Receipts 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Uttar Pradesh 
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It is analysed from the table 5.13 that the property tax is the major source of revenue for 
Nagar Nigams. It contributes around 23-28 per cent of the total receipts in the year 
1993-94 to 1994-95. Apart from property tax, other taxes contribute around 12-17 per 
cent of the total revenue and the tax sources contribute around 40 per cent of the total 
revenues. On the other hand non-tax revenues contribute almost one-fourth of the total 
receipts, which is around 25-30 per cent. The total own sources revenue contributes 
more than half of the income of Nagar Nigams, which is around 66-72 per cent. It is 
66.60 per cent in 1993-94 and 71.84 per cent in 1994-95. Almost two third of the total 
receipts is comprised of own source revenue and remaining one third is in the shape of 
grants-in-aid from the government. 
5.7.2 NAGAR PALIKA PARISHAD AND NAGAR PANCHAYAT 
Own Sources of revenues 
1 Building and Land Tax: a tax on the annual value of buildings or lands or of 
both. 
2 Trade Tax: a tax on trades and callings carried on within the municipal limits 
and deriving special advantages from, or imposing special burdens on 
municipal services. 
3 Professional Tax: a tax on trades, callings and vocations including all 
employments. 
4 Entertainment Tax: a theater tax, which means a tax on amusement or 
entertainment. 
5 Vehicle Tax: a tax on vehicles and other conveyances plying for hire or kept 
within the municipality or on boats moored therein. 
6 Dog Tax: a tax on dogs kept within the municipality. 
7 Animal Tax: a tax on animals used for riding, driving, draught or burden, when 
kept within the municipality. 
8 Circumstances Tax: a tax on inhabitants assessed according to their 
circumstances and property. 
9 Water Tax: a water tax on the annua! value of building or lands of both. 
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10 Drainage Tax: a drainage tax on the annual value of buildings leviable on such 
buildings as are situated within a distance, to be fixed by rule in this behalf for 
each municipality from the nearest sewer line. 
11 Scavenging Tax: a scavenging tax for disposal of domestic wastes. 
12 Conservancy Tax: a conservancy tax for the collection, removal and disposal 
of excrementious and polluted matter from privies, urinals, cesspools. 
13 Transfer of Immovable Property: a tax on deeds of transfer of an immovable 
property situated within the limits of the municipality. 
14 Others: any other tax, which the State Legislature has power to impose in the 
State. 
The details of the aggregate revenue receipts of nagar palika parishads of UP are given 
in table 5.14. 
Table: 5.14: 
Nagar Palika Parishads of UP: Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1993-94 to 1994-95) 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
Revenue 
Property Tax 
Other Taxes 
Total Own Source Revenue 
Non-Tax Revenue 
Total Own Tax Revenue 
Grants 
Total Receipts 
1993-94 
1032.74 
(8.98) 
883.89 
(7.69) 
1866.63 
(16.24) 
1740.51 
(15.14) 
3607.14 
(31.38) 
7884.44 
(68.61) 
11491.58 
(100) 
1994-95 
1158.11 
(8.35) 
1306.65 
(9.42) 
2464.76 
(17.77) 
1305.77 
(9.41) 
3770.53 
(27.19) 
10096.15 
(72.80) 
13866.68 
(100) 
' Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage share in Total Receipts 
Source: Report of First State Finance C ommission of Uttar [ 'radesh 
It appears from the table 5.14, the property tax contributes only 8 per cent and other 
taxes contribute 7 to 9 per cent of the total revenues. It exhibits that total tax revenues 
contribute very meager amount of the total revenue i.e. around 17 per cent. On the other 
side, non-tax revenue is also sharing very small amount, which is around 9 to15 percent 
of the total receipts. It is observed that, total own source revenue contributes only 27 to 
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32 per cent, which is around 32 per cent in 1993-94 and 27 per cent in 1994-95. The 
remaining part, which is around 68 to 72 per cent, is fulfilled by way of grants. 
The taxes assigned to nagar panchayats are same as done to nagar palika parishad, but it 
may be noted that most of the nagar panchayats are not levying these taxes whatsoever 
their own sources of revenues are in the shape of user charges or non-tax revenues. The 
details of the aggregate revenue receipts are furnished in table 5.15. 
Table: 5.15: 
Nagar Panchayats of UP: Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
Revenue'^ >-v ;;:$:•;>"':: 
Tax Revenue 
Non-Tax Revenue 
Total Own Source Revenue 
Grants 
Total Receipts 
1991-92 
284.85 
(17.31) 
295.41 
(17.95) 
580.26 
(35.26) 
1065.02 
(64.73) 
1645.28 
(100) 
1992-93 
299.94 
(14.46) 
332.28 
(16.01) 
632.22 
(30.48) 
1441.96 
(69.65) 
2074.18 
(100) 
1993-94 
383.93 
(17.63) 
366.75 
(16.84) 
705.68 
(34.48) 
142.67 
(65.52) 
2177.35 
(100) 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage stiare in Total Receipts 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Uttar Pradesti 
It is observed from the table 5.15 that the total receipts of Nagar Panchayats comprise 
one-third of total own sources, out of which tax revenues contribute around 14 to 17 per 
cent and non-tax revenues contribute 16 to 17 per cent. Thus total own source 
contributes 30 to 35 per cent of the total receipts; it is 35.26 per cent in 1991-92, 30.48 
per cent in 1992-93 and 34.48 per cent in 1993-94. The remaining 65 to 70 per cent 
comes through grants-in-aid from the government. Hence it is observed from the Tables 
5.14 and 5.15 that grants play a very important role in their total receipts of Nagar Palika 
Parishads and Nagar Panchayats. 
5.7.3 ZILA PANCHAYAT 
Zila Panchayats have their own fund called Zila Nidhi wherein shall be placed all sums 
received including the grants-in-aid from the Consolidated Fund of the State and all 
loans raised by or on behalf of the Zila Panchayat. 
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5.7.3.1 OWN SOURCES OF REVENUE 
A Zila Panchayat may impose the following namely; 
a) Property Tax: a tax on circumstance and property; 
b) Other Taxes: any other tax, which the State Legislature has the power under 
the Constitution of India to impose in the State and of which imposition by the 
Zila Panchayat has been authorized. 
Circumstances and Property Tax: The power of Zila Panchyat to impose a tax on 
circumstances and property shall be subject to the following conditions and restrictions, 
namely 
a) The tax may be imposed on any person residing or carrying on business in 
the rural areas provided that such a person has so resided or carried on 
business for a total period of at least six months in the year under 
assessment; 
b) No tax is imposed on any person whose total taxable income is less than Rs 
20,000 per annum. 
c) The rate of tax is not to exceed three paise in a rupee on the total taxable 
income and; 
d) The total amount of tax imposed on any person shall not exceed such 
maximum, if any, as may be prescribed by rule. 
For the purpose of this section 'taxable income' means estimated income but shall not 
include income of the following classes: 
i) Agriculture income as defined in the India Income Tax Act, 1922, and; 
ii) Income on which any tax has previously been imposed by any Urban Local 
Authority. 
The Zila Panchayat may, on payment of such commission as may be specified by the 
State Government, entrust the work of collection of the tax on circumstance and property 
levied upon the resident of gram panchayat. In such case it is the duty of gram 
panchayat to collect the tax from such residents and to remit the realisation to the Zila 
Nidhi. Out of its net proceeds from the tax of circumstances and property,' the Zila 
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Panchayat shall contribute to the funds of the Gram Panchayat of the District, such 
amounts as it may determine, having regard to the requirement of each of such Gram 
Panchayats. 
5.7.3.2 NON-TAX REVENUE 
Zila Panchayat or the Kshetra Panchayat may fix any levy, school fees, fee for use of 
libraries sarais, and paraos fees for the use of, or benefit derived from, any of the works 
or institutions constructed or maintained by the Zila Panchayat or the Kshetra Panchayat 
originally undertaking famine prevention or relief works, fees for the service of bulls and 
stallions and for registration of animal shows and industrial exhibitions held under its 
authority or otherwise, to which the public is allowed access and at which the Zila 
Panchayat or the Kshetra Panchayat provide sanitation and other facilities of the public 
and tolls for the use of bridges, constructed, repaired or maintained by the Zila 
Panchayat or the Kshetra Panchayat. 
Licence Fees and Tolls in Respect of Markets: Subject to rules made by the State 
Government in this behalf, a Zila Panchayat may impose in any market established, 
maintained or managed by it any one or more of the following fees or tolls: 
a) License fees on brokers, commission agents, weighmen or measures 
practicing their calling within such market; 
b) Tolls on vehicles, porters, animals bringing goods for sale into such a 
market; 
c) Market fees for the right to dispose goods for sale into such a market or for 
the use of such a building or structure therein; 
d) Fees on the registration of animals sold in markets. 
The details of the aggregate revenue receipts are given in table 5.16. 
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Table: 5.16: 
Zila Panchayats of UP: Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
Revenue 
Property Tax 
Non Tax Revenue 
Total Own Source Revenue 
State Grants 
Central Grants 
Total Transfers 
Total Receipts 
1991192 
196.87 
(9.71) 
1798.64 
(88.76) 
2512.37 
(98.47) 
11.00 
(0.54) 
19.83 
(0.97) 
30.83 
(1.52) 
2543.20 
(100) 
1992-93 
273.35 
(4.52) 
2590.19 
(42.88) 
3104.36 
(51.93) 
1576.21 
(26.09) 
1327.41 
(21.97) 
2903.62 
(48.06) 
6007.98 
(100) 
1993-94 
382.69 
(5.40) 
3027.05 
(42.78) 
3409.74 
(48.19) 
1345.02 
(19.01) 
2320.52 
(32.79) 
3665.54 
(51.80) 
7075.28 
(100) 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate percentage share in Total Receipts 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Uttar Pradesh 
It may be analysed from the table 5.16 that the property tax is the only source of tax 
revenue, in the total receipts of Zila Panchayats. It contributes very meager share of 4-9 
per cent. The major source of receipts is contributed by non-tax revenue, which varies 
from 42 to 80 per cent, which contributes around 80-90 per cent of the total own source 
of revenues. The total own source of revenue is 98 per cent in 1991-92, 53 per cent in 
1992-93 and 48 per cent in 1993-94 of the total receipts. The reason for high 
contribution in 1991-92 is that, in this year the percentage share of grants is very low. 
5.7.4 KSHETRA PANCHAYAT 
Kshetra Panchayats have their own fund called Kshetra Nidhi. It consists of all the sums 
received, including the grants and the grants-in-aid from the Consolidated Fund of the 
State and all loans raised by or on behalf of kshetra panchayat. A kshetra panchayat 
may receive such contributions in cash or in kind as may be made by any person for any 
work of public utility and the kshetra panchayat may utilise the same together with its 
contributions, wherever necessary in executing such work. A kshetra panchayat shall not 
incur any expenditure for acquiring or renting land beyond these limits of the khando'ciox 
constructing any work beyond these limits except with the sanction of the State 
Government. 
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5.7.4.1 OWN TAXES 
Kshetra Panchayat may in such manner as may be prescribed, impose: 
(i) Water Tax: water tax where it constructs or maintains a scheme for providing 
drinking water or irrigation or for any other purpose under its jurisdiction; 
(ii) Electricity Tax: electricity tax, where it provides for lighting arrangement at a 
public street or other public places; 
(iii) Other Taxes; any other tax, which the State Legislature has the power under 
Constitution to impose in the State and of which imposition by kshetra 
panchayat has been authorized by the State Government. 
5.7.4.2 NON-TAX REVENUE 
A kshetra panchayat may charge fees to be fixed by law or by public auction or by 
agreement for the use or occupation (except lease) of any immovable property vested in 
or entrusted to the management of the kshetra panchayat including any public good or 
the place of which it allows the use or occupation whether by allowing a project thereon 
or otherwise. 
a) School Fees: a kshetra panchayat may fix and levy school fees; 
b) Library, Sarai and Paraos Fees: fees for the use of library, sarais and paraos; 
c) Construction and Maintenance Fees: fees for the use of or benefits derived 
from any of the work or institution constructed and maintained by the kshetra 
panchayat; 
d) Fees for Regulation of Animals: Fees for the service of bulls and stallions 
and fees for the regulation of animals; 
e) Exhibition and Fair Fees: Fees for fairs, markets, agricultural shows and 
industrial exhibitions held under its authority or otherwise; 
f) Sanitary Fees: Fees for the use of sanitary and other facilities provided by the 
kshetra panchayat; 
g) Toll Tax: Tolls for the use of bridges, constructed and maintained by the 
kshetra panchayat. 
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Additional fees 
a) License fees on brokers, commission agents, weighmen practicing tlneir calling 
within such markets; 
b) Tolls on vehicles, pet animals or porters bringing goods for sale into such markets; 
c) Market fees for goods for sale in such markets or for the use of any building or 
structure therein; and 
d) Fees on the registration of animals sold in the markets. 
5.7.5 GRAM PANCHAYAT 
5.7.5.1 OWN TAX REVENUES 
1. Land Revenue: a tax on land revenue not less than 25 per cent but not 
exceeding 50 per cent of the total amount of the land revenue payable by a 
tenant. 
2. Entertainment Tax: a tax on theater, cinema or similar entertainment 
temporarily stationed in the area of the gram panchayat not exceeding 5 
rupees per diem; 
3. Animal and Vehicle Tax: a tax payable by the owner thereof on animals and 
vehicles other than vehicle kept within the area of the gram panchayat and 
plied for hire, at that rate: 
(a) in the case of animal not exceeding 3 rupees per animal per annum. 
(b) in the case of vehicles not exceeding 6 rupees per vehicle per annum. 
4. Sales Tax: A tax on person exposing goods for sale in markets, haats or melas 
belonging to or under the concern of gram panchayat concerned. 
5.7.5.2 NON- TAX REVENUE 
1. Registration F-ees: fees on the registration of animals sold In any market and 
place belonging to or under the control of the gram panchayat. 
2. Slaughter house Fees: fees for use of slaughter house and encamping 
grounds. 
3. Water Charges: a water rate where gram panchayat supplies water for 
domestic consumption. 
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4. Cleaning of Drainage Charges: a toll for cleaning private latrine and drains 
payable by the owner or occupiers of the house to which the private latrine is 
attached, where such cleaning is done through the agency of gram panchayat. 
5. Cleaning and Lighting Tax: a tax for cleaning and lighting of streets and 
sanitation. 
6. Irrigation Water Charges: an irrigation rate where water for irrigation purpose 
is supplied by the gram panchayat for any small irrigation project constructed 
and maintained by it. 
7. Other Taxes: any tax, which the State legislature has the power under the 
Constitution to impose in the State and of which imposition by the gram 
panchayat has been authorized by the State Government. 
The details of the aggregate revenue receipts of Gram Panchayats of UP are furnished 
hereunder 
Table: 5.17: 
Gram Panchayat of UP: Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
Revenue 
Surcharge on Land Revenue 
Other Taxes 
Total Tax Revenue 
Non Tax Revenue 
Total Own Source Revenue 
State Grants 
Central Grants 
Total Receipts 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate percenta 
1991-92 
247.48 
(7.82) 
226.30 
(7.15) 
473.78 
(14.98) 
147.32 
(4.66) 
621.10 
(19.64) 
19.81 
(0.62) 
2519.92 
(79.72) 
3160.83 
(100) 
ge share in Total 
1992-93 
146.31 
(5.24) 
216.25 
(7.75) 
362.56 
(12.99) 
55.95 
(2.00) 
418.51 
(15.00) 
27.49 
(0.98) 
2341.62 
(84.00) 
2787.62 
(100) 
Receipts 
1993-94 
113.13 
(4.26) 
216.95 
(8.17) 
330.08 
(12.43) 
59.03 
(2.22) 
389.11 
(14.65) 
21.30 
(0.80) 
2244.96 
(84.54) 
2655.37 
(100) 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Uttar Pradesh 
It is clear from the table 5.17 that out of the total own source of revenues of gram 
panchayats of UP, three-fourth is comprised of tax revenues and one-fourth is of non-tax 
revenues. Surcharge on land revenues contributes around 4-7 per cent and the 
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contributions of othier taxes are also between 7-8 per cent of the total receipts. So the 
total tax revenue is around 12-14 per cent of the total revenues. On the other hand, non-
tax revenue contributes very meager amount of 2-5 per cent. So the total own source 
revenue is constituting about 14-20 per cent of the total receipts; it is around 19.64 per 
cent in 1991-92, 15 per cent in 1992-93 and 14.65 in the year 1993-94 of the total 
receipts. The remaining 80-85 per cent is in the form of grants given by the government. 
5.8 NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF DELHI 
5.8.1 FINANCIAL POWERS OF RURAL LOCAL BODIES 
The provisions for the sources of income of the panchayats were laid down in three 
legislations, namely, the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954; the Delhi Panchayat Raj Act, 
1954 and the Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957. The Gaon Panchayats were 
empowered to levy taxes, with the previous sanction of the Lt. Governor and share 
certain net revenue proceeds and receive grants-in-aid. They could also borrow money. 
The leviable taxes included: a) A tax on the rent payable by an asami (tenant) under the 
Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, not exceeding three paise in the rupee of such rent; and 
b) A tax on land revenue payable by a bhumidar (landlord) not exceeding six paise in the 
rupee. The total burden of these taxes on an individual was not to exceed Rs 250 per 
annum. 
5.8.2 OWN SOURCES OF FINANCE OF MCD 
The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) levies the following taxes, namely; 
a) Property taxes; 
b) A tax on vehicles or animals; 
c) A theater tax; 
d) A tax on advertisement other than advertisement published in the newspaper; 
e) A duty on the transfer of property; and 
f) A tax on the building, payable along with the application for sanction with the 
building plan. 
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Additional Taxes 
a) An educational cess; 
b) A local rate on land revenues; 
c) A tax on professions, trades and calling and employment, 
d) A tax on the consumption (sale or supply) of electricity; 
e) A betterment tax on tiie increase in urban land values caused by thie 
execution of any development and improvement work; 
f) A tax on boats; and 
g) Toll. 
These taxes are assessed and collected in accordance with the provision of this Act and 
the byelaws made thereunder. Some sorts of exemptions are allowed in general 
property tax to small urban and rural areas and places of worship and for charitable 
character. Similarly, tax on vehicles and animals are exempted on those kept in the 
ghosi colonies and dairies in the rural areas. Tax on advertisement is exempted on 
certain modes of advertisement in rural areas. 
5.8.3 NON-TAX SOURCES 
Non- tax revenue accrues from fees, rent and fines from various activities and ventures. 
These are: 
i) Fines for offences against law; 
ii) Process fees; 
iii) Education fees; 
iv) Fines from cattle's pounds; 
v) Fees from hospitals; 
vi) Fees from vehicle licenses; 
vii) Tehbazari fees; 
viii) Rent for lands and buildings; 
ix) Fees for chabutaras, projections, etc; 
x) License fees for offensive trade, articles of food and drinks; 
xi) License for hawking carts, rent of markets and slaughter fees; 
xii) Receipts from encroachments, employees. State insurance office; 
xiii)Sale of land; 
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xiv)Interest on investment, commercial ventures, development charges; and 
xv) Reimbursement of expenditure for fire services rendered to the NDMC, etc. 
The details of the revenue receipts of the MCD are given in table 5.18. 
Table 5.18: 
Municipal Corporation of Delhi: Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs 
Revenue 
Property Tax 
Other Taxes 
Total Tax Revenue 
Non Tax Revenue 
Total Own Tax Revenue 
Share in Assigned Taxes 
Grants 
Total Transfers 
Total Receipts 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate per 
In Crores 
1991-92 
138.17 
(26.33) 
38.97 
(7.42) 
177.14 
(33.76) 
34.38 
(4.64) 
201.52 
(38.40) 
87.77 
(16.72) 
235.40 
(44.86) 
323.17 
(61.59) 
524.69 
(100) 
centage share 
) 
1992-93 
137.24 
(26.54) 
49.89 
(9.65) 
187.12 
(36.19) 
40.65 
(7.86) 
227.77 
(44.05) 
65.00 
(12.57) 
224.21 
(43.36) 
289.21 
(55.94) 
516.98 
(100) 1 
1993-94 
205.82 
(31.99) 
62.09 
(9.65) 
267.91 
(41.65) 
36.10 
(5.61) 
304.01 
(47.26) 
84.47 
(13.13) 
254.73 
(39.60) 
339.20 
(52.73) 
643.21 
(100) 
in Total Receipts 
Source: Report of First Finance Commission of NOT of Delhi 
It is anaylsed from the table 5.18 that the property tax yields the major income for MCD, 
which accounts for one-third of the total receipts of MCD and around 70 per cent of the 
total own source of revenues. It contributes around 26 to 31 per cent and the other taxes 
contribute only 7 to 9 per cent of the total receipts, so the total tax revenue contributed is 
around 38 to 47 per cent, which is less than half of the total receipts. Year wise, it 
contributes 38.40 per cent in 1991-92, 44.05 per cent in 1992-93 and 47.26 per cent in 
the year 1993-94. The remaining 52 to 62 per cent are given by the government by ways 
of fiscal transfers. 
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5.8.4 NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL 
5.8.4.1 OWN TAXES 
i) Property tax; 
ii) A tax on vehicles and animals; 
iii) A theater tax, 
iv) A tax on advertisement other than advertisements published in the 
newspapers, 
v) A duty on the transfer of property; and 
vi) A tax on the buildings payable along with the application for sanction of the 
building plan. 
5.8.4.2 ADDITIONAL TAXES 
i) an education cess; 
ii) a tax on professions, trades, calling and employments; 
iii) a tax on the consumption, sale or supply of electricity; 
iv) a betterment tax on the increase in urban land values caused by the 
execution of any development or improvement works; and 
V) tolls. 
Table 5.19: 
New Delhi Municipal Council: Aggregate Revenue Receipts (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Crores) 
Revenue 
Property Tax 
Other Taxes 
Total Tax Revenue 
Non Tax Revenue 
Total Own Source Revenue 
Share in Assigned Taxes 
Grants 
Total Transfers 
Total Receipts 
* Figures in parenthesis indicate percen 
1991-92 
8.80 
(3.60) 
1.44 
(0.59) 
10.24 
(4.20) 
189.69 
(77.84) 
199.93 
(82.05) 
7.05 
(2.89) 
22.68 
(9.30) 
29.73 
(12.20) 
243.68 
(100) 
tage share in Total 
1992-93 
11.82 
(4.5) 
0.79 
(0.30) 
12.61 
(4.79) 
208.10 
(79.11) 
220.71 
(83.91) 
8.21 
(3.21) 
20.27 
(7.70) 
28.48 
(10.82) 
263.03 
(100) 
Receipts 
1993-94 
18.37 
(6.03) 
1.26 
(0.41) 
19.63 
(6.45) 
244.41 
(80.30) 
264.04 
(86.75) 
8.46 
(2.78) 
16.05 
(5.27) 
24.51 
(8.05) 
304.36 
(100) 
Source: Report of First Finance Commission of NCT of Delhi 
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It is observed from the table 5.19 that the tax source of revenue contributed very meager 
portion of the total receipts which is around 4 to 6 per cent of the total receipts, the 
property tax only gave 3 to 6 per cent, whereas other taxes give only 0.3 to 0.6 per cent 
of the total receipts. The non-tax revenue is major source of income for NDMC, it alone 
contributes 77 to 80 per cent of the total receipts. So the total own source revenue 
contributed around 82 to 87 per cent of the total income and the fiscal transfers fill the 
gap of 8 to 12 percent. 
5.9 SUMMARY 
From the discussion In the chapter, it is observed that there are certain differences in 
imposing of various taxes and non-taxes. For a ready reference observations are 
summarized in tabular form as given in Table 5.20 and 5.21. 
Table. 5.20: 
Comparison of Taxes Imposed by Urban Government in Tamil Nadu, Uttar 
Pradesh and Delhi 
Revenue 
Property Tax 
General Purpose Tax 
Drainage Tax 
Education Tax 
Library Tax 
Lighting Tax 
Scavenging Tax 
Water Tax 
Professional, Trade, 
Calling & Employment 
tax 
Service Tax 
Vehicle Tax 
Tax on Animal 
Vacant Land Tax 
Trade Tax 
Tax on Companies 
Tax on Advertisement 
House Tax 
Land Revenue 
Entertainment Tax 
Stamp Duty, Court Fees 
and Registration 
Surcharge on Sale Tax 
Tamil Nadu 
MC 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Muni 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
T.Panc. 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Uttar Pradesh 
NN 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
NPP 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Delhi 
MOD 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
NDMC 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
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Revenue 
Income from Minor 
Minerals 
Toll Compensation 
Betterment Tax 
Tax on Transfer of 
Immovable Property 
Theater Tax 
Tax on Building 
Land Revenue 
Tax on Consumption 
and Sale of Electricity 
Tax on Boats 
Toll for Cleaning 
Private Latrine and 
Drains 
Tax on Luxuries in 
Hotels & Lodging 
Houses 
Betting Tax 
State Excise Revenue 
Sugarcane Cess 
Urban Land Tax 
Terminal Taxes on 
Goods or Passengers 
Carried by Railways, 
Sea or Air 
License Fees and Other 
Charges 
Income from Properties 
Income from Special 
Services 
Users Charges 
Tax on Carriages, 
Animals, Carts, etc. 
Tamil Nadu 
MC 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Muni 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
T.Panc. 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Uttar Pradesh 
NN 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
NPP 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Delhi 
MOD, 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
NDMC 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Table: 5.21: 
Comparison of Taxes and Non-Taxes Imposed by PRIs in Tamil Nadu, Uttar 
Pradesh 
Revenue 
Property Tax 
House Tax 
Circumstances on Property Tax 
Local Cess Surcharge on Land 
Revenue 
Tam 
Pane. 
Union 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
1 Nadu 
Vill. 
Pane 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Zila 
Pane 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Uttar Pradesh 
Kshetra 
Pane 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Gram 
Pane 
No 
No 
No 
No 
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Revenue 
Professional Tax 
Land Revenue 
Tax on Agriculture Land for 
Specific Land 
Entertainment Tax 
Animal and Vehicle Tax 
Sales Tax 
Water Tax 
Electricity Tax 
Pilgrim Tax 
Fees and Fairs 
Market Fees 
Toll Tax 
Sanitary Fees 
Exhibition and Fair Fees 
Construction and Management 
Fees 
Fees for registration of animals 
sold 
Fees for Library, Sarai, etc 
School Fees 
Licence fees 
Irrigation Water Charges 
Cleaning and lighting Tax 
Cleaning and Drainage Charges 
Water Charges 
Slaughterhouse Fees 
Registration Fees 
Tamil Nadu 
Pane. 
Union 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Vill. 
Pane 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Uttar Pradesh 
Ziia? 
Pant 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Kshetra 
Pane 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Gram 
Pane 
No 
Yes 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
No 
No 
. No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
It is clear from the tables 5.20 and 5.21 that the taxes imposed by ULBs of TN, UP and 
NCT of Delhi are not uniform; the only tax that is common to all the levels of ULBs is 
Professional/Trade & Calling and Employment tax. Whereas the entire local bodies 
except Town Panchayats of TN impose property tax and entertainment Tax. In lieu of 
Property tax they impose House tax. The other common taxes, which are imposed by 
almost all the local bodies except a few, are education tax, water tax, vehicle tax, 
advertisement tax, toll compensation, tax on transfer of immovable property and theater 
tax. 
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In case of PRIs, fees and fines are the only source of revenue which are common to all 
the levels of PRIs, the other common taxes which are imposed by almost all the local 
bodies except a few are, water tax, animal and vehicle tax. 
In case of ULBs in TN, Property tax is the main tax for local bodies. To municipalities in 
TN, it contributes more than 30 per cent to the total non-debt receipts. This source 
contributes more than 20 per cent to the town panchayats whereas about 15 per cent 
contribution from this source to municipal corporations of TN. Total receipts from own 
taxes in all the three types of ULBs varies between 27 to 40 per cent. Non-Taxes 
contribution to town panchayat and municipalities is about 30 per cent, whereas in case 
of municipal corporation their contribution is only about 12 per cent. Total own sources 
revenue contributes about 2/3"^  to the total receipts in case of town panchayats and 
municipalities whereas for municipal corporation, its contribution is between 50 to 62 per 
cent. 
In case of Uttar Pradesh, the share of Property tax was about 27 per cent in municipal 
corporation and only 9 per cent in municipalities. The total tax revenue accrues to the 
extent of 40 per cent to municipal corporations and 16 per cent in municipalities. Non-
Taxes revenue contributes about 26 per cent in municipal corporation and only 9 per 
cent in municipalities. The total own tax revenue finances to the extent of 66 to 71 per 
cent to municipal corporations and 27 to 31 per cent in municipalities. 
The picture of relative share of these sources in NCT of Delhi is also not different. In 
MCD, property tax contribution was in the range of 39 to 45 per cent and in NDMC, it 
was only 4 to 6 per cent in total non-debt receipts. The role of non-tax receipts was 7 to 
12 per cent in MCD and while in NDMC, it was above 80 per cent. In aggregate, MCD's 
total own source revenues in total receipt were 58 to 66 per cent and this share was 82 
to 87 per cent in NDMC. 
The source of finance among PRIs in all the three States is different. House tax is the 
main tax for village panchayats in TN. Total tax revenue shares only 9 to 12 per cent out 
of which about 7 per cent is from house tax. Non-taxes also share about 10 per cent 
thereby total own source revenue contribution is nearby 20 per cent to the total revenue 
receipts. Certain local cess surcharge and non-tax resources are the main sources of 
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revenue to PUCs. While local cess surcharge contnbutes about 5 per cent, non-taxes 
contribute slightly more than this ratio, thereby the share of total own source of revenue 
goes upto 12 per cent. In UP, the gram panchayats depend largely on surcharge on land 
revenue along with other taxes. Total tax revenue contribution is about 12 to 15 per cent 
in the total revenue receipts in which surcharges are about 4 to 8 per cent. The 
contribution of non-taxes revenue varies from 2 to 5 per cent and total own source of 
revenue varies in the range of 15 to 20 per cent, in case of ZP, non-tax revenue is the 
major source of revenue. 
Footnotes: 
1. The Constitution of India, Seventh Schedule, List II: State List, No-5- Local Government, that is to say, the 
Constitution and Power of Municipal Corporation, Improvement taists. District Boards, mining settlement authorities 
and other local authorities for the purpose of local self-government or village administration. 
2. Octroi vi^ ere abolished in most of the States and in lieu of this levy of surcharge vi/as entrusted to the local bodies. 
3. There is a lively and important debate in the local finance literature over whether or not local property taxation, as 
employed in the U.S, constitutes benefit taxation. Bruce Hamilton (1975-1976) and William Fischel (1992) make the 
case that local property taxes combined with local zoning ordinances produce what is effectively a system of 
benefit taxation. Peter Mieszkowski and George Zodrow (1989) take the opposite view. 
4. An excellent restatement and extension of the Gordon analysis are given by Inman and Rubinfeld (1996). David 
Wildasin (1998a) provides a valuable survey of the various implications of factor mobility both for economic 
efficiency and for the redistributive impact of public policy. 
5. Resident-based taxes (also called "destination-based taxes") are levies on factor of production (such as land, labor 
and capital) based on the owner's residence and on goods and services based on the residence of the consumer. 
In contrast, source-based taxes (or "origin taxes") involve taxing factors where they are employed and goods and 
services where they are purchased. Under resident-based taxation, governments have much less capacity to 
export the incidence of their taxes onto economic units elsewhere. Source-based taxes, however, are often easier 
to administer and, in certain forms, tend to be more commonly used by State and local governments. 
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CHAPTER -6 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL 
FISCAL TRANSFERS 
CHAPTER 6 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS 
In the previous chapter an overview of the range of own sources of revenues of various 
types of local bodies in different States has been provided. The statistical information 
covered in the chapter shows that these resources are not sufficient to meet expenditure 
needs of the local bodies. Therefore, they are dependent on intergovernmental fiscal 
transfers from their parent States. Present chapter deals with the rationale, type and 
practice of intergovernmental transfers and intended economic effects of the grants. 
6.1 THEORY OF FISCAL TRANSFERS 
According to Oates (1972), "Intergovernmental grants constitute a distinctive and 
important policy instrument in fiscal federalism that can serve a number of different 
functions". The literature on the subject emphasised three potential roles for such grants 
viz., the internalisation of spillover benefits to other jurisdictions, fiscal equalisation 
across jurisdictions and an improved overall tax system. 
Grants can take either of two general forms. They can be 'conditional grants' that place 
any of various kinds of restrictions on their use by the recipient. Or they can be 
'unconditional' i.e. lump-sum transfers to be used in any way that recipient wishes. The 
theory prescribes that conditional grants in the form of matching grants (under which the 
grantor finances a specified share of the recipient's expenditure) be employed where the 
provision of local services generates benefits for the residents of other jurisdictions. The 
rationale here is simply the usual Pigouvian one, for subsidies that induce individual (in 
this case policy maker or the electorate) to incorporate spillover benefits into their 
decision-making calculus. The magnitude of the matching shares, in such instances, 
should reflect the extent of the spillovers\ 
In contrast, unconditional grants are typically the appropriate vehicle for purpose of fiscal 
equalisation. The purpose of these grants is to channel funds from relatively wealthy 
jurisdictions to poorer ones. Such transfers are often based on an equalisation formula 
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that measures the 'fiscal need' and 'fiscal capacity' of each Province, State, or locality. 
These formulae result in a disproportionate share of the transfers going to those 
jurisdictions with the greatest fiscal need and the least fiscal capacity^. 
Although widely used, equalising intergovernmental grants are by no means a necessary 
feature of fiscal federalism (Dan Usher 1995; Robin Boadway 1996). Economists 
normally think of distributive measures from rich to poor as those that transfers require a 
somewhat different jurisdiction based on social values^, in practice such equalising 
grants play a major role in many countries. In the fiscal systems of Australia, Canada 
and Germany, for example, there are substantial transfers of income from wealthy 
provinces or States to poorer ones. In United States, in contrast, equalising grants from 
the Federal to State Governments have never amounted to much. Intergovernmental 
grants in the US, typically address specific functions or programs, but usually do not 
accomplish much in the way of fiscal equalisation. At the levels of the States, however, 
there are many such programs under which States provide equalising grants to local 
jurisdictions. 
Fiscal equalisation is a contentious issue from an efficiency perspective. Some 
observers see such grants as playing an important role in allowing poorer jurisdictions to 
compete effectively with fiscally stronger ones. This view holds that, in the absence of 
such grants, fiscally favoured jurisdictions can exploit their position to promote continued 
economic growth, some of which comes at the expense of poorer ones. Fiscal 
equalisation, from this perspective, helps to create a more level playing field for 
interjurisdictional competition". 
But the case is not entirely persuasive. Others have argued that fiscal equalisation can 
stand in the way of needed regional adjustments that promote development in poorer 
region. McKinnon (1997a), for example, contends that in the United States, the 
economic resurgence of the South following World War II resulted from relatively low 
levels of wages and other costs. It was this attraction of low wages and costs that 
ultimately induced economic movement to the South, bringing with it a new prosperity. 
Fiscal equalisation, from this perspective, may actually hold back the development of 
poorer areas by impeding the needed interregional flow of resources (both emigration 
and immigration) in response to cost differentials. 
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But the primary jurisdiction for fiscal equalisation must be on equity grounds and it is a 
redistributive issue that it continues to occupy a central place on the political stage. In 
some cases, as in Canada, it may provide the glue necessary to hold the federation 
together. In other instance, like Italy, it may become a divisive force, where regions, 
weary of large and longstanding transfer of funds to poorer areas, actually seek 
dissolution of the Union. Fiscal equalisation is a complex economic and political issue. 
The third potential role for intergovernmental grants is to sustain a more equitable and 
efficient overall tax system. For reasons already discussed, centrally administered, non-
benefit taxes with a single rate applying to the national tax base will not generate the 
sorts of locational inefficiencies associated with varying rates across decentralized 
jurisdictions. Moreover, central taxes can be more progressive, again without 
establishing fiscal incentives for relocation. There is, in fact, considerable evidence to 
indicate that State and local systems of taxes are typically more regressive than Central 
taxation, (e.g., Howard Chernik, 1992). There is thus some force in an argument for 
'Revenue Sharing' under which the Central Government effectively serving as a tax-
collecting agent for decentralised levels of government^. The Central Government then 
transfers funds, in a presumably unconditional form, to Provinces, States and/or 
localities. It is certainly possible, where the polity wishes, to build equalising elements 
into transfers. While there is a real case for the use of intergovernmental grants, a most 
important qualification is that such a system of grants must not be too large in the sense 
of undermining fiscal discipline at lower levels of Government. 
The prescriptive theory of intergovernmental grants thus leads to a vision of a system in 
which there exists a set of open-ended matching grants, where the matching rates 
reflect the extent of benefit spillovers across jurisdictional boundaries and a set of 
unconditional grants for revenue sharing and, perhaps equalisation purpose. Such a 
conception has, however, only modest explanatory power. We do in fact find federal 
matching programs that have supported a number of State and local activities with 
spillover effects, including, for example, grants for interstate highway construction. 
However on closer examination, important anomalies appear. These grants are often 
closed, rather than open-ended. They thus do not provide incentives for expansion at the 
margin. Moreover, the federal matching shares are typically much larger than justifiable 
147 
by any plausible level of spillover benefits. More generally, in a careful study of the 
intergovernmental grants system, Inman (1988) concludes that the economic theory of 
intergovernmental grants does not provide a very satisfactory explanation of the 
structure of US grant programs; he finds that a political model can do a much better job 
of explaining US grant programs^. 
David Bradford and Oates (1971 a, b) tried to lay the foundations for a positive theory of 
the response to intergovernmental grants by setting forth a framework in vjhlch the 
budgetary decisions of the recipients of such grants are treated explicitly in a collective-
choice setting. In short, these grants are treated, not as grants to an individual decision-
making, but rather as grants to polities that make budgetary decisions by some collective 
algohthm (such as simple majority rule). This exercise produced some intriguing 
equivalence theorems. For example, it is straightforw/ard to show that a lump-sum grant 
to a group of people is fully equivalent in all its effects, both allocative and distributive, to 
a set of grants directed to the individuals in a group. Moreover, these results applied to 
an important class of collective-choice procedures, encompassing several of the major 
models, employed in the public-finance literature. These theorems, known as the 'veil 
hypothesis', thus implying that the grant to a community is fully equivalent to, a central 
tax rebate to the individuals in the community. Intergovernmental grants, according to 
this view, are simply a 'veil' for a federal tax cut. 
The difficulty is that this hypothesis has not fared well in empirical testing. It implies that 
the budgetary transfer should be (roughly) the same as the response to an equal 
increase in private income in the community. But empirical studies of the response to 
grants have rejected this equivalence time and again. Such studies invariably find that 
State and Local Government spending is much more responsive to increases in 
intergovernmental receipts than it is to increases in the community's private income and 
this has come to be known as 'flypaper effect', i.e. money sticks where it hits. While this 
finding may not be all that surprising. It is not so easy to reconcile with models of rational 
choice, for it suggests that the same budget constraint gives rise to different choices 
depending upon what form the increment to the budget takes. There is now a large 
literature that tries in a variety of ways (some quite ingenious) to explain the flypaper 
effect''. James Mines and Richard Thaler (1995) have suggested recently that it is just 
one of a more general class of cases where having money on hand (e.g., from grants) 
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has such different effect on spending behavior than where the money must be raised 
(e.g., by taxation). 
Much on the early empirical work on the expenditure response to intergovernmental 
grants studies the period from the 1950's through the 1970's when these grants 
exhibited a continuing path of expansion. As a result, much of the interest focused on 
the budgetary response to increases in grants. However, in more recent times, efforts at 
fiscal retrenchment and devolution have led to large cuts in a wide range of federal grant 
programs. This has raised the interesting and important question of whether the 
response to cuts in grants is similar in size and magnitude to the response to increases 
in these grants. Gramlich (1987), for example, observed that during this period of 
retrenchment, State and local governments responded to the cutbacks in grants by 
picking up much of the slack. They increase their own taxes and replaced in large part 
the lost grant funds so as to maintain levels of existing programs. If Gramlich is right 
then we should observe a basic asymmetry in response: the spending of recipients 
should be more in response to increases in grant monies than to decreases in these 
revenues. This Issue is of some importance if we are to understand the budgetary 
implications of the ongoing process of fiscal decentralisation. In the first study of this 
issue, Stine (1994), examining the response of the county governments In Pennsylvania, 
found just the opposite of Gramlich's predictions: his estimate implies that these county 
governments not only failed to replace lost grant revenues, but that they reduced their 
spending from own revenues on these programs as well, giving rise to a 'super flypaper 
effect.' There are, however, some tricky and troublesome issues of measurement and 
interpretation in the Stine study. Subsequently, using national aggregate data on the 
State and Local Government sector, Shama Gankhar and Dates (1996) were unable to 
reject the hypothesis that the expenditure response to increases and decreases in 
intergovernmental grants has the same absolute value per dollar of grants. Their findings 
are thus consistent with the proposition that the flypaper effect operates symmetrically in 
both directions. 
6.2 THEORY OF GRANTS-IN-AID 
Grants-in-aid are given to the local authorities to perform their functions. As the Central 
and State Governments burden local authorities with more and more functions, they 
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have a moral obligation to assist them to carry out these functions particularly when they 
have, already tapped the principal sources of revenue. The principle that grants-in-aid 
should form one of the important sources of revenues of local authorities has been 
accepted not only in India but also all over world. 
Grants-in-aid to local bodies are necessary for various reasons: 
a) They provide local authorities a sound basis for administration and planning 
of their activities. 
b) They assume balanced growth among local units by providing a uniform 
minimum standard of services to all the people regardless of the financial 
conditions of the local government. 
c) They can also be used as an instrument to encourage and stimulate certain 
policies and programmes, e.g. family planning, polio drops programme, 
which are considered desirable in the larger national interest 
d) They also help in the development of certain services e.g. health and 
education, which are of national importance. The greater the interest of the 
State in the service, the greater should be the financial aid from the State to 
the local bodies. 
e) The grants also enable local bodies to cover the increased cost of 
administration over payment of increased salaries, cost of living allowance 
etc, necessitated by the change in the value of money. 
f) They also serve the very important purpose of shifting the burden of equally 
rising costs from regressive local taxation to the more progressive State and 
National taxes. 
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Flow Chart- 6.1- Grants-in-aid to Local Bodies 
Source: based on King (1984) 
It is true that excessive dependence on grants will undermine the financial responsibility 
of the local bodies and lead to extravagant expenditure. It is also true to some extent 
that the State's aid to local bodies leads to centralisation and to a certain amount of 
interference by the State in their autonomy. It is also alleged that grants tend to support 
public services of certain localities at the cost of others. There is no denying the fact that 
inspite of these drawbacks, the system of grants-in-aid has now come to stay and it is 
not possible to visualise within the near future any system of local finance, which could 
completely do away with grants-in-aid. Moreover, the most expensive local government 
services or national services are administered with a broad element of discretion at local 
level. If the proportion of local expenditure met from grants increases because of this 
tendency, there is nothing wrong in it, since it has been the policy of government to 
encourage local authorities to provide and maintain new and extended services. Grants 
also serve the very important purpose of shifting the burden of equally rising costs from 
regressive local taxation to the more progressive State and National taxes. There is no 
logical basis for the argument that the revenue from taxes at the disposal of a local 
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authority should not be less than the amount of grants-in-aid received by it. In State-
Local government relationship, local government must inevitably be in the position of the 
junior partner. It should be possible to increase grants and at the same time, level the 
proportion of expenditure to be found from the local authority's own resources at a 
sufficiently high level to ensure that local authorities still had an important financial stake 
and remained partners and not become agents of the State Government. 
Grants-in-aid can be broadly classified into two categories viz. 
1. Recurring Grants are those, which are meant to meet the deficiency in the 
recurring expenditure of local bodies and are therefore, given annually. Recurring 
grants may be further sub-divided into two categories: 
a) Block Grants: Block grants that are called general grants, are used to 
supplement the general revenues available for carrying out the' normal 
functions of the local authorities and have no conditions attached to them. 
They are designed to boost up poor local bodies to the minimum level of 
income that would be necessary to ensure that all of them are financially able 
to meet their essential liabilities. 
b) Specific Grants: Specific grants are earmarked for certain specific purposes 
and carry with them certain conditions to ensure that they are utilised 
properly. Amount of the grant is determined by any of the methods mentioned 
under block grants. 
2. Non-recurring Grants: are usually given for some specific purpose to meet the 
initial expenditure. 
The amount of grants may be based on any of the following basis and each of them has 
some advantages and disadvantages. 
i) Percentage basis (also known as matching basis): The percentage basis 
method puts a premium on the financial condition of the lower body, which has 
the effect of making richer bodies richer and poorer, comparatively poorer, 
ii) Unit basis: Unit basis usually takes into consideration population only and as 
such is more rigid. 
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iii) Formula basis: The method based on formula takes into consideration 
population, income, expenditure, etc. and imparts flexibility. 
iv) Deficiency basis: The grants based on deficiency criteria involve ascertaining 
the gap between the needs and resources of local bodies. 
The block grants based on anticipated deficits (deficiency method) in carrying out the 
minimum programme at a certain level of services, are especially appropriate for local 
authorities, which are in earlier stages of development. Specific grants are useful in 
stimulating local action in desired field and in providing the desired measure of control 
over the quality of services. The block grants, if distributed too generously, make local 
authorities less disposed to raise revenues from their own sources and may lead to less 
prudent use of funds than would otherwise be. The common pitfalls, which are inherent 
in the use of specific grants, are that: 
i) they become too numerous, too narrowly defined or too generous, leading to 
rigidities and distortion in the objectives and programmes of local authorities; 
ii) differences in wealth of different areas are widened; 
iii) the reporting and stipulations attached to grants become unduly burdensome 
which sometime negate the very purpose of local government. 
The advantage and disadvantages inherent in block and specific grant systems show 
that neither of them is useful if followed exclusively. A combination of both the methods 
is likely to be more useful and meaningful, where local authorities are to assume 
Increasing responsibility for direct services and development activity. 
The necessity of a wise and co-herent policy regarding grants-in-aid has been 
emphasized by the Local Finance Enquiry Committee (1950) as well as by the Taxation 
Enquiry Commission. The Taxation Enquiry Commission observed that, "No State has in 
this context a grants-in-aid code that embodies simple and well-defined principles. 
Further, of course, both the amount of the grant and the payment of the amount are in 
actual practice contingent upon the State Government's own finances as these vary from 
year to year. The complaints have been voiced that the promised grants, not 
infrequently, fail to materialise. Therefore, It was recommended to each State 
Government for adoption of a system of grants-in-aid based on the following principles: 
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i) There should be a basic 'general purposes' grant for each local body other 
than the bigger municipalities and corporations; 
ii) The local bodies eligible for such grant within each category (municipality, 
panchayats, etc.) should be classified into a few simple divisions based on 
population, area, resources, etc and the grant itself relayed to these factors as 
well as to the size of the normal budget of the local bodies; 
iii) The basic grant should be such that, after taking into account its own 
resources, the local body will have fairly adequate finance for discharging its 
obligatory and executive functions; 
iv) The basic grants should be assured over a reasonable period of years- say 
three or five and save for exceptional reasons, should not be subject to 
alterations from year to year within that period; and 
v) There should in addition be specific grants (annual and other), which, as at 
present, will be for particular items and services. These should be conditional 
on (a) the particular services being maintained at a prescribed level of 
efficiency and (b) the local body exploiting its own resources to the extent 
indicated by government from time to time." 
It is obviously not possible to evolve a common code of grants-in-aid, which can be 
followed by all the States. It is obvious that within certain well-defined principles, each 
State should form its own code taking into account the existing financial position, of the 
different categories of local bodies in the State and also the nature of functions entrusted 
to them. The principles recommended by the Taxation Enquiry Commission should be 
followed by all the States. The following additional principles are also recommended:-
(a) For the purpose of evolving the principles in accordance with which such grants 
should be made, the urban local bodies should be classified into six groups: 
i) Class A Corporations - Metropolitan cities and big industrial centres, 
ii) Class B Corporations/ Municipalities - covering cities with more than 
five lakhs population, 
iii) Corporations and Municipalities with more than one lakh but less than 
five lakhs population, 
iv) Municipalities with more than 50,000 but less than one lakh 
population. 
154 
v) Municipalities with more than 20,000 but less than 50,000 
populations, 
vi) Municipalities, town area committees and notified area committees 
with less than 20,000 population. 
(b) The Committee recommends that the urban local bodies should get a recurring 
annual per capita basic general purposes grant at the following rates: -
ji 
iii 
iv 
V 
vi 
Class A Corporations 
Class B Corporation - Municipalities 
Corporations and Municipalities with more than 1 lakh but less than 5 
lakhs population 
Municipalities with more than 50,000 but less than 1 lakh population 
Municipalities with more than 20,000 but less than 50,000 populations 
Municipalities, town area committees and notified area committees with 
less than 20,000 population 
25% 
25% 
50% 
75% 
100% 
150% 
(c) With regard to specified grants, the Committee is of opinion that for water supply and 
drainage schemes, grants should be made on the following lines:-
i 
ii 
iii 
Class -A 
Corporations 
Class B 
Corporation 
Municipalities 
Corporations 
and 
Municipalities 
with more than 1 
lakh but less 
No grant should be given but State and Central 
Government should give all assistance in securing 
loans on liberal terms. 
Some grant may be necessary but the State 
Government may decide this after taking into 
consideration all the relevant factors with a view to 
make the project a practical proposition. 
The municipality should contribute 10% of the total 
cost of the scheme. 
66.67% to be raised as loans by the municipalities and 
the State Government would give the necessary 
guarantee. 
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than 5 lakhs 
population 
23.33% would be given as grant. 
IV Municipalities 
w/ith more than 
50,000 but less 
than 1 lakh 
population 
10% of the total cost of the scheme should be 
contributed by the municipality 
50% loan to be raised by the municipalities with 
government guarantee 
40% grant 
Municipalities 
with more than 
20,000 but less 
than 50,000 
populations 
10% of the total cost of the scheme should be 
contributed by the municipality 
40% loan to be raised by the municipalities with 
government guarantee 
50% grant 
VI Municipalities, 
Town area 
committees and 
notified area 
committees with 
less than 20,000 
population 
The municipality should contribute 10% of the total 
cost of the scheme. 
30% loan to be raised by the municipalities with 
government guarantee 
60% grant. 
6.3 FISCAL RESPONSE TO INTER-GOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFERS 
The policy level grants may be viewed, as has already been discussed earlier, as a 
means by which the local governments can fulfill the desire of parent governments to 
expand services, to equalize local incomes, or to make greater use of the common tax 
base without directly assuming the functional responsibilities of lower level governments. 
Hence, these transfers are used to bring efficiency and/or equity among the federating 
units. Some of the likely responses of local governments to different types of grants 
would be analysed here on the basis of neoclassical microeconomic theory. 
These grants may be conditional (specified purpose) or unconditional (block) in nature. 
Conditional grants are dependent on the behavior of the recipient local government. 
Grantor may require it to be spent on a particular programme. This type of grant may be 
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matching or non-matching. In matching grants, the grantor agrees to match a certain 
portion of the expenditure, say 'm' per cent of the total cost for providing that 
good/sen/ices at the local level. This type of grant may be open or closed ended. The 
effect of these grants on the decision about the levels of the expenditure/own source 
revenues may be analysed by assuming that a local government maximises a utility 
function in exactly the same manner as an individual dose. Therefore, the relevant 
indifference curve technique may be considered suitable for such analysis. In the 
following analysis (Wilde, 1968) an initial budget line (12 in figure 6.1) represents a 
constraint prior to any receipt of grants. It limits the consumption possibilities between 
good X (local goods) and Y (non-local other goods). The local government seeks to 
maximise utility under this constraint. The impact of grant is then captured by changes in 
the position and/or slope of the budget line. 
Unconditional non-matching closed ended grants: Figure 6.1 shows that EQ is the 
point of preference in the absence of grants, 15 represents tax price of OXo units of local 
goods, if no grant is received. If it receives a fixed amount of grant equivalent to 13, then 
it may purchase additional units of local goods (X°X\ provided these are normal goods, 
due to shift of the equilibrium point to a new higher level of Ei. It is not only that the 
consumption of LPG is increased but also there would be an increase of purchase of 
non-LPG to the extent of 78. 
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Unjis 
ofY 
Figure: 6.1 
Unconditional non-matching grant 
Units of X 
Source: based on Naresh (1997) 
Conditional Non-matching closed-ended grants: Possible impact of tliis type of grant 
is shown in figure 6.2. In this case total grant must be spent on LPG. Now budget line 
would like 154 and the conditional constraint forces the local government to a corner 
solution 5. Local government would move from Eo to Ei in the absence of conditional 
grants compared to unconditional grants. It is on the lower level of welfare (curve 1) 
because of the high spending of the particular LPG than it would other wise choose. 
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Figure: 6.2 
Units of X 
Source: based on Naresh (1997) 
Matching open-ended grants: In this case, grant operates like a pure subsidy and the 
budget line changes its slope from 12 to 13 (figure 6.3), consequently initial equilibrium 
shifts from EQ to Ei. There is a movement along the price consumption curve (hereafter 
PCC) to the point where OX, of the good is demanded. The price subsidy will always 
lead the governments to consume more of the good than with unconditional non-
matching grant. These two grants are compared in this figure. To enable the authority to 
consume OXi, the grantor must offer an unconditional non-matching grant equivalent to 
14. This would create a new equilibrium point at E2. With an unconditional non-matching 
grant the impact is simply that of "income-effect" (a shift along the ICC). But in the case 
of matching open-ended grant the effect is that of a price reduction, which incorporates 
both a substitution-effect and an income-effect and hence the shift along the price 
consumption path PCC. 
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Figure: 6.3 
Matching open-ended grant 
Units of X 
Source: based on Naresh (1997) 
Matching closed-ended grants: With this type of grant the budget line would be 
kinked. Let it be assumed that initially the conditions of the matching grants are such as 
to reduce the price of the local good. It means that the grantor will match at a rate of 23 
to 01 (23/01) (figure 2.4). The budget line changes from 12 to 13. Assuming an upper 
limit on this grant equal to 25, government would choose to move from Eo to Ei along the 
ICC. By comparison if the upper limit for spending were 28, then the matching rate is 
relevant. The budget line is now 178 and the individual would choose to move along the 
PCC to point E2. Clearly everything depends on the way in which the grant is closed. 
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Figure: 6.4 
Matching closed-ended grant 
Units of X 
Source: based on King (1984) 
Quite often it has been observed and pointed out tiiat the administrators do violate the 
legal conditions attached with specified grants. They are able to manipulate by 
converting a fraction of conditional grants into general-purpose grants. This 
phenomenon is termed as "fungibility" of resources. Another anomaly is that of the 
"flypaper-effect" which asserts that the grant "money sticks to where it hits". It is often 
concluded that upon receipts of a grant, politicians fail to reduce grantee taxes as much 
as they would if they genuinely tried to maximize community welfare. Gramlich (1977) 
has noted that there was a disharmony between the interests of bureaucrats and voters. 
Hence, a series of obvious questions arise while attempting to analyse the aid 
programmes, such as: what are the likely effects of matching, base-equalising, or 
lumpsum grant on local expenditure and taxes? How might we evaluate these effects? 
And, how can we use this information in a democratic process seeking to design a 
"best" grants-in-aid package? (Inman, 1977) 
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Several of the earlier studies directly addressed tiiemseives to the question "Has federal 
aid been mainly a substitute for State and local funds, or have expenditures from State 
and local revenue sources been increased as a result of the aid?" (Osman, 1966 b). 
Grants are assumed to have a stimulative effect defined as an increase in expenditure 
on a given function from "own sources revenue" as a result of grant to that function, if 
the value of the coefficient attached with the aid variable in the question is more than 
unity, it is interpreted as stimulative. The general equation used is as follows. 
Expi = tto + ai Xii + ...+ ttn Xni + p A, + 5 Y, + v,-
Key: 
Expi = annual per capita State and local current expenditure of the i'^  government, 
X's= demographic, economic and political explanatory variables, 
Ai= per capita aid to {"'government, 
Y, = per capita income to i'" government, 
Vi= random term. 
Empirical Result Estimates of Elasticity of Grants 
Type of grants 
Unconditional 
Unlimited matching 
Limited matching 
Elasticity 
"YE<0 
" T O " Y E < 0 
"TO<0 
"PE<1 
"PE>1 
"PE<1 
"PE>1 
E,.i = 0 
Appropriate 
independent 
variable 
G 
G 
G 
g 
g 
G 
G 
G 
Partial derivative of 
expenditure on grant 
5E/ 5G < 0 
5E/ 5G < 1 
5E/ 5G > 1 
SB/ 5G < 1 
§E/ 6G > 1 
5E/ 5G < 1 
1 < 5E/ 5G < g 
1 < SE/ 5G < g 
Source: Gramlich (1977) 
Key: E = local expenditure on the grant-aided function; 
Eo= expenditure is on other goods; 
G = grants; 
g = matching ratio; 
"YE = own income-elasticity; 
"Y° = income elasticity for other goods; and 
"PE = own price-elasticity. 
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The introduction of A in this function creates a problem of a circulatory nature since total 
expenditure is the sum of expenditures financed through own source revenues as well 
as grants. To solve this problem attempts were made to net out total expenditure from 
the effect of grants element. Thus the transformed equation was expressed as follows: 
Exp'i = ao + ai Xij+ ...+ apXnj + (3' Ai + y Y; + u; 
Where, Exp', = Expi;and (3' = (p'-l) 
In this case, Stimulation is indicated by p'> 0. 
Gramlich (1977) finds in his review that nearly three-fourth of the expenditure studies 
had concluded that P' is significantly greater than unity (table 6.1). Some contradictory 
results are also evidenced. Adams (1966) finds that in many underdeveloped areas, 
State aid stimulates 'local fiscal effort' whereas Federal aid generates a negative 
response. Osman (1966 b) also obtained a high value of P'. For education and health 
P' >1 and for general expenditures, highway and public welfare P' >0 but <1. It is 
discovered that Federal aid also had a 'dual' effect, i.e., for every unit increased in aid to 
all other functions and education expenditure increased by 52 per cent. Questions 
relating to both of these findings were raised on the grounds of substitutability of the 
functions and their not being complementary in the presence of a budget constraint. 
The existence of a simultaneous relationship between expenditure and aid is considered 
to be one of the reasons for obtaining a high value of P', which is interpreted as a 
measure of the strength of the causal relationship. Pogue and Sgontz (1968) 
emphasized that the P' may be a biased measure of the cause and effect relationship 
that Osman and others have claimed to measure. A non-zero estimate of p could be 
obtained under the following conditions: 
i) Expenditures are determined, in part, by aid payments with expenditures 
having no effect on aid payments. 
ii) Aid payments are determined, in part, by expenditures with aid payments 
having no effect on expenditures. 
iii) Aid payments and expenditures are jointly determined. 
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iv) Some of the factors which influenced both aid and expenditures are 
included in the error term. 
Statements (i), (ii) and (iii), are mutually exclusive, however, statement (iv) and any one 
of these can hold at the same time. It was recognised that p will correctly measure the 
causal effect of aid on expenditures only if statements (ii), (iii) and (iv) are invalid. 
Conditions (ii) and (iii) may be valid because certain types of aid have matching 
requirements. If aid is an increasing function of expenditures, the OLS coefficient P' 
exhibits a positive bias as an estimate of the true coefficient p. To obtain as unbiased 
estimate of p, a two-equation model is required that explains both expenditures and aid 
(Gramlich, 1969 and Pogue and Sgontz, 1966). 
Horowitz (1968) developed and tested a simultaneous equation model that recognises 
the possibility that aid depends on expenditures. He finds that one per cent increase in 
per capita expenditures would lead to increase in 16 per cent in aid. And, one 
percentage increase in aid, on the other hand, would lead to a 126 per cent increase in 
expenditures. This result is quite moderate compared to that obtained earlier by 
employing single-equation models. O'Brien (1971) concludes that expenditures and 
grants are not simultaneously determined and that grants stimulate expenditures. Noe 
(1974) also reached similar conclusions. 
Gramlich (1977) has evaluated the studies based on the USA. In summary, he has 
tested and verified the hypothesis as given below: 
i) open-ended conditional grants generally result in somewhat lower spending 
than the size of the grant, indicating that the price-elasticity of demand for most 
services is probably somewhat less than one; 
ii) closed-ended unconditional grants result in some tax reduction and some 
expenditure increase, with the expenditure increase less than that for open-
ended conditional grants, as would be predicted by theory; 
iii) closed-ended unconditional grants, on the other hand, stimulate much more 
spending than Central Government tax cuts in the long run, indicating at a 
minimum the need for some revision in political theories that feature a harmony 
of interests between bureaucrats and voters; 
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iv) closed-ended conditional grants stimulate total local spending roughly equal to 
grant, generally slightly more spending than that stimulated by closed-ended 
unconditional grants either because they are given in areas where demand is 
more elastic since they are large relative to existing expenditures, or because 
they come with effective effort-maintenance provision. 
Gramlich has further cautioned that the results obtained on the US economy may not be 
universal. He contends that the above tested hypotheses is broad in nature and require 
further extension. Some of these extensions may be made by incorporating the politico-
economic theory of bureaucracy. 
6.4 INTER-GOVERNMENTAL FISCAL TRANSFER TO LOCAL BODIES 
6.4.1 GRANTS-IN-AID 
The use of intergovernmental transfers (grants-in-aid) becomes a prominent feature of 
fiscal institutions in countries with a federal set-up. Broadly, grants can be grouped 
under two categories: 
a. Conditional or specific purpose grants 
b. Unconditional or general purpose grants 
In the specific purpose grants, there is a condition attached to it to ensure that apart from 
spending the amount for the purpose for which it is given, a certain standard is also to be 
maintained. The amount of specific purpose grants can be determined in many ways. A 
certain percentage of locally financed expenditure may be assigned to a given service or 
for specific need. In contrast, in general purpose grants no such conditions are attached. 
Local bodies (recipients of grants) can use the grants according to their own local 
priorities. Generally, the grants are given to the poor or financially weak local bodies to 
uplift the standard of services provided by them. For every specific purpose (conditional) 
grant, there is a 'matching grant'. According to a specified formula, the local bodies are 
required to match each grant rupee or a certain portion of funds they accept with their 
own revenue. Thus, it becomes obligatory for the local bodies to raise revenue 
equivalent to the specific purpose grants they get. 
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There are other types of grants viz. block grants, establishment grants, road 
maintenance grants, minor irrigation grants and miscellaneous grants. The block grants, 
constituting the major proportion of total grants, are given to the PRIs for the execution 
of public works programmes on the basis of applications received from them stating their 
requirements. The quantum of the grants depends on the type of the projects proposed 
by the panchayats. The allocation of the grant is generally made arbitrarily, as 
determined by the State concerned. As a result, the panchayats have to create political 
lobbies to pressurise the State Governments to get the block grants and in the process 
the weak panchayats suffer. 
6.4.2 SHARED / ASSIGNED REVENUE 
The financial assistance from the Central or State Government to the local bodies can 
be either through grants or through assigned revenues. By 'assigned revenue' is meant 
that the proceeds of certain taxes are exclusively, assigned to the local bodies. By 
'shared revenue' is meant that the proceeds of certain State revenues are shared by the 
State with local bodies. Conflicting opinion have been expressed on the question 
whether grants-in-aid or the assignment or sharing of State taxes is the better method of 
rendering financial assistance to local bodies. The Taxation Enquiry Commission 
expressed the following view: -
"That the additional revenue should be fully made available to the local bodies by the 
way of grants-in-aid rather than by way of assignment of a share in the receipts of the 
taxes levied by the government, firstly because revenue without responsibility would be 
demoralising and secondly because grants-in-aid can be determined on the basis of 
needs and be coupled with the maintenance of desirable standards." 
The Municipal Finance Officers Association, Chicago, in their monograph on Municipal 
Non-Property Taxes, expresses the following view: -
"Local government should share more fully in certain stage collected revenues and the 
share should come to them as a right and not as a privilege". 
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The main disadvantage of the system of shared revenues is that it fails to tackle the 
problem of unequal resources. It also creates an additional problem of overlapping tax 
jurisdictions. Once the allocation of shares departs from the basis of origin, shared 
revenue virtually becomes grants-in-aid. 
The assignment of separate revenues also does not solve the basic problem of making 
available adequate revenues to the local bodies particularly the lower level of 
government. There is also an element of rigidity in the system and like the method of 
shared revenues; it also fails to tackle the problem of unequal local resources. Assigned 
revenues in effect are just grants with the additional feature that the sources from which 
the money to pay the grant is derived is stipulated by law. 
Now let us turn specifically to local bodies of Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and NCT of 
Delhi. Intergovernmental fiscal transfer to local bodies consists of assigned revenues 
and grants. Assigned revenues contain two parts: 
i) taxes levied, collected and passed on the local bodies by the State Government, 
ii) taxes levied, collected and shared by the State Government with the local bodies. 
6.5 TAMIL NADU 
6.5.1 MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS 
6.5.1.1 ASSIGNED/ SHARED REVENUES 
There are some assigned taxes available to Municipal Corporations of TN whose 
revenue is shared between the local bodies and the State Government. 
1. Surcharge on Stamp Duties on Transfers of Property: This source of income 
accounts for about 12 per cent of the total income of all corporations. The income 
from stamp duty and surcharge is stated to have reached Rs. 700 crores during 
1995-96. The SFC of TN recommends that, there is much scope for increasing 
revenue by plugging the loopholes and by checking evasions and also by giving 
legal backing for issue of periodical guidelines, on value of properties adopted for 
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registration. It is brought to notice of the government that huge evasion of stamp 
duty and surcharge is observed in the case of transfers of high-rise buildings. 
The government may consider bringing in a proper legislation to curb this 
evasion. 
2. Entertainment Tax: The entertainment tax is levied on entertainment like 
cinema, horse races, shows, etc. This tax collected around Rs. 60 crores in year 
1993-94. It is recommended by the SFC of TN that the revenue realised from this 
source should be shared between the State and local bodies as 30 per cent goes 
to State Government and 70 per cent to local bodies. They also made some 
more suggestions viz. 
a) this tax is entirely earmarked to local bodies after deduction of only 
collection charges, 
b) the assignment should be 90 per cent of the total realisations of this 
compounded tax to the local bodies. 
3. Surcharge on Sales Tax: It is seen that the total surcharge so collected are 
proposed to be distributed as detailed below: 
50 per cent of the realisations from Chennai Corporation area will go to Chennai 
Corporation and 20 per cent of the realisations will be allocated to municipalities 
and corporations of Mudurai and Coimbatore on a sharing formula as below: 
i) 50 per cent directly on population basis 
ii) 25 per cent on per capita own revenue realised basis 
iii) 25 per cent as gap grant to bridge real deficit 
The funds realised out of this surcharge for the last three years and the amounts 
distributed to the local bodies out of that are indicated below: 
Table No: 6.1 
Detail of Surcharge on Sales Tax-Collection and distribution to local bodies in TN 
(Rs in Crores) 
Surcharge 
Amount realised 
Amount distributed to local bodies 
1991-92 
189.88 
-
1992-93 
221.66 
110.50 
1993-94 
215.03 
38.21 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
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From the table 6.1 it is observed that the amount passed on to local bodies is very low 
as compared to the level of taxation. Even if the portion of sales tax is not passed on, at 
least the surcharge levied and realised should be totally made available to the local 
bodies. 
It is recommended by the SFC of TN that, since the surcharge on sales tax levied has 
been merged with the compounded sales tax, 15 per cent of the compounded tax 
(equivalent to the rate of surcharge previously levied) may be assigned to local bodies 
and taken to a divisible pool. 
4. Lease of Minor Minerals 
5. Toll Compensation 
New Assignments From State Taxes 
The SFC of TN also suggests some other sharable taxes from which the local bodies 
could claim reasonable share which are as below: 
1. Tax on luxuries in hotels and lodging houses: The income derived by the 
government under this head is Rs. 45 crores per year and it is recommended that 
25 per cent of the income may be allocated to the local body for inclusion in 
general divisible pool for distribution to all local bodies. 
2. Betting Tax: The revenue derived from this source Is about Rs. 5.48 crores per 
year. A share of at least 25 per cent is assigned to the local body concerned 
namely Chennai Corporation and Udhagamandalam Municipality. 
3. State Excise Revenue: The total revenue collected under this head is Rs. 564 
crores in 1992-93 and Rs. 614 crore in 1994-95. Around 25 per cent of this 
revenue is recommended to be assigned and taken for general distribution from 
divisible pool to all local bodies. 
4. Motor Vehicle Tax: On the introduction of the Motor Vehicles Tax, the toll 
collection by the local bodies was abolished. The government collected Rs. 
333.57 crores as motor vehicle tax and from this tax, 7 per cent is set apart as 
'Rural Road Development Fund' that is around Rs. 20 crores. Atleast 40 per cent 
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of the collection should be set apart by the government for sharing through 
divisible pool among the various types of local bodies. 
5. Agriculture Income Tax: The SFC recommends that government may allocate 
25 per cent from this tax to the areas covered by plantations. 
6. Sugarcane Cess: Under the Tamil Nadu Sugar Factories Control Act, 1949, a 
sugarcane cess is levied on the sugar mill owners and the Director of Sugar is 
holding this fund and spending on the development of roads in the concerned 
area by undertaking the job through that department. 
7. Urban Land Tax: This tax is levied on urban non-agricultural land and the 
revenue is used to carry out slum clearance schemes and housing schemes for 
low-income group. The SFC recommends a 50 per cent share out of this revenue 
to urban local bodies concerned. 
8. Terminal Tax on goods or passengers carried by railways, sea or air 
9. Advertisement Tax: In Chennai Corporation and in Municipalities of 
Kanyakumari District, this tax is levied and it is suggested by the SFC of TN that 
other Corporations and Municipalities should also levy this tax. 
10. Cable TV Tax: A few suggestions were made to the SFC of TN about the levy on 
cable TV operators; 
i) leeway rights across and along local body for each connection at Rs. 60 per 
year, 
ii) Cable TV service to customers as sales tax for a charge of Rs.150 per cable 
connection. 
As shown in table 5.2 that assigned/shared revenue contributes 35-60 per cent of the 
total receipts of the municipal corporation of TN. In the year 1991-92, it contributed 45 
per cent, in 1992-93 it contributes 58.74 per cent and in 1993-94 it contributed around 35 
per cent. 
6.5.1.2 GRANTS 
There is no specific system of grants-in-aid and there is no general-purpose grant for 
local bodies. The grants are given either as incentive for tax efforts or for matching the 
efforts in maintenance of services. Mostly, the grants-in-aid are discretionary and 
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unpredictable and no specific provision has been made in the statute to mal<e them 
compulsory, except in a few cases. 
The details of grants available to Municipal Corporation and income derived are given 
below: 
Table 6.2: 
Details of Grants from State Government to Municipal Corporations of TN 
(RSI 
Grants-in-aid 
Grants for general purpose 
Road 
Public Health 
Medical 
• 
Noon-meal center 
Water supply 
Education 
Total 
n thousands) 
1991-92 
9859 
359 
1534 
32385 
21590 
5297 
31764 
102788 
1992-93 
994 
2454 
1688 
42726 
13297 
565 
14442 
76166 
1993-94 
1805 
682 
4565 
53991 
10433 
200 
6855 
78531 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
The grants-in-aid to Municipal Corporations of TN on revenue account are very meager 
covering only 5 per cent of the total revenue receipts of the Municipal Corporations. As 
shown in table 5.2, it is 5.30 per cent in 1991-92, 2.6 per cent in 1992-93 and 3.21 per 
cent in 1993-94. 
The general-purpose grants are limited to a few corporations in select years and the 
specified purpose grants constitute about 90 per cent of the total grants in all these three 
years viz, 1991-92 to 1993-94. Medical grants account for a higher percentage against 
the specified purpose grants given to the corporations; the levels of the grants vary 
among the corporations, in 1991-92, Chennai Corporation received 64 per cent of the 
total grants and in 1992-93 and 1993-94 the percentage exceeded more than 80 per 
cent. 
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6.5.2 MUNICIPALITIES 
6.5.2.1 ASSIGNED/ SHARED REVENUES 
The assigned/shared revenues now available to the municipalities are the same as 
available to the municipal corporations viz. 
i) Entertainment tax 
ii) Stamp duty surcharge 
iii) Surcharge on sales tax 
iv) Incomes from minor minerals 
v) Toll compensation 
The income from existing assigned/shared taxes are as follows: 
Table: 6.3: 
Assigned/Shared Revenues of Municipalities of TN (1991-92 to 1993-1994) 
(Rs in Crores) 
Details 
Surcharge on Stamp Duty 
Surcharge on Sale tax 
Local Cess 
Entertainment tax 
Toll compensation 
Lease on Mines & Minerals 
Total 
1991-92 
14.92 
3.19 
0.00 
15.85 
0.61 
0.01 
34.58 
1992-93 
20.84 
2.54 
0.00 
16.49 
0.90 
0.07 
40.84 
1993-94 
18.12 
0.74 
0.00 
19.34 
0.99 
0.02 
39.21 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
The surcharges on stamp duty and entertainment tax are the major source of assigned 
revenue. Only this tax contributes around 50 per cent of the assigned revenues. It is 
clear from the table 5.5 that shared revenue contributes around 27 to 30 per cent of the 
total receipts of municipalities of TN. In the year 1991-92, it contributed 27 per cent, in 
1992-93 and 1993-94 this share went upto 30 per cent of the total receipt of 
municipalities. 
The recommendations made under Municipal Corporations regarding all assignment 
under surcharge on stamp duty, entertainment tax and sales tax will be applicable to the 
municipalities. Regarding the income from minor minerals the recommendations made 
under the Panchayat Unions will be applicable to Municipalities also. 
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Similarly the recommendations relating to some more additional assignment / sharing of 
revenue from the following State taxes have also been discussed earlier under Municipal 
Corporation and the recommendations made therein will be extended to municipalities 
also, are given below; 
i) Tax on luxuries in hotels and lodging houses; 
ii) Betting tax; 
iii) State excise revenue; 
iv) Motor vehicle tax; 
v) Agriculture income tax; 
vi) Sugarcane Cess; 
vii) Urban land tax; 
vill) Terminal tax on goods or passengers carried by railways, sea or air. 
NEW TAX DOMAINS 
i) Advertisement tax on hoardings 
ii) Cable TV 
6.5.2.2 GRANTS 
The details of grants available to municipalities and income derived are given in table 
6.4. 
Table 6.4: 
Municipalities of TN: Details of Grants from the State Government 
(1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Crores) 
Grants 
For General Purpose 
For Specific Purpose 
Roads 
Public Health 
Medical 
Noon-Meal Centers 
Education 
Total for Secific Purpose 
Incentive Grants 
1991-92 
1.46 
0.49 
0.46 
0.29 
0.36 
7.28 
8.88 
1992-93 
0.88 
1.61 
0.43 
0.48 
0.50 
1.57 
4.59 
1993-94 
0.80 
1.82 
0.49 
0.65 
0.51 
0.95 
5.42 
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Grants 
Small Savings Incentives 
House Tax Matching Grants 
Total 
Compensation Grants 
Total 
1991-92 
00 
00 
00 
0.51 
10.85 
1992-93 
0.09 
0.24 
0.33 
0.89 
6.69 
1993-94 
0.02 
0.01 
0.03 
0.09 
12.69 
Source: Report of the First State Finance Commission of TN 
House tax matching grants relates to a few Town Panchayats recently upgraded as 
municipalities. No such grant is available to municipalities as such. The municipalities 
are expected not only to maintain civic amenities, but also maternity and child welfare 
centers and dispensaries on medical side. The revenue derived from the available 
resources to municipalities is very limited, inelastic and inadequate to meet the minimum 
level of civic amenities to be provided to the people. So it is necessary that the 
municipalities have to be considered for a regular system of revenue grants from the 
State Government. It is clear from the table 5.5 that the grants-in-aid contributed 4 to 8 
per cent of total income of municipalities of TN. It is 8.74 per cent in 1991-92, in 1992-93 
it contributed 5 per cent and in 1993-94 it contributed 4 per cent in the total receipts. 
6.5.3 TOWN PANCHAYATS 
6.5.3.1 ASSIGNED / SHARED REVENUE 
The assigned/shared revenues available to Town Panchayats are the same as those are 
available to Municipal Corporation and Municipalities, viz. 
i) 
ii) 
iii) 
iv) 
V) 
vi) 
Entertainment tax; 
Stamp duty surcharge; 
Surcharge on sales tax; 
Local cess; 
Incomes from minor minerals; and 
Toll compensation. 
The income from existing assigned / shared taxes are furnished in table 6.5. 
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Table, 6.5: 
Town Panchayats of TN: Assigned/Shared Revenues by source 
(1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Crores) 
Sources 
Surcharge on Stamp Duty 
Surcharge on Sales Tax 
Local Cess 
Entertainment Tax 
Toll Compensation 
Lease: Mines and Minerals 
Total Shared Revenue 
1991-92 
17.68 
0.27 
0.26 
2.85 
0.01 
0.08 
21.15 
1992-93 
23.43 
0.68 
0.37 
3.05 
0.03 
0.05 
27.61 
1993-94 
22.47 
. 0.33 
0.39 
0.54 
0.03 
0.05 
26.81 
Source: Report of the First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
The surcharge duty contributes major portion of total shared revenue. It contributes 
around 30 to 38 per cent in the total receipts. It is observed from table: 5.8 that in 1991-
92 it contributes 33.43 per cent, in 1992-93 it contributes 38.40 per cent and in 1993-94 
it contributes 31 per cent of the total receipts. The recommendations made for assigned / 
shared revenue under Municipal Corporation and Municipalities will be applicable to 
Town Panchayats also. 
6.5.3.2 GRANTS 
The State Government gives grants-in-aid to town panchayats for various purposes like 
for maintenance and improvement of roads, lighting, public health, house tax, matching 
grants, etc. The income from various grants available to town panchayats is given below: 
Table 6.6: 
Town Panchayats of TN: Details of Grants from the State Government 
(1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Crores) 
Details 
For general purpose 
For specific purpose 
Roads 
Public Health 
Medical 
Noon-Meal centers 
Education 
Total specific purpose 
Incentive grants 
Small savings incentives 
1991-92 
1.01 
0.50 
0.22 
0.10 
0.00 
0.02 
0.75 
0.01 
1992-93 
1.34 
0.65 
0.37 
0.01 
0.00 
0.03 
1.06 
0.05 
1993-94 
1.17 
0.60 
0.20 
0.01 
0.00 
0.32 
1.13 
0.15 
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Details 
House tax matching grant 
Total Incentive 
Compensation grants 
Total Grants 
1991-92 
0.29 
0.30 
0.10 
2.16 
1992-93 
0.31 
0.36 
0.16 
2.92 
1993-94 
0.33 
0.48 
0.20 
2.98 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
The grants now available are paltry and not adequate. It is recommended by the SFC of 
TN that, all the Town Panchayats in special and selection grades may be initially 
assured of regular yearly grants. It is clear from the table 5.8 that around 3 to 4 per cent 
of share in total receipts are given by grants. It is around 3.4 per cent in 1991-92, 4.08 
per cent in 1992-93 and in 1993-94 it contributes 3.74 per cent of the total receipts. 
6.5.4 PANCHAYAT UNION 
6.5.4.1 ASSIGNED/SHARED REVENUE 
The following are available to Panchayat Unions as shared revenues: 
1. Local cess; 
2. Entertainment tax; 
3. Mines and Minerals fees; Seigniorage fees collected by the Geology and Mines 
Department on minor minerals in the areas of the local bodies concerned. 
The Income from the above sources in the last 3 years as obtained by the SFC is given 
hereunder: 
Table 6.7: 
Panchayat Unions of TN: Income from Assigned/Shared revenue by source 
(1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Crores) 
Source 
Local Cess 
Entertainment Tax 
Mines and Minerals fees 
Total 
1991-92 
1.71 
4.67 
0.63 
7.01 
1992-93 
2.76 
5.04 
0.61 
8.41 
1993-94 
3.74 
5.36 
0.60 
9.70 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
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Assigned / shared revenue contributes very meager amount in the total receipts i.e., 
around 3 per cent of the total receipts. It is clear from the table 5.10 that in 1991-92 it 
contributes 2.68 per cent, in 1992-93 it contributes 2.84 per cent and in 1993-94 it 
contributes 2.50 per cent of the total receipts. 
6.5.4.2 GRANTS 
Panchayat Unions are in receipt of various grants as below: 
Statutory Grants 
1. Local cess surcharge matching grants; 
2. Local roads grants. 
Non-statutory Grants 
1. Grants for maternity centers; 
2. Grants for maintenance of dispensaries; 
3. Development grants like village work grants (rural water supply, link roads 
and school buildings). 
Other Grants: There are other types of grants, namely women & child welfare grants 
and social education grant. In addition, they are now sanctioned various plan grants 
under centrally sponsored schemes namely: 
i) Jawahar Velai Vaippu Thittam; 
ii) Intensive Jawahar Velai Vaippu Thittam; 
iii) Employment Assurance Scheme; 
iv) Local Areas Development Schemes; 
v) Central Rural Development Schemes; 
vi) Decentralised District Plan. 
The income from various grants available to Panchayat Unions is given in table 6.8. 
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Table 6.8: 
Panchayat Unions of TN: Details of Grants from the State Government 
(1991-92 to 1993-94) 
Grants 
Grants-in-aid 
Local Cess Surcharge 
Small Savings 
Total 
Non Statuary Grants 
Local Roads Grants 
Minor Irrigation Grants 
Local Irrigation Grants 
Dispensary Grants 
Maternity Grants 
Development Grants (vi^ ater supply, lighting etc.) 
Others 
Total 
1391-92 
344764 
2495 
347259 
84253 
5098 
4878 
9618 
26551 
45118 
2083568 
2259084 
(Rs in t 
1992-93 
328016 
5289 
333305 
112232 
4624 
5495 
3104 
27506 
61144 
2299303 
2513408 
housands) 
1993-94 
473622 
8797 
482419 
15105 
5392 
6692 
2293 
29158 
66075 
3151366 
3276021 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
In case of Panchayat Union, Grants-in-aid accounts for 84 to 87 per cent of the total 
income. It is clear from the table 5.10 that in the year 1991-92 it contributes amund 87 
per cent of the total receipts, in 1992-93 it goes down upto 35 per cent and in the year 
1993-94 it contributes 87 per cent of the total receipts. 
6.5.5 VILLAGE PANCHAYAT 
6.5.5.1 ASSIGNED/SHARED REVENUE 
The following are the shared revenues of Village Panchayats: 
a) Local Cess; 
b) Surcharge on Stamp Duty; 
c) Entertainment Tax; 
d) Mines and Minerals. 
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The income of Village Panchayats from the above sources is furnished in table 6.9. 
Table 6.9: 
Village Panchayats of TN- Details of income from Assigned / Shared revenues 
(1991-92 to 1993-94) 
(Rs in Crores) 
Item 
Surcharge on Stamp Duty 
Local Cess 
Entertainment Tax 
Mines and Minerals 
Total 
1991-92 
36.35 
0.40 
1.22 
0.14 
38.11 
1992-93 
47.11 
0.53 
1.43 
0.34 
49.41 
1993-94 
49.46 
0.71 
1.45 
0.30 
51.91 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
Out of the total shared revenue, surcharge on stamp duty contributes the major and 
other taxes contribute very meager amount. Assigned/shared revenue contributes 36 to 
42 per cent, as shown in table 5.12. It is 38.57 per cent in 1991-92, 41.98 per cent in 
1992-93 and 36.54 per cent in 1993-94. 
Assignment of shared revenues has been discussed in detail under Panchayat Unions. 
Recommendations made thereunder will also apply to Village Panchayats. 
6.5.5.2 GRANTS 
The following are the grants given to Village Panchayats: 
1. House tax matching grants; 
2. Water supply grant; 
3. Lighting grants; and 
4. Rural development programme grants. 
(1) above is statutory and (2), (3) are adhoc. 
The income from the grants-in-aid to Village Panchayats may be seen from the table 
6.10 below: 
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Table 6.10: 
Village Panchayats of TN: Details of grants-in-aid from higher levels of 
government (1991-92 to 1993-94) (Rs in Lakhs) 
Details 
Statutory Grants: 
House Tax matching grants 
Small Savings, Grants 
Statutory Grants 
Non-statutory Grants: 
Water Supply Grants 
Street Light Grants 
Funeral rites Grants 
Development Grants: 
Jawahar Velai Vaippu 
intensive J.V.V.T 
Employment Assurance 
Prog, of Assured Employment 
Others: 
Development grants: total 
Non-statutory grants: total 
Total grants 
1991-92 
815.40 
14.29 
829.69 
33.59 
80.72 
51.68 
2950.49 
129.99 
30.38 
12.70 
16.58 
3140.14 
3306.13 
4135.82 
1992-93 
855.23 
28.68 
883.88 
36.56 
53.28 
57.43 
3329.66 
169.93 
39.53 
8.51 
24.35 
3571.98 
3719.25 
4603.13 
1993-94 
867.48 
196.08 
1063.56 
112.99 
202.06 
108.32 
4280.37 
230.57 
64.00 
23.94 
42.90 
4641.78 
5065.15 
6128.71 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Tamil Nadu 
Village Panchayats gets statutory and non-statutory grants. It is observed from the table 5.12 
that out of the total grants, 80 per cent is contributed by non-statutory grants whereas the 
statutory grants contributes only 20 per cent. Around 43 per cent of the total receipts are 
contributed by the grants. 
6.5.6 DEVOLUTION MECHANISM RECOMMENDED BY THE FIRST STATE FINANCE 
COMMISSION OF TAMIL NADU 
Summarily the system of intergovernmental fiscal transfers in TN is as follows. The total 
own tax revenues are grouped into two Pools. In Pool A are those taxes, which are 
collected by the State on behalf of local body and in turn given back to the local bodies. 
In Pool B additional devolution out of the rest of the State's own taxes as per 
recommendations of SFC are pooled. Out of this 92 per cent resources are retained by 
the State Government and the rest 8 per cent are devolved to the local body. 15 per cent 
of it (1.2 per cent of pool B) is reserved for equalisation and incentive fund for rewarding 
revenue performance of the local bodies, as well as to fill up the post-devolution gap, if 
any. Rest of the 8 per cent (i.e. 6.8 per cent of pool B) is earmarked for general 
devolution to local bodies. 40 per cent of it goes to Urban Pool and 60 per cent for the 
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rural government. Since there are three types of urban local bodies namely Municipal 
Corporation, Municipalities and Town Panchayats, the share of Urban Pool is 
apportioned in the ratio of 31:31:38 respectively to these local bodies. In case of PRIs, 
86 per cent goes to panchayats and 14 per cent to District Panchayats of the rural Pool. 
Panchayats are of two types namely Village Panchayats and Panchayat Union Council, 
the share of 86 per cent equally goes to both of them. A schematic Flow chart 6.2 shows 
the pattern of devolution. 
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Flowchart-6.2: Devolution Mechanism as recommended by first report of SFC of TN 
STATE'S OWN TAX 
REVENUE 
I 
POOL A: Taxes collected by the 
State on behalf of local bodies and 
given back to them. 
Resources retained by the State 
Government (initially 92% of pool B) 
POOL B: Additional devolutions 
recommended by the SFC from the 
rest of sources (Assume 100) 
Resources devolved to the local 
bodies (initially 8% of pool B) 
15% or 1.2% of pool B devolution 
reserves to local bodies or for 
equalisation and incentive fund for 
rewarding revenue performance and 
filling up the post devolution gap. 
f 
Urban Pool (40% of General 
Devolution or 2.72% of pool B) 
i' 
Gorporatio 
n(31%of 
urban pool 
or 
0.8432% 
of pool B) 
i 
General Devolution to local bodies 
(6.8% of Pool B) 
\ 
Rural Pool (60% of General 
Devolution or 4.08% of Pool B) 
f ^ 
Municipalit 
ies(31% 
of Urban 
Pool or 
0.8432 % 
of Pool B) 
Town 
Panchayat 
s (38% of 
Urban 
Pool or 
1.0336% 
of Pool B) 
Panchayats 
other than 
District 
Panchayats 
(86% of Rural 
Pool or 3.5088% 
of Pool B) 
District 
Panchayats 
(14% of Rural 
Pool or 
0.5712% of 
Pool B) 
f i 
Village Panchayats (50% of 
other Panchayats Devolutions 
or 1.7544% of Pool B) 
Panchayat Unions (50% of 
other Panchayats Devolution 
or 1.7544% of pool B) 
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6.5.7 DESIGN OF FISCAL TRANSFERS RECOMMENDED BY THE FIRST STATE FINANCE 
COMMISSION AND ACCEPTED BY THE GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU 
While devising the Resource Allocation Mechanism (RAM), the First State Finance 
Connmission (SFC) proceeded from the needs angle - not only those needs that are 
currently being attended to, but the ones emerging In the coming years on account of 
growing aspirations of the people. The Commission made detailed studies of the norms 
and standards for the following six core services: Drinking water, roads, street lighting, 
sanitation/ sewerage, solid waste management and storm water drains. The financial 
implications of O&M expenditure and the spending gaps relating to these six core civic 
services have been worked out. 
To cover the resource gaps, the State Finance Commission considered the following 
steps: 
i) Full exploitation of revenue potential of the existing local taxes. This would 
imply reforming of the property tax, the main source of revenue for the local 
bodies by proper assessment of property, easy procedure for appeal, revision 
of rates on both residential and commercial properties and review of 
exempted cases. As regards other taxes, reforms would mainly be in the form 
of revision of rates. In addition, optimum adoption of user charges will 
strengthen the mobilisation of Internal resources. 
ii) Assignment of additional taxes, subject to the efficiency of local bodies to 
collect them and piggybacking on certain elastic resources of the State 
Government such as excise duty, sales tax and motor vehicles tax. 
iii) Sharing through a formula based on factors such as revenue collection 
efficiency, population and expenditure needs. Grant distribution policy should 
satisfy the principle of equalisation of expenditure, i.e., the transfer should be 
made in such a way as to reduce the imbalances and equalize the financial 
status and service levels of the local bodies. 
iv) The feasibility of privatising those services where NGOs can provide efficient 
services at competitive cost depending on the nature and type of service 
should be explored. 
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Fiscal Devolution from Government 
The suggestions incorporate a percentage of general sharing from the State taxes as 
indicated in the Pool A and B below in which the SFC divides all the State taxes: 
Pool A: This contains taxes which rightly belong to the local bodies but collected by 
Government, i.e., surcharge on stamp duty, local cess and local cess surcharge (due as 
per the basic land revenue computed by Damodaran Committee) and entertainment tax. 
Pool B: This forms the nucleus for general devolution from net tax revenue of the State 
to the local bodies from other State taxes as sales tax, motor vehicle tax, State excise 
duty and all others. 
The need for filling up the gap over and above the additional tax and non-tax revenues 
of the local bodies have been considered with reference to the fiscal gap of individual 
units. 
Distribution 
Quantum of devolution from the net tax revenue of the State has been proposed after 
considering the devolution that would be feasible due to constraints on State fiscal 
conditions. It is also a point whether the local bodies would have built the capability to 
absorb any sudden jump in devolution in the very first year itself, because they will have 
to get properly equipped to manage the funds provided. In this context, the SFC 
considered whether the devolution could be in a phased manner to reach the target 
percentages at least during 2001-02. Accordingly, SFC fixed the overall percentage for 
devolution in a phased manner. The devolution proposed for each year with gradual 
increase is as follows: 
Tamil Nadu: Proposed phasing of the devolution to local bodies by the SFC 
Year 
1997-98 
1998-99 
1999-2000 
2000-01 
2001-02 
Share in State's own 
net tax revenue 
8% 
9% 
10% 
11% 
12% 
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Special Reserve from Global Sharing 
The SFC recommends that the quantum of general allocation based on 8, 9, 10, 11 and 
12 percentages for the respective years from the divisible Pool B. Out of the total net 
allocation available for general distribution, 15 per cent will be earmarked for 
Equalisation and Incentive Fund (EIF), with a view to correcting possible deficiencies 
arising in the implementation of the devolution formula as also continuing with the 
practice of the incentive grants presently available for local revenue efforts such as the 
house tax-matching grant and local cess surcharge-matching grant. In this context, the 
SFC also noted that the exact quantum needed cannot be decided at this stage and 
hence an adhoc provision of 15 per cent has been suggested. With the experience 
gained during the first year of distribution, the amount for the future years can be suitably 
modified. If any sum Is left undisbursed out of the Equalisation Fund, it can be 
redistributed to all the local bodies on the principles as formulated for general 
distribution. 
The SFC recommends the distribution of the remaining 85 per cent of the Pool B 
resources in three steps: 
Step I (Vertical): Allocation of funds earmarked by the State for transfer to rural local 
bodies and urban local bodies. 
Step II (Vertical): Distribution of allocations earmarked to rural 7 urban local bodies in 
Step 1 to the respective tiers of District Panchayats, Panchayat Unions, Village 
Panchayats, Panchayats under rural areas and town Panchayats, Municipalities and 
Municipal Corporations under urban areas. 
Step III (Horizontal): Inter-se distribution of funds allocated to the respective tiers, viz., 
allocation among Village Panchayats/ Panchayat Unions/ District Panchayats and Town 
Panchayats / Municipalities/ Municipal Corporations. 
The Government has decided for the devolution of 8 per cent of all taxes other than 
entertainment tax to the local bodies. List of local taxes accepted by the Government for 
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levying by urban local bodies as per recommendations of the First State Finance 
Commission are: Property tax; profession tax; toll compensation; advertisement tax; user 
charges; specific service charges from private markets, additional charges for water 
supply; license fees & other charges; improvement & income from properties; 
development charges under town planning; land use with respect to urban local bodies; 
parking fees; penalties and fines; local cess surcharge; local cess; house tax; 
remunerative schemes; development grant; and distribution and credit of surcharge on 
stamp duty. 
Recommended local taxes not accepted by the Government 
Vehicle tax; tax on timber; cable TV; surcharge on bus tickets on floating population; 
calculation of LCS based on average land revenue; reduction in local cess and local 
cess surcharge based on remission and waiver in land revenue; house tax; tax on 
agricultural land for specific purposes; water tax; and fairs and festivals. 
Consequent to this devolution some of the earlier grants being made to Panchayats and 
Panchayats Unions will no longer be available. The grants that will not be available from 
1.4.1997 are: 
a) Panchayats: Maintenance of hand pumps; Maintenance of power pumps; 
Grants for Panchayat Assistant's salary; Provision of street lights to weaker 
Panchayats; Compensation grant in lieu of surcharge on sales tax to Village 
Panchayats; and House tax-matching grant. 
b) Panchayat Unions: Local cess surcharge-matching grant; local roads grant; the 
expenditure so far incurred from the above grants will now have to be incurred by 
the respective local bodies from out of the grants being devolved from the SFC 
recommendations. 
The SFC devolution grants must therefore be utilised only for the following purposes: 
a) Panchayats: Salaries and wages of the approved staff; maintenance of drinking 
water facilities including hand pumps and power pumps; maintenance of street 
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lights and payment of electricity charges; statutory obligations like public health, 
hygiene, sanitation, sewerage, etc. which are required to be taken care of by the 
panchayats under the various sections of the Tamil Nadu Panchayats Act 1994; 
and office maintenance and expenses including stationery. 
b) Panchayat Unions: Salaries and wages of the approved Panchayat Unions 
staff; pension fund, provident fund, TA/DA and other related expenses of the 
Panchayat Unions; office maintenance and expenses including stationery, 
electricity charges, telephone charges etc.; maintenance of all Panchayat Union 
buildings and buildings vested with the Panchayat Unions; Maintenance of 
Panchayat Union roads; and maintenance of minor irrigation tanks vested with 
the Panchayat Unions. 
The following instructions are for strict compliance by all local bodies: 'Staff salary, 
pension contribution and provident fund contribution, office expenses will be first charges 
on these grants'. In respect of Village Panchayats the next priority should be 
maintenance of drinking water facilities including open wells, hand pumps and power 
pumps; streetlights; public health hygiene and sanitation; and any other statutory items 
of work. In respect of Panchayat Unions, the next priority should be the maintenance of 
all buildings. However, maintenance of roads, minor irrigation tanks, etc. should be taken 
only after providing for the above commitments. 
• Except as provided for by Government Orders, no fresh appointment on-part 
time/ NMR/ full time/ temporary basis of any category of staff should be made by 
any of the local bodies. 
• The District Collector, as Inspector of Panchayats and Panchayat Union will 
ensure strict compliance with these instructions. 
• Instructions regarding taking up capital works with the surplus, if any available 
under these grants, will be issued separately by the Director of Rural 
Development. 
• Apart from the SFC grants, the Panchayats will have their own resources in the 
form of house tax, profession tax, license fees, etc. Apart from this, they will also 
be eligible for continuing devolution on local cess, stamp duty surcharge, share 
of entertainment tax, fees under mines and minerals, etc. 
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• Panchayat Unions will continue to be eligible for local cess surcharge, surcharge 
on stamp duty, proportion of entertainment tax, etc. 
Source: Naresh (1999) 
6.6 UTTAR PRADESH 
6.6.1 GRANTS FOR LOCAL BODIES 
a) Grants for Nagar Nigam: It is seen from the table 5.13 that the grants are 
covering around 28 to 34 per cent of the total receipts of Nagar Nigams of 
Uttar Pradesh. It is 33.39 per cent of the total receipts in 1993-94 and 28,15 
per cent in 1994-95. 
b) Grants for Nagar Palika Parishad: Whereas in case of Nagar Paiika 
Parishad, as it is shown in table 5.14 that the grants are the major source of 
receipts. It contributed 68 per cent of total receipts in 1993-94 and 72.80 per 
cent in 1994-95. 
c) Grants for Nagar Panchayats: In case of Nagar Panchayats, as given in 
table 5.15, 65 to 70 per cent of the total receipts are contributed by grants. It 
is 64.73 per cent in 1991-92, around 70 per cent in 1992-93 and 65.52 per 
cent of the total receipts in 1993-94. 
d) Grants for Zila Parishad: The grants have been received by Zila Parishads 
as part of State plan and Centrally sponsored schemes for performing the 
agency functions of implementing the schemes of the State Government and 
the Central Government and not by way of their share or devolution in terms 
of activities and functions entrusted to them in pursuance of provisions of 73'^ ^ 
Amendment to the Constitution. 
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Table 6.11: 
Grants received by 68 Zila Parishads of UP (1991 to 1994) 
(Rs in 
Years 
Grants received by State Government 
Grants received by Central Government 
Lakhs) 
1991-92 
11.00 
19.83 
1992-93 
1576.21 
1327.41 
1993-94 
1345.02 
2320.52 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Uttar Pradesh 
It is clear from the table 6.11 that both the State and Central grants getting high jump 
from 1992-93 to 1993-94. State grants contribute around 20 to 25 per cent of total 
receipts whereas Central grants contribute 20 to 32 per cent. Around half of the total 
receipts of Zila Parishad are donated by the grants. As furnished in table 5.16, it 
contributes around 1.52 per cent in 1991-92, then a steep rise of 48.06 per cent in 1992-
93 and 51.80 per cent in 1993-94. 
e) Grants for Gram Panchayat 
Table 6.12: 
Grants from State and Central Government received by 58605 Gram Panchayats In 
UP (1992-93 to1994-95). (Rs in Lakhs) 
Years 
Grants received by State Government 
Grants received by Central Government. 
1992-93 
27.49 
2341.62 
1993-94 
21.30 
2244.96 
1994-95 
31.82 
2558.89 
Source: report of First State Finance Commission of Uttar Pradesfi 
Table 6.12 shows that by way of State plan grants-in-aid, the Gram Panchayats received 
very meager amount. However they received substantial amount out of Centrally 
sponsored schemes. The State plan grants contributes less than 1 per cent of the total 
receipts of gram panchayats, whereas this share is more than 80 per cent in case of 
central grants. It is observed from table 5.17 that the grants contributed around 80 to 85 
per cent of the total revenue; it is 80.53 per cent in 1991-92, 84.92 per cent in 1992-93 
and 85.34 per cent of the total receipts in 1993-94. 
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6.6.2 SUGGESTIONS OF SFC OF UP REGARDING GRANTS 
With a view to synchronise the effects of increasing devolution with the addition of 
grants-in-aid flowing from the Central Government, the same formula should be applied 
for its inter se distribution, which suggested for increased devolution of funds on the non-
plan side. Further, these grants should be utilised strictly for civic services like improving 
drainage facilities, garbage disposal, latrines, street lighting, etc. for which the necessary 
schemes should be drawn up by the urban local bodies and got approved by the State 
Government. 
To discontinue the present system of grants-in-aid to ULBs and to adopt a system of 
vertical resource sharing in which all State taxes are pooled, and a proportion thereof 
should be devolved to the urban local bodies. For PRIs also the present system of 
grants sfiould also be done away with. Instead they may be given a share in the net 
proceeds of State taxes. As the ULBs were not collecting more than 50-55 per cent of 
the current demand of their own taxes, the Commission recommends that assignment of 
more taxes and duties to the ULBs is not likely to be of great help and it will do more 
harm than good to both the ULBs and the State Government. 
Regarding the grant-in-aid on plan side, these are essentially of non-recurring nature 
and it was not found feasible to envisage the shape of things to come in respect of non-
recurring items of expenditure. The functions given to PRIs and ULBs are envisaged in 
11'^ and 12'^  Schedule of the Constitution. The Commission feels that if and when a 
decision is taken by the State Government to pass on those schemes to the ULBs, the 
State Government will also accordingly have to pass on necessary funds for the purpose 
to them. It is also suggested that an amount of Rs 189.88 crores per annum should be 
given by the State Government as matching contribution to the Tenth National Finance 
Commission's grants of an equivalent amount (of 189.88 crores) for rural local bodies, 
that is a total of Rs 379.76 crores per annum should be given to rural bodies and these 
grants should not be utilised for meeting salaries and wages. 
Loans Converted Into Grants: It is suggested by the SFC of UP that the outstanding 
loans given to different local bodies outstanding as on 31.3 1994, for sanitation and 
water supply, urban development schemes, integrated development of small and 
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medium towns, beautification, be converted into grants. But before converting each loan 
into grants, due scrutiny of each loan will have to be made. 
6.6.3 DEVOLUTION MECHANISM RECOMMENDED BY THE FIRST STATE FINANCE 
COMMISSION OF UTTAR PRADESH 
According to the interim report of the Commission, 7 per cent of the State net tax 
revenue was to be earmarked for the ULBs and 3 per cent of the State net revenue was 
to be earmarked to the PRIs. The percentage recommended for the ULB's and the PRI's 
was arrived at after taking into consideration what these local bodies have been 
receiving from the State Government as recurring grants-in-aid from year to year. In the 
case of ULBs which were in receipt of a total grant of Rs 285 crores during 1995-96 an 
amount of Rs 378 crores reckoned as 7 per cent of State net tax revenue was 
recommended for them by way of devolution, so that ULBs which were in receipt of 
higher level of Government's grant do not get lesser amount in devolution. But at the 
same time Nagar panchayats and smaller Nagar Palika Parishads, etc which have been 
getting lesser amount, will get a suitable increase, so that they could get adequate 
financial help to stand on their feet. Keeping in view the amounts received by Nagar 
Nigams, Nagar Palika Parishads and Nagar Panchayats during the last 3 years by way 
of grants-in-aid, a share of 3.12 per cent for each of Nagar Nigams and Nagar Palika 
Parishads and 0.76 per cent for Nagar Panchayats were earmarked out of the total 
devolution of 7 per cent This amount was further divided between each ULB keeping in 
v\evj their population and area. 
It was also recommended that the ULBs instead of getting their share of devolution 
through a number of channels would henceforth get their own share direct from the 
finance department. It was also clearly stated that, although 7 per cent of the devolution 
may be passed on to the ULBs during 1996-97, but from 1997-98 initially, only 90 per 
cent of their share be passed on to these ULBs and the remaining 10 per cent be 
released only after they have reached a certain target of recovery. 
In the case of PRIs, it was observed that only the Zila Panchayats and Gram 
Panchayats were discharging functions of their own. The Kshetra panchayats had no 
functions of their own but are functioning as a monitoring agency for various 
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development schemes operating in their blocks. The Commission recommended 3 per 
cent of the State net tax receipts to be earmarked for the Zila Panchayats and Gram 
Panchayats of the State in which 80 per cent of the total devolution should go to Gram 
Panchayats and 20 per cent to the Zila Panchayats. But later it was recommended that 
some responsibilities should also be given to Kshetra Panchayat and it should also get 
some share in the devolution. It was also recommended that out of 80 per cent of Gram 
Panchayat's share 10 per cent would go to Kshetra Panchayat's. The fund is devolved to 
various local bodies, 80 per cent on the basis of the ratio of population living in their 
areas and remaining 20 per cent in the ratio of the physical area under their jurisdiction. 
Flow Chart- 6.3: Devolution Mechanism recommended by First State Finance 
Commission of Uttar Pradesh 
STATE'S OWN TAXES 
± 
POOL A: Taxes collected by the 
State on behalf of local bodies and 
given back to them 
Ir 
POOL B: Additional devolutions 
recommended by the SFC from the 
rest of sources (Assume 100) 
^ r 
Resources retained by the State 
Government (initially 90% of poo! B) 
V 
Resources devolved to the local 
bodies (initially 10% of pool B) 
1 r 
Urban Pool (70% of General 
Devolution or 7% of pool B) 
r 
^ r 
Rural Pool (30% of General 
devolution or 3% of Pool B) 
^ r 
Out of 
urban 
Pool, 
share of 
3.12% to 
Nagar 
Nigam 
^ r 
Out of urban 
Pool, share 
of 3.12% to 
Nagar 
Palika 
Parishad 
^ r 
0.76% of 
share 
goes to 
Nagar 
Panchayat 
20% of the 
Rural Pool 
goes to Zila 
Parishad 
80%, of the 
Rural Pool 
goes to 
Gram 
Panchayat 
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6.7 NATIONAL CAPITAL TERRITORY OF DELHI 
6.7.1 REVENUE-SHARING 
The Municipal Corporation of Delhi (MCD) was required to pay to the Gaon Sabhas the 
net proceeds of the tax on profession, trades, callings and employment, as and when 
that tax was levied in the Gaon Sabha areas and also the proceeds of the property taxes 
on lands and buildings in those areas as might be determined from time to time by the 
MCD. 
6.7.2 GRANTS-IN-AID 
The Panchayat Raj Act provided for voluntary contribution of physical labour by the 
members of the gaon sabhas and the rules made under the Act permitted receipt of 
contributions from the MCD and the general public for establishing and maintaining 
village volunteer force, libraries and reading rooms. Grants for other purposes could also 
be received, from the government, the corporation or the public. 
The gaon panchayats were getting a matching grant of Rs 5000 as per the rules. These 
grants were given to carry out specified development works, namely, (a) maintenance 
and development of wells and tanks; (b) reclamation of waste-land and its cultivation; (c) 
maintenance and protection of panchayat ghars (building); (d) construction and 
maintenance of link roads; (e) pavement of streets in village abadis (residential areas); 
(f) provision of storm water drains and soak pits; and (g) filling of insanitary depressions 
and leveling of lands. 
6.7.3 INTER GOVERNMENT FISCAL TRANSFERS 
Grant-in-aid is basically meant to support expenditure on education, civic receptions, 
improvement of Jhuggi Jhopari (JJ) colonies, community services, malaria eradication, 
TB treatment and other schemes. Grant-in-aid to the Corporation is on the following 
basis: -
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i) Grant-in-aid for institutions/services transferred from Delhi Administration to 
Delhi Municipal Corporation, equivalent to 100 per cent of the expenditure 
incurred on them by the Delhi Administration as on the date of their transfer 
ii) Grant-in-aid for educational purposes, equivalent to 50 per cent (now 
agreed to 75 per cent) of the net expenditure incurred by the corporation 
(excluding the item mentioned in (i)). The position in this regard is to be 
revised with the introduction of compulsory free primary education. 
iii) Grant-in-aid for augmenting medical, health and public facilities in the rural 
areas, limited to 75 per cent of the actual expenditure incurred on each 
project, subject to an overall maximum of Rs 5 lakhs per annum. 
iv) Grants-in-aid of Rs 10 lakhs per annum for improvement of sanitation, 
facilities in rehabilitation colonies taken over by the corporation from the 
ministry of rehabilitation. 
v) The government also gives as general grant-in-aid of Rs 3 for every Rs 7 
raised by the corporation by way of additional taxation, i.e. either by the levy 
of fresh taxes or by increasing the existing rates of taxes. 
6.7.4 SHARED / ASSIGNED REVENUE 
The assigned revenues available to MCD and NDMC are given below. 
(i) Terminal Taxes: This tax is collected by the terminal tax agency, 
managed by MCD as an agent of the Delhi Administration. The net 
proceeds of this tax are distributed among all the three local bodies in the 
NCT of Delhi, on population basis. Since MCD manages the agency, it 
gets the expenditure reimbursed. The population of MCD includes both 
urban and rural in its jurisdiction. 
(ii) Entertainment Tax: This is shared on the basis of number of cinema 
houses in the respective jurisdiction of the local bodies. 
(iii) Motor Vehicle Tax: Proceed of this tax is shared on the basis of 
proportion of motor able surface areas of roads in the jurisdiction of the 
respective local bodies. 
(iv) Betting Tax: The share of this tax goes only to the NDMC. 
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The details of the income from Assigned / Shared revenue of the MCD are furnished in 
table 6.13. 
Table 6.13: 
Municipal Corporation of Delhi: Details of income from Assigned/Shared 
Revenues (1991-92 to 1993-94) 
Revenue 
Terminal Tax 
Entertainment Tax 
Tax on motor vehicles 
Total Assigned Revenues 
1991-92 
3691 
(41.57) 
2266 
(25.52) 
2930 
(33) 
8877 
(Rs in Lakhs) 
1992-93 
3115 
(47.92) 
1465 
(22.53) 
1920 
(29.53) 
6500 
1993-94 
4704 
(55.68) 
1826 
(21.61) 
1917 
(22.69) 
8447 
Source: Report of First State Finance Commission of Delfii 
More than half of MCD's receipts came through fiscal transfers comprising share in 
assigned taxes and grants. It is clear from the table 6.13 that the share in assigned taxes 
accounts for 18 to 25 per cent of MCDs total receipts. Terminal tax contributes around 
38 to 57 per cent, entertainment tax contributes around 21 to 27 per cent and tax on 
vehicle contributes 20 to 35 per cent of the total shared revenue. Table 5.18 explains the 
contribution of the assigned revenues in the total receipt of MCD. Assigned revenue 
contributes only 13 to 17 per cent of the total receipt. In the year 1991-92 it is 16.72 per 
cent, only 12.57 per cent in 1992-93 and 13.13 per cent in 1993-94. More than half of 
MCD's receipts came through 'fiscal transfers', out of which 75 per cent v^ /as contributed 
by grants and remaining 25 per cent by getting share in assigned revenue. The 
percentage share of grants in total receipts shows a decreasing trend over the year 1991 
to 1994. It is 44.5 per cent in 1991-92, 43.36 per cent in 1992-93 and 39.60 per cent in 
1993-94. 
The details of the assigned / shared revenue for NDMC are given in table 6.14. 
Table 6.14: 
New Delhi Municipal Council: Details of income from Assigned/Shared Revenues 
(1991-92 to 1993-94) 
Revenue 
Terminal Tax 
Entertainment Tax 
Betting Tax 
1991-92 
106.81 
(10.71) 
91.67. 
(9.19) 
309.37 
(31.03) 
1992-93 
91.44 
(12.96) 
154.16 
(21.85) 
126.90 
(17.98) 
(Rs in Lakhs 
1993-94 
157.37 
(19.16) 
193.78 
(23.60) 
137.39 
(16.73) 
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Revenue 
Tax on motor vehicles 
Others 
Total Assigned revenues 
1991-92 
488.70 
(49.02) 
0.34 
(0.03) 
996.89 
(100) 
1992-93 
332.73 
(47.16) 
0.29 
(0.03) 
705.52 
(100) 
1993-94 
332.20 
(40.46) 
0.59 
(0.07) 
821.03 
(100) 
Source: Report of the First State Finance Commission of Delhi 
Share in assigned revenues contributes a meager amount that is around 2 to 4 per cent 
of the total receipts. The betting tax^ accrues exclusively to NDMC and no other local 
body receives anything from it. It is clear from the table 6.14 that betting tax contributes 
around 20 to 30 per cent of the total receipts, tax on vehicle contributes the higher share 
in total receipts that is around 40 to 50 per cent, terminal tax contributes only 10 to 20 
per cent and entertainment tax contributes 10 to 24 per cent. As given in table 5.19, 
grants of NDMC contribute a meager amount that is about 5 to 10 per cent of the total 
receipts. It is 9.30 per cent in 1991-92, 10.82 per cent in 1992-93 and 8.05 per cent in 
1993-94. 
6.7.5 PROPOSED ALTERNATIVE SYSTEM OF DEVOLUTION FOR NCT OF DELHI 
Design of Fiscal Transfers recommended by the First State Finance Commission and 
accepted by the Government of Delhi. 
The Commission has come to the conclusion that the present system of relying on 
statutory grants-in-aid and scheduled or itemised tax-sharing through assigned taxes 
requires to be replaced by a system of global sharing of the tax revenues of Government 
of Delhi with the municipalities. This is in keeping with the current thinking which has 
been adopted by a national consensus in the sharing of tax revenue of the Centre with 
the States, by virtue of Government of India accepting the alternative recommendations 
of the Tenth Finance Commission in favour of global sharing, even though it required 
amendment of the Constitution. While recommending the new system, the latter listed 
the main benefits resulting from such an arrangement as follows: 
a) With a given share being allotted to the States in the aggregate revenues from 
central taxes, States will be able to share the aggregate buoyancy of central 
taxes. 
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b) The Central Government can pursue tax reforms without the need to consider 
whether a tax is shareable with the States or not. 
c) The impact of fluctuations in Central tax revenues would be felt alike by the 
Central and State Governments. 
d) Should the taxes mentioned in Articles 268 and/or 269 form part of this 
arrangement; there will be a greater likelihood of their being tapped. 
The Commission is of the view that the reasons listed above apply with equal force to 
the present case. Adopting the global sharing system would involve amendment of 
relevant provisions in the following enactments: 
i) Section 184 of DMC Act, 1957 in respect of Entertainment Tax collected in 
MCD area; 
ii) Section 125 of NDMC Act, 1994 in respect of Entertainment and Betting Tax 
collected in NDMC area; 
iii) Section 20 of the Delhi Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1962 in respect of Motor 
Vehicles Tax; and 
iv) Section 42(r) of DMC Act, which requires payment of grants-in-aid for 
elementary education. 
This is not much of a price to pay for introducing a reform of far-reaching consequence. 
It may be noted that similar approach has been adopted by a number of State Finance 
Commissions and has received good response. 
Recommended Fiscal Transfers 
In a nutshell the Commission found that, the position of the pattern of transfers that they 
had been receiving in the past as also its projection into the future, over the award 
period has been as follows: 
(a) The share of Government of Delhi's tax revenues transferred to municipalities 
(including Delhi Cantonment Board) during the reference period (1985-86 to 
1995-96) ranged between a high of 14.16 per cent to a low of 9.4 per cent. The 
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lowest share was in the last year, having consistently declined from the peak 
attained during the preceding four years. 
(b) This decline, attributable to the relative stagnation both of revenues from 
assigned taxes and of non-Plan grants-in-aid in contrast to the buoyancy of 
GNCTD's own tax resources, is not likely to reverse but to get aggravated. The 
share is projected to decline to as low as 7.67 per cent in the last year of the 
award period, i.e. in the year 2000-01. Over the five-year award period, the share 
is projected at 8.14 per cent as against the average of 11.1 per cent over that of 
the preceding five years. 
(c) Thus, the decline in the share over the five year period, from the actual of 1995-
96 and the projected of 2000-01 is of the order of 1.73 per cent, while that 
between the average of last five years of the reference period and that of the five 
years of award period is as high as 2.96 per cent. 
The Commission viewed such decline with great concern and was of the opinion that this 
cannot be sustained with reference to any of the principles enunciated above. At the 
same time, the state of municipal finances left the Commission with no option but fc 
underscore the point that both MCD and NDMC, the latter's better financial position 
notwithstanding, have been seriously remiss on both sides of their balance-sheets. They 
liad not raised, even collected, the resources that are well within their reach and they 
have fallen far short of putting the resources available to them to effective and efficient 
use. The citizen who pays his tax dues and user charges and in the process also puts up 
with harassment and worse from an ill-managed system, remains the hapless victim of 
fiscal, financial and administrative inadequacies of municipal administration in the 
National Capital Territory. 
The Commission was, therefore, of the view that while maintaining the bottom-line of 
fiscal equity, the recommended fiscal transfers must provide potent incentives for 
improved performance on the part of MCD and NDMC on both the resource 
augmentation and economy & efficiency fronts. Further, the Commission suggests that 
MCD in particular may consider setting up a Board of Internal Revenue at the apex, 
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under the Commissioner, in place of the present system of an Additional Commissioner 
(Taxes) assisted by an Assessor and Collector. 
A beginning could be made with property tax. Simultaneously, GNCTD could also 
examine the setting up of an Experts Group on economy and efficiency measures in the 
municipalities for achieving higher quality civic services in cost-effective manner, leading 
to far greater citizen satisfaction than at present. 
The Commission therefore recommended-
1. A basic annual fiscal transfer of 9.5 per cent of Government of NCT of Delhi's tax 
revenue to MCD and NDMC; 
2. A further annual transfer, on matching basis, subject to a maximum of 1.5 per 
cent of Government of NCT of Delhi's tax revenue equivalent to excess of 
revenue over and above the amounts projected was taken into account by the 
Commission for the respective years of award period; and 
3. Another transfer, on rriatching basis, subject to a maximum of 1.5 per cent of 
Government of NCT of Delhi's tax revenue equivalent to savings in expenditure 
against projections made by the Commission for the respective years of the 
award period. 
Alternatively, transfers under (2) and (3) above could be brought under one criterion -
that of surplus on non-Plan account that MCD or NDMC or both generate for financing 
capital expenditure in each year. The transfer can then be made on a matching basis, 
subject to an overall ceiling of 3 per cent of Government of NCT of Delhi's tax revenue 
in that year. 
The division of 70 per cent of the amounts arrived at as above between MCD and NDMC 
may be on the basis of the ratio of the population living in their respective areas and 
remaining 30 per cent in the ratio of the physical area under their jurisdiction. As regards 
DCB, the Commission is precluded from making any recommendations. As the amounts 
involved are tiny, these could be met by separate grants over and above the devolution 
recommended above. 
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Flow Chart- 6.4: Devolution Mechanism as recommended by First State Finance 
Commission of NCT of Delhi. 
GLOBAL SHARING OF REVENUES 
OF NCTD'S OWN TAX RENENUE 
Devolution Recommended by the SFC 
from the rest of sources (assume 100) 
POOL A: Resources retained 
by the State Government 
(87.5%) 
± 
POOL B: Resources devolved to 
local bodies (12.5%) 
9.5% on non-matching basis 
devolve to MOD and NDMC (on 
70% of population and 30 % on 
area basis} 
1.5%toMCD&NDMCon 
matching basis 
Maximum 1.5% on matching basis 
equivalent to saving in expenditure 
against projections made by 
Commission. 
6.8 SUMMARY 
It may be observed from the related tables given in Chapter V that various types of local 
governments depend on their respective parent governments lo finance their 
expenditure needs to varied extent. The intergovernmental fiscal transfers to bridge this 
gap comes in the form of revenue sharing, statutory grants and also non-statutory 
grants. Apart from certain grants in certain cases, the ratio of total transfers in total 
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revenue receipts provides a measure of dependence of these local bodies on their 
parent governments. 
In Tamil Nadu the degree of dependence of Municipal Corporation is maximum 
compared to Town Panchayats and Municipalities. While in case of Municipal 
Corporations it is more than 50 per cent, on the contrary in other forms of government it 
is about 36 per cent. In the total transfers of Municipal Corporation, 35 to 58 per cent 
was contributed by shared revenues and grants contributed a very meager amount of 3 
to 6 per cent. Similarly in case of municipalities shared revenue contributed 27 to 30 per 
cent whereas grants only contributed 4 to 8 per cent. In case of Town Panchayats 
shared revenue contributes 30 to 39 per cent and grant's contribution is only of 3 to 5 
per cent. Obviously the PRIs depend heavily on these transfers in the range of 80 to 86 
per cent, out of which 40 to 46 per cent is contributed by the grants and shared revenues 
contributed 36 to 40 per cent. 
In Uttar Pradesh, the dependence of Municipalities and Nagar Panchayat on State 
Governments is to the extent of 68 to 73 per cent, whereas Municipal Corporations 
depend less to the extent of 28 to 33 per cent. In case of PRIs, Gram Panchayats get 
these transfers to the extent of 80 to 85 per cent of the total receipts and to Zila 
Panchayats these transfers are around 50 per cent. 
Whereas in case of NCT of Delhi, the dependence of MCD is higher as compared to 
NDMC. MCD depends on the transfers to the extent of 52 to 62 per cent, out of which 
grants contribute around 40 to 45 per cent and shared revenues give their contribution of 
13 to 17 per cent. Whereas NDMC is quite independent for its own resources as it only 
depend to the extent of 8 to 12 per cent on transfers, out of which grants contribute 6 to 
9 per cent and shared revenue contributes a very meager amount of 2 to 3 per cent. 
Footnotes: 
^ Matching grants (possibly negative) can, in principle, also serve to correct sonrie of the distortions 
associated with the decentralized use of nonbenefit taxes (Gordon 1983). 
^ Fiscal equalisation can also make use of matching grants. If the objective of the equalisation program is 
to equalize taxable capacity, the granting government may choose to supplement the revenue base of 
fiscally poorer jurisdictions by matching any revenues they collect by some specified percentage. Such a 
measure has the potential of allowing all jurisdictions to raise the same tax revenues per capita for a 
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given tax rate (irrespective of ttne actual size of ttneir tax base). This form of fiscal equalisation is called 
'power equalisation' and has gotten some attention in US for State programs to achieve various equity 
goals- most notably in the area of school finance (e.g., Feldstein, 1976; and Nechyba 1996). 
•* The issue here is that from the perspective of redistribution income from rich to poor, equalising 
intergovernmental grants are bound to have some perverse effects. For such grants, although 
transferring income from w/ealthy to poor on average, will inevitably result in some income transfers from 
poor individuals who reside in wealthy jurisdictions to rich persons In generally poor areas. In this sense, 
such equalising measures are not as effective as programmes that distribute income from rich to poor 
Individuals, But a society may well wish, for other reasons, to provide additional support for the provision 
of local public services (such as schools) in relatively low-income areas (e.g., Inman and Rebinfeld 
1979). 
'' As Boadway and Flatters (1982) have shown, equalising grants may be required to offset distorting 
locational Incentives where some jurisdictions offer pecuniary fiscal advantages to potential residents 
resulting, for example, from large, taxable natural resources endowments. 
^ This argument has even more force where, as In some developing countries and emerging 
democracies, provincial and local governments simply lack the capacity for effective tax administration. 
In this setting, central transfers and /or the piggybacking of supplementary rates on top of centrally 
administered taxes may be the only realistic option. 
® As Inman and Rebinfeld (1996) point out, the prescriptive theory of grants presumes a central planner 
or political process that "will select socially preferred policies". However, the public-choice literature 
makes clear the potential of Central Government political mechanisms to make Inefficient choices 
concerning policies that affect various groups differently. In addition, a grant- distributing agency may 
have its own objectives; for an excellent study of how such objectives can influence the pattern of grants, 
see Chernick (1976). 
^ For survey and Interpretations of this literature, see Gramlich (1977), Ronald Fisher (1982), Gates 
(1994) and Nines and Thaler (1995). 
8 In January 1993, Gol abolished the terminal tax but decided to compensate the loss of revenue of the 
local bodies by giving them "grants" calculated at 10 per cent compound increase each year on the basis 
of the proceeds during 1992-93. 
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CHAPTER -7 
COMPARISON OF 
RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE 
THREE STATE FINANCE 
COMMISSIONS 
CHAPTER 7 
COMPARISON OF RECOMMENDATIONS OF THREE STATE 
FINANCE COMMISSIONS 
The SFCs were constituted in different States under different set of circumstances. The 
prevalent conditions of State-Local fiscal relations were different but the Constitutional 
mandate required that in future these relations should become as per the provisions of 
the IZ"^ and 74"" Amendment to the Constitution. Therefore, these Commissions were 
more or less given the similar terms of references to function and give recommendations 
to these governments. It is not surprising that there might be several similarities in these 
recommendations while dissimilarities may also not ruled out. In this chapter an attempt 
has been made to highlight such features in the recommendaiions of our sample States. 
As already noted, these States are different locationally and were different in terms of 
State-Local fiscal relations. Comparative analyses of their recommendations are 
discussed below and all the common features of these three States are furnished in 
Table 7.1 given at the end of the chapter. 
7.1 GLOBAL SHARING OF REVENUES 
7.1.1 RECOMMENDATION BY SFC OF TAMIL NADU 
Out of the total resources, the government retains 92 per cent (pool A) and remaining 8 
per cent (pool B) of the resources goes to local bodies for devolution between different 
urban and rural local bodies. 15 per cent of it (1.2 per cent of pool B) is reserved for 
equalisation fund and remaining 85 per cent (i.e., 6.8 per cent of pool B) is earmarked 
for general devolution to local bodies. 40 per cent of it goes to ULBs (urban pool) and 60 
per cent goes to PRts (rural pool). Out of the urban pool, 31 per cent goes to Municipal 
Corporation, 31 per cent to municipalities and remaining 38 per cent goes to Town 
Panchayats. On the other hand, out of the rural pool, 43 per cent each goes to Village 
Panchayat and Panchayat Union Council, while the remaining 14 per cent goes to 
District Panchayat. 
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7.1.2 RECOMMENDATIONS BY SFC OF UP 
Out of total resources the government retains 90 per cent and remaining 10 per cent 
goes to local bodies for devolution between different ULBs and PRIs. Out of this 10 per 
cent resources, 7 per cent is earmarked for ULB's and 3 per cent goes to PRI's. Out of 3 
per cent of the net proceeds of State taxes (which is of the order of Rs 162.00 crs) one-
fifth thereof, should be earmarked for Zila Panchayats and the balance four-fifth for 
Gram Panchayats. 7 per cent of the net proceeds of State's total tax, may be earmarked 
for devolution of funds to the ULBs. Inter-se apportionment of the above is as 3.12 per 
cent to Nagar Nigams, 3.12 per cent to Nagar Palika Parishads and only 0.76 per cent to 
Nagar Panchayats respectively. 
7.1.3 RECOMMENDATIONS BY SFC OF DELHI 
Out of total resources, the State Government retaines 87.5 per cent and remaining 12.5 
per cent of the resources goes to local bodies. 9.5 per cent on non-matching basis 
devolves to NDMC and MCD, while 1.5 per cent goes to MOD and NDMC on matching 
basis. Maximum 1.5 per cent on matching basis equivalent to saving in expenditure 
against projections is made by the Commission. 
7.2.1 DEVOLUTION PATTERN RECOMMENDED BY THE SFC OF UP 
1. The local bodie's share in net proceeds of the State's tax revenue be passed on 
directly to them by the State finance department. 
2. As in the case of devolution of funds to the ULBs, devolution of funds to the 
PRIs be passed on directly to them by the State finance department. 
3. Higher devolution of funds from non-plan side to enable the rural bodies to carry 
out their non-plan functions of maintenance, etc. The provision for grants-in-aid 
on non-plan side in the budget of PRIs should be done away with, including the 
provision for grants equivalent to the amount of land revenue (non-plan and 
plan). 
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7.2.2 BASIS OF DEVOLUTION 
The SFC of UP suggested that the criterion for devolution of net proceeds of State's tax 
revenues to PRI's and ULB's should be 80 per cent on the basis of population living in 
their respective area and 20 per cent on the basis of physical area under their 
jurisdiction, whereas the SFC of Delhi reconnmended this criterion as 70 per cent on the 
basis of population and rennaining 30 per cent on the area basis. The SFC of TN does 
not discuss the criterion of devolution. 
7.2.3 DIVERSION OF DEVOLUTION 
Kshetra Panchayats of UP are entrusted with the responsibilities of maintenance of 
some capital assets which at present are supposed to be looked after by gram 
panchayat's or any such statutory body. Then 10 per cent of the non-plan devolution 
should be earmarked for kshetra panchayat, out of the gram panchayats share and inter 
se distribution of said amount between kshetra panchayat should be on the same 
criterion / formula which has been recommended by the SFC of UP for Zila panchayats 
and gram panchayats. 
7.2.4 DEVOLUTION IN INSTALLMENTS 
To insure that the ULBs fulfill the responsibility cast on them of improving their own 
resources seriously, it is suggested by the SFC of UP that, initially only 90 per cent 
amount of the devolution should be released to the local bodies and the remaining 10 
per cent should be released only after it is established that the local body concerned has 
shown marked improvement in collecting its own revenues. 
7.2 GRANTS-IN-AID 
7.2.1 TAMIL NADU 
Recommendations made by the SFC of TN regarding grants-in-aid 
1. Specific Purpose Grants: The grants are given either as incentive for tax efforts 
or for matching the efforts in maintaining of services. Mostly the grants are 
discretionary and unpredictable and no specific provision has been made in the 
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statute to make them compulsory, except in a few cases. To improve this, SFC of 
TN suggested that the services lil<;e maternity, dispensary and family welfare 
should be based on National Goals. So the specific purpose grants given for 
these services will be covered by devolutions under 73'^ and 74'^  Amendments to 
the Constitution and the fund allocated for this purpose by the Central and State 
Government should be passed on the local bodies on the basis of the prescribed 
norms. Incentive and untied grants now available will be taken care of while 
devolutions are distributed since such grants are necessary to ensure additional 
resource generation. The reimbursement of D.A increases may be sanctioned to 
the local bodies outside the general devolution. This should be applicable in case 
of municipalities also. 
2. Half Grants for Dustless Surface and Roads Grants: In town panchayats, 
grants are given for improvement of roads and dustless surfacing of the roads. 
For this SFC of TN recommends that the lengths of the roads should be 
measured for the purpose of allocation of share out of motor vehicles tax to the 
divisible pool. Moreover, the improvement of roads can be taken up under 
special schemes formulated tor town panchayats 
3. House tax Matching Grants: The village panchayats have a very meager 
income under house tax. The existing system of house tax matching grants can 
also be linked to collection performance instead of providing equal amount. 
4. Drainage Grants: a regular yearly drainage grants must be given for taking up 
drainage schemes. 
5. Non-tax Revenue Grants: In PUCs, the Local Road Grant (LRG) may be 
continued on the existing principle of population and the lengths of roads. The 
rate for length of roads may be adopted at the revised rates indicated by Chief 
Engineer (High Ways and Road Ways) (CE (HW & RW)) and the amount needed 
for maintenance of PUC roads has also been arrived at on the basis of the rates 
given by the HW & RW department and has been taken into account for arriving 
at the share of local bodies for Motor Vehicle Tax (MVT). Since the share on 
MVT is proposed to be taken to the divisible pool for distribution, no separate 
local roads grants may be made thereafter. Till then the grants may continue. 
6. Grants for maintenance of IVlaternity Centers and Dispensary: The 
dispensaries of PUCs may be continued with grants to meet the full cost of 
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maintenance, but their working needs examination. Rural dispensaries could be 
privatized by permitting local willing doctors to use the building. The government 
should reimburse the entire cost of the ayahs as grant and continue them, as 
PUC's staff till retirement, for services. 
7. Grants for Remunerative Schemes: In village panchayats with higher 
population / income, remunerative schemes like establishing shops, markets, bus 
stands and community centers may be encouraged with assistance from 
government but they should not be entirely on loan, but on grants-cum-loan 
basis. The freedom to implement the schemes should be left to the panchayats 
except for technical guidelines and supervision. 
8. Development Grants: The grants intended for VP may be directly adjusted to 
the panchayat funds by the District Authorities to avoid delay in routing through 
the panchayat unions. Freedom is given to the local bodies, to utilise the funds 
for priority items in the area rather than sticking to the purpose indicated for the 
grants. 
9. The grants for street lighting and water supply of VP will have to continue on 
regular basis. The consumption charges in public lighting and also the repair 
charges for water sources may be met by government in full. 
10. Centrally Sponsored Employment Programmes: The role of the SFC is mainly 
concerned with the deficiencies in the maintenance of the assets created by local 
body from its resources and assets created through other schemes and handed 
over to the local bodies. The maintenance grants are in the nature of 
discretionary grants and they can neither be predicted nor insisted. The Massive 
Employment Oriented Programmes are currently based on certain guidelines 
indicated by the concerned ministries and administrative departments and relate 
to capital formation. The guidelines may be re-examined as a part of devolution 
for more flexibility to include civic service infrastructures also for better public 
utility. 
11. Grants for municipalities: For municipalities regular system of revenue grants 
from the State Government and to avoid complacency, the eligibility for grants-in-
aid may be related to the fiscal capacity as well as performance of the 
municipality. 
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7.2.2 UTTAR PRADESH 
Recommendations made by the SFC of UP regarding grants-in-aid: 
For Grants, SFC of UP suggests that with a view to synchronise the effects of increasing 
devolution with additionality of grants-in-aid flowing from the Central Government, the 
same formula should be applied for its inter-se distribution, which is suggested for 
increased devolution of funds on the non-plan side. Further, these grants should be 
utilised strictly for civic services like improving drainage facilities, garbage disposal, 
latrines, street lighting, etc. for which the necessary schemes should be drawn up by the 
urban local bodies and got approved from the State Government. 
The SFC of UP recommends discontinuation of the present system of grants-in-aid to 
ULBs and to adopt a system of vertical resource sharing in which all State taxes are 
pooled and a proportion thereof devolved to the urban local bodies. For PRIs also the 
present system of grants should also be done away with. Instead they may be given a 
share in the net proceeds of the State taxes. As the ULBs were not collecting more than 
50 to 55 per cent of the current demand of their own taxes, the Commission 
recommends that assignment of more taxes and duties to the ULBs is not likely to be of 
great help and it will do more harm than good to both the urban local bodies and the 
State Government. 
Regarding grants-in-aid on plan side, these are essentially of non-recurring nature and it 
was not found feasible to envisage the shape of things to come in respect of non-
recurring items of expenditure. The functions given to PRIs and ULBs are envisaged in 
11"^ and 12'^  Schedule of the Constitution. The Commission feels that if and when a 
decision is taken by the State Government to pass on those schemes to the ULBs, the 
State Government accordingly will also have to pass on necessary funds for the purpose 
also to them. It is also suggested, as per recommendations of the Tenth Union Finance 
Commission, that the grant recommended by them should not be utilised for meeting 
salaries and wages. 
Apart from devolution of funds, the SFCs have recommendations related to tax reforms, 
introduction of new taxes and reforms in general administration. All the 
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recommendations aim at delivery of civic services at a reasonable level to all the citizens 
whether in urban or rural areas. 
7.3 REFORMS IN RESOURCE RAISING 
7.3.1 TAX REVENUES 
7.3.1.1 PROPERTY TAX 
It is well known that property tax (hereafter PT) is the major source of revenue for local 
governments in India; therefore it is very important to strengthen it. The SFC of TN 
recomn'iends to switching over the present system of 'Annual Value System' to 'Area 
Linking Unit Value System'. It ensures better acceptability to the people and yields more 
revenue for the local bodies. Whereas the SFC of UP is in fovour of adopting 'Carpet 
Area' as the basis for assessing the Annual Rental Values of building in ULBs. The SFC 
of Delhi suggests for adoption of 'Unit Area Method' (UAM) as an alternative to 
reasonable annual rent (actual and assessed) for computing the Annual Rateable Value 
(ARV). 
The SFC of TN divides the local bodies into six categories for fixing Basic Rental Plinth 
and the SFC of UP determines property tax based on the the criterion as the Annual 
Rental Value of the property i.e. location of property (property on the principal main road 
/ main road or other than these), use of property (residential, commercial or industrial), 
type of construction (pucca building with RCC / RBC roof or semi pucca or other). It also 
suggests that for calculating of Annual Rental Value of building / properties 
measurement of carpet Area would be calculated as: rooms & covered veranda-full 
measurement of internal dimension; balcony or corridor-50 per cent measurement of 
internal dimension; garage-25 per cent measurement of internal dimension; area 
covered by bathrooms, latrine, kitchen, portico, stairs shall not form part of the carpet 
area for purpose of determining Annual Rental Value. 
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Revision of rates of Property Tax: Once the property tax is determined, it has to be 
revised after some time keeping in view the increase in the value of property. It is 
suggested that TN may go for general revision of property tax once in three years based 
on inflation rate with reference to consumer price index, but it would be done without 
deployment of additional staff by dividing the area into zones and revision made zone-
wise every year. A preliminary analysis of the revised structure reveals that it will lead to 
additional revenue of 25 to 45 per cent. In the present system of UP for revision and 
assessment of Annual Rental Value of buildings, which is done in ever '^ five years, may 
continue. However, wider powers should be given for ensuring speedy recovery of 
property and other taxes. The SFC of Delhi is in favour of reducing "ex-parte" timing 
from 3 years to 3 months. A study made by Human Settlement Management Institute 
(HSMI) bears out that the municipalities are collecting only a fraction of the potential 
revenues due to sheer management inadequacies. Therefore, it is advisable to identify 
all the legal hurdles and abnormalities, which produce hindrances in tapping this source 
fully. If the under assessment is rectified properly then collection of property tax may go 
up to 300 per cent. 
Deduction: TN and UP have considered the depreciation of the property and therefore 
allowed the deduction of the Annual Rental Value attributable to the building. 
Tamil 
Nadu 
Age of Building 
Discount 
0-10 years 
5 per cent 
11-20 years 
10 percent 
21-30 years 
20 per cent 
31 & above 
30-40 per cent 
Uttar 
Prad 9Sh 
Age of Building 
Discount 
25 years and below 
10 percent 
25-40 years 
20 per cent 
Above 40 years 
30 per cent 
In UP the rates of property tax after allowing deductions are as below: property tax 
@2.5 per cent of annual rental value, water tax @ 2 per cent of annual rental value and 
sewerage tax @ 2 per cent of annual rental value. 
Exemption: The existing provision for exemption of PT in TN should be removed and it 
is recommended by the SFC of TN, that all Centra! Government properties, charitable 
and educational institutions, etc should not be totally exempted from PT but instead of it. 
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concessions may be given in the levy of general purpose tax by restricting the levy of 
service tax alone. In case of industrial estates, tax concession should be given only for 
five years. If the Government in the interest of public cannot collect tax, compensation 
for loss of revenue should be simultaneously made available to the local bodies by the 
State Government. The SFC of UP also gave suggestion for removing the existing 
provision for exemption of the urban property from PT and all the property in the ULBs 
area should he brought in the tax net. PT should also be imposed on that portion of the 
building or land attached to the places of worship, which has been given on rent and are 
being used for purposes other than public worship. Whereas the SFC of Delhi was of the 
view to exempt all non-residential properties from Delhi Rent Control Act. 
Rebate: To encourage people's participation in paying PT, it is suggested by the SFC of 
TN, a rebate of 2 per cent may be allowed for prompt payment and 5 per cent for the 
advance payment of tax. These rebate rates may be indicated in the pass book/ card 
itself. Whereas the SFC of UP is in favour of giving rebate of 40 per cent of Annual 
Rental Value allowed in respect of, owner occupied residential buildings; this also 
includes deduction allowed according to age of building. 
Penalty: The SFC of TN gave advice that in the case of defaulters a penalty of five per 
cent of the tax may be added for each half year concerned. Whereas the SFC of UP was 
of the view that, penalty should be made on late payment after due date @ 2 per cent 
per month. 
Collection Procedure of Property Tax: All the three States are in favour of increasing 
PT collection and suggest some points for its efficient collection. The SFC of TN 
suggests that new system of collection of PT should be introduced and at the time of first 
assessment a passbook or a card may be issued which contains all particulars about tax 
levied. It is the responsibility of the taxpayer to pay the tax at the appropriate counters in 
the zones. At the time of payment entries will stand as proof for payment of tax. 
The SFC of UP advises that tax collection should be made on self-assessment basis 
and it will annually be done with the demand notice. Ten per cent incentive amount may 
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be provided with a payment within one month of the demand notice. The carpet area 
rates in respect of each local body are to be determined by the State Government. The 
foregoing schemes of PT should be applied uniformly in all the local bodies. 
Quinquennial assessment of properties should strictly be made and regular exercise for 
enumeration of houses should be carried out. Delhi has shown an increasing trend of PT 
collection and the SFC of Delhi suggests that it may be further increased by widening of 
base and logical assessment will also be converted into revenue in a gradual process. 
The SFC of UP recommends that levy of circumstances and property tax should be 
obligatory for all the Zila Panchayats so that none of the Zila panchayat is left with any 
option in the matter. 
Valuation Cell for assessment of property: Both TN and UP felt need of a valuation 
cell consisting of technically qualified people to help local bodies in assessment of 
properties and assist in determination of cost of services for user charges. The SFC of 
UP added that employees engaged in octroi collection should be deployed in updating 
the work of enumeration of houses and number plates allotted for each house so that no 
house escapes the house tax net. The SFC of TN further says, if the assessees/ lessees 
resort to legal proceeding or if the local body is compelled to resort to legal action for 
collection, a special provision should be made in the enactment concerned, whereby the 
assessees may have to deposit 50 per cent of the tax assessed in case of new 
assessments or to deposit the old tax and 50 per cent of increase in new tax in the case 
of general revision and similarly the lessees may have to deposit the accepted lease 
amount. In case of habitual defaulters, distrait proceeding should be resorted to instead 
of filing suits. In this regard, the SFC of UP says that the government should enact a 
common legislation for all ULBs so that the ambiguities about levy and recovery of taxes 
presently evident in the uniform policy for levy and recovery of property and other taxes 
may be removed. The Development Authorities and Jal Sansthans which are operating 
in a municipal area should be brought under the umbrella of elected local bodies. The 
power of sanctioning building plans in the area falling in the jurisdiction of local bodies 
should vest in the local bodies and not in the Development Authorities so that local 
bodies are able to administer in a better way regarding the levy and collection of 
property tax. 
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Service Tax Component: The total property tax in TN may be divided into two ineads 
namely general-purpose tax and service tax component on 50:50 basis, whereas this 
criteria is not followed by UP and Delhi. The SFC of TN suggests fetching transparency 
and reduced litigation. A directory of PT may be printed and made available to all the 
taxpayers, clearly indicating the rate of taxation adopted area-wise with all exemptions / 
concessions incentives and penal provisions. 
Computerisation: Due to large number of PT assessee's huge records have to be 
maintained, the TN and UP felt the need of computerization of all the data related to PT 
in order to administer this tax efficiency. 
Surcharge Duty on Transfer of Property: The SFC of TN suggests following points 
that will help in enhancing the Surcharge Duty on Transfer of Property: 
a) Giving legal backing for issue of periodical guidelines on value of properties to be 
adopted for registration. 
b) It is brought to the notice of the government that huge evasion of stamp duty and 
surcharge is observed in the case of transfers of high-rise buildings. It needs 
proper legislation to curb this evasion. 
c) To levy stamp duties on built-up areas in high-rise buildings for adopting with 
suitable modifications, amendments of the provisions of law are needed. 
d) Regarding transfer of documents to neighbouring States for registration, the re-
registration can be made compulsory as per the value of land obtained in TN with 
reference to the guidelines. 
e) There is much scope for increasing revenue by plugging the loopholes and by 
checking evasions. 
f) The procedure similar to the one adopted in the case of entertainment tax may 
be adopted for adjustment of the revenue to local bodies. 
7.3.1.2 PROFESSION TAX: All the three States levy professional tax but only SFC of TN 
suggests some points to improve its collection through this tax. The local bodies should 
take immediate steps for tax mopping of all kinds of assesses. Notices may be issued to 
those who have not registered themselves for it. Penal action may be initiated at least in 
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a few cases, which will make others to seek voluntary registration and enrolment. Rates 
may be revised after an interval of time. 
7.3.1.3 HOUSE TAX: A suggestion was made by the SFC of TN that the Property tax should be 
introduced in the town panchayats by switching over from the house tax. The 
components falling under the service tax (viz. part of property tax) may be examined in 
detail and fixed keeping in mind the priority of service in the town panchayats, subject to 
the maximum ceiling prescribed for the property tax. 
7.3.1.4 WATER TAX: The SFC of TN recommends that compulsory levy of water tax as an 
addition to house tax in VPs. The Governrrlent may permit the house connections in 
village panchayats where adequate water is available for supply. This will help in 
generating more revenues. It is also suggested to municipal corporation and 
municipalities to levy higher charges. Whereas in UP the property tax, water tax and 
sewerage tax are to be collected together by ULBs concerned and the receipts of these 
taxes are to be passed to Jal Sansthans or executive body of the Water Supply and 
Sewerage Schemes. The SFC of UP recommends that the ULBs which do not produce 
and distribute potable water themselves but where Jal Sansthans supply water for them, 
should pay for water to Jal Sansthans. A mutually agreed percentage may be adopted 
for the purpose and if ULBs fail to pay them (Jal Sansthans) the same should be 
recovered from local bodies by the State Government out of devolutions to them from 
the State budget. To avoid illegal tapping of water it is needed to tighten the assessment 
machinery to ensure that such illegal tapping of water is brought to book and necessary 
charges recovered. Observing that water supply is an essential service, which should be 
maintained on commercial lines, it is necessary to revise charges / rates and the entire 
domestic water supply should be metered but the minimum flat rate should be raised so 
that sustained level of revenues accrues to the ULBs. If the meter reader staffs are in 
surplus it should be reduced to save the staff cost. Where adequate water tax / water 
charges are not being levied by the ULBs, they should be prevailed upon to levy and 
recover them. For drinking water, the tube wells should be repaired and the chocked 
pipelines should also be repaired properly. 
214 
7.3.1.5 TAX ON ANIMALS AND CARRIAGES: This tax is only levied by TN and UP. The SFC 
of TN suggests to abolish this tax and a uniform pattern of licensing of animals like dogs, 
pigs and other domestic animals may be introduced. 
7.3.1.6 TIMBER TAX: Tax on timber is unique to Chennai Corporation and may be continued 
and extended to other corporations, after due examination. 
7.3.1.7 VACANT LAND TAX: The levy of vacant land tax is considered necessary since these 
lands derive the incremental price benefit due to basic amenities provided. The SFC of 
TN suggested that the burden of vacant land tax should not be passed on to upon the 
buyer, since only the sellers mainly avail of the incremental benefits of price. It should be 
levied for a specific period, by a tax rate of 0.5 to 1 per cant of the capital value, which is 
considered to be a normal rate on vacant land. 
7.3.1.8 VEHICLE TAX: Vehicle Tax is levied in all these three States. The SFC of TN 
recommends that since the tax on carts and bicycles has been abolished, local bodies 
may in lieu of that levy tax on motorised vehicles, two wheelers and tractors, which do 
not come within the purview of Motor Vehicle Taxation Act. The rates of levy on two 
wheelers be Rs 10-15 and Tractors Rs 15-30 but the bicycles and charts be exempted 
from it. 
7.3.1.9 PILGRIM TAX: The SFC of TN advised that pilgrim tax or a similar tax may be levied in 
respect of places of holiday & resorts, seasonal specialities, temple towns and places of 
geological or archaeological importance. So it is necessary to identify these areas and 
promote them. For the specific season pilgrim tax may be higher but uniformly levied at 
the lesser rate throughout the year. Such tax may be levied on bus passengers as an 
addition to bus fares, which may be passed on to the local government. 
7.3.1.10 SURCHARGE ON SALES TAX: Since this tax has been merged with compounded sales 
tax, the SFC of TN suggests that 15 per cent of the sales tax may be assigned to local 
bodies and taken to a divisible pool. 
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7.3.1.11 ADVERTISEMENT TAX: All these three States levy this tax. While SFC of TN suggests 
that, 
(a) The entire hoarding whether in city or in the highway should be under the 
control of concerned local bodies and the revenue earned should go to the 
local bodies concerned. 
(b) If, in the interest of proper regulation, the highways department has to regulate 
the hoarding, the yield may be made available to the local bodies concerned, 
after retaining some charges. The rates should depend upon size, location, 
type and message. 
7.3.1.12 ENTERTAINMENT TAX: All three States levy this tax. The SFC of TN suggests that the 
assignment to the local bodies should be 90 per cent of the local realisations of this 
compounded tax. This revenue can be divided between the PUCs and the VPs in the 
ratio of 30:70. 
7.3.1.13 CABLE TV: In TN, this tax is collected with entertainment tax, at the rate of Rs 60 per 
connection. It is advised by the SFC of TN that the entire money go to local bodies after 
retaining the local charges. 
7.3.1.14 TAX ON LUXURIES IN HOTEL AND LODGING HOUSE: This tax is newly introduced 
in TN and it is suggested by the SFC of TN that 25 per cent of the income from tax on 
luxuries in hotel and lodging house may be allocated to the local body for inclusion in 
general divisible pool for distribution to all local bodies. 
7.3.1.15 SUGARCANE CESS: This tax is collected in TN only and SFC of TN suggested that 
revenue collected through sugarcane cess should be passed on to local body and this 
money should be used to improve roads of that area. 
7.3.1.16 INCOME FROM SOCIAL FORESTRY: The panchayats of TN may be permitted to raise 
forestry in all poramboke lands and tank bunds irrespective of ownership. A regular 
system of tender cum auction should be prescribed to enable realisation of real income. 
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This suggestion was made by tlie SFC of TN winereas no such comnnents are given by 
UP and Delhi. 
7.3.1.17 FISHERY RENTAL: In TN, the power of auctioning assets of local body should only be 
given to concerned local body. The SFC of TN gave suggestion for appointing a 
committee consisting of representatives of panchayats and officials for ensuring proper 
implementation. Power of interferences should be given to collectors if implementations 
are not done properly. Fish Farmers Development Co-operative Agencies should also 
participate in the auctions. In case of PWD tanks, a share of proceeds should be made 
available to the local panchayats. In respect of bigger tanks, covering more than one 
panchayat or PUC, auction may be done through a Committee consisting of the 
representatives of the local bodies involved. 
7.3.1.18 PATTA TREES: The SFC of TN suggests that a committee consisting of representatives 
of PUC, PUC commissioner and concerned revenue official should auction wind-fallen 
trees. The Committee should decide the auction to ensure better price and the amount 
goes to PUC Council Treasury for credit to the village panchayat funds. 
7.3.1.19 FAIRS AND FESTIVALS: Local bodies contribute to the expenditure on civic amenities 
provided to the temples. The SFC of TN suggests that the temple authorities may collect 
an additional fee along with the entrance tickets and pass on that money to concerned 
local bodies. 
7.3.2 NON-TAX REVENUES 
7.3.2.1 USERS CHARGES: The SFC of TN suggests some steps to streamline the principles 
for user charges and to ensure higher level of income and services. The local bodies 
should prioritise the services depending upon local needs to meet the cost involved from 
out of user charges and service tax. Wherever user charges cannot be identified, it 
should be set off against the service tax and the local body should aim for full cost 
recovery of these services. The community that can afford higher rates should be 
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charged higher rates and those who cannot afford, may be subsidised or totally 
exempted. 
7.3.2.2 LICENCE, FEES AND OTHER CHARGES: The SFC of TN is of the view that the local 
bodies will have to undertake tax mopping by preparing a computerized list based on 
immediate survey and the additions and deletions can be made once in a year. This will 
help in quicker issue of licenses of Dangerous and Offensive trade. The penalty for 
default may be 3 to 4 times more than the normal license fee. A grace time for renewal 
with penalty may be given for a period of 3 months. The license fee prescribed should be 
suitably updated once in 3 years based on inflationary rates and on Consumer Price 
Index. Whereas UP and NCT of Delhi have not discussed this issue. 
7,3.2.3 INCOME FROM PROPERTIES: Some suggestions given by the SFC of TN to increase 
income from properties are: 
i) The local bodies could resort to commercial line and think of switching over to 
a system of advertising the proposed project calling for applications from the 
intending allottees even at the initial stages. The allottees could be selected 
in advance and the rent fixed in accordance with the prevailing market rates. 
ii) The local bodies may take advances from intending allottees and this will 
reduce the financial burden. In all these transactions the government may 
prescribe suitable built in checks to ensure accountability. 
iii) The local bodies may create the assets by deploying their own departmental 
officials or local contractors. They should not be compelled to give such 
projects to monopolised government machinery. 
iv) In case of default, the defaulter should be compelled to vacate and the 
allotment made to a new bidder through auction-cum-tender and the advance 
paid be forfeited or returned to the defaulter after adjusting the arrears of rent 
to be paid with cost or re-auction with a penal fee for default. 
v) The privatisation of the maintenance of these commercial assets on contract 
system can also be tried with a view to achieve economy in maintenance and 
to avoid deployment of special staff and to provide for a net return. 
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7.3.2.4 INCOME FROM SPECIAL SERVICES: To increase revenue from special services it is 
suggested by the SFC of TN that: 
i) Under Town Planning, there is a high potential for collection of development 
charges. 
ii) In the case of new layouts, the cost of providing basic amenities like roads, 
lights and drainage can be met through development/ betterment charges. 
iii) This can be tried in industrial areas and in relation to upper middle class areas. 
iv) The charges can be fixed in accordance with the norms of the CMDA (Chennai 
Metropolitan Development Authority). 
v) If charges are considered high it may be collected in installments. 
7.3.2.5 LICENSING OF EXISTING MARKET SHOPPING COMPLEXES AND BUS STANDS: 
The SFC of TN recommends that in the matter of lease or extension of lease, there 
should be no outside interference. Tender-cum-auction may be adopted and period of 
lease may be three years with gradual increase in lease amount or rent once in a year at 
a pre-determined percentage. At the end of three years, fresh auction may be 
conducted. The existing lessee may also bid and be given preference to continue at 
higher rates quoted. The defaulters in rent/lease amount should be ineligible for the 
bidding. Auction should be liable for cancellation by the local body if it is proved that 
there is subletting of the property. 
7.3.2.6 FIXING OF FEES IN THE MARKET BUS STANDS: The SFC of TN suggests some 
measures for fixing of fees for collection of bus stand fees from buses. The Transport 
Corporations and private bus operators can be asked to pay a lumpsum to the local 
body concerned at a rate to be agreed upon depending upon the trips. In big urban 
areas, the local body may construct dormitories or lodges, in or near the bus stand to 
enable to travellers stay overnight. This will fetch a sizable income to the local body 
concerned. 
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7.3.2.7 PRIVATE MARKET: It is suggested by the SFC of I N that specific service charges may 
be collected for special services like environmental sanitation by way of garbage 
clearance, sewerage, water supply, etc by the local body from the private markets. 
7.3.2.8 INCOME FROM MARKETING COMMITTEES: Marketing committees collect fees and 
retain them for maintaining their infrastructure. Hence it is recommended by the SFC of 
I N to increase the fees and 50 per cent of the collections may be transferred to the 
concerned local bodies. 
7.3.2.9 LAND USE: The SFC of TN is of view that, in all the ULBs and PRIs, a survey should be 
made for all the porambokes and vacant lands and a list of such assets should be 
prepared. Vacant lands should be put to proper use by opening shopping complexes, 
markets, bus stands, slaughter houses, etc. In the new layouts, open spaces are 
indicated for schools, shops, parks, etc. Excepting ihe space indication for parks, other 
places are not handed over to local body. If such open spaces are not utilised for the 
purpose for which they are reserved within a year, the promoter is permitted to sell it as 
house sites. All the open spaces reserved should be handed over to the local bodies to 
avoid conversion by collusion and evasive tactics. The local bodies will then have 
adequate space for earmarked activities. The SFC of UP recommends that with addition 
of new area to the ULB, the need for provision of basic civic services comes up, but at 
the same time it strains the finances because no additional income accrues immediately 
after addition of new area to the local bodies. On the other hand, in such new areas of 
local bodies, spurious real estate agencies crop up which start purchasing land at throw 
away prices and later on sell them at exorbitant rates thereby making big profits. So, it is 
advisable that this phenomenon should be brought to the notice of the State 
Government and suitable appropriate action should be taken, so that interests of ULBs 
are safeguarded and the ULBs have a right to acquire that land and develop that area 
for housing colonies or carve out plots and sell them to public and the fund may go to the 
ULBs which could be utilised for general development and other activities. Delhi does 
not recommend any thing on this tax. 
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7.3.2.10 TAXES ON AGRICULTURAL LAND FOR SPECIFIC PURPOSES: The SFC of TN 
recommended that instead of tax on agricultural land, an enabling provision for levy of 
betterment charges could be made on all the properties in the area. The Panchayats can 
levy and collect them whenever funds are needed. The SFC of UP suggests that gaon 
panchayat should in addition be empowered to impose a levy on use of pump set as 
also a levy on use of tractors in rural areas for carrying out agricultural operations. 
7.3.2.11 LAND REVENUE: It is well known that the land revenue is the most important source of 
revenue for the rural local bodies but the village panchayats are not utilising to the full 
potential of income from surcharge on land revenues. So the SFC of TN recommends 
that this should be collected by revenue machinery of the State Government along with 
the demand for land revenue. The maximum prescribed rate of surcharge on the land 
revenue is 50 per cent of land revenue. It is further recommended that the amount of 
surcharge on land revenue that is collected by the revenue staff should not be passed 
on to gram panchayat on the basis of origin of collection but instead 0.25 per cent of net 
proceeds of State's taxes be earmarked for devolution to Gram Panchayat and the 
amount be distributed on the same criteria which the Commission has recommended for 
devolution to them out of their share in 3 per cent of net proceeds of State's tax revenue. 
The amount equal to land revenue, which at present is being earmarked for rural local 
bodies partly on non-plan account and partly on plan account, should be done away 
with. It has been observed that presently land holding upto 3.125 acres are exempt for 
land revenue. The SFC of UP also suggests that, from now onwards this should not be 
the practice. 
7.4 NUCLEUS CELL 
1. Constitution of Nucleus Cell: The SFCs of all the three States, namely, TN, 
UP and NCT of Delhi recommended that a permanent Finance Commission 
Division or Valuation Cell should be created and strengthened which would 
act as Memory / Statistical Data Bank for successive SFCs. TN added that a 
tax SQuad under the Valuation Cell might be created at the headquarters for 
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making surprise checks to avoid evasion of tax mopping. UP is also in favour 
of a separate cell for PRIs for the same reason. 
2. Database for Local Bodies: It is a common knowledge that research on 
fiscal aspects of the local government institutions is seriously hampered by 
the non-availability of a national or even a State-wise database. So it is 
advised by tne SFC of TN to create an Urban Information System (URBIS) for 
the database for every urban local body and Rural Information System 
(RURIS) for rural local bodies. 
3. Panchayati Raj Finance Department Corporation: It was set up in 1973 
but has not served the purpose for which it was set up. The SFC of UP 
suggests that it would be desirable to wind up this corporation. 
7.5 ilVIPROVEIVIENT OF SERVICES 
i) Street Lighting: The SFC of UP is of the view that street lighting should 
follow a uniform norm for installing the number of lamps per kilometer of 
road length or per thousand populations in the entire area under the local 
bodies. 
ii) Sanitation: The condition of sanitation in ULB's of UP is highly 
unsatisfactory. So, it is suggested by the SFC of UP that the sanitation 
works be done according to norms and if necessary, private parities / Non-
Governmental Organisations (NGOs) should be given on contract the work 
of sanitation and disposal of garbage. Regular and close monitoring of the 
working of staff engaged in sanitation work should be done. Equipments 
used for purposes of sanitation should be maintained, repaired and changed 
whenever necessary. 
iii) Maintenance Of Roads: An expenditure on maintenance of roads, in large 
number of cases, exceeds the PWD norms and it is surprising that even the 
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roads remain un-repaired. The SFC of UP suggests finding out loopholes 
and prescribes certain norms for maintenance of roads. 
iv) Privatisation Of Civic Services: Privitisation of civic services is advisable 
by all the three States. The SFC of TN suggests, privatisation could be 
attempted in selected areas like primary collection and deposition of bins, 
maintenance of roads, streetlights, hand pumps, pumping stations and 
transmission system. Privatised pumping activities in sewage station, could 
be extended to integrated schemes. Sewerage treatment facilities could be 
linked to reuse treated wastewater. Among rural communities, maintenance 
of common resources could be initiated. The SFC of UP recommends 
privatisation of civic services and private participation in ULBs in order to 
bring about improvement in essential civic services. The SFC of NCT of 
Delhi suggested in order to improve the civic services and to reduce the cost 
thereof, PublioPrivate-Partnerships (P-P-P) is an appropriate strategy for 
the present. Some of the services, which Delhi government is looking for 
privatisation, are maintenance of roads, sewage, disposal and solid waste 
disposal, sanitation (Sulabh Shauchalaya) water supply and urban transport. 
v) Water Scheme Funds: The SFC of UP is of the view that for better 
maintenance of rural water schemes, funds should be mads available to the 
rural panchayats directly, otherwise necessary funds should be given to Jal 
Nigam through rural panchayats for supervision and control over the 
maintenance. 
vi) Public Lamp: The SFC of UP recommended that, the maintenance of 
public lamp posts carried out by the State Electricity Board in the rural area, 
may be continued, but Gram Panchayats should properly supervise over 
their maintenance and for this purpose, the GPs should pay to the electricity 
board out of the Commission's schemes of devolution. 
7.6 MAINTENANCE OF ACCOUNTS 
1. Common Budget Estimates: The SFC of UP prescribes a common 
detailed format for budget estimates for all the three categories of ULBs, so 
that budgets of all ULBs should be prepared ward-wise and operated upon 
223 
by uniform pattern for which specific recomnnendations has been made. In 
addition, the SFC of UP is of the view that the responsibilities of audit of 
accounts of nagar nigams, nagar palika parishads should be given to 
Accountant General (UP) and accounts of nagar panchayats may continue 
to be audited, as present, by the Director of Local Funds Accounts. The 
Accountant General, (UP) should submit a detailed audit report annually in 
respect of nagar nigams, nagar palika parishads and nagar panchayats. 
These audit reports should be placed before the State Legislature through 
Public Accounts Committee. It is also emphasized that the rules to be 
framed thereunder which are under consideration of the State Government 
under finance department, should be finalised without further delay, so that 
necessary action as provided in the Act is taken in case of gross negligence 
/ irregularities. The SFC of Delhi suggests that the accounts should be 
maintained in a form which should not only be simple and transparent but 
should also facilitate their comprehension and comparison of the enormous 
size and variety of the financial transactions of the municipality from one 
financial year to another. The prime objectives of the system of classification 
of municipal accounts should be to facilitate the formulation, authorisation 
and execution of the budget. 
2. Control System of Budgets: It is contemplated that the local bodies 
prepare the budget well before the commencement of the year and get 
sanction by the respective councils. So it is advised by the SFC of TN that, 
the control mechanism with the aid of budget as a tool, should be tightened 
to the optimum level and for this local bodies should make a plan containing 
all the details of the schemes to be implemented in the next year. 
3. Preparation of Budget: The SFC of UP recommends that budgets of all 
ULBs should be prepared ward-wise and operated upon by adopting a 
uniform pattern for which specific recommendation has been made in the 
report. 
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7.7 DEBT MANAGEMENT 
1. Loans Converted into Grants: It is suggested by the SFC of UP that, the 
outstanding loans given, for sanitation and water supply, urban 
development schemes, integrated development of small and medium towns 
and beautification, to different local bodies, outstanding as on 31.3 1994 be 
converted into grants, but before converting each loan into grants, due 
scrutiny of each loan will have to be made. 
2. Debt Servicing and Liabilities: The SFC of TN suggested that, the 
payment schedule might be revised with more number of installments. 
Interest rate may be subsidised by the government to lower tiers of ULBs. 
The local bodies may be allowed to clear the arrears by paying current 
annuity with one installment of arrears without additional installment on 
outstandings. 
7.8 STAFF 
1. Staffing Pattern in PRIs: As the people are now by and large av^are of the 
benefits of Rural Development Programmes (RDP), there is need for 
restructuring the staff. Regarding this the SFC of TN makes a few suggestions; 
daily chores of street cleaning, scavenging etc should be privatised on lumpsum 
contracts and no separate staff need be posted for the village panchayats. In 
respect of combined Water Supply Schemes, covering a number of local bodies, 
the maintenance may be best left to the care of the Tamil Nadu Water Supply 
and Drainage Board. With the increasing amount of works under special 
schemes, there is a growing need for the creation / strengthen of the engineering 
cell particularly for the ULBs. In this regard the SFC of UP suggests that the 
State Government is already bearing the burden of payment of salary of Gram 
Panchayat Adhikari, which may continue to be borne by the State Government. 
Every ZP has tax collection staff expenditure, so the staff should be properly 
engaged in recovery of various taxes so that its coverage is enhanced. 
2. Staff Salaries: The SFC of TN says in respect of special schemes, cost of 
project staff whether recruited temporarily or existing staff should be built into the 
project and form an integral part of the overall project cost. It is suggested by the 
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SFC of UP that local government must take the initiative to collect their pending 
arrears of tax and non-tax revenues out of which the salary of their employees 
must be paid regularly. 
3. Supervision of staff: Barring centralised services, the Executive Officers at the 
level of nagar palika parishads and nagar panchayats and Mukhya Nagar 
Adhikaris at the level of nagar nigams should be declared appointing authorities 
in respect of the subordinate staff under them. It is suggested by the SFC of UP 
that they should be given power to inflict punishment, including dismissal, over 
their employees. The powers to hear and decide appeal against the punishment 
should vest in the Mayor, in the case of nagar nigams and in the Chairman of 
nagar panchayat and nagar palika parishad respectively. 
4. Surplus staff: Referring to the surplus staff continuing in the ULBs without 
proper work assignment, it is advisable to government of UP that the staff 
originally engaged for octroi collection should be gradually disbanded and the 
civic services which have been left unattended to, should be entrusted to this 
staff. The duty hours and work of sanctioned staff are not properly monitored in 
the light of the norms, thus resulting in poor standard of sanitation services and 
increasing expenditure on sanitation staff. So it is necessary the work of 
sanitation staff should be monitored closely and regularly. Encouraging private 
agencies on contract basis for sanitations and disposal of garbage should also 
help. 
5. Transfer of staffs: In order to bring about improvement in performance of Class 
IN and IV employees, the SFC of UP recommends that for those categories of 
Class III and Class IV employees who do not form part of the centralised services 
in the ULBs, necessary rules for recruitment of staff and their transfer within a 
division on the recommendations of the Executive Officer of the ULBs, be made. 
6. Recruitment of staff: Referring to the high level of expenditure being incurred 
on the staff, the SFC of UP recommends that some definite norms for sanction 
and recruitment of staff should be made so that the total income generated by 
the local bodies are not consumed by the salary of staff. 
7. Deployment of Staff: The SFC of UP added that, employees engaged in octroi 
collection should be deployed in updating the work of enumeration of houses and 
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in installing number plates allotted for each house so that no house escapes the 
house tax net. 
Provident Fund: The SFC of TN suggests, that the provident fund 
administration may be taken out of the control of the concerned local bodies 
since all the local bodies have appropriated the collections v i^thout any 
investment. It may be centralised and the total Provident Fund deduction by local 
bodies may be worked out once in a half year and got compulsorily remitted to 
the authority concerned. In case of defaulters, amount may be adjusted from 
government assistance to be released to the concerned local bodies. Unless 
some drastic action is taken, the appropriation of the provident fund 
accumulations by the local bodies cannot be controlled. 
Payment of Pension: The gap between the pension contributions and actual 
pension payments is of recurring nature. Since local bodies are paying 20 per 
cent of the pension contribution, they cannot be asked to meet entire pension 
liability. It is not practical also, because the local bodies are not in a position to 
meet even the monthly salary payments. Therefore it is suggested by the SFC of 
TN that the government should bear the commitment. It is also felt that a 
separate fund should be created for it and government will have to contribute to 
the fund from time to time to cover the deficit. The government may give the 
entire pensionary payments of the local bodies. 
7.9 TAX REFORMS 
1. Resource Allocation Mechanism: The SFC of TN says that the task before the 
local bodies is to improve the service level up to acceptable standard and to 
maintain and enhance the acceptable standard in the future. A study shows that 
most of the local bodies are experiencing fiscal gap. To reduce this fiscal gap the 
SFC of TN suggests certain aspects, they are, full exploitation of revenue 
potential, proper assessment of property, easy procedure for appeals, revision of 
rates on both residential and commercial properties and the components of 
property tax, enforcement of good collection through review of exempted cases 
from property tax net, revision of rates of other local body taxes and optimum 
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adoption of user charges. Thus they will strengthen the mobilisation of internal 
resources. This is also experienced in the case of UP. Therefore it is very 
important to enhance their own resources. Levy of circumstances and property 
tax should be made obligatory for all the ZP's so that none is left with any option 
in the matter. Local bodies have piled up heavy uncleared liabilities. Most of the 
local bodies show slackness to tap their own sources of income to the full. So it is 
important to improve recovery of their own tax and non-tax revenue and cut down 
their expenditure to the minimum level including expenditure on staff. Moreover, 
the staff engaged in various schemes should be properly trained so that their 
level of work improves. 
2. Standing Committee: In order to settle the outstanding liabilities of the ULBs, a 
standing committee should be constituted to examine such unpaid liabilities and 
on the recommendations of the Committee, the finance department should 
recover such disputed unpaid liabilities by setting them off against the amounts to 
be released to the urban local bodies by way of their share in the net proceeds of 
State taxes and the budgetary allocation of government and semi-government 
units. 
3. Revision of Rates of License and Fees: The SFC of UP suggested that the zila 
parishad should revise their rates of license and other fees, etc and also pay 
greater attention to recover their dues through proper follow up. 
4. Uniformity in Levy of Taxes: To bring about uniformity in levy of taxes of the 
PRIs of UP, it is suggested by the SFC of UP that instead of having two sets of 
enactments there should be one common legislation for PRIs so that different 
ambiguities are done away with and every PRI has the same set of legal 
provisions throughout the State. 
5. Diversion of Revenues: Zila parishad should be empowered to award contracts 
/ lease of tanks, etc. of 2 hectares and above for pisciculture purpose, since this 
would result in diversion of revenue of gram panchayats to zila panchayats. 
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7.10 ON TRANSITIONAL LOCAL BODIES 
It is recommended by the SFC of I N that, 
1. A town panchayat can be upgraded into municipality only if it is urban in 
character and should satisfy the census norms of density of population i.e., 
minimum population of 30,000, atleast 75 per cent of the male working force 
engaged in non-agricultural activities and its average annual income exceeds Rs 
50 lakhs excluding grants, loans and lapsed deposits. 
2. Further the SFC of I N recommends that a municipality can be upgraded into 
municipal corporation only if it has minimum population of 100,000 and average 
annual income exceeds Rs 50 crores. 
3. For constitution of village panchayat of TN in future, a minimum population of 
2,500 may be adopted. When two or more VPs desire to be merged, the 
government may allow a suitable financial incentive. The VPs may be classified 
into 3 grades according to average annual income for the last 5 years. The 
annual income range may be reviewed periodically and the revised range may be 
fixed by the government. 
4. Whereas in the case of UP, it is desirable to reduce the number of local bodies 
so that they may become economically and administratively viable units. As per 
norms minimum population of 5,000 be required for constituting a gram 
panchayat. A corporation may be set up with an authorized capital of Rs 25 
crores; 4/5'^ of this should be subscribed by the State Government and the 
remaining 1/5* by the ULBs. 
7.11 HUMAN RESOURCES DEVELOPMENT AND TRAINING 
For the local body functionaries a recommendation is made by the SFC of TN that the 
elected representatives of the people and the administrative machinery of local 
governments have been entrusted with an onerous task for governance for the twin 
objectives of Economic Development and Social Justice. In the past, there have been 
cases of failures in the local government performance due to mal-administration. This 
229 
shows the need for training and Human Resource Development (HRD). An integrated 
training package of inductional, functional and managerial training shall be imparted to 
officials, non-officials and elected representatives involved, on the functions and 
responsibilities of local bodies. For this many institutes are listed which can impart 
training to the local bodies employees. The SFC of UP is also having the same opinion 
on this issue. It says that the State Government should carry out a crash programme for 
the training of newly elected representatives of the Panchayati Raj Institutions. 
7.12 ADMINISTRATIVE REFORMS 
1. Revision of Administrative Structure: The SFC of UP recommends for the 
constitution of Committee of experts to go into the question of reorganising the 
administrative structure of the urban local bodies like the State Urban 
Development Authority (SUDA) and directorate of urban local bodies. 
2. Mechanism for Performance and Accountability: The SFC of TN suggests 
that for motivating local body personnel to give out their best, a reward be given 
by incentive (cash award & certificate) for good work and disincentives for poor 
work. Performance of the local government should be transparent so that it is 
visible to the citizens. Local officials should also report their performance to 
citizens periodically. An annual performance report should be published that 
describes, in simple terms the performance in terms of achievements against the 
goal set. It should exhibit basic features of revenue and expenditure sources of 
the budget and measures of the quality and quantity of services provided and 
make comparison with previous years and with other local governments. 
3. Expert Committee: The SFC of UP suggests that a Committee of experts should 
go into the question of reorganising the administrative structure of PRIs including 
different directorates / units. 
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7.13 TAX ADMINISTRATION 
1. Inefficient Collection of Taxes: 
i) Observing that the urban local bodies of UP are not tapping their tax and 
non-tax sources or revenue fully, so it is advised by the SFC of UP that 
the tendency to overlook their own sources of income, should be 
discouraged. 
ii) PRIs of UP are also not able to collect their tax and revenue properly, so 
the commission is of the view that new taxes should not be assigned to 
them, as these taxes will meet the same fate as already assigned taxes 
have. On the other hand the State Government might lose substantial 
part of its own revenues. 
2. Revision of Tax Structure: The SFC of UP advice that the rates of different 
taxes like professional tax, vehicle tax, theatre tax, etc., which have not been 
revised for long should be revised immediately. 
3. Recovery of their Dues: it is recommended by the SFC of UP that the ULBs 
should make special drive for recovery of their dues in full and with that ensure 
liquidation of their outstanding liabilities. 
7.14 MISCELLANEOUS 
1. Adequacy of Powers of Local Bodies and Streamlining the Procedure: The 
SFC of TN recommends that: 
(i) It is generally agreed that there is need for greater decentralisation and 
delegation of financial powers to the local bodies. Sufficient mechanisms are 
built by the government to safeguard the public interest and the properties of 
the local bodies with special references to revenue expenditure, capital 
expenditure and receipts from lease / auction. 
(ii) The technical sanction power for works may be suitably enhanced. 
(iii) Employment generation schemes be carried out and the responsibilities may 
vest with the panchayats of that area, who will be fully responsible for proper 
and timely execution of works. 
231 
(ivj Tender procedures should not only be transparent for pronnoting healthy 
competition but should also aim at excellence in quality of works. In respect 
of works, where tender procedure is adopted, along with tender notice, 
tender schedules may also be published with reference to type, design with 
instructions to type the schedule filling the rates and submit the sealed 
tender to overcome the difficulty at present experienced in obtaining tender 
schedule from the local body offices. 
(v) A 'Work Committee' be constituted in every local body except VPs with 
powers to recommend to the council for deciding tenders and also to look 
into complaints and into quality of implementation. In case of VPs they 
themselves can attend to this work. 
2. Community Participation in Local Administration: The SFC of TN suggests 
some of the views, as below: 
(i) In all development programmes, the role of community is very crucial both 
for the success of the programme as well as for its sustainability. Emphasis 
that the community should not only participate in the planning, 
implementation, monitoring and evaluation of the programmes but to the 
extent possible should be partners in the cost sharing. The non-
governmental organisations (NGOs) are better suited to organise the 
community and should be involved not only in the task of community 
organisation but also in policy formation, monitoring and evaluation. 
(ii) NGOs which are community based, non-political and are constituted by the 
marginalised people and have a close and effective rapport with the people 
they work, may be given their due recognition and effectively utilised in 
planning, implementation, management and monitoring of programmes at 
grassroots level in both urban and rural areas. 
(iii) Adoption of a bottom up approach to plan for urban poverty alleviation. 
(iv) NGOs and wherever possible, organisations like Scouts and NSS can be 
involved for the proper maintenance of community infrastructure like water 
supply, roads, street lighting, etc. 
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(v) In schools and colleges, in their curriculum, the need for proper maintenance 
of core civic services, involvement of the students and the people in this 
affair, must be included. 
7.15 SUMMARY 
In retrospection it may observed that the three different reports of the Commissions are 
based on three different settings in terms of geographical location, political scenario, 
different stages of development of State-Local relation and empowerment of local 
bodies. Therefore the recommendations also have different hues and colours on various 
aspects of local government and fiscal position. The uniformity among all these reports 
are in terms of such subjects as setting up of finance cell at State level, need for the 
reforms in property tax, property tax system, whether it is assessment, enforcement and 
collection of arrears etc. The reports have also emphasised the need to increase the 
widening of resources base of both ULBs and PRIs either by improving the existing tax 
and non-tax resources assigned to them, or by adding some more taxes of local nature 
from the State list to local bodies. 
With regard to sharing of taxes between State and local bodies in the form of revenue 
sharing and grants, the reports have preferred global sharing rather than specific tax 
sharing, however the ratio may differ. In case of grants-in-aid the variety of these grants 
among States is noticeable. The grants may be for either general-purpose or even 
specific purposes to support certain civic functions. In some cases these specific 
purpose grants have been tied up with matching ratios. 
In the area of administration the reports have come up with various suggestions to 
improve the governance capacity and administrative acumen of both the officials and the 
elected members at all the levels of local bodies. To support the reform in administration, 
the reports have recommended for computerisation, privatisation of certain sen/ices, 
reform in budget making and accounting system from cash to accrual basis, etc. 
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Table 7.1 provides the comparisons of the recommendations for SFC of TN, UP and 
NCT of Delhi on some of the common issues. 
Table 7.1: 
Comparison of Recommendations made by the SFC's of TN, UP & NCT of Delhi on 
some of the common issues 
ISSUES 
Global Sharing of 
Revenues 
Basis of Devolution 
TAMIL NADU 
Out of the total resources 92% 
retained by the government 
and remaining 8% of the 
resources goes to local bodies 
for devolve between different 
ULBs and PRIs. 
Out of the 8% resources 6.8% 
(60 per cent of local bodies 
resources) devolve to rural 
local bodies and 2.72% (40% 
of local bodies resources). 
Out of 60% of the rural local 
bodies revenues: DP get 
share of 14% and 86% goes 
to PUC and VP. 
Out of which, 31% of the 
urban pool goes to MC. 31% 
to the municipalities and 
remaining 38% goes to IPs. 
UTTAR PRADESH 
Out of total resources 90% 
retained by the government 
and remaining 10% of the 
resources goes to local bodies 
for devolve between different 
ULBs and PRIs. 
Out of the 10% resources 7% 
goes to ULB's and 3% to PRl's. 
Out of 3% of the net proceed of 
State taxes, 1/5 thereof 
should be earmarked for ZPs 
and the balance 4/5'" for GPs 
7% of the net proceeds of 
State's total tax, earmarked to 
ULBs, out of these NNs get 
3.12 %, NPPs gets 3.12% and 
NPs gets 0.76. 
The criteria of 80% population 
and 20% area for devolution of 
net proceeds of State's tax 
revenues to PRl's and ULB's. 
NCT of DELHI 
Out of total 
resources 87.5% 
attained by the 
State 
Government and 
remaining 12.5% 
of the resources 
goes to local 
bodies. 
9.5% on non-
matching basis 
devolve to 
NDMG and 
MCD. 
1.5% to MCD 
and NDMG on 
matching basis. 
Maximum 1.5% 
on matching 
basis equivalent 
to saving in 
expenditure 
against 
projections made 
by the 
commission. 
The criteria of 
70% population 
and 30% area for 
devolution of net 
proceeds of 
State's tax 
revenues. 
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Grants-in-aid The Specific purpose grants 
like Maternity, Dispensary, 
Fannily Welfare etc. will be 
covered by devolutions under 
73'" and 74"' Amendments to 
the Constitution and the funds 
allocated for the purpose by 
the Central and State 
Governments should be 
passed on to Local Bodies on 
the basis of the prescribed 
norms. 
The effects of increasing 
devolution v^ i^th additionally of 
grants-in-aid flowing from the 
Central Government, the same 
formula should be applied for 
its inter se distribution, which 
had suggest for increased 
devolution of funds on the non 
plan side. These grants should 
be utilised strictly for civic 
services like improving 
drainage facilities, garbage 
disposal, latrines, street 
lighting, etc. for which the 
necessary schemes should be 
drawn up by the urban local 
bodies and got approved for 
the State Government 
Incentive and untied grants 
now available will be taken 
care of while devolutions are 
distributed since such grants 
are necessary to ensure 
additional resource generation 
(Like House Tax Matching 
Grant and LCS Matching 
Grant to PRI) 
Discontinuance of grants-in-aid 
system of ULB and to adopt a 
system of vertical resource 
sharing in which all-State taxes 
are pooled and a proportion 
thereof devolved to the urban 
local bodies. As the urban local 
bodies were not collecting 
more than 50-55 per cent of the 
current demand of their own 
taxes, the commission 
recommends that assignment 
of more taxes and duties to the 
ULBs is not likely to be of great 
help and it will do more harm 
than good to both to the urban 
local bodies and the State 
Government 
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Principles of distribution of 
funds from State to local 
bodies are being considered 
separately. After 
experimenting the system of 
distribution, the need for 
further grants-in-aid can be 
studied, if there is still need, 
Equalisation grants will be 
necessary. 
The reimbursement of D A 
increases may be sanctioned 
to the local bodies outside the 
general devolution. There is 
every justification in the claim, 
even though the percentage 
of requirement may vary 
among the local bodied. 
Regarding grant-in-aid on plan 
side, these are essentially of 
non-recurring nature and it was 
not found feasible to envisage 
the shape of things to come in 
respect of non-recurring items 
of expenditure. As the decision 
of the government on the 
function to be given to the 
urban local bodies envisaged in 
the twelfth schedule of the 
Constitution ha^ e^ not come 
about, the commission feels 
that if and when a decision is 
taken by the State Government 
to pass on those schemes to 
the ULBs, the State 
Government will have to pass 
on accordingly necessary funds 
for the purpose also to them. In 
so as certainly sponsored and 
central sector schemes are 
concerned, the present system 
of grant-in-aid in each year will 
depend on the amount that is 
sanctioned for the purpose by 
the Gol. 
As per recommendations of the 
Tenth National Finance 
Commission, the grant 
recommended by them should 
not be utilised for meeting 
salaries and wages. 
Constitution of 
Nucleus Cell: 
A tariff and valuation cell 
consisting of technically 
qualified people may be 
created at State level, which 
helps in the valuation of 
properties. A tax squad under 
the valuation cell may be also 
created at Headquarters for 
making surprise checks to 
avoid evasion of tax mopping 
The difficulties face by the 
commission in obtaining 
essential statistical data, the 
said cell should also be put 
incharge of preparing annual 
review of the finance of the 
ULB's and PRI's and their 
review report placed before the 
legislature. 
A permanent 
Finance 
Commission 
Division, on the 
lines of the one 
in Gol, will set up 
by government 
of NCT of Delhi 
to service, as 
also act as 
Memory / Bank 
for the 
subsequent 
Delhi Finance 
Commissions. 
Reforms in Resource Raising; 
Property Tax; Area 
Base: 
Switching over from Annual 
Value System to the area linking 
unit value System 
Carpet area as the basis for The 
assessing the Annual Rental 
Values of building. 
adoption of 
UAM in place of 
ARV. For 
computing the 
ARV. 
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ISSUES 
Revision of Rates 
Computerization: 
Deduction: 
Exemption: 
TAMIL NADU 
Basic rental plintti area for 
monthly rental value: 
Affluent area, Middle-income 
area and Low-income area. 
General revision in every 3 
years on inflation rate with 
reference to consumer price 
index. 
The revised structure reveals 
that it will lead to an additional 
revenue generation from 25-50 
per cent. 
Computerization is desirable to 
administer taxes efficiently. 
Age of the 
building (in 
years) 
0-10 
11-20 
21-30 
31 & above 
Discount in 
percent 
5 
10 
20 
30-40 
Rates of taxes on the ARV 
basis: 
Corporations; 20-40% 
Municipalities: 15-35% 
Town Panchayats 15-30%. 
Exemption from property tax to 
should not be minimum. Service 
taxes should be collected only 
exemption confined to property 
tax only. Service tax may be 
evied in addition to the user 
charges now collected 
UTTAR PRADESH 
Criteria for determining ARV of a 
property in this State: 
a-Location of property: 
b- Use of property: 
c- Type of construction. 
Revision of Annual Rental Value 
of a property in ULBs. 
The data collected & assessment 
of taxes should be computerized. 
Age of the 
building (in 
years) 
Less than 25 
25-40 
above 40 
Discount in 
per cent 
10 
20 
30 
Rates of the property taxes after 
deductions as below: Property tax 
@2.4 per cent of ARV, water tax 
@ 2 per cent of ARV. Latrine or 
sewerage tax @ 2 per cent ARV. 
Rebates of 40 per cent of ARV 
are allowed to owner occupied 
residential buildings. 
Exemption from payment of 
property tax should be minimal 
and prescribed by law. Service 
related taxes might be collected 
in most cases while exemption 
may be confined to the property 
tax only. 
NOT of DELHI 
UAM may be 
applied in low-
income areas such 
as LIG flats and 
resettlement 
colonies. 
To reduce "ex-
parte" timing from 3 
years to 3 months. 
Studies made by 
HSMI, bears out 
that the local 
govrenment's are 
collection only a 
fraction of the 
potential revenues 
and advised to 
identify the legal 
hurdles and 
amoralities, if it is 
checked then 
revenue generation 
will go upto 300 per 
cent. 
Exemption of all 
non-residential 
properties from 
Delhi rent control 
Act, 
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There should no restrictions 
concessions, abolition or write-
off of tax or other revenue 
sources available/earmarked to 
local bodies by government 
without consulting the LBs 
Exemptions are not granted on 
recommendation of State 
Government. 
Total exemption for al 
educational institutions 
Industrial State, Public sectorlbuilding 
units and Central and State 
Government properties from 
taxation is not equitable 
Concessions may be giving in 
the levy of general-purpose tax worship 
by restricting the levy to service|to 
tax alone. 
Properly tax should also be 
imposed on that portion of the 
of land attached to the 
places of public worship which 
have been given on rent are been 
used for purpose other than 
public worship. Such portion of 
should also be subjected 
water tax, latrine and sewage 
tax. 
Collection Procedure: The responsibility of praying tax 
should devolve legally on 
taxpayers by suitable provisions 
in the enactments. 
Different procedures and 
practices for recovery of property 
tax should be adopted by ULB's 
and a uniform procedure for 
sending demand notice to the 
taxpayers once in a year by each 
local body. 
Revision: At the time of first assessment 
general revision a passbook or a 
ard may be issued to assesses, 
which contain particulars about demand 
tax levied due date of payments 
grace time allowed for payment 
The amount of tax indicated will 
be final, unless the tax is revised 
in the meantime. 
/Tax collections are made on self-
assessment forms. Tax collection 
may be made annually with the 
notice served once a 
year. 
Rebate: A rebate of 2% may be allowed 
for prompt payment and 5% for|provided 
the advance payment of tax. 
10% incentive amount may be 
with a payment within 
one month of the demand notice. 
Penalty: n the case of defaulters a 
penalty of 5% of the tax may be 
added for each half year cent 
concerned and collected. 
Penalty should be made on late 
payment after due date @ 2 per 
per month 
Efficient System of Tax 
Collection of Property 
Tax: 
collection machinery may be 
given incentive for higher 
collection of tax involved. 
Enumeration of houses in the 
local bodies area and allotment 
number plates for each house, so 
that no house escapes the house 
tax net. 
Entire amount of 
oflaccumulated 
collectable arrears 
will be collected 
within five years @ 
Rs 280 crore per 
annum. 
Action may be taken for poor 
performance, against the 
concerned machinery, if no 
improvement is found even afterjand 
direction. 
It is recommended that 
quinquennial assessment 
properties should strictly be made 
regular exercise for 
enumeration of houses should be 
carried out. 
Collection 
of efficiency, which is 
as low as 31% in 
1996-71 can be 
increased only 
gradually to the 
level of 40% in 
1998-99, 45% in 
1999-2000 and 
50% in 2000-2001. 
Subsequently it 
should be taken to 
a level of 70%. 
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Write-off of arrears should be 
allowed only after exhausting a 
methods of collection, Including 
filing of suit. Indiscreet write-i 
should be subjected to question. 
State Government should enact 
one common legislation for all 
urban local bodies so that the 
off ambiguities about levy and 
recovery of taxes presently 
evident In the UP. municipal 
corporation act, 1959 and UP 
Municipal Act, 1916 are done 
away with and every urban local 
body has the same set of lega 
provisions throughout the State 
One time increase 
due to widening of 
base and logical 
assessment will 
also be converted 
into revenue in a 
gradual process 
Although MCD has 
already taken up 
widening of base 
and is likely to 
rationalise 
discretionary 
assessment in 
1998-99, we take 
only 25% of such 
increase as 
property tax 
revenue for 1998-
99 followed by 40% 
in 1999-2000 and 
50% in 2000-2001 
Permitting distrait against A 
immovable properties will enable 
improvement in collection. 
Reduction in tax for vacancy 
remissions for a continuous 
period of 90 days, instead of 30 
days now adopted. 
comprehensive enactment 
embracing the forgoing 
recommendations of the 
commission over-riding the 
president different provisions 
under various acts, so that the 
uniform policy for levy and 
recovery of property and other 
taxes in all the ULBs is applied 
House Tax The main reform needed is to 
introduce property tax in TPs by 
switching over from the House zila 
Tax now levied under Tamil 
Nadu Panchayats Act, 1994. 
Levy of circumstances and PT 
should be obligatory for all the 
panchayats. 
Land Use Both in urban and rural local 
bodies, a survey should be 
made to list out all the 
porambokes and vacant lands 
and a list of such assets should 
be prepare. 
Vacant lands should be put to 
proper use by opening shopping 
complexes, markets, bus stands, 
slaughterhouses etc.. Open 
spaces are not handed over to 
local body. If such open spaces 
are not utilised for the purpose 
for which they are reserved 
within a year, the promoter is 
permitted to sell it as house sites 
With addition of new area to the 
urban local bodies the need for 
provision of basic civic services 
comes up, but at the same time It 
strains the finances of urban local 
bodies because with the addition 
of new areas no additional 
income accrues immediately to 
the local bodies. On the other 
hand, in such new areas of local 
bodies spurious real estate 
agencies crop up with start 
punishing land at throw away 
prices and later on sell them at 
exorbitant rates thereby making 
big profits. 
Tax On Agricultural 
Land For Specific 
Purposes: 
nstead of this agriculture tax 
levy of betterment charges can 
be made on all the properties in 
the area. The panchayats can 
levy and collect whenever funds 
are needed. The owners of 
The Gram Panchayat should in 
addition by empower to impose a 
levy on use of pump set and 
tractors in rural areas for carrying 
out agricultural operations. 
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vacant lands also may be made 
liable for this levy of betterment 
charges. 
Improvement of Services 
Privatization 
Civic Services 
Areas where privatization 
could be attempted: Primary 
collection and deposition at 
bins-by community groups in 
all large urban centres, 
Regional waste management 
agency for disposal facility 
Maintenance of road, street 
lighting, pumping station, 
Transmission Systems and 
Sewage Station etc. 
In order to bring about 
improvement in essential civic 
services, private participation to 
be encouraged in all ULBs. 
In order to 
improve and 
reduce costs of 
CIVIC services, 
privities certain 
municipal 
services. Public-
Private-
Partnerships (P-
P-P) are 
recommended 
as the 
appropriated 
strategy to be 
adopted for the 
present. 
Maintenance of 
roads, sewage 
disposal and 
solid waste 
disposal, sulabh 
shauchalaya, 
water supply, 
urban transport 
MCD is 
desperately 
looking for the 
substitutes for 
teachers, doctors 
safai 
karamcharis.etc 
in the name of 
adopting 
innovative 
technologies 
Maintenance of 
Accounts 
The accounts of ULB may 
continue to be maintained 
according to present rule, 
which should be followed in 
letter and sprit. 
The pnme 
objectives of the 
system of 
classification of 
municipal 
accounts should 
be to facilitate 
the formulation, 
authorisation and 
execution of the 
budget. 
The responsibilities of audit of 
accounts ULB's should give to 
accountant general, UP 
However the accounts of NPs 
may continue to be audited, as 
it present by the Director, local 
funds accounts. 
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The accountant general, UP. 
should submit a detailed audit 
report annually in respect of 
ULB's these audit reports 
should be placed before the 
State legislature through public 
accounts committee. 
Common Budget 
Estimates: 
A common detailed format for 
budget estimates for all the 
three categories of ULB's and it 
should be prepared ward wise 
and operates upon by uniform 
pattern for which specific 
recommendation has been 
made in the report. 
The accounts 
should be 
maintained in 
simple and 
transparent form 
but should also 
facilitate their 
comprehension 
and comparison 
of the enormous 
size and verity of 
the financial 
transactions of 
the municipality 
from one 
financial year to 
another. 
Staffing Pattern: To reorganize the staffingtThi 
pattern in local bodies, there is a 
need for the re-organization 
the structure in the local bodies. 
e staff should be properly 
engaged in recovery of 
of circumstances and property tax 
and its coverage enhanced. The 
commission has also suggested 
that the minimum limit of Rs 
2,000/- should be done away with 
In respect of special schemes 
cost of project staff should be 
built into the project and form an 
integral part of the overall project 
cost. 
For improvement in performance 
of class 111 and IV civic 
employees, necessary rules for 
recruitment of staff and their 
transfer within a division on the 
recommendations of the 
Executive Officer of ULBs are 
made. 
Training to Local|An 
Bodies Functionary 
integrated training 
of inductional, functional and 
managerial training shall be 
imparted to officials and non 
official elected representatives 
involved, on the functions and 
responsibilities of local bodies 
package The finance then a crash 
programme for the training of 
newly elected representatives of 
the three tier PRls should be 
carried out by the State 
Government. 
Tax Reforms 
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Resource Allocation 
Mechanism 
Full exploitation of revenue 
potential, proper assessment 
of property, easy procedure 
for appeals, revision of rates 
on both residential and 
commercial properties and the 
components of PT, 
enforcement of good 
collection, through review of 
exempted cases from PT net, 
revision of rates of other local 
body taxes and optimum 
adoption of user charges w\\\ 
strengthen the mobilisation of 
internal resources. 
Levy of circumstances and 
property tax should be 
obligatory for all the zila 
panchayats so that none of the 
zlla panchayat is left with any 
option in the matter. 
Assignment of additional 
faxes subject to the efficiency 
of local body to collect those 
taxes and piggy-backing on 
certain elastic resources such 
as exercise duty, sales tax 
and motor vehicles tax etc., 
will improve the taxing powers 
of the local bodies. 
The sharing might be through 
a formula based on factors 
such as collection 
performance, population and 
expenditure needs. 
The feasibility of privatizing 
those services where non 
governmental organizations 
(NGOs) can provided the 
services at competitive cost 
depending on the nature and 
type of services should be 
explored. 
The local bodies have piled up 
heavy unclear liabilities. The 
studies made by the 
commission of a few local 
bodies show that this has 
happened because of the 
slackness on the pan of the 
local bodies to tap their own 
souices of income to the full. It 
is high time the urban local 
bodies bring about 
improvement in the recovery of 
their own taxes and non-tax 
revenues and cut down their 
expenditure to the minimum 
level including expenditure on 
staff. It is also suggested 
engaged in various schemes of 
urban local bodies should be 
not properly trained so that 
their level of working improves 
On Transitional Local Bodies 
Upgrading 
Municipality 
Municipal 
Corporation 
Into 
The criteria for the 
Constitution of a Municipal 
Corporation or upgrading a 
Municipality into a Municipal 
Corporation in future may be: 
i- Minimum population of 10 
lakh; and, 
ii- Average annual income of 
Rs 50 crores. 
A corporation should be set up 
in a State, where leveraging 
funds and subsidies interest 
rate on non-remunerative but 
desirable schemes to 
strengthen civic infrastructure. 
To begin with, such a 
corporation may be set with an 
authorized capital of say Rs 
25.00 crs, 4/5 of this should be 
subscribed by the State 
Government and the remaining 
1/5 by the urban local bodies. 
The corporation should be 
allowed to be administered in a 
professional manner and it 
would be desirable if some 
competent expert of all India 
standing were appointed the 
chairman of this corporation. 
State Finance 
Department 
Although the financial position 
of local bodies are not very 
In order to insure that the 
urban local bodies fulfill the 
In most of the 
State Finance 
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healthy, even then the State 
local bodies asked the urban 
local bodies to provide 
matching contribution by 
raising their resources as per 
the conditions laid down by 
the tenth finance commission 
responsibility cast on them of 
improving their ovs/n resources 
seriously, while 7 per cent of 
the net proceeds of the State 
taxes may be passed on to the 
ULB's initially only 90 per cent 
of their share may be passed 
and remaining 10 per cent 
given to them at the end of 
each year on the basis of their 
performance measured in 
terms of following criteria: - I -
Each local bodies may levied 
and collects all taxes and non 
tax items which are of 
obligatory nature, II- Recovery 
of their tax and non-tax 
revenue as percentage of the 
current demand is at least of 
the order of 70 per cent in 
1997-98 to be stepped up by 5 
per cent each year so that it 
reaches the level of 85 per cent 
in the year 2000-2001 - the 
last year of the period of the 
recommendation. 
Departments act 
as nodal 
agencies for the 
work of the State 
Finance 
Commission 
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CONCLUSIONS 
CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
The concept of local self-government is not new to India, the similar system may be 
traced back during Chola period. The British rule eclipsed the system, however, the 
Imperial Government latter on realised the necessity of local self-government and 
initiated many measures to create local bodies under various enactments. Though 
several committees and commissions were appointed earlier to examine the financial 
requirements of ULB's and PRI's, yet they were adhocin character and did not enjoy any 
Constitutional status. It has been strongly suggested by many, that the chronic problem 
of local finance can be solved only through having scientific method of devolution of 
power and resources. The SFCs should make recommendation so as to ensure a stride 
and adequate flow of resources to the local bodies through grants and loans (in addition 
to the assigned heads of revenue and shared taxes). The 1992, Acts suggest for an 
appointment of State Finance Commission in all the States within one year from the 
commencement of the Constitution Amendment Act initially and thereafter for every five 
years, to review the finances of the local bodies and to recommend the principles on the 
basis of which the taxes are to be appropriated by or assigned to the local bodies, as 
also grants-in-aid to the local bodies from the Consolidated Funds of the States. The 
basic function of the SFC is to look into the finances of the local bodies, both rural and 
urban and to devise a system of distribution of the government revenues to the local 
bodies, its powers of taxation and the responsibilities for improving its local finances and 
services. 
Fiscal federalism revolves around the two questions, (i) which level of government 
provides which functions, so as to avoid potential incompatibilities and destructive 
competitions among the government and achieve a social welfare maximum? (ii) how 
much people sort themselves among the various jurisdiction again with the goal of 
avoiding incompatibilities and intergovernmental competitions and achieving a social 
welfare maximum?. Different theories of fiscal federalism have tried to answer these 
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questions. In the present study the theories given by Stigler and Gates have been 
examined. 
Stigler gave two principles of local governments and concluded that these two principles 
implies that decision-mal<ing should occur at the lowest level of government consistent 
with the goals of allocational efficiency and distributional equity. To achieve an optimal 
federalist system, various legitimate functions of government are best distributed among 
the governments within the fiscal hierarchy. The National Government is the proper 
government for resolving the distributional question in order to avoid inconsistencies and 
competition among governments. Dates solidified Stigler's principle by suggesting that 
the optimal form of federal government in which each level of government, possessing 
complete knowledge of the tastes of its constituents and seeking to maximize their 
welfare, would provide the Pereto-efficient level of output and would finance this through 
benefit pricing. 
Those functions that supply public services to meet the varying tastes and preferences 
of citizens should necessarily go to the lower-level governments. Whereas the functions 
which are not involved in such variations in requirements and preferences and which 
enjoy economies of scale should go to the higher (National / State) level of government. 
Whereas such clear-cut demarcation is not possible, it results in spatial spillover of 
benefits and costs. The National Government in such cases should try to internalise 
them by providing financial assistance to local self-governments. This is the economic 
justification of grants from higher-level governments to lower level governments. The 
resources of revenue, those whose base is spatially mobile, should necessarily go to the 
National Government and those, which are immobile, should go to the local 
governments. Benefit levies are more efficient when they are administered at local level, 
as it is easier to assess the benefits and costs. The sources, which involve redistributive 
role, should go to the National Government on efficiency ground. 
When the structure of rural and urban local bodies in TN, UP and NCT of Delhi is 
compared, the structure of TN and UP seems almost similar except the difference in 
nomenclature. Delhi on the contrary being a former union territory and now a quasi-state 
government does have different structure for local bodies. In TN and UP, there are three 
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horizontal urban local bodies and three vertical rural local bodies, whereas, NCT of Delhi 
is quite different. It has two tier rural local bodies; one at the grass root level and the 
second tier is only a non-statutory and advisory body at the block level and three 
horizontal urban bodies i.e., MCD, NDMC and DCB. Among all the local bodies in the 
NCT of Delhi, only MCD conforms to the norms of the local self-government. MCD has 
also is unique character that it also has rural areas within its jurisdiction. The NDMC has 
a unique setup, in the sense; it has excluded the modality of electing Municipal 
Councilors. 
Rural local bodies of all these three States consist of gram sabha. The common features 
of the gram sabha are that, it consists of persons registered in the electoral roll relating 
to village panchayat, these sabha elect members. Chairman and Vice-Chairman. The 
quorum for a meeting of gram sabha are 1/3^ ^^  in the case of TN and 1/5'^  in UP and 2/3''^  
for NCT of Delhi. Gram Sabha meets atleast thrice in a year but not more then six 
months are intervening between any two meetings in TN. Two general meeting in UP 
are necessary. Village Panchayat of TN and gaon panchayat of UP constitute for five 
years. Village Panchayat can be constituted in TN with minimum population of 500 or 
more. Whereas this minimum limit is 1,000 in case of gram panchayat of UP. The 
chairman is known as President in TN and Pradhan in UP and NCT of Delhi. VP in TN 
have five to fifteen members whereas nine to fifteen in case UP depending upon the 
population and these members are chosen by direct election. In all these three States 
provision for reservation of SC/ST and women in proportion to the population but not 
exceeding 27 per cent exists. 
In UP, Pradhan of gram panchayat can be removed by a majority of 2/3''' members of 
the panchayats present and voting. No motion in the first year is allowed but in case 
motion fails, it cannot be moved again v/ithin one year. Whereas in NCT of Delhi also for 
removal of Pradhan of gaon sabha, 2/3''' majority of the members present and voting is 
required. 
Intermediate levels of panchayat have different nomenclature. In TN, it is known as 
PUC, whereas in UP it is called Kshetra Panchayat and in case of NCT of Delhi it is 
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known as Panchayat Samiti. Panchayat Samiti is a non-statutory local body that acts as 
an advisory body. The PUCs are headed by Chairnnan and KP by Pradhan. PUCs 
consist of elected members (at the rate of one for 5,000 population), MP's, MLA's and 
Presidents of village panchayat. The KP consists of elected members (at the rate of 1 for 
2,000 population), all Pradhans (ex-officio), MP's and MLA's. PUC notice by 2/3'" 
members and the government after considering the view of the members of the council 
can remove the Chairman and in KP it may be done by the majority of the elected 
members. No notice within one year and no fresh notice within one year of rejections 
can be considered. In both KP and PUC, seats are reserved for SC/ST and women in 
proportion to their population but not exceeding 27 per cent. 
Town Panchayat in Tamil Nadu and Nagar Panchayat in Uttar Pradesh are in a 
transition stage of being converted into an Urban Local Bodies from Village Panchayat, 
having a population limit of minimum 5,000 and 75 per cent of the male working 
population are engaged in non-agriculture activities in TN and 30,000 to 1 lakhs in case 
of UP. Town Panchayats (TN) consists of two persons nominated by State Government, 
MPs, MLAs and MLCs of State. Whereas Nagar Panchayat (UP) consists of ten to 
twenty four members and ex-officio members MP's and MLA's representing 
constituencies and two to three MLCs. 
In Tamil Nadu, Municipalities are having minimum population of 20,000 and 75 per cent 
of male working population members are engaged in non-agricultural activities. In case 
of UP, minimum population varies between 1 to 5 lakhs. In NCT of Delhi it is known as 
New Delhi Municipal Council it has no limitation of population. 
Municipalities of Tamil Nadu consist of a Chairman and twenty to twenty five councillors 
out of whom one councillor is the Vice Chairman and two members nominated by the 
State Government. The municipality of UP consists of the Chairperson and twenty five to 
fifty five elected, and ex-officio members comprising ail the MPs, MLAs representing 
constituencies and three to five MLCs nominated by the State. NDMC consists of a 
Chairperson nominated by the Central Government, three MLAs of Delhi, five members 
nominated by Central Government, two members nominated by Central Government in 
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consultation with the Chief iVIinister of Delhi and two MPs. Reservation for SC/ST and 
women are similar in these entire municipalities and it is according to Article 243-T of the 
Constitution of India. 
Municipal Corporation of TN consists of 155 elected councillor, MPs, MLAs and 10 
members nominated by the State Government. Municipal Corporations of UP consists of 
Nagar Pramukh and Sabhasads whose number varies between 60 to 10, MP's and 
MLA's of that area and the State Government nominates five to ten members. The 
Sabhasads are chosen by direct elections. Municipal Corporation of Delhi is composed 
of the directly elected councilors, on the basis of adult franchise from various wards, ten 
persons are nominated by the administrators, all the MP's of MCD, the MLA's and 1/5'^  
MLA's of the NCT of Delhi nominated by the speaker of that Legislative Assembly. In all 
the three States seats are reserved for SC/ST and women candidates in proportion to 
the population and as per Article 243-T of Indian Constitution. 
It may be argued that in TN among ULBs of various nature there is non-uniformity in 
adopting XII schedule on the functions of maintenance of roads and bridges, water 
supply, public health, vital statistics, regulation of slaughter houses, public and private 
drainage, plantation of trees and provision of public bathing. In case of Uttar Pradesh, it 
is on the function of Planning of Social & Economic development, to take care of fire 
services, poverty alleviation programme, vital statistics, plantation of trees, public 
bathing and provision of rest houses. In case of NCT of Delhi both the ULBs have 
adopted all the functions to be performed. The functions that are performed by all the 
local governments in these three States are public amenities including street lighting, 
parking lots, bus stops, public conveniences and public and private latrines. It means 
upkeeping of the city has been recognized as the sole function to be performed by them. 
In case of PRIs, the assignment of functions among VPs, Panchayat Samiti and District 
Boards are of different nature in all the States. The basic unit of PRIs remains village 
level of local body. Therefore, it would be interesting to observe that the common 
functions are minor irrigation, water management, maintenance of roads, culverts, 
bridges, ferries, waterways & other means of communication, libraries & cultural 
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activities, health and sanitation. Relief work and promotion of tourism have not been 
taken up by any PRIs. Among all the three States, the indicative list under XI Schedule 
has been adopted to the maximum extent by the Uttar Pradesh. 
The taxes imposed by ULBs of TN, UP and NCT of Delhi are not uniform; the only tax 
that is common to all the levels of ULBs is Professional/Trade & Calling and Employment 
tax. Whereas the entire local bodies except Town Panchayat of TN impose Property tax 
and Entertainment tax. In lieu of Property tax they impose House tax. The other common 
taxes, which are imposed by almost all the local bodies except a few, are education tax, 
water tax, vehicle tax, advertisement tax, toll compensation, tax on transfer of 
immovable property and theater tax. 
In case of PRIs, fees and fines are the only source of revenue which are common to all 
the levels of PRIs, the other common taxes which are imposed by almost all the local 
bodies except a few are, water tax, animal and vehicle tax. 
Property tax is the main tax for ULBs in Tamil Nadu. To municipalities in TN it 
contributes more than 30 per cent of the total non-debt receipts. This source contributes 
more than 20 per cent to the town panchayats whereas about 15 per cent to the 
contribution from this source to municipal councils of TN. Total receipts from own taxes 
in all the three type of ULBs varies between 27 to 40 per cent. Non-Tax revenues 
contribute to town panchayat and municipalities about 30 per cent, whereas in case of 
municipal corporation their contribution is only about 12 per cent. Total own sources 
revenue contributes about 2/3'''' to the total receipts in case of town panchayats and 
municipalities whereas for municipal corporation its contribution is between 50 to 62 per 
cent. 
In case of Uttar Pradesh, the share of Property tax is about 27 per cent in municipal 
corporation and only 9 per cent in municipalities. The total tax revenue accrues to the 
extent of 40 per cent to municipal corporations and 16 per cent in municipalities. Non-
Taxes revenue contributes about 26 per cent in municipal corporation and only 9 per 
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cent in municipalities. The total own tax revenue finances to the extent of 66 to 71 per 
cent to nnunicipal corporations and 27 to 31 per cent in municipalities. 
The picture of relative share of these sources in NCT of Delhi is also not different. In 
MCD, property tax contribution was in the range of 39 to 45 per cent and in NDMC it was 
only 4 to 6 per cent in total non-debt receipts. The role of non-tax receipts was 7 to 12 
per cent in MCD and while in NDMC it was above 80 per cent. In aggregate, MCD's total 
own source revenue in total receipt was 58 to 66 per cent and this share was 82 to 87 
per cent in NDMC. 
The source of finance among PRIs in all the three States is different. House tax is the 
main tax for village panchayats in TN. Total tax revenue shares only 9 to 12 per cent out 
of which about 7 per cent is from house tax. Non-taxes also share about 10 per cent 
thereby total own source revenue contribution is nearby 20 per cent to the total revenue 
receipts. Certain local cess surcharge and non-tax resources are the main sources of 
revenue to PUCs. While local cess surcharge contributes about 5 per cent, non-taxes 
contribute slightly more than this ratio, thereby the share of total own source of revenue 
goes upto 12 per cent. In UP, the gram panchayats depend largely on surcharge on land 
revenue along with other taxes. Total tax revenue contribution is about 12 to 15 per cent 
in the total revenue receipts in which surcharges are about 4 to 8 per cent. The 
contribution of non-taxes revenue varies from 2 to 5 per cent and total own source of 
revenue shares in the range of 15 to 20 per cent. In case of ZP, non-tax revenue is the 
major source of revenue. 
Various types of local governments depend on their respective parent governments to 
finance their expenditure needs to varied extent. The intergovernmental fiscal transfers 
to bridge this gap comes in the form of revenue sharing, statutory grants and also non-
statutory grants. Apart from certain grants in certain cases, the ratio of total transfers in 
total revenue receipts provides a measure of dependence of these local bodies on their 
parent governments. 
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In Tamil Nadu the degree of dependence of Municipal Corporation is maximum 
compared to Town Panchayats and Municipalities while in case of Municipal 
Corporations it is more than 50 per cent, on the contrary in other forms of government it 
is about 36 per cent. In the total transfers of Municipal Corporation 35 to 58 per cent 
contribution a by shared revenues and grants contributed very meager amount of 3 to 6 
per cent. Similarly in case of municipalities shared revenue contribute 27 to 30 per cent 
whereas grants only contribute 4 to 8 per cent and also in case of Town Panchayats 
shared revenue contribute 30 to 39 per cent and grants gave their contribution only of 3 
to 5 per cent. Obviously the PRIs depend heavily on transfers in the range of 80 to 86 
per cent, out of which 40 to 46 per cent is contributed by the grants and shared revenues 
contribute 36 to 40 per cent. 
In Uttar Pradesh the dependence of Municipalities and Nagar Panchayat on State 
Governments is to the extent of 68 to 73 per cent, whereas Municipal Corporations 
depend less to the extent of 28 to 33 per cent and in case of PRIs, Gram Panchayats get 
these transfers to extent of 80 to 85 per cent of the total receipts and to Zila Panchayats 
these transfers are around 50 per cent. 
Whereas in case of NCT of Delhi, the dependence of MCD is higher as compared to 
NDMC. MCD depends on the transfers to the extent of 52 to 62 per cent, out of which 
grants contribute around 40 to 45 per cent and shared revenues give their contribution of 
13 to 17 per cent. Whereas NDMC is quite independent for their own resources and only 
depend to the extent of 8 to 12 per cent on transfers, out of which grants contribute 6 to 
9 per cent and shared revenue contribute a very meager amount of 2 to 3 per cent. 
In retrospection it may observed that the three different reports of the commissions are 
based on three different settings in terms of geographical location, political scenario, 
different stages of development of State-Local relation and empowerment of local 
bodies. Therefore the recommendations too have different hues and colours on various 
aspects of local government and fiscal position. The uniformity among all these reports 
is in terms of such subjects as setting up of finance cell at State level, need for the 
reforms in property tax. Property tax system, whether it is assessment, enforcement or 
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collection of arrears etc. The reports have also emphasized the need to increase the 
widening of resource base of both ULBs and PRIs either by improving the existing tax 
and non-tax resources assigned to them or by adding some more taxes from the State 
list to local bodies. With regard to sharing of taxes between State and local bodies in the 
form of revenue sharing and grants, the SFC report have preferred global sharing rather 
than specific tax sharing, however the ratio may differ. In case of grants-in-aid the variety 
of these grants among States is noticeable The grants may be for either general-
purpose or even specific purposes to support certain civic functions, in some cases 
these specific purpose grants have been tied up with matching ratios. 
In the area of administration the SFC reports have come up with various suggestions to 
improve the governance capacity and administration acumen of both the officials and the 
elected members at all the levels of local bodies. To support the reform in administration 
the reports have recommended for computerization, privatisation of certain services, 
reform in budget making and accounting system from cash to accrual basis, etc. 
If we go through the terms of references, it may be observed that the principal 
references are the same of all the three States but on examining examine minutely it is 
being observed that the government of Uttar Pradesh has entrusted more tasks, to its 
State Finance Commission, whereas the scope of NCT of Delhi is limited. The State of 
NCT of Delhi is different from the other two States, as it does not have PRIs, since its 
the rural bodies are merged with MCD. There was a long pending demand of local 
bodies for a scientific devolution of taxes between State and local bodies. The 73^ ^ and 
74'^  Amendment to the Constitution is the landmark in the history of local bodies of India, 
since a large number of persons are living in rural areas but for their welfare local bodies 
need financial support. Many important taxes which were collected by the local bodies 
but had been taken up by the State. Therefore there was a falling in tax revenue to the 
local bodies, for example in Uttar Pradesh Octroi duties collected by municipalities were 
abolished and in lieu of this, levy of surcharge was entrusted to the trade tax 
department. 
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Though the terms of references are almost same for different state finance commissions 
yet their approach for devolution of taxes and for determination of tax rate are different. It 
may be due to the different local needs. Although PT is levied by all the three States, but 
only Tamil Nadu has examined the property tax in much detail and they have also 
suggested a detailed scheme for levying of this tax, to achieve progress of the taxation 
and better compliance. It is therefore suggested that other States can adopt the 
recommendation of TN, UP and Delhi as a model with certain modifications according to 
their local needs and requirements. 
The SFC of TN has laid special emphasis on the measures of increasing resources for 
ULBs. The have enumerated certain taxes for this purpose, to name a fevi/ these are 
library tax, lighting tax, surcharge from sale tax, income from minor minerals, land 
revenues, tax on luxuries in hotels and lodging houses, betting tax. State excise 
revenue, sugarcane cess, urban land tax, terminal taxes, etc. It has been observed that 
these taxes are imposed only by ULBs of TN. Taking their benefit in view, it is advised 
that the other States of India should also follow suit. Uniquely only the Chennai 
Municipal Corporation imposes timber tax. Though it has not contributed much in the 
financial position of the Corporation yet it is worth following by other ULBs of the other 
States. 
It has been examined from the financial positions of the UP and NCT of Delhi that 
betterment tax, tax on transfer of immovable property, theater tax, tax on boats have 
been levied to raise the revenues but these have not been adopted by the TN. It is 
suggested that TN should not hesitate in introducing these taxes for the betterment of 
the financial position. It is also recommended that other States of India should also 
impose these taxes, wherever they do not exist. 
The UP Government took the initiative in introducing the trade tax and toll for cleaning of 
private latrine and thus helped the ULBs In raising their resources for the improvement of 
living conditions of their residents. It would be healthy step for other States of India to do 
the same if they have not as yet introduced it. Similarly NCT of Delhi levied the tax on 
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consumption, sale of electricity and tax on buildings. It is recommended that the other 
States may follow this step taking into the local phenomena in view. 
It has been observed that Property Tax has been imposed by Zila Parishads in UP 
whereas Village Panchayats of TN have levied House Tax in its place. If feasible, this 
tax may be introduced by other States of India also. Not only this, PRIs of UP have taken 
bold steps by levying circumstances on property tax, land revenue, entertainment tax, 
sales tax, electricity tax, market fees, toll tax, sanitary fees, exhibition and fair fees, 
construction and management fees, fees for registration of animal, library fees, school 
fees, irrigation water charges, water charges and slaughter fees. It is suggested that 
other States should not lag behind in these respects if they have not already imposed 
these taxes. 
The PRIs of TN came forward in levying local cess surcharge on land revenue, 
professional tax and pilgrim tax and thus improved their lot to a great extent. It is opined 
that other States should take this step for their economic betterment as well. 
It is for the general information that SFC of UP emphasized the quality improvement of 
services like, street lighting, sanitation, maintenance of roads and public lamps. These 
recommendations would prove as beacon lights for the amelioration of lives of the 
peoples of the ULBs and it is proposed that the ULBs of other States should also 
incorporate these recommendations in their civic services. 
It is also suggested that other investigators may study this research topic by adopting 
other tools in order to complement and supplement the suggestions made herein. It is 
also advised that this very topic may also be taken for research by taking other States 
for comparison in view. Last but not the least this study may prove as a stepping-stone 
for further studies on the part of other investigators in future. 
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ANNEXURES 
Annexure. A.1 
PART IX 
THE PANCHAYAT 
243. Definition. In this part, unless the context otherwise required, -
a. "District" means a District in the state; 
b. "Gram sabha" means a body consisting of persons registered in the electoral rolls relating to a 
village comprised within the area of panchayat at the village level; 
c. "Intermediate level" means a level between the village and District levels specified by the 
Governor of a State by public notification to be the intermediate level for the purposes of this 
part; 
d. "Panchayat" means an institution (by whatever name called) of seif-panchayat constituted 
under article 243B, for the rural areas; 
e. "Panchayat area" means the territorial area of a panchayat; 
f. "Population" means the population as ascertained at the last preceding census of which the 
relevant figures have been published; 
g. "Village" means a village specified by the governor by public notification to be a village for the 
purposes of this part and includes a group of villages so specified. 
243 A. Gram sabha. A gram sabha may exercise such powers and perform such Functions at the 
village level as the legislature of a State may, by law, provided. 
243 B. Constitutions of panchayats. 
1. There shall be constituted in every state, panchayats at the village, intermediate and District 
levels in accordance with the provisions of tills part. 
2. Notwithstanding anything in clause (1), panchayats at the intermediate level may not be 
constituted in a State having a population not exceeding twenty lakhs. 
243 C. Composition of panchayats. 
1. Subject to the provisions of this part, the Legislature of a State may, by law, make provisions 
with respect to the composition of panchayat: 
2. Provided that the ratio between the population of the territorial area of a panchayat at any level 
and the number of seats in such panchayat to be filled election shall, so far as practicable, be 
the same throughout the state. 
3. (2). All the seats in a panchayat shall be filled by persons chosen by direct election from 
territorial constituencies in the panchayat area and, for this purpose, each panchayat shall be 
divided into territorial constituencies in such manner that the ratio between the population of 
each constituency and the number of seats allotted to it shall, so far as practicable, be the same 
throughout the panchayat area. (3). The legislature of the State may, by law, provide for the 
representation-
a- of the chairman ship of the panchayats at the village level ,in the panchayats at the 
intermediate level, in the panchayats at the District level; 
b- of the chairpersons of the panchayats at he intermediate level, in the panchayats at the 
District level; 
c- of the member of the house of the people and the members of the Legislative Assembly 
of the State representing constituencies which comprise wholly or partly a panchayat 
area at a level other than the village level, in such panchayat; 
d- of the members of the council of states and the members of the legislative council of the 
state, where they are registered as electors within-
i- a panchayat area at the intermediate level, in panchayat at the intermediate level; 
ii- a panchayat area to the District level, in panchayat at the District level. 
4. The chairperson of a panchayats and other members of a panchayat whether or not chosen by 
election from territorial constituencies in the panchayat area shall have the right to vote in the 
meeting of panchayats; 
5. The chairperson of -
a) a panchayat at the village level shall be elected in such manner as the legislature of a 
State may, by law, provide; and 
b) a panchayat at the intermediate level or District level shall be elected by, and form 
amongst, the elected members thereof. 
243 D. Reservation of seats. 
1 . Seats shall be reserved for, -
i. the schedule castes; and 
ij. the scheduled tribes, 
2. in every panchayat and the number of seats so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the 
same proportion to the total number of seats to be filled by direct election in that panchayat as 
the population of the schedule caste and schedule tribes in that panchayat areas bears to the 
total population of that area and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different 
constituencies in a panchayat. 
3. Not less then one third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the 
scheduled castes and schedule tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct 
election in every panchayat shall be reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by 
rotation to different constituencies in the panchayat. 
4. Not less than one- third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the 
schedule castes and scheduled tribes) of the total number of seats to be filled by direct 
election in every panchayat shall be reserved for women and such seats may be allotted by 
rotation to different constituencies in a panchayat. 
5. The offices of the chairpersons in the panchayats at the village or any other level shall be 
reserved for the scheduled castes, the scheduled tribes and women in such manner as the 
legislature of a State may, by law, provided: 
6. Provided that the number of offices of chairpersons reserved for the scheduled castes and 
scheduled tribes in the panchayats at each level in any State shall bear, as nearly as may be, 
the same proportion to the total number of such offices in the panchayats at each level as the 
population of the scheduled castes in the State of the scheduled tribes in the State bears to 
the total population of the state: 
• Provided further that not less than one-third of the total number of offices of 
chairpersons in the panchayats at each level shall be reserved for women. 
• Provided also that the number of offices reserved under this clause shall be allotted by 
rotation to different panchayats at each level. 
7. The reservation of seats under clause (1) and (2) and the reservation of offices of 
chairpersons (other than the reservation for women) under clause (4) shall ceased to have 
effect on the expiration of the period specified in article 334. 
8. Nothing in this part shall prevent the Legislature of a State from making any provision for 
reservation of seats in any panchayat or offices of chairperson in the panchayat at any level in 
favour of backward class of citizens. 
243E. Duration of Panchayats, etc. 
1. Every panchayat, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in forces, shall 
continue for five years from the date appointed for its first meeting and no longer. 
2. No amendment of the law for the time being in force shall have effect of causing dissolution of 
a panchayat at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the 
expiration of its duration specified in clause (1). 
3. An election to constitute a panchayat shall be completed-
a. before the expiry of Its duration specified in clause (1); 
b. before the expiration of the period of six months from the date of its dissolution: 
Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved panchayat would 
have continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under 
this clause for constituting the panchayat. 
4. A panchayat constituted upon the dissolution of a panchayat before the expiration of its 
duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved panchayat 
would have continue under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. 
243 F. Disqualifications for membersliip. 
1. a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as, and for being, a member of a panchayat -
if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purposes of 
elections to the legislature of the State concerned: 
Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five 
years of age, if he has attained the age of twenty-one years; 
if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the legislature of the state. 
2. If any questions arise as to whether a member of a panchayat has become subject to any of 
the disqualifications mentioned in clause (1), the question shall be referred for the decision of 
such authority and in such s the legislature of a State may, by law, provided. 
243G. Powers, authority and responsibility of Panchayats. 
Subject of the provision of all the Constitution, the legislature of a State may, by law, endow the 
panchayats with such powers and authority and may be necessary to enable them to FUNCTIONS as 
institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and 
responsibilities upon panchayats at the appropriate level, subject to such conditions as may be specified 
therein, with respect to-
(a) The preparation of plans for economic development and social justice; 
(b) The implication of schemes for economic development and social justice as may be 
entrusted to them including those in relation to the matters listed in the Eleventh scheduled. 
243 H. Power to impose taxes by, and funds of, tlie panchayats. 
The legislature of a State may, by law, -
(a) authorise a panchayat to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees 
in accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits; 
(b) assign to a panchayat such taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied and collected by the State 
government for such purposes and subject to such conditions and limits; 
(c) provide for making such grants-in-aid to the panchayats from the consolidated fund of 
the sate; and 
(d) provided for Constitution of such funds for crediting all moneys received, respectively, by 
or on behalf of the panchayats and also for the withdrawal of such moneys there from, 
as may be specified in the law. 
243-1 Constitution of Finance Commission to Review Financial Position. 
1-The governor of the State shall, as soon as may be within one year from the commencement of 
the Constitution (seventy-third amendment) act, 1992, and thereafter at the expiration of every fifth 
year, constitute a Finance Commission to review the financial position of the financial position of 
the panchayats and to make recommendations to the governor as to-
(a) the principles which should govern-
(i) the distribution between the State and panchayats of the net proceed of the taxes, 
duties, tolls and fees leviable by the state, which may be divide between the panchayats at all 
levels of their respective shares of such proceeds; 
(11) the deternimation of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned to, or appropriated 
by, the panchayats; 
(iii) the grants-in-aid to the panchayats from the consolidated fund of the state; 
(b) the measure needed t improves the financial position of the panchayats; 
(c) any other matter referred to the finance commission by the governor in the interests of sound 
finance of the panchayats. 
2- The legislature of a State may, by law, provided for the composition of the commission, the 
qualifications, which shall be requisite for appointment as members thereof and the manner in 
which they shall be selected. 
3- The commission shall determine their procedure and shall have such powers in the 
performance of their functions as the legislature of the State may, by law, confer on them. 
4- The governor shall cause every recommendation made by the commission under this article 
together with an explanatory memorandum as to the action taken thereon to be laid before the 
legislature of the state. 
234 J. Audit of accounts of panchayats.. 
The legislature of a State may, by law, make provisions with respect to the maintenance of 
accounts by the panchayat and the auditing of such accounts. 
243 K. Elections of the panchayats. 
(1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and 
the conduct of, all elections to the panchayats shall be vested in a State election commission 
consisting of a State election commissioner to be appointed by the governor. 
(2) Subject to the provision of any law made by the legislature of a state, the conditions of 
service and tenure of office of the State election commissioner shall be such as the governor may 
by rule determine: 
Provided that the State election commissioner shall not be removed from has office 
except in like manner and on the like grounds as a judge of a high court and the conditions 
services of the State election commissioner shall not be varied to his disadvantages after has 
appointment. 
(3) The governor of a State shall, when so requested by the State election commissioner. Make 
available to the State election commission such staff as may be necessary for the discharge of 
the functions conferred on the State election commission by clause (1). 
(4) Subject to the provision of this Constitution, the legislature of a State may, by law, make 
provision with respect to all matters relating to, or in connection with, elections to the panchayats. 
234-1. Application to Union Territories. 
The provisions of this part shall apply to the union territories and shall, in their application to a 
union territory, have effect as if the references to the governor of a State were references to the 
administrator of the union territory appointed under article 239 and references to the legislature or 
the legislative assembly of a State were references, in relation to a union territory having a 
legislative assembly, to that legislative assembly: 
Provided that the president may, by public notification direct that the provision of this part shall 
apply to any union territory or part there subject to such exceptions and modifications as he may 
specify in the notification. 
243 IVI. Part not to apply to certain areas. 
(1) Nothing in this part shall apply to the scheduled areas referred to in clause, and the tribal 
areas referred to in clause (2), of article 244. 
(2) Nothing in this part shall apply to -
(a) the State of Nagaland, Meghalaya and Mizoram; 
(b) the hill area in the State of Manipur for which for which District councils exist under any law for 
the time being in force. 
(3) Noting in this part -
(a) relating to panchayats at the District level shall apply to the hill areas of the District of 
Darjeeling in the State of west Bengal for which Darjeeling gorkha hill council exists under any 
law for the time being in force; 
(b) shall be constructed to affect the functions and powers of the Darjeeling Gorkha hill council 
constituted under such law. 
(4) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, -
(a) the legislature of a State referred to in sub-clause (a) of clause (2) may, by law, extend this 
part to the state, except the areas , if any , referred to in clause(1), if the legislative assembly of 
that State passed a resolution to that effect by a majority of the total memberships of that house 
present and voting; 
(b) parliament may, by law, extend the provisions of this part to the scheduled areas and the tribal 
areas referred t in clause{1) subject to such exceptions and modifications as may be specified in 
such law, and In such law shall be deemed to be an amendment of this Constitution for the 
purpose of article 368. 
243 N. Continuances of existing laws and pancliayats. 
Notwithstanding anything in this part, any provision of any law relating to panchayats in force in a 
State immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (seventy-third amendment) act, 
1992, which is inconsistent with is inconsistent with the provision of this part, shall continue to be 
in force until amended or repealed by a competent legislature or other competent authority or until 
the expiration of one year from such commencement, whichever is eariier; 
Provided that all the panchayats exiting Immediately before such commencement shall continue 
till the expiration of their duration, unless sooner dissolved by a resolution passed to that effect by 
the legislative assembly of that State or, in the case of a State having a legislative council, by 
each house of the legislature of that state. 
243 O. Bar to interfere by courts in electoral matters. 
Not withstanding anything in this Constitution, -
(a) the validity of any law relating to the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such 
constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Article 243 k, shall not be called in question 
in any court; 
(b) no election in any panchayat shall be called in question except by an election petition 
presented to such authority and in such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by 
the legislature of a state. 
Source: the Constitution on India 
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Annexure.A.2 
PART IX A 
THE MUNICIPALITIES 
243 P. Definitions. 
In this part, unless the context otherwise requires, -
(a) "Committee" means a committee constituted under Article 243S; 
(b) "District" means a District in the state; 
(c) "Metropolitan area" means an area having a population of ten lakhs or more, comprised in 
one or more District and consisting of two or more municipalities or panchayats or other 
contiguous areas, specified by the governor by public notification to be a metropolitan area for 
the purposes of this part; 
(d) "IVIunicipal area" means the territorial area of a municipality as is notified by the governor; 
(e) "IVIunicipality" means as institution of self-government constituted under article 243Q; 
(f) "Panchayat" means a panchayat constituted under article 243 B; 
(g) "Population" means the population as ascertained at the last preceding Census of which the 
relevant figures have been pulDlished. 
243 Q. Constitution of municipalities. 
(1) There shall be constituted in every state,,-
a. a nager panchayat (by whatever name called) for a transitional area, that is to say, an 
area in transition from a rural area to an urban area; 
b. a municipal council for a smaller urban area; and 
c. a municipal corporation for a larger urban area, 
in accordance with the provision of this part: 
Provided that a municipality under this clause may not be constituted in such urban area or part 
thereof as the governor may, having regard t the size of the area and the municipal services 
being provided or proposed to be provided by an industrial establishment in that area and such 
other factors as he may deem fit by public notification, specify t be an industrial township. 
(2) In this article, "a transitional area", "a smaller urban area" or" a larger urban area" means such area 
as the governor may, having regard to the population of the area, the density of the population 
therein, the revenue generated for local administration, the percentage of employment in non-
agricultural activities, the economic importance or such other factors as he may deem fit, specify 
by public notification for the purposes of this part. 
243 R. Compositions of municipalities. 
(1) Save as provided in clause (2), all the seats in a municipality shall be filled by persons 
chosen by direct election from the territorial constituencies in the municipal area and for this 
purpose each municipal area shall be divided into territorial; constituencies t be known as wards. 
(2) The legislature of the sate may, by law, provide -
(a) for the representation in am municipality of -
(i) persons having special knowledge or experience in municipal administration: 
(ii) the members of the house of the people and the members of the legislative assembly of the 
State representing constituencies which legislative assembly ogf the State representing 
constituencies which comprise wholly or partly the municipal area; 
(iii) the members of the council of State registered as electors within the municipal area; 
(iv) the chairpersons of the committees constituted under clause (5) of article 243 S: 
Provided that the persons referred to in paragraph (1) shall not have the right to vote in the 
meeting of the municipality: 
(b) the manner of election of the chairperson of a municipality. 
243 3. Constitution and composition of wards committees, etc 
(1) There shall be constituted wards committees, consisting of one or more wards, within the territorial 
area of a municipality having a population of three lakhs or more. 
(2) The legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to -
(a) the composition and the territorial area of a wards committee; 
(b) the manner in which the seats in a ward committee shall be filled. 
(3) A member of a municipality representing a ward within the territorial area of the wards committee 
shall be a member of that committee. 
(4) Where a ward committee consists o f -
(a) one ward, the member representing that ward in the municipality; or 
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(b) two or more wards, one of the members representing such wards in the municipality elected by 
the members of the wards committee, 
shall be the chairperson of that committee. 
(5) Nothing in this article shall be deemed to prevent the Legislature of a State from making any 
provision for the Constitution of committees in addition in to the wards committees. 
243 T. Reservation of seats. 
(1) Seats shall be reserved for the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes in every municipality and 
the number of sears so reserved shall bear, as nearly as may be, the same proportion to the total 
number of seats to be filled by direct election in that municipality as the population of schedules casts in 
the municipality area or of the scheduled tribes in the municipal area bears to the total population of that 
area and such seats may be allotted by rotation to different constituencies in a municipality. 
(2) Not less than one-third of the total number of seats reserved under clause (1) shall be reserved for 
women belonging to the scheduled castes or as the case may be, the scheduled tribes. 
(3) Not less than one-third (including the number of seats reserved for women belonging to the 
scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes) of the total number of seated to be filled by direct election in 
every municipality shall be reserved for women and such seas may be allotted by rotation to different 
constituencies in a municipality. 
(4) The officers of chairperson in the municipalities shall be reserved for the scheduled castes, the 
schedules tribes and women in such manner as the legislature of a State may, by law, provide. 
(5) The reservation of seats under clause (1) and (2) and the reservation of offices of chairperson (other 
than the reservation for women) under clause (4) shall cease to have effect on the expiration of the 
period specified in article 334. 
(6) Nothing in this part shall prevent the legislature of a State from making any provision for reservation 
of seats in any municipality or offices of chairperson in the municipalities in favour of backward class of 
citizens. 
243 U. Duration of municipalities, etc. 
(1) Every municipality, unless sooner dissolved under any law for the time being in force, shall continue 
for five years from the date appointed for its meeting and no longer: 
Provided that a municipality stiall be given a reasonable opportunity of being heard before its dissolution. 
(2) No amendment of any law for the time being in force shall have the effect of causing dissolution of a 
municipality at any level, which is functioning immediately before such amendment, till the expiration of 
its duration specified in clause (1). 
(3) An election to constitute a municipality shall be completed, -
(a) before the expiry of its duration specified in clause (1); 
(b) before the expiration of a period of six months from the date of its dissolution: 
Provided that where the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would have 
continued is less than six months, it shall not be necessary to hold any election under this clause for 
consisting the municipality for such period. 
(4) A municipality constituted upon the dissolution of a municipality before the expiration of its 
duration shall continue only for the remainder of the period for which the dissolved municipality would 
have continued under clause (1) had it not been so dissolved. 
243 V. Disqualifications for membership. 
(1) a person shall be disqualified for being chosen as and for being, a member of a municipality-
(a) if he is so disqualified by or under any law for the time being in force for the purpose of elections to 
the legislature of the State concerned: 
Provided that no person shall be disqualified on the ground that he is less than twenty-five years of age, 
if he has attained the age of twenty-one years; 
(b) if he is so disqualified by or under any law made by the legislature of the state. 
(2) If any questions arises as to whether a member of a panchayat has become subject to any of the 
disqualifications mentioned in clause (1), the question shall be referred for the decision of such authority 
and in such s the legislature of a State may, by law, provided. 
243 W. Powers, authority and responsibilities of municipalities etc. subject to the 
provisions of this Constitution, the legislature of a State may, by law, endow-
(a) The municipalities with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as 
institutions of self-government and such law may contain provisions for the devolution of powers and 
responsibilities upon municipalities, subject to such conditions as may be specified therein, with respect 
to-
(i) the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice; 
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(ii) the performance of functions and the implementation of schemes of schemes as may be entrusted to 
them including those in relation to the matters listed in the twelfth schedule; 
(b) The committees with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to carry out the 
responsibilities conferred upon them including those in relation to the matter listed in twelfth scheduled. 
243 X. Power to impose taxes by, and funds of, the municipalities. 
The legislature of a State may, by law, -
(a) Authorise a municipality to levy, collect and appropriate such taxes, duties, tolls and fees in 
accordance with such procedure and subject to such limits; 
(b) assign to a municipality such taxes, duties, tolls and fees levied and collected by the State 
government for such purposes and subject to such conditions and limits; 
(c) Provide for making such grants-in-aid to the municipality from the consolidated fund of the sate; and 
(d) Provided for Constitution of such funds for crediting all moneys received, respectively, by or on behalf 
of the municipality and also for the withdrawal of such moneys there from, as may be specified in the 
law. 
243 -Y- FINANCE COMMISSION. 
1- The finance commission constituted under article 243-1- shall also review the financial position of 
the municipalities and make recommendation to the governor as to-
a- The principles which should govern-
(i)- the distribution between the State and the municipalities of the net proceeds of the taxes, duties, tolls 
and fees levied by the state, which may be divided between them under this part and the allocation 
between the municipalities at all levels of their respective shares of such proceeds; 
(ii)- the determination of the taxes, duties, tolls and fees which may be assigned to, or appropriate by, 
the municipalities; 
(ill)- the grants-in-aid to the municipalities from the consolidated fund of the state; 
(b)- the measure needed to improve the financial position of the municipalities; 
(c)- any other matter referred to the finance commission by the governor in the interests of the sound 
finance of the municipalities, 
(2) The governor shall cause every recommendation made by commission 
under this article together with an explanatory memorandum as to the action taken thereon to be laid 
before the legislature of the state. 
234Z. Audit of accounts of municipalities. 
The legislature of a State may, by law, make provisions with respect to the maintenance of accounts by 
the municipality and the auditing of such accounts. 
243 ZA. Elections of the municipality 
(1) The superintendence, direction and control of the preparation of electoral rolls for, and the conduct of, 
all elections to the municipalities shall be vested in a State election commission reffered to in article 
243K. 
(2) Subject to the provision of the Constitution, the legislature of the State may be, by law 
made by the legislature of a state, make provision with respect with all metters relating to, or in 
connection with, election to the municipalities.: 
234 ZB. Application to Union Territories. 
The provisions of this part shall apply to the union territories and shall, in their application to a union 
territory, have effect as if the references to the governor of a State were references to the administrator 
of the union territory appointed under article 239 and references to the legislature or the legislative 
assembly of a State were references, in relation to a union territory having a legislative assembly, to that 
legislative assembly: 
Provided that the president may, by public notification direct that the provision of this part shall apply to 
any union territory or part there subject to such exceptions and modifications as he may specify in the 
notification. 
243 ZC. Part not to apply to certain areas. 
(1) Nothing in this part shall apply to the scheduled areas referred to in clause, and the tribal areas 
referred to in clause (2), of article 244. 
(2) Nothing in this part shall be construed to affect the functions and powers of the Darjeeling Gorkha hill 
Council constituted under any law for the time being in force for the hill areas of the District of Darjeeling 
in the State of west Bengal. 
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(3) Notwithstanding anything in this Constitution, parliament may, by law, extend the provisions of this 
part to the scheduled areas and the tribal areas referred t in clause(1) subject to such exceptions and 
modifications as may be specified in such law, and in such law shall be deemed to be an amendment of 
this Constitution for the purpose of article 368. 
243 ZD. Committee for District planning. 
(1) There shall be constituted in every State at the District level a District planning committee to 
consolidate the plans prepared by the panchayats and the municipalities in the District and to prepare a 
draft development plan for the District as a whole. 
(2) The legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to-
(a) The composition of the District planning committee. 
(b) The manner in which the seats in such committees shall be filled: 
Provided that not less than four-fifths of the total number of members of such committee shall be elected 
by, and from amongst, the elected members of the panchayat at the District level and of the 
municipalities in the District in proportion to the District level and the municipalities of the rural areas and 
of the urban areas in the District; 
(c) the function related to District planning which may be assigned to such committees; 
(d) the manner in which the chairpersons of such committees shall be chosen. 
(3) every District planning committee shall, in preparing the draft development plan,-
(a) have regard to -
(!) matters of common interest between the panchayats and the municipalities Including spatial 
planning, sharing of water and other physical and natural resources, the integrated development of 
infrastructure and environmental conservation; 
(ii) the extent and type of available resources whether financial or otherwise; 
(b) consult such institutions and organisations as the governor may, by order, specify. 
(4) the chairperson of every District planning committee shall forward the development plan, as 
recommended by such committee, to the government of the development plan, as recommended by 
such committee, to the government of the state. 
243 ZE. Committee for metropolitan planning. 
(1) There shall be constituted in every metropolitan area a metropolitan planning committee to prepare 
a draft development plan for the metropolitan area as a whole. 
(2) The legislature of a State may, by law, make provision with respect to-
la) the composition of the metropolitan planning committee. 
(b) The manner in which the seats in such committees shall be filled: 
Provided that not less than two-third of the members of such committee shall be elected by, and from 
amongst, the elected members of the municipalities and chairpersons of the panchayats in the 
metropolitan area in the proportion to the ratio between the population of the municipalities and the 
panchayats in that area; 
(c) the representation in such committees of the government of India and the government of the 
State and of such organisation and institutions as may be deemed necessary for carrying out the 
functions assigned to such committees; 
(d) the functions relating and coordination for the metropolitan area which may be assigned to such 
committees; 
(e) the manner in which the chairpersons of such committees shall be chosen. 
(3) every metropolitan planning committee shall, in preparing the draft development plan,-
(a) have regarded to -
(i) the plans prepared by the municipalities and the panchayats in the metropolitan area; 
(ii) matter of common interest between the municipalities and panchayats, including co-ordinate spatial 
planning of the area, sharing of water and other physical and natural resources, the integrated 
development of infrastructure and environmental conservation; 
(ill) the over all objectives and priorities set by the government of India and government of the state. 
(iv) the extent and nature of investments likely to be made in the Metropolitan area by agencies of the 
government of the State and other available resources whether financial or otherwise; 
(b) Consult such institutions and organisations as the governor may, by order, specified. 
(4) The chairperson of every metropolitan planning committee shall forward the development plan, as 
recommended by such committee, to the government of the state. 
243 ZF. Continuance of existing laws and municipalities. 
Notwithstanding anything in this part, any provision of any law relating to municipalities in force in a State 
immediately before the commencement of the Constitution (seventy-third amendment) act, 1992, which 
is inconsistent with is inconsistent with the provision of this part, shall continue to be in force until 
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amended or repealed by a competent legislature or other competent authority or until the expiration of 
one year from such commencement, whichever is earlier: 
Provided that all the municipalities exiting immediately before such commencement shall continue till 
the expiration of their duration, unless sooner dissolved by a resolution passed to that effect by the 
legislative assembly of that State or, in the case of a State having a legislative council, by each house of 
the legislature of that state. 
243 O. Bar to interfere by courts in eiectoral matters. 
Not withstanding anything in this Constitution, -
(a) the validity of any law relating to the constituencies or the allotment of seats to such 
constituencies, made or purporting to be made under Article 243 ZA shall not be called in question in any 
court; 
no election in any municipalities shall be called in question except by an election petition presented to 
such authority and In such manner as is provided for by or under any law made by the legislature of a 
state. 
Source: The Constitution of India. 
IX 
Annexure. A.3 
ELEVENTH SCHEDULE 
(Article 243 G) 
1. Agriculture, including agriculture extension. 
2. Land improvement, implementation of land reform, land consolidation and soil conservation. 
3. Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development. 
4. Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry. 
5. Fisheries. 
6. Social forestry and farm forestry. 
7. Minor forest produce. 
8. Small-scale industries, including food-processing industries. 
9. Khadi, village and cottage industries. 
10. Rural housing. 
11. Drinking water. 
12. Fuel and fodder. 
13. Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and means of communication. 
14. Rural electrification, including distribution of electricity. 
15. Non-convention energy resources. 
16. Poverty elevation programme. 
17. Education including primary and secondary school. 
18. Technical training and vocational training. 
19. Adult and non-formal education. 
20. Libraries. 
21. Cultural activities. 
22. Marl<ets and fairs. 
23. Health and sanitation, including hospitals and primary health center and dispensaries. 
24. Family welfare. 
25. Women and child development. 
26. Social welfare, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally retarded. 
27. Welfare of weaker section, and in particular, of the schedule caste and the schedule tribe. 
28. Public distribution system. 
29. Maintenance of community assets. 
Source: The Constitution of India 
Annexure. A. 4 
TWELFTH SCHEDULE 
(Article 243 W) 
1. Urban planning town planning. 
2. Regulation of land use and construction of buildings. 
3. Planning of social and economic development. 
4. Roads and bridges. 
5. Water supply for domestic industries and commercial purposes. 
6. Public health, sanitation conservancy and solid waste management. 
7. Fire services. 
8. Urban forestry, protection of environment and promotion of ecological aspects. 
9. Safeguarding the interests of weaker section of society, including the handicapped and mentally 
retarded. 
10. Slum improvement and up gradation. 
11. Urban poverty alleviation. 
12. Provision of urban amenities and facilities such as parks, gardens, play ground. 
13. Promotion of cultural, education and aesthetic aspects. 
14. Burials and burials ground, cremation and cremation ground and electric crematoriums. 
15. Cattle ponds, prevention of cruelty to animals. 
16 Vital statistics Including registration of birth and deaths. 
17. Public amenities including street lighting, parking lots, bus stops and public conveniences. 
18. Regulation of slaughterhouses and tanneries. 
Source: The Constitution of India 
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Annexure. A.5 
Committees System In Different Layers of Governmant in Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and Delhi. 
AT VILLAGE LEVEL: 
State 
Tamil 
Nadu 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Name of the 
committee 
No. of members. Mode of 
election of the 
chairman 
Major functions. 
In Tamil Nadu at village level committees are not mentioned in the act. 
Samata samiti 
Vikas samiti 
Gram shiksha 
samiti 
Lok hit samiti 
2-4 
2-4 
2-4 
2-4 
Up-pradhan 
Pradhan 
Pradhan 
Pradhan 
Promotion of major interests 
of SCs/ STs/ BCs. 
Protection of them from 
social injustice and 
exploitation. 
Welfare of women and 
children. 
Agriculture production animal 
husbandry, rural industries, 
poverty alleviation 
programmes. 
Promotion and development 
of primary education 
Public health, public works 
and others. 
Gram panchayat may establish other committees, if necessary. 
AT INTERIVIEDIATE LEVEL: 
Tamil 
Nadu 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Appointment 
committee 
Agriculture 
production 
committee 
Education 
committee 
General 
purpose 
committee 
Karya samiti 
Vitta avam 
Shiksha samiti 
Samata samiti 
3 
4 
As specified by P.U.C. 
1 memb. from each 
circle in the K. P. 
Depends upon the no. of 
circle in each K.P 
Chairman 
Chairman 
Chairman 
Chairman 
Pramukh 
Senior up-
pramukh 
Junior up-
pramukh 
Senior up-
pramukh 
Appointment to all posts 
under the panchayat union 
and approval of pay relating 
these posts. 
As delegated by Kshetra 
Panchayat. 
Appointment to all posts 
under the P.U.C and 
approval of pay relating 
these posts. 
As determined by panchayat 
union. 
Finance, taxation, economic 
development, general 
administration, etc. 
Agriculture, cooperation, 
animal husbandry, minor 
irrigation, industries etc. 
Education, health, sanitation, 
women welfare, youth 
welfare etc. 
As delegated by Kshetra 
panchayat. 
COMMITTEE SYSTEM AT DISTRICT PANCHAYAT: 
Tamil 
nadu 
Committee for 
food and 
agriculture 
Industry and 
labour 
Public work 
Education 
Not more than 5 
" 
" 
Elected 
" 
" 
Functions determined by the 
District panchayat 
" 
" 
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AT VILLAGE LEVEL: 
State 
Uttar 
pradesh 
Name of the 
committee 
Health and 
welfare 
Karya samiti 
Vitta samiti 
Shiksha evam 
jan Swathya 
samiti 
Krishi udhyog 
evam nirman 
samiti 
Samata samiti 
Niyojan samiti 
No. of members. 
10-13 
6 or 9 deepending upon 
whether number of 
members of parishad is 
40 or more than 40. 
Mode of 
election of the 
chairman 
Adhyaksha 
I I 
Elected 
" 
" 
Major functions. 
t i 
Establishments, taxes etc 
Income, expenditure, 
appropriation of grants 
Education, health 
Agriculture, industry, 
construction. 
Social justice. 
Planning 
Any up samiti if needed. 
Source: Based on Khanna (1994) 
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Annexure. A.6 
State Wise, Number of Elected Representatives in the Tliree-Tier Panchayati Raj 
S.No 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Name of the State 
Andhra Pradesh 
Arunachal Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Goa 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Jammu & Kashmir** 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
Maharashtra 
Madhya Pradesh 
Manipur* 
Meghalaya* 
MIzoram* 
Nagaland 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Sikkim 
Tamil Nadu 
Tripura 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
Total 
No. of 
Gram 
Panchayat 
20500 
2012 
2486 
11653 
183 
13330 
5958 
2921 
. 
5640 
991 
28000 
30922 
166 
. 
. 
. 
5263 
11591 
9185 
148 
12787 
525 
58605 
3242 
226108 
* Traditional Councils 
** Information Not Available 
Source: Basic Rural Statistics 
No. of 
representatives 
396000 
5733 
24860 
150000 
1433 
133300 
48201 
18258 
-
77500 
10800 
319056 
473500 
3714 
-
. 
-
76462 
104319 
91850 
827 
165000 
5400 
804000 
61385 
2971446 
, 1996, Governm 
No.of 
Intermediats 
1093 
79 
196 
589 
-
82 
10 
72 
-
75 
152 
296 
459 
9 
. 
-
-
814 
136 
237 
-
387 
16 
902 
332 
5736 
ent of India, IV 
No. of Elected 
Representatives 
22953 
1205 
2486 
15000 
. 
2730 
3100 
1661 
-
4860 
1550 
. 
8262 
-
. 
. 
-
5263 
1088 
3792 
. 
7000 
196 
55750 
8516 
145412 
linistry of Rural Ar 
Krist 
System. 
No. of 
Zila 
Parishads 
22 
12 
40 
39 
2 
19 
16 
12 
. 
20 
14 
29 
45 
. 
. 
. 
. 
30 
14 
31 
4 
22 
3 
68 
17 
457 
No. of 
Elected 
Represen 
tatives. 
1210 
77 
2486 
1500 
. 
323 
271 
252 
-
1215 
360 
1450 
946 
. 
-
-
. 
850 
286 
527 
198 
900 
70 
2230 
664 
15815 
eas and Employment, 
ii Bhawan, New Delhi. 
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Annexure. A.7 
Number of Urban Local Bodies and elected representatives in India 
States 
Andhra Pradesh 
Assam 
Bihar 
Goa 
Gujarat 
Haryana 
Himachal Pradesh 
Karnataka 
Kerala 
Madhya Pradesh 
Maharashtra 
Manipur 
Orissa 
Punjab 
Rajasthan 
Tamil Nadu 
Tripura 
Uttar Pradesh 
West Bengal 
Andaman & 
Nicobar 
Chandigarh 
Delhi 
Pondcherry 
Daman &Due 
Total 
(Numbers in the pare 
Municipal 
Corporation 
07 (395) 
01 
06 
-
06 (468) 
01 
01 (25) 
06 (410) 
05 (298) 
20 (1069) 
15 (1417) 
-
02 (70) 
03 
03 
06 (480) 
-
11 (841) 
06 
-
01 
01 
-
-
101 
'nthesis shows e 
Municipality 
94 
25 
70 
13 
86 
20 
19 
122 
53 
106 
228 
07 
29 
97 
11 
102 
01 
226 
112 
01 
-
01 
05 
02 
1430 
lected 
(2833) 
(353) 
(155) 
(2745) 
(183) 
(3196) 
(1597) 
(2527) 
(4901) 
(560) 
(3494) 
(5970) 
•epresent 
Nagar Panchayat 
15 
42 
93 
-
60 
32 
29 
89 
-
283 
-
20 
72 
34 
169 
611 
12 
44 
4 
-
-
-
-
-
2009 
atives) 
(314) 
(202) 
(1260) 
(221) 
(1355) 
(4537) 
(1056) 
(9794) 
(5518) 
116 
68 
169 
13 
152 
53 
49 
214 
58 
409 
243 
27 
103 
134 
183 
719 
13 
681 
122 
01 
01 
02 
05 
02 
3540 
Total 
(3542) 
(557) 
(155) 
(4473) 
(1359) 
(429) 
(4961) 
(1895) 
(8131) 
(6318) 
(1686) 
(1699) 
(4421) 
(13768) 
(12329) 
(2706) 
(134) 
(968554) 
Source: based on Khanna (1994) 
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Annexure. A.8 
The Constitution of India, Part IV, Directive Principles of State Policy, Article 40 on organisation of 
Village Panchayats. 
Organisation of Village Panchayats- The State shall take steps to organize village panchayats and endow 
them with such powers and authority as may be necessary to enable them to function as units of self-
government. 
Source: The Constitution of India 
Annexure.A.9 
FUNCTIONS OF DISTRICT PANCHAYAT: TAMIL NADU 
The District Panchayat shall advise to government on all matters concern the activities of Village 
Panchayats, Panchayat Union Council as well as on all matters relating to the development of the 
economic resources of the District and the service maintain there in for promotion of cultural and welfare of 
the inhabitants of the District. In particular it shall perform the following functions: 
1- Advising the government on all matters relating to the service maintained by and all 
development of schemes under taking by all Village Panchayat and Panchayat Union 
Councils in the District as well as those agencies in the District which are included under 
the administration control of the government. 
2- Watching the progress of the measures under taking by the Government, Village 
Panchayats, Panchayat Union Council and departmental agencies in respect of the 
services and development schemes aforesaid. 
3- Advising the government of the matters concerning the implementation of any provision of 
law or any order specifically referred to by the government to the District Panchayat, such 
as: 
i- Classification of matters as Village Panchayats markets and Panchayat Union markets and fixing 
rates of contribution payable by one authority to the other, 
ii- Classifications of fairs and festivals as Village Panchayat fairs, V.P. festivals and Panchayat Union 
fairs and festivals, and 
iii- Classification of roads (other than roads classified by the government as national highways State 
highways and major District roads) as panchayat village roads and Panchayat Union roads, 
iv- Advising the government on all the matters relating to development of roads transport. 
For the purpose of efficiently performing its functions under this act every District may: 
a- Under such measure as it deems necessary; 
b- Collect such data, as it deems necessary. 
c- Publish statistics or other Information relating to the various aspects of the regulation or 
development of the activities of Panchayat Union Council and Village Panchayat in the 
District, 
d- Required any Panchayat Union Council or Village Panchayat to furnish such information as 
may be required by it in relation to the measures under taking by the Panchayat Union 
Council or Village Panchayat for the regulation and development of its activities as such, 
and other matters as may be prescribed. 
The District Panchayat shall prepare an annual report giving a true and full account of its activities during 
the previous year and government shall lay on the table of the legislative assembly all such reports 
together within its comments thereon. 
Source: The Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act 1994 
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Annexure. A.10 
FUNCTIONS OF PANCHAYAT UNION COUNCIL: TAMIL NADU 
It shall be the duty of Panchayat Union Council, within the limits of its funds, to make reasonable provision 
for carrying out the requirements of the Panchayat Union in respect of the following matters: 
1- The construction, repair and maintenance of all public roads in the Panchayat Union, which 
are classified as Panchayat Union roads. 
2- The establishment and maintenance of dispensaries and child welfare centers and payment 
of subsidiaries to rural medical practitioners. 
3- The construction and maintenance houses for poor, orphanages, shops, stalls, plinths, the 
training and employment of vaccinators, the removal of congestion of population and the 
provision of house sites. 
4- The opening and maintenance and expansion or improvement of elementary school 
including the payment of grants to private management in respect of elementary school. 
5- Prevention and remedial measures connected with any epidemics or malaria. 
6- Control of fairs and festivals classified by the Panchayat Union Council as those reserved for 
it. 
7- Veterinary relief. 
8- The extension of village sites and the regulation of building. 
9- The opening and maintenance of public markets, which are, classify as Panchayat Union 
markets. 
10- The maintenance of statistics relating to births and deaths. 
11- The establishment and maintenance of poultries. 
12- Improvement of agriculture, agriculture stock and the holding of agriculture show. 
13- The promotion and encouragement of cottage industries. 
14- Such other duties as the government may impose. 
15- The government shall entrust to the Panchayat Union Council the execution of the National 
Extension Service scheme of community development, including in particular all measures 
relating to the development of agriculture, animal husbandry and village industries organizer 
on a trust all or any of the schemes, programmes and activities for the economic 
development of the Panchayat Union area. The Panchayat Union Council may make such 
provisions as it may think fit for carrying out the requirements of the Panchayat Union in 
respect of measures of public utility to promote safety, health, comfort or convenience to the 
inhabitants of the Panchayat Union. 
Source: The Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act 1994 
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Annexure. A. 11 
FUNCTIONS OF VILLAGE PANCHAYATS: TAMIL NADU 
It shall be the duty of the Village Panchayat, within the limits of its funds, to make reasonable provision of 
carrying out the requirement of Village Panchayat in respect of following matters: 
1- The construction, maintenance and repair of all village roads. 
2- The lighting of public roads and public places in built-up areas. 
3- The construction of drains and the disposal of drainage water and sewage. 
4- The cleaning of street, removal of rubbish and jungle growth, the filling of disuse wells, in 
sanitary ponds, pools, ditches, pits, or hollows, and other improvements of the sanitary 
condition of village. 
5- The provision of public latrines and arrangements of cleanse latrines whether public or 
private. 
6- The opening of and maintenance of burial grounds. 
7- The sinking and repairing of wells, ponds or tanks and the construction and maintenance of 
water for washing and bathing purposes; and. 
8- Such other duties as the government may impose. 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS: 
As regards the discretionary functions the list is very wide and covers almost all aspects of village 
development, some of important actives including— 
1- The plantation and preservation of trees on the side of public roads. 
2- The lighting of public roads and public places in areas other than Panchayat Union markets. 
3- The control of fairs and festivals. 
4- The opening and maintenance of public places, slaughter houses, reading rooms, literacy centers, 
public landing places, cart standing and public cattle's sheds, establishment and maintenance of 
wireless receiving sets. 
5- Play grounds, parks, sports club and centers of physical cultures, and the construction of works of 
public utility and provision of other provisions for the safety, health, comfort, convenience, culture or 
recreation of the inhabitants of the village. 
6- All unreserved forests in the village shall vest with the Village Panchayat and the administered by it for 
the benefit of such a village. 
Source: The Tamil Nadu Panchayat Act 1994 
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Annexure. A.12 
FUNCTIONS OF ZILA PARISHAD: UTTAR PRADESH: 
1- To classify fairs and festivals of Gram Pancliayat (GP), Ksetra Pancfiayat (KP) and Zila 
Pancliayat (ZP); fairs and festivals for purpose of management and control by the concerned 
panchayat. 
2- To classify as village roads, inter village roads and District for the purpose of management by 
the concerned panchayat. 
3- To supervise generally the activity of the GP and KP of the District. 
4- To act as the main channel of correspondence betw/een the State government at the one 
hand and the KP and the GP on the ottier hand. 
Other Functions: 
1- Agriculture including agriculture extension: 
a- promotion of measure to increase the agricultural production, 
b- establishment and maintenance of godowns. 
2- Planning and implementation of land improvement, soil conservation and land conservation 
of programme entrusted by the government. 
3- Minor irrigation, water management and water development: 
a- construction and maintenance of minor irrigation and inter khand water project, 
b- managing the water distribution, 
c- development of sub- soil water, 
d- water shed development. 
4- Animal husbandry, poultry and dairying: 
a- establishment and maintenance of veterinary and animal husbandry services. 
b- improvement of breeds. 
c- promotion of dairy, poultry and pigging. 
5- Fisheries: Development of fisheries in irrigation worl<s. 
6- Social and farm forestry: 
a- promotion of social and farm forestry, tree plantation and sericulture, 
b- development of wasteland. 
7- Promotion and implementing programme of minor forest produce. 
8- Promotion of Small industry and food processing unit. 
9- Cottage and Village Industries: 
a- establishing and maintaining training centers for training in Village and Cottage industries, 
b- establishment of panchayat industries at District level. 
10- Rural housing: 
a- promoting and development of rural housing programmes, 
b- implementing of rural housing at non-residential area, 
c- construction of community centers and rest houses; 
d- monitoring of rural housing work done by GP and ZP. 
11- Fuel and fodder land: 
a- monitoring and development of fuel and fodder programmes. 
b- maintenance and development of plants for fuel and fodder areas. 
c- monitoring of programme, regulated by GPs and KPs. 
12-Drinking water: 
a- maintenance of drinking water of public use. 
b- plan and programme for drinking water. 
13- Roads, Culverts, bridges, ferries, watenvays and other means of communication; 
a- development and maintenance of rural roads, culverts, bridges, and watenways of the 
District, 
b- maintenance of river banks, 
c- writing of directions and marks on roads, 
d- help in removal of encroachment on roads and public places. 
14- Rural electrification: 
a- assisting GP and KP in rural electrification, 
b- helping in distribution of light in rural areas. 
15- Non conventional energy sources: 
a- development of source of non-conventional energy, 
b- Assisting programme for GP and ZP. 
16- Poverty alleviation programmes: 
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a- planning, monitoring and supervision of poverty alleviation programme, 
b- coordination of programme with otiier department. 
17- Education including primary and secondary schiools: 
a- construction, maintenance and supervision of primary and secondary sctioois, 
b- providing education for all in District. 
c- survey and evaluation of primary and secondary education in the District. 
18- Establishment and monitoring of technical and vocational training centers. 
19- Planning and implementation of adult literacy and informal educational programme. 
20- library: 
a- construction and maintenance of libraries and reading rooms at khand level and in District, 
b- Implementation of programme. 
21- Sports and cultural affairs: 
a- promotion of cultural activities, 
b- promotion and supervision of regional cultural and sports activities, 
c- arrangement of cultural and folk activities on important occasions. 
22- Markets and fairs: 
a- supervision and monitoring of rural markets, fairs (including cattle fairs). 
b- supervision and monitoring of work done by GP and KP regarding market and fairs. 
23- Medical and sanitation: 
a- assessing and suitable financing the KP. in the prevention and control of epidemic. 
b- establishment, maintenance and management of Physical Health Center (PHC) and 
dispensaries, 
c- providing drinking water facilities. 
24- Implementation, supervision and monitoring of family welfare programmes. 
25- Maternity and child development: 
a- implementation of maternity and child health programmes. 
b- promotion of school health and nutrition programme. 
26-Social welfare including welfare for handicapped and mentally retarded: 
a- participation of the social welfare programmes including welfare for handicapped and 
mentally retarded, 
b- promoting social welfare programmes or old age and widow pension schemes. 
27- Welfare for the weaker section especially for SC / STs: 
a- promotion of welfare of the Scheduled Castes and Scheduled Tribes and weaker sections. 
b- protecting such castes form social injustice and exploitation. 
c- establishment and management of such hostels. 
d- preparation of plans and implementation of schemes for social justice. 
28- Planning and distribution of rural community. 
29- Maintenance of community assets: 
a- coordination and integration of the development schemes, 
b- preservation and maintenance of community assets. 
30- Planning and statistics: 
a- preparation of plan for economic development. 
b- review of the plan framed by the KP, their coordination and consolidation. 
c- ensuring the execution of the plan at khand and village level. 
d- periodical review of achievements and targets. 
e- collection of data and maintenance of statistics on all matters relating to the implementation 
of the plan within the District. 
31-Relief work; 
a- construction, repair and maintenance of famine preventive works, establishment and 
maintenance of relief work, and relief houses and adoption of such other measures of relief 
in time of famine and scarcity as may be considered necessary, 
b- establishment, maintain and management of visiting of poor houses, asylums, orphanage, 
markets and rest houses, 
c- ZP may make reasonable provision with in the District in respect of the following matters: 
(i) laying out, whether in areas previously built or not, new public roads and acquiring land for that 
purpose and for the construction of buildings and their compounds on such roads, 
(ii) reclaiming unhealthy localities, 
(iii) furthering educational object by measures other than the establishment and maintenance of 
schools, 
(iv) taking a census and granting rewards for information which may trend to secure the correct 
registration of vital statistics; 
XX 
(v) constructing, subsiding or guarantying rewards for which may trends to secure the correct 
registration of vital statistics; 
(vi) securing and assisting to secure suitable place for the carrying on any offensive, dangerous or 
obnoxious trade, calling or practices; 
(vii) conserving and preventing injury or contamination to or pollution of, rivers and other sources 
of water supply within its jurisdiction; 
(vii) promotion of tourism; and 
(ix) the doing of any thing whether inside or outside the District, where on expenditure is declared 
by the State government or by the ZP with in the sanction of the State government to be an 
appropriate charge on the ZP nidhi. 
A ZP or a KP, with the prior approval of the State government, and with the concert of the GP or 
bhumi prabhandak samiti delegates to it any of its powers and functions. Similarly a ZP may 
declare to the KP and vive-versa any of its powers and functions. The State government also 
has the power to do so. 
Source: Uttar Pradesh, Kshetra Panchayat & Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam (1961) 
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Annexure. A.13 
FUNCTIONS OF KSHETRA PANCHAYAT: UTTAR PRADESH 
The following are the powers and function of the Kshetra Panchayat: 
1- Agriculture including agriculture extension: 
b- promotion and development of agriculture and horticulture; 
c- promotion and cultivation of marketing of vegetables, fruits and flowers; 
2- Land development, land reform, land consolidation and soil conservation: a- assisting 
the government and ZP in the implementation of land improvement; 
b- soil conservation and land consolidation programme of the government; 
3- Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development: 
a- assisting the government and ZP in the construction and maintenance of minor irrigation 
work; 
b- implementation of community and individual irrigation works; 
4- Animal husbandry, dairy and poultry: 
a- maintenance of veterinary services; 
b- improvement of breed of cattle's, poultry and other live stock; 
c- promotion of dairying, poultry and piggery; 
5- Fisheries: Promotion of fisheries development: 
6- Social and farm forestry: 
a- planning and preventing trees on the side of roads and public land; 
b- development and promotion of social forestry and sericulture. 
7- Minor forest produce: Promotion and development of minor forest produce. 
8- Small Industries: 
a- help in development of rural industry; 
b- creating general awareness of agro-industrial development. 
9- Cottage and village industries: Marketing the products of cottage industries. 
10- Rural housing: Assisting a rural housing programme and its implementation. 
11- Drinking water: 
a- provision and assisting in development of drinking water; 
b- guarding for drinking polluted water; 
c- encouraging and monitoring rural water supply programmes; 
12- Fuel and fodder land: 
a- promotion of programme related to fuel and fodder; 
b- planting of trees near roads in the panchayat area; 
13- Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, waterways and other means of communication: 
a- construction of roads and culverts outside the village and their maintenance; 
b- construction of bridges; 
c- help In management of ferries and waterways. 
14- Rural electrification: Promotion of rural electrification. 
15- Promotion and use of non- conventional energy and its promotion. 
16- Poverty alleviation programme: Implementation of poverty alleviation programmes. 
17- Education including primary and secondary schools: 
a- development of primary and secondary education; 
b- promotion of primary and social programme; 
18- Technical training and vocational education. 
19- Supervision of adult literacy and informal education centers. 
20- Promotion and supervision of rural libraries. 
21-Sports and cultural affairs: 
a- supervision of cultural affairs; 
b- promotion and organisation of regional folk songs, dances and rural sports. 
22- Markets and fairs: promotion, management and supervision of fairs and markets (including cattle 
fairs) out side GP. 
23- Medical and sanitation: 
a- establishment and maintenance of P.H.C. and dispensaries; 
b- control of epidemics; 
c- implementation of rural health and sanitation programmes; 
24- Family welfare; promotion of family welfare programmes. 
25- Maternity and child development; 
b- promotion of programme for participation of Organisation in women and children health, 
school health and nutrition programmes; 
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c- promotion of programme related to development of child and women welfare; 
26- Social welfare including the welfare of handicapped and mentally retarded: 
b- participation in the social programmes including welfare of the handicapped and 
mentally retarded; 
c- monitoring of the old age and widow pension schemes. 
27- Welfare of the weaker section and in particular to the S.C. and S.T: 
a- promotion of welfare of the S.C. and weaker section; 
b- preparation of plans and implementation of schemes for social justice. 
28- Distribution of essential commodities. 
29- Maintenance of community assets: guiding and monitoring, preservation and maintenance of 
community assets. 
30- Planning and statistics: 
a- preparation of plans for economic development; 
b- review, co-ordination and integration of plans prepared by the GP; 
c- ensuring execution of the khand and GP development plans; 
d- periodical review of achievement and targets; 
e- collection of data and maintenance of statistics and respect of matters relating to the 
implementation of the khand plan. 
31- Supervision over GPs: 
a- distribution of grants of the GP in accordance with the prescribed procedure; 
b- general supervision according to rule over the activities of the GP. 
Source: Uttar Pradesh, Kshefra Panchayat & Zila Panchayat Adhiniyam (1961) 
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Annexure. A.14 
FUNCTIONS OF GRAM PANCHAYAT: UTTAR PRADESH 
Subject to such conditions as may be specified by ttie State government, a Gram Panchayat (GP) shall 
perform the following functions, namely: 
1- Agriculture, including agriculture extension; 
a- promotion and development of agriculture and horticulture. 
b- development of wastelands and grazing land and preventing their unauthorized alienation, and use. 
2- Land development and land reform implementation, land consolidation and soil conservation: 
a- assisting the government and other agencies in land development, land reform and soil 
conservation. 
b- assisting in land consolidation. 
3- Minor irrigation, water management and watershed development: 
a- managing and assessing in water distribution from minor irrigation projects, 
a- Construction, repair and maintenances of minor irrigation project, regulation of supply of water for 
irrigation purpose. 
4- Animal husbandry, dairying and poultry: 
a- improving breed of cattle, poultry and other livestock, 
b- promotion of dairying, poultry, pigging etc. 
5- Fisheries: Development of fisheries in the villages. 
6- Social and farm forestry: 
a- planning and preserving trees on the side of roads and public lands, 
b- development and promotion of social and farm forestry and sericulture. 
7- Minor forest produce: promotion and development of minor forest produce. 
8- Small industries: 
b- assisting the development of small Industries, 
c- promotion of local trade. 
9- Cottage and Village Industries: 
a- assisting in the development of agricultural and commercial Industries, 
b- promotion of cottage industries. 
10- Rural housing: 
b- implementation of rural housing programmes. 
c- distributing house sites and maintenance of records relating to them. 
11 - Drinking water: 
a- construction repair and maintenance of public wells, tanks and ponds for supply of water for 
drinking, washing, bathing purposes, 
b- regulation of sources of water supply for drinking purposes. 
12- Fuel and fodder land: 
b- development of grass and plants relating to fuel and fodder land, 
c- control of irregular transfer of fodder land. 
13- Roads, culverts, bridges, ferries, water- ways and other means of communications: 
b- construction and maintenance of village roads, bridges, ferries and culverts. 
c- maintenance of waterways. 
d- removal of encroachment of public places. 
14- Rural electrification: Provisions for and maintenance of lighting of public streets and other places. 
15- Non-conventional energy sources: Promotion and development of programmes of non-
conventional energy sources and its maintenance in village. 
16- Poverty alleviation programme: Promotion and implementation of poverty alleviation programmes. 
17- Education including primary and secondary schools and public awareness about education. 
18- Technical training and vocational education: Promotion of rural art and artesian. 
19- Adult and informal education; promotion of adult literacy. 
20- Library: establishment and maintenance of libraries and reading rooms. 
21- Sports and cultural affairs: 
a- promotion of social and cultural activities, 
b- organizing seminars on different festivals, 
c- establishment and maintenance of rural clubs for sports. 
22- Markets and fairs: Regulations of melas, markets and hats in panchayats areas. 
23- Medical and sanitation: 
a- promoting rural sanitation. 
b- preventing against epidemics. 
c- programmes of human and animal and vaccination. 
d- preventive action against stray cattle and live- stocks. 
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e- registering birtli, death and marriages. 
24- Family welfare: promotion and implementation of family welfare programmes. 
25- Plan foe economic development: Preparation of plans for economic development of the area of 
GP. 
26-Maternity and child development; 
b- participation in the implementation of women's and child welfare programmes at GP level. 
c- promotion child health and nutrition programmes. 
27- Social welfare including welfare of handicapped and mentally retarded: 
b- assisting in old age and widow pension schemes. 
c- participation in the social welfare programmes, including welfare of the handicapped and mentally 
retarded. 
28-Welfare of weaker section and in particular of the schedule caste and schedule tribes: 
a- participation in the implementation of the specific programmes for the schedule castes, the 
schedule tribes and other weaker section of the society. 
b- preparation and implementation of schemes of social justice. 
29- Public distribution system; 
a- promotion of public awareness with regard to the distribution of essential commodities, 
b- monitoring the public administration system. 
30- Maintenance of community assets: Preservation and maintenance of community assets. 
The GP shall prepare every year a development plan for the panchayat area and submit it to the KPs 
concerned. The State may assign to the GP management and maintenance of a forest situated in the 
panchayat area, management of water lands, pasture lands or vacant lands belonging to government 
situated within the panchayat area and collection of any tax or land revenue and maintenance of 
related records. 
Source: Uttar Pradesh, Gram Panchayat Adhiniyam (1961) 
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Annexure. A.15 
FUNCTIONS OF GAON PANCHAYAT: IN NCT OF DELHI 
The goan panchyat had been assigned a long list of duties, both obligatory and discretionary under 
the two legislations, the Delhi Land Reforms Act, 1954, and the Delhi Panchayati Raj Act, 1954. 
These functions were: 
Obligatory Functions: 
1- To assist in the development of agrrcuifure, commerce and industry, in 
particular, framing programmes of production, reclamation of waste lands, 
establishment and care of common glazing grounds, allotment of places for 
storing manure; 
2- Regulation of melas (fairs), markets and haats (local unorganized markets); 
3- To maintain registers of births deaths and marriages, and such records relating 
to cattle census, population census and other statistics as may be prescribed; 
4- To construct and maintain public wells, tanks and ponds and regulate sources 
of water supply for drinking purposes; 
5- To look after village sanitation and attend to medical relief and maternity and 
child welfare; 
6- To provide for primary education, of both boys and girls, and to construct, and 
maintain public streets and attend to their lighting; 
7- To regulate the construction of new buildings or the extension/alteration of any 
existing buildings. 
Discretionary Functions: 
The Gaon panchayat was empowered to take up, at its discretion, the following functions: 
1- Prescribing minimum standards of cultivation with a view to increasing production, and 
also to make arrangements for cooperative management of land and other resources of 
the villages; 
2- To regulate the use of manure and fertilizers; 
3- To develop co-operation, establish stores for improved seeds and implements, 
encourage production and use of improved seeds, take step to improve breed to cattle, 
and provide for veterinary care of cattle and prevention of disease among them; 
4- To raise a volunteer force for watch and ward, and set up organisations to promote 
goodwill and social harmony among different communities; 
5- To act as a channel through which government assistance reaches villages, and to 
especially help in obtaining and distributing government loans among agriculturists; 
6- To enter into contract with the government to collect any taxes or dues payable to the 
State or with any or all the proprietors of land for the collection of rent on their behalf; 
7- To regulate extension of abadi and to establish and maintain public radio sets and 
gramophones libraries and reading rooms, and akharas, clubs and other places of 
recreation and games; 
8- To provide relief against famine or other natural calamities; 
9- To undertake any other measure of public utility to promote moral and material well 
being or convenience of the villagers. 
Source: Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 
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Annexure. A.16 
FUNCTIONS OF PANCHAYAT SAMITIS: NCT of DELHI 
The functions assigned to panchayat samitis included: 
Advising the administration and also the MCD, if the latter so, desired, regarding various 
development schemes, disbursing such loans and grants as were placed at its disposal by the 
administration, preparation and execution of the development plans for the block and coordination 
of the plans, covering more than one Gram panchayat, and any other function assigned by the 
Delhi Administration or the Municipal Corporation of Delhi, 
Source; Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 
Annexure. A.17 
CIRCLE PANCHAYATS: NCT of DELHI 
The circle panchayats performs primarily judicial functions and had been assigned primarily two 
types of functions to perform: 
(i) To provide panels of Panchayat adalat (courts) for the trial of certain types of suits, criminal 
cases and proceedings specified in the act; and; and 
(ii) To perform certain development and other related functions, if the Lt. Governor decided to 
utilize the services of the Circle Panchayats in this work. 
Source: Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957 
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Annexure. A.18 
FUNCTIONS OF THE MUNICIPAL CORPORATION: TAMIL NADU 
a- Pubic health, safety and convenience. 
b- Water supply, lightening and drainage naming streets and numbering of buildings, etc (omitted) 
c- Provision and licensing of public latrines and urinals. 
d- Scavenging: provision for removal of rubbish and filth. 
e- Streets: maintenance and repair of streets, naming of public streets and numbering of buildings. 
f- General powers of building regulations: prohibition against use of 
inflammable materials for buildings, etc., without permission, 
g- Precaution against dangerous structures, dangerous trees, dangerous tanks, wells, holes and fire, 
h- Provision of public bathing-houses, washing houses, and places for bathing and for washing 
animals, 
i- Provision of municipal slaughterhouses, and licenses for slaughterhouses. 
j - Regulation of milk trade, market butchers shops, etc. 
k- Provision of pubic markets and licensing of privates markets. 
I- It is the duty of commissioner to inspect, places for sale, etc. 
m- Provision for burial and burning grounds and crematoria within or without the city by the 
corporation. And licensing of places for disposal of dead, 
n- Vital statistics and the prevention of disease: compulsory vaccination for smallpox. 
0- General Provision Regarding Licenses, Registrations And Permissions. 
Source: Madras City Municipal Corporation Act, 1919 
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Annexure. A. 19 
FUNCTIONS OF MUNICIPALITIES: TAMIL NADU 
As provided in The Tamil Nadu District Municipalities Act - 1994, the State government may, by 
notification and subject to this conditions and restriction may be specified therein, entrust to the 
Municipalities, Town Panchayat the wards committee or any other committee constituted under 
this act with such powers and responsibilities with respect to the preparation of plans for economic 
development and social justice and also with such powers and authority as may be necessary to 
enable them to carry out the responsibilities conferred upon them including those in relation to the 
matter listed in schedule X of Tamil Nadu Municipal Act. 
Functions: 
1-Water Supply: 
a- construction and maintenance of water works, 
b-Water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purpose. 
c-private water supply for consumption and domestic 
2- Lighting: provision of lightening public streets. 
3-Public and Private Drainage: control and maintenance of system of drainage over house-drain, 
privies and cesspools. 
4-Public and Private Latrines: 
a-provision of public latrines and urinals, 
b-provision of private latrines and urinals by owners and occupiers , and for laborers and in 
markets etc. 
5-Scavenging: municipality to arrange for the removal of rubbish and filth and prohibition against 
keeping filth on premises too long. 
6- Public and Private Streets: 
a- maintenance and repair of public streets. 
b- Planting and preservation of avenue streets. 
c- Making of new private streets. 
d- Prohibition against obstructions in or over streets. 
e- Removal of encroachments 
f- Naming of streets and buildings. 
7- Nuisances: Dangerous Structure, Trees and Places 
a-Precautions in case of dangerous building structure, trees and tanks, wells, and holes. 
b-Precaution against fire. 
8- Control over Certain Animals: 
a-Prevention of cruelty to animals. 
b-Prohibition against keeping animals so as to be a nuisance and dangerous. 
9- Slaughtering Houses: provision and licence of municipal slaughterhouses. 
10- Milk Trade: regulation of milk trade. 
11- Disposal of the Dead: 
a-Provision for burial and burning grounds and crematoria within or without the city by the 
corporation 
b-licensing of places for disposal of dead. 
c-report of burials and burnings. 
12- Vital Statistics: compulsory registration of vital statistics. 
13- Dangerous Diseases: 
a-power to notify 'dangerous diseases' and Prevention of infection. 
b-small pox: compulsory vaccination and obligation to give information of small-pox. 
Source: Tamil Nadu District Municipality Act ,1920 
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Annexure. A. 20 
FUNCTIONS OF TOWN PANCHAYAT: TAMIL NADU 
The functions of the Town Panchayats and the Municipalities are one and the same and are given 
in Annexure A. 19. The same are narrated below: 
Provision and maintenance of water supply; 
i- Provision and maintenance of Streetlight; 
ii- Provision and maintenance of Public drainages; 
V- Provision and maintenance of Public latrines; 
v- Arranging for cleaning the streets and removal of sweepings; 
vi- Provision and maintenance of Public streets, roads; 
vii- Plant and preserve trees on the sides of public streets. 
Source: Tamil Nadu District Municipality Act, 1920 
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Annexure. A.21 
FUNCTIONS OF NAGAR NIGAM (MUNICIPAL CORPORATION): UTTAR PRADESH 
OBLIGATORY DUTIES OF THE CORPORATION--
It shall be incumbent on the corporation to make reasonable and adequate provision, by any 
means or measures which it is lawfully competent to it to use or to take, for each of the following 
matters, namely,-
1. Eradication, where there no boundary marks, of the substantial boundary mark of such 
description and in such a position as shall be approved by the State government defining the limits 
or any alteration in the limits of the city; 
2. The name and numbering of streets and of public places vested in the corporation and the 
numbering of premises; 
3. The collection and removal of sewage, offensive matters and rubbish and treatment and 
disposal thereof including there of including establishing and maintaining farm and factory; 
4. The watering, scavenging and cleaning of all public streets and places in the city and the 
removal of all sweeping there from; 
5. The construction, maintenance and cleansing of drains and drainage works, and of public 
latrines, water-closets, urinal and similar conveniences; 
6. Supplying, construction, and maintaining in accordance with the general system approved by 
the corporation receptacles fittings pipes and other appliances what so ever on or for the use of 
premises for receiving and conducting the sewerage thereof into drains under the control of the 
corporation. 
7. The management and maintenance of all corporation waterworks and the construction or 
acquisition of new works necessary for a sufficient supply of water (domestic, industrial and 
commercial purposes). 
8. Guarding from pollution water used for human consumption and preventing polluted water from 
being so used. 
9. The lighting of public streets, corporation markets and public buildings and other public places 
vested in the corporation; 
a- the construction and maintenance of parking plots, bus stops and public convenience; 
10. The establishment, maintenance or supports of public hospitals and dispensaries including 
hospitals for the isolation and treatment of persons suffering or suspected to be infected with a 
contagious or infectious disease and carrying out other measures necessary for public medical 
relief; 
11. Preventing and checking the spread of contiguous, infectious and dangerous disease; 
12. Provision for anti-rabbis treatment. 
13. Maintenance of ambulance services; 
14. Establishment and maintaining a system of public vaccination; 
15. The registration of vital statistic including births and deaths; 
16. Establishment, maintaining and assisting maternity centers and child 17. welfare and birth 
control clinics and promoting population control, family welfare and small family norms; 
18. The Organisation, maintenance or management of chemical or bacteriological laboratories for 
the examination and analysis of water, food or drugs, for the detection or diseases or adulteration 
or for research connected with the public health; 
19. The reclamation of unhealthy localities, the removal of noxious vegetation and generally the 
abatement of all nuisances; 
20. The regulation and abatement of offensive and dangerous trades, callings or practices 
including prostitution; 
21. The maintenance, fixing and regulation of places for the disposal of the dead and the provision 
of new places for the said purpose and the disposing of unclaimed dead bodies or aiding within its 
means any arrangement made with the same objectives by any other institution; 
22. The construction and maintenance of public markets and slaughter houses,(tanneries) and the 
regulation of all markets and slaughter houses. 
23. The securing or removal of dangerous buildings and places; 
24. Maintaining hydrants and rendering and such assistance, including the maintaining or 
managing of fire brigade in extinguishing fires and protecting lives and property when fire occurs, 
as the State government may be in general or specific order direct from time to time; 
25. The removal of obstruction and projections in or upon streets, brigades, and other public 
places. 
26. Establishment, maintaining, aiding and suitably accommodation schools for primary education 
including nursery education. 
27. Establishment and maintenance or grading aid to institutions of physical cultures; 
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28. Maintenance and contribution to the maintenance of veterinary tiospitaJs; 
29. The construction or acquisition and maintenance of cattle- ponds; 
30. The construction, maintenance, alteration and improvement of public streets, bridges, 
subways, culverts, causew/ays and the like; 
31. Planting and maintaining trees on road sides and other public places; 
32. Regulation of traffic and regulation of traffic signs; 
33. Assisting by constructing and maintaining residential quarters, by given loans in the proper 
housing of corporation conservancy staff and all sections of working classes; 
34. Town planning and improvement including slum clearance and preparation and execution of 
housing schemes and laying out of new streets; 
a- Promotion urban forestry and ecological aspects and protection of the environment. 
35. Maintenance and developing values of properties vested in, or entrusted to the management of 
corporation; 
a- safe guarding the interest of weaker section of the society including the handicapped and 
mentally retarded, 
b- the promotion of cultural and educational, aesthetic aspects; 
c- the construction and maintenance of cattle ponds and prevention of cruelty of animal; 
36. The issue of a bulletin reporting proceedings or substance of proceedings of the corporation 
and of its committees and given other information about the activities of the corporation; 
37. The maintenance of the corporation offices and of all public monuments and open space and 
other properties vested in the corporation; 
38. The prompt attention to official letters and preparation and submission of such return, 
Statements and reports as the State government requires the corporation to submit; and 
39. Fulfillment of any obligation imposed by or under the act or any other law for the time being in 
force; 
40. Slum improvement and up gradation; 
41. Urban poverty alleviation; 
42. Providing urban amenities and facilities such as parks, gardens and playgrounds. 
DISCRETIONARY DUTIES OF CORPORATION: 
The corporation may, in its discretion, provide from time to time, either wholly or partially, for all or 
any of the fodowings matters, namely— 
1. The Organisation, maintenance or management of institution including lunatic asylums, 
leper homes, orphanages and rescue homes for women, within or without the city for the 
care of peoples who are infirm, sick or incurable, or for the care and training of blind, 
deaf, mute or othenwise disabled persons or of handicapped children; 
2. The provisions of milk for expectant or nursing mothers or infants or schools children; 
3. Swimming pools, public wash houses, bathing places and other institutions designed for 
the improvement and construction of bathing places and other institutions designed for 
the improvement and construction of bathing ghats on river banks; 
4. Dairies or farms within or without the city for the supply, distribution and processing of milk 
and milk products for the benefits of the residents of the city. 
5. The construction and maintenance in public streets or places of drinking fountains or 
drinking sheds or stand posts for human beings and water troughs for animals; 
6. Encouraging music and other fine arts and providing music in public place or places of 
public resorts. 
7. Making grants to educational and cultural institutions situated within and outside the city; 
8. The provision of recreation grounds, installing statues and beautifying the city; 
9. The holding the exhibition, athletics or games; 
10.The regulation of lodging houses, camping grounds and rest houses in the city. 
11. The construction, maintenance and establishment of theaters, rest houses and other public 
buildings. 
12.The Organisation and maintenance, in time of scarcity, of shops or stalls for the sale of 
necessities of life. 
13.The building and purchase and maintenance of dwellings for corporation officers and 
servants; 
14.The grants of loans for building purposes to corporation servants on such terms and 
subject to such conditions as may be the corporation; 
15. Any other measures for the welfare of corporation servants or any class of them; 
16. With the State government previous sanction, the purchase of any undertaking for the 
supply of energy 
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17.With the State government's previous sanction the construction, purchase, organization, 
maintenance or management of tramways, tracl<less trams or motor transport facilities for 
the conveyance of the public or goods within or without the city; 
18.The furtherance of educational objects, and making grants to educations within or without 
the city; 
19.The establishment and maintenance or the aiding of libraries, museums and art galleries, 
botanical or zoological collection and the purchaser construction of buildings therefore; 
20.The establishment and maintenance or contributions to the maintenance of bath, bathing 
ghats, washing places, tanks, wells, dams and other works of public utility; 
21 .The construction and maintenance of infirmaries of hospitals for animals; 
22.The destruction of birds, animals causing a nuisance or of vermin, and the confinement or 
destruction of stray or ownerless dogs; 
23. Contributions towards any public fund raised for the relief of human suffering within the city 
or for the welfare of the public. 
24. Presentation of civic addresses and holding the civic receptions. 
25.The acquisition and holding of grazing grounds and the acquisition and maintenance of 
breeding stud; 
26. Grants for loans or other facilities to any persons, society or institution interested in the 
provision of dwellings or the execution of the house schemes; 
27.The provision of poor relief; 
28. The building or purchase and maintenance of gaushalas and of sanitary stables of horses, 
ponies or cattle used in hackney carriages or cart; 
29. Survey of buildings and lands; 
30.The adoption of any measures likely to promote the public safety, health or convenience. 
31. Subject to the provision in the budget, the making of a contribution towards any public 
ceremony or entertainment of the city; 
32. Subject to the provision in the budget, the making of a contribution towards any public 
ceremony or entertainment in the city; 
33. The establishment and maintenance of tourist bureau; 
34. The establishment and maintenance of a press and the workshop for corporation work as 
also for undertaking private work on charges in spare time; 
35. Making arrangement for preparation of compost manure from nigh soil and rubbish; 
36.Taking measures to promote trade and industries and establishing a corporation bank; 
37. Establishing labor welfare centers for its employees and subsidizing the activities of any 
association, union or club of such employees by grant or loan for its general 
advancement; 
38. Organizing or contributing to municipal boards unions; 
39. Making provision for removal of social disabilities of schedule caste and backward classes; 
40.Taking measures for the control and relief of begging; 
41,With the previous sanction of State government the setting up and maintenance of 
corporation police force for taking up and discharging such police duties and in such 
manner as may be prescribed; 
42.The previous sanction of State government, the under taking of any commercial duty 
providing or promoting amenity or employment and removing unemployment; 
43. The doing of analysis whereupon expenditure is declared by the State government or by 
the corporation with the sanction of the State government to be an appropriate charges 
on the corporation fund; 
Source: Uttar Pradesh Municipal Corporation Adhiniyam, 1959 
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Annexure. A.22 
FUNCTIONS OF NAGAR PALIKA PARISHAD (MUNICIPALITY): UTTAR PRADESH 
It shall be the duty of every municipality to make reasonable provision within the municipality for— 
1- Lightening public streets and places; 
2- Watering public streets and places; 
3- Making a survey, and erection of boundary marks, of the municipality; 
4- Clearing public streets, places, and drains, removing noxious vegetation, and abating all public 
nuisances; 
5- Regulating offensive, dangerous or obnoxious trades, calling or practices; 
6- Removal or destruction of stray dogs and dangerous animals; 
7- Removing, on the ground of public safety, health or convenience, undesirable obstructions and 
projections in streets or public places; 
8- Securing or removing dangerous building or places; 
9- Acquiring, maintenance, changing and regulation place for the disposal of the dead (and 
making arrangement for the disposal of unclaimed dead bodies after ascertaining for the police 
in writing that there is no objection to do so;) 
10-Construction, altering and maintaining public streets, culverts, markets, slaughter houses, 
latrines, privies, urinals, drains, drainage works and sewerage work; 
11-Planting and maintaining of trees on roadsides and other public places; 
12- Providing water supply for domestic, industrial and commercial purposes; 
i- providing a sufficient supply of pure and unpolluted water for drinking 
purpose for peoples and wholesome water for other household 
purposes, 
ii- maintaining in addition to any source of water-supply, public wells, if any, in the working 
condition, guarding from pollution their water and keeping it fit for human consumption; 
13- Registering birth and deaths; 
14- Establishing and maintaining a system of public vaccination; 
15- Establishment, maintaining or supporting public hospitals and dispensaries, and providing public 
medical relief: 
i- establishment, maintaining and assisting maternity centers and child welfare and birth control 
clinics and promoting population control, family welfare and small family norms; 
ii- maintenance and contributing to the maintenance of veterinary hospitals, 
iii- establishing and maintaining or granting aid to institutions of physical culture; 
16- Establishing and maintaining primary schools; 
17- Rendering assistance in extinguishing fires and protecting life and property when the fire 
occurs; 
i- protection, maintaining and developing the property vested in, or entrusted to the management 
of the municipalities; 
a- maintaining the finance of the municipalities in the satisfactory condition and meeting its 
liabilities; 
b- prompt attention to official letters and preparation of such returns statements and reports as the 
State government requires the municipalities submit; and 
c- fulfilling any obligation imposed by the law upon it. 
ii- Regulating tanneries; 
a. construction and maintenance of parking-lots, bus stops and public convenience; 
b. promoting urban forestry and ecological aspects and protection of the environment. 
c. safeguard the interests of weaker section of society including the handicapped and mentally 
retarded; 
d. promoting cultural, educational and aesthetic aspects. 
e. constructing and maintaining cattle pounds and preventing cruelty to animals; 
f. slum improvement and up gradation; 
g. urban poverty alleviation; 
h. providing urban alleviation; 
i.providing urban amenities and facilities such as gardens, public parks and playgrounds. 
DISCRETIONARY FUNCTIONS: 
A municipalities may make provisions, within the limits of the municipality (and with the sanction of 
the prescribed authority outside such limits) for-
(a) Laying out in areas whether previously built upon or not, new public streets and 
acquiring land for that purpose and for the construction of buildings, and their 
compounds to about on such streets; 
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i- preparing and execution of master plan: 
(b) Construction, establishment and maintaining (or contributing to the maintenance of) 
libraries, museums, (reading rooms, radio receiving stations, lepers, homes, 
orphanages, baby folds and rescue homes for women,) lunatic asylums, halls, offices, 
dharamshalas, rest houses, encamping grounds, poorhouses, diaries, bath, bathing 
ghats, washing places, drinking fountains, wells, tanks, dams and other work of public 
(c) Furthering educational objects by measures other than the establishment and 
maintenance of primary schools; 
(d) Taking a census, and granting rewards for information which may tend to secure the 
correct registration of vital statistics; 
(e) Granting rewards for information leading to the detection of evasion of tax imposed 
under this act, or the detection of the causing of injury to or encroachment on property 
vested in or entrusted to the management and control of the municipality; 
(f) Giving relief, on the occurrence of local calamities, by the establishment and 
maintenance of relief work or otherwise; 
(g) Securing and assisting to secure suitable places of the carrying on of any trade or 
manufacture. 
(h) Establishing and maintaining a farm or factory for the disposal of sewage; 
(i) Making arrangements for preparation of compost manure for night soil and rubbish; 
(!) Construction, subsidizing or guaranteeing tramways, railroads or other means of 
locomotion and electricity (or gas) power works: 
(j) Holding fairs and exhibitions, 
(k) Preparing and executing houses and town planning schemes; 
(I) Taking measures to promote trade and industries; 
(I) Supply of milk. 
(m) Establishment of labour welfare centers for its employees and subsidizing the activities 
of any associations, union and club of such employees by grants and loan, for its 
general advancements, 
(n) Organizing or contributing to municipality unions; 
(o) Adopting any measure to promote the public safety, health and convenience; 
(p) Removing social disabilities of schedule castes and backward classes in such 
manner as may be prescribed; 
(q) Taking measures for the control of beggary 
Source: United Provinces Municipalities Act. 1916 
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Annexure. A. 23 
FUNCTIONS OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATION OF DELHI: 
Obligatory Function: 
Subject to the provision of tlie act and any other law for the time being in force, it shall be 
incumbent) on the corporation to make adequate provision by and means or measures w^hich it 
may lawfully use of take, for each of the following matters, namely: -
a- The construction, maintenance and cleaning of drains and drainage works and of public latrines, 
urinals and similar conveniences, 
b- The construction and maintenance of works and means of providing supply of water for public and 
private purposes; 
c- The scavenging, removal and disposal of filth, rubbish and other obnoxious or pollution matters, 
d- The construction of purchase, maintenance, extension management and conduct of— Any 
undertaking for providing a sufficient supply of pure and wholesome water, 
e- The reclamation for providing a sufficient supply of pure and wholesome water, 
f- The regulation of places for the disposal of the land and the provision and maintenance of places 
for the said purpose, 
g- The registration of birth and deaths, 
h- Public vaccination and inoculation. 
i- Measures for preventing and checking the spread of dangerous diseases, 
j - The establishment and maintenance of hospitals, dispensaries and maternity and child welfare 
centers and carrying out of other measures necessary for public medical relief; 
k- The construction and maintenance of municipal markets and slaughter houses and regulation of 
all markets and slaughter houses; 
k- The securing or removal of dangerous buildings and places; 
I- The regulation and abatement of offensive or dangerous trade odd practices; 
m- The construction, maintenance, alteration and improvement of public streets, bridges, culverts, 
causeways and the like; 
n- The lighting, watering and cleaning of public streets and other public places; 
0- The removal of obstructions and projections in or upon streets, bridges and other public places; 
p- The naming and numbering of streets and premises; 
q- The establishment, maintenance of, and aid to, schools for primary education subject to such 
grants as may be determined by the central government from time to time; 
r- The maintenance of municipal offices; 
s- The laying out or the maintenances of public perks, gardens or recreation grounds; 
t- The maintenance of fire- bridge and the protection of like and property in the case of fire 
u- The maintenance of monuments and memorials vested in any local authority in Delhi immediately 
before the commencement of this act or which may be vested in the corporation after such 
commencement; 
V- The maintenance and development of the values of all properties vested in or entrusted to the 
management of the corporation; 
w- the preparation of plans for economic development and social justice. 
X- The fulfillment of any other obligation imposed by or under this act or 
any other law for the times being in force. 
Discretionary Functions: 
a- The furtherance of education including cultural and physical education, by measure the more than 
the establishment of, and aid to, schools for primary education; 
b- The establishment and maintenance of, and aid to libraries, museums, art galleries, botanical and 
zoological collections; 
c- The establishment and maintenance of, aid to stadium, gymnasium, akharas and places for sports 
and games, 
d- The plantation and maintenance of trees on roadsides and elsewhere, 
e- The survey of buildings and lands, 
f- The registration of marriages, 
g- The taking of a census of population, 
h- The civic receptions to persons of distinction; 
i- The provisions of music or other entertainment in public places or places of public resorts and the 
maintenance of theaters and cinemas. 
j - The Organisation and maintenance of fairs and exhibitions; 
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k- The acquisition of moveable and immoveable property for any of the purposes before mentioned, 
including payment of the cost of investigation, survey or examinations in relation to thereto for the 
construction and adoption of buildings necessary for each purposes. 
I- The construction and maintenance of -
Rest houses, 
Poor houses. 
Infirmaries, 
V- Children's home's, 
V- Houses for deaf and damp and for disable and handicapped children's, 
vi- Shelters for destitute and disable persons, 
vii-Asylums for purpose for persons of unsound minds, 
m- The construction or purchase and maintained for dwelling houses for municipal officers and other 
municipal employees or any class of them including the sanctioning of loans to such officers and 
employees or any class of them for construction of houses and purchase of vehicles, 
n- The construction and maintenance of cattle's ponds. 
0- Any measure for the welfare of the municipal officers and other municipal employees or any class 
of them for construction of houses and purchases of vehicles, 
p- The Organisation or management of chemical or bacteriological laboratories for the examination or 
analysis of water, food and drugs fort he detection of diseases or research connected with the 
public health or medical relief; 
q- The provision for relief to destitute and disable persons 
r- The establishment and maintenance of veterinary hospitals, 
s- The Organisation, construction, maintenance and management of swimming pools, public wash 
houses, bathing places and other institutions designed for the improvement of public health; 
t- The Organisation and management of farms and dairies within or outside Delhi for the supply, 
distribution and processing of milk and milk products for the benefit of the residents of Delhi; 
u- The Organisation and management of cottage industries, handicrafts centers, and sales emporia; 
V- The construction and maintenance of warehouses and godowns; 
w- The construction and maintenance of garages, sheds and stands for vehicles and cattle biers; 
X- The provision for unfiltered water supply; 
y- The improvement of Delhi in accordance with improvement schemes approved by the corporation; 
z- The provision of housing accommodation for the inhabitants of any area or for any class of habitat 
ants; and, 
Any measure not herein before specifically mentioned, likely to promote public safety, health, 
convenience or general welfare. 
Source: Delhi Municipal Corporation Act. 1994 
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Annexure. A. 24 
FUNCTIONS OF NEW DELHI MUNICIPAL COUNCIL: 
Obligatory Functions Of The Council; 
Subject to the provision of this act and any other law for the time being in force, it shall be 
incumbent on the council to make adequate provisions by any means and measures 
Which it may lawfully use or take, for each of the following matters, namely;-
a- The construction maintenance and cleansing of drains and drainage works for the public latrine, 
urinals and similar conveniences; 
b- The construction maintenance of works and means for providing supply of waters for public and 
private purposes; 
c- The scavenging, removal and disposal of fifth, rubbish and other obnoxious or polluted matters; 
d- The construction or purchase, maintenance, extension, management for-
i-supply and distribution of electricity to the public; 
ii- providing a sufficient supply of pure and wholesome water; 
e- The reclamation of unhealthy localities, the removal of noxious vegetation and generally the 
abatement of all nuisances; 
f- The regulation of places for the disposal of dead and the provision and maintenance of places for 
the said purpose, 
g- The registration of births and deaths, 
h- Public vaccination and inoculation; 
i- Measure for preventing and checking the spread of dangerous diseases, 
j - The establishment and maintenance of dispensaries and maternity and child welfare centers and 
the carrying out of the measures necessary for public medical relief; 
k- The construction, and maintenance of municipal markets and regulation of the markets. 
I- The regulation and abatement of offensive or dangerous trade or practices; 
m- The securing or removal of dangerous buildings and places; 
n- The construction, maintenance, alteration and improvements of the public streets, bridges, 
culverts, causeways and the like; 
0- The lightening, watering and cleansing of public streets and other public places; 
p- The removal of obstructions and projections in or upon streets, bridges and other public places; 
q- The naming and numbering of streets and premises; 
r- The establishment and maintenance of, and aid to, school for primary education subject to such 
grants as may be determined by the central government from time to time; (NDMC covers 
secondary/senior secondary level) 
s- The maintenance of municipal offices; 
t- The laying out or the maintenance of public parks, gardens or recreation grounds; 
u- The maintenance of monuments and memorials vested in any local authority in New Delhi 
immediately before the commencement of this act or which may be vested in the council after 
such commencement. 
V- The maintenance and the development of the value of all properties vested in or entrusted to the 
management of the council; 
w- The preparation of plan for economic development and social justice; 
X- The maintenance including the expansion and up gradation of facilities of the hospitals existing on 
the date of the commencement of this act; 
y- Sanction or refuse erection or re-erection of buildings and 
z- The fulfillment of nay other obligation imposed by or under this act or any other law for the time 
being in force. 
Discretionary Functions of The Council: 
Subject to any general and special order of the government, or the central government from time 
to time, the council may provide either wholly or in part for all or any of the following matters, 
namely-
a- The furtherance of education including cultural and physical education, by measures other than the 
establishment and maintenance of, and aid to, school for primary education; 
b- The establishment and maintenance of, and aid to, libraries, museums, art galleries, botanical and 
zoological collections, 
c- The establishment and maintenance of, and aid to, stadium, gymnasia, akharas and places for 
games and sports, 
d- The planting and care of trees on roadsides and elsewhere; 
e- The survey of building and lands; 
f- The registration of marriages; 
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g- The taking of a census of population; 
h- Ttie provision of housing accommodation for the inhabitants of any area or for any class of 
inhabitants; 
i- The provision of music and other entertainment in public places or places of public resort and the 
establishment of theaters and cinemas; 
j - The Organisation and management of fairs and exhibitions; 
k- The acquisition of movable or immovable property for any of the purposes before mentioned, 
including payment of the cost of investigations, surveys or examinations in relation thereto for the 
construction or adaptation of buildings necessary for such purpose; 
I- The construction and maintenance of— 
i-rest houses, 
ii- poor houses; 
iii- infirmaries; 
iv- children's home. 
V- houses for the dump and deaf and for disabled and handicapped children, 
vi- shelters for destitute and disabled persons, 
vii- Asylums for persons of unsound mind; 
m- The construction and maintenance of cattle's ponds; 
n- The building or purchase and maintenance of dwelling houses for the municipal offices and other 
municipal employees. 
0- Any measure for the welfare of the municipal officers and other municipal employees or any class 
of them including the sanction of loans to such officers and employees and any class of them for 
construction of houses and purchase of vehicles; 
p- The Organisation and management of chemical and bacteriological laboratories for the 
examination and analysis of water, foods and drugs for the detection of diseases or research 
connected with the public health or medical relief; 
q- The provision of relief to destitute and disable persons; 
r- The establishment and maintenance of veterinary hospitals; 
s- The Organisation, construction, maintenance and management of swimming pools, public 
washhouses, bathing places and other institutions designed for the improvement of public health. 
t- The Organisation and management of farms and dairies within or without New Delhi for 
the supply, distribution and processing of milk and milk products for the benefits of the residents 
of New Delhi. 
u- The Organisation and management of cottage industries, handicraft centers and sales emporia. 
V- The construction and maintenance of warehouses and godowns. 
w- The construction and maintenance of barrages, sheds and stands for vehicles and cattle biers; 
x- The provision of unfiltered water supply; 
y- The improvement of New Delhi in accordance with improvement schemes approved by the 
council; 
z- Any measures not hereinbefore specifically mentioned, likely to promote public safety, health, 
convenience or general welfare; 
Source: The New Delhi Municipal Council Act 1994 
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